Title - Commentary on Tattvarth Sutra of Vacaka Umasvati

By - Pandit Sukhalalji

Translated by - Shri K. K. Dixit

FOREWORD

It gives me great pleasure, indeed, in publishing the English translation of Pt. Sukhlalji's Commentary on Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra on the auspicious occasion of 2500th year of Nirvana of Lord Mahavira whose teaching were, probably for the first time, epitomized in Sanskrit by Umasvati.

Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra has attracted the attention of the prominent Jaina Acaryas from the date of its composition (4th-5th Century) upto the modern times. This is the reason why numerous commentaries have been written on it in different periods of time. Hence these commentaries clearly reflect the development of jaina philosophy through all these periods of time. In order to introduce the students to this vast literature Pt. Sukhlalji's had written a commentary both in Hindi and Gujarati. The commentary in Gujarati was published in A. D. 1930, and the same in Hindi was published in V.S. 1996 (A.D. 1939). This Commentary in Gujarati and Hindi has run into many editions. But the English translation of this commentary is being published here by us for the first time. And the credit of this has to go Dr. K. K. Dixit. It is he who translated the work and wrote a brilliant preface entitled 'Tattvarthasutra-A Historical Evaluation. Through this English translation the English-knowing readers will have a glimpse into the deep learning and patient work of Pt. Sukhlalji.

Pt. Sukhlalji has made corrections, additions and subtractions in all the previous editions of the commentary and in the Introduction whenever he found it necessary, and this present edition (in English) too he has made some corrections, additions and alterations. Thus in this English translation we have final views about the author and other allied subjects.

I am most thankful to Pt. Sukhlalji for agreeing to the publication of the English translation of this Commentary on the Tattvarthasutra. Even at the age of 94 he was ready to revise his views.
This is something very rare.

The Jnanodaya Trust established by Pt. Sukhlalji has donated Rs.6000/- for the publication of this work. For this I am grateful to the Trust.

Our thanks are due to Dr.Jesalpura of Swati printing press for bringing out the book within a short period of time.

This translation will be of great benefit to the students of jaina philosophy and religion; and it may even serve as a handbook of Jainism in many respect.

L.D. Institute of Indology
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15th June 1974.

Dalsukh Malvania
Director.

GENERAL CONTENTS

TATTVARTHA SUTRA

A Historical Evaluation

Tattvarthasutra of Umasvati is a compendium of the theoretical positions to several Branches of learning and adopted by the Jainas uptil the author's time which could have c. 3rd-4th centuries A.D. Thus divided into ten chapters it takes up in its first chapter problems pertaining to epistemology , in the second those pertaining to an empirical study of the animate world, in the third and forth those pertaining to mythological cosmography, in the fifth those pertaining to ontology, in the sixth to tenth those pertaining to ethics. particularly noteworthy is the framework it choose to arrange the traditionally received material. For at the very outset of the first chapter it announces that right faith, right cognition and right conduct constitute the three ingredients of what constitute the pathway to moksa (1.1) and then goes on to make clear that right means faith in the seven fundamental verities jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara, moksa (1,2,4)- the rest of the first chapter being devoted to a treatment of cognition-right and otherwise; the remaining nine chapters can be viewed in two alternative ways. Thus one chapters two to five continue the treatment of cognition by telling us as to what might be the possible objects of right cognition while the chapters six to ten undertake a treatment of right conduct; or one might say that the chapters two to five undertake a treatment of the verities jiva and ajiva, the chapter six that of the verity asrava, the chapter eight that of the verity bandha, the chapter nine that of the verities samvara and nirjara, the chapter ten that of the verity moksa (the position of the chapter seven remaining anomalous inasmuch as it in effect party treats a problem related to asrava and party one related to samvara). In any case, one is bound to form the impression that the position that right faith, right cognition and right conduct jointly constitute the pathway to moksa as also the position that right faith means faith in the seven verities jiva, ajiva, asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara, moksa, must have been with the jainas since the very beginning, and yet the fact is that both were very recent positions in Umasvati's time. The two cases might be considered one by one.

Since the very beginning the Jaina authors were discussing as to what type of conduct on a monk's part is conduces to moksa, and in due course they also began to discuss as to what type of conduct on a pious householder's part is conducive to a happy rebirth- there being no question of one attaining moksa without having become a monk; at this later stage it also began to be emphasized that all right conduct presupposes faith in the correctness of the Jaina scriptures- also that one must listen to the Jaina scriptures in order to develop faith in them. A classical popular exposition of this final position occurs in

Uttaradhyayana chapter three where the author mourns that it is very difficult to be born as a man, still more difficult to listen to the Jaina scriptures, still more difficult to develop faith in these scriptures, still more difficult to act in conformity to the teaching of these scriptures. A somewhat technical position of the same position occur in Dasasrutaskandha chapter ten where human beings are ethically gradated inasmuch as some do not even listen to the Jaina scriptures, some listen to them but do not develop faith in them, some develop faith in them but do not act in conformity to them, some develop faith in them and act in conformity to them. Umasvati himself refers to this very position when he declares that right faith might be generated in one either naturally or as a result of being taught (1.3)- the first case being an exceptional type of case while the second being a case where one develops faith in the jaina scriptures as a result of these scriptures being taught to him; so while propounding the thesis that right faith, right conduct jointly constitute the pathway to Moksa he must be meaning by 'right cognition' something different from a mere listening to the Jaina scriptures. However, there was not only no Jaina tradition of thus positing right cognition by the side of right faith, but in view of another position adopted by the jaina theoreticians it was impossible for a Jaina to treat right cognition as a new acquisition over and above right faith. For these-theoreticians came to maintain that whatever cognition one has is a case of false cognition so long as one has no faith in the jaina scriptures while the same automatically becomes a case of right cognition as soon as one has faith in them, a position elucidated by Umasvati himself (1, 32-33.) It is therefore difficult to see what Umasvati means when he speaks as if right cognition is a new acquisition over and above right faith (that he does consider right cognition to be a new acquisition becomes evident from his argument [bhasya on 1.1] that it is possible to have right faith without right cognition but not vice versa). It is suggested that by 'right cognition' Umasvati means a full comprehension of the Jaina scriptures, and that might be so; but the point is that to thus emphasize that a full comprehension of the Jaina scriptures is a condition necessary for the attainment of moksa was no part of the Jaina's theoretical heritage. What seems to have happen is that nearabout the time of Umasvati the Jaina theoreticians became aware of the anomaly that among the Indian philosophers they were almost alone not to recognize right cognition as a means necessary for the attainment of moksa. In view of their specific historical background it was impossible for them not to mention right faith and right conduct in this connection; so they just added right cognition to those two and declared the three to be a joint means of moksa. Of course, when the non-Jaina philosophers declared right cognition to be the sole means of moksa they had an implicit understanding that this right cognition is to be accompanied by something like the Jaina's 'right faith ' and 'right conduct'; but the point was never made explicit. Similarly, when the Jaina philosopher spoke as if right faith and right conduct constitute a joint means of moksa they had an implicit

understanding that these right faith and right conduct are to be accompanied by something like the non-Jaina philosopher's 'right cognition'; but the point was made explicit at so late a stage, and when it was made explicit difficulties arose on account of the rather technical position that right cognition never arises before the rise of right faith while after the rise of right faith it arises automatically.

Similarly, the Jaina authors were obviously and naturally conscious that there was something characteristic about the ideas they were propounding, but they had no tradition of saying that these ideas in their totality stood covered by a definite set of concepts. some move in this direction was made in a passage like Sutrakrtanga, II.5.12-28 and Aupapapatika, I.33 where an impressive catalogue of theoretical Concepts was framed and the point emphasized that it is proper to posit these concepts and improper not to posit them. But subsequently it was realized that such a catalogue of concepts must be standardized in a manageably brief form, and hence came into existence an adjectival phrase describing the theoretical equipment of an ideal pious Jaina householder. The phrase occurs in the course of an account of the ideal pious Jaina householder that first makes its appearance in Sutrakrtanga 2.2.24 and is then repeated in Bhagavati 2.5, Aupapapatika 2.20 and at so many other places. Here the ideal Jaina householder is said to be conversant with the following twelve concepts :

(1) jiva	(2) ajiva
(3) punya	(4) papa
(5) asrava	(6) samvara
(7) vedana	(8) nirjara
(9) kriya	(10) adhikarana
(11) bandha	(12) moksa

All these concepts except kriya and adhikarana also occur in those two earlier lengthy catalogues found in Sutrakrtanga and Aupapatika (the former in fact having akriya instead of adhikarana); moreover, the concept vedana occurring in the Sutrakrtanga catalogue of 12 concepts is missing in the subsequent texts which in fact contain only 11 concepts.* All this apparently jumbled information is relevant for a historical evaluation of the doctrine of nine tattvas (=fundamental verities) inasmuch as this doctrine could not have been current at the time when the text-passages in question were written. For according to this doctrine the entire body of Jaina theoretical positions stands covered by the nine fundamental concepts jiva, ajiva punya, asrava, samvara, nirjara, bandha, moksa, concepts which are invariably present in these passages without attracting any special notice. certainly, the context of these passages makes it clear that if the doctrine of nine tattvas was current at the time when they were written they would have mentioned not these and those concepts they do but just the nine concepts brought to special they do but just the nine concepts brought to special notice by this doctrine. As for this

doctrine itself, it was formulated with a view to satisfying a strongly felt theoretical urge, for now was not the question of cataloguing as many of characteristic Jaina concepts as possible but of cataloguing just those concepts which would cover the entire body of Jaina theoretical positions without being redundant. And hence it was that that catalogue of twelve concepts which was latest to arrive on the scene was subjected to a scrupulous pruning. So far as ontological positions were concerned the two concepts jiva and ajiva obviously took complete care of them, but the remaining ten concepts which had all to do with ethical positions contained redundancies. Here the concept bandha standing for involvement in transmigratory cycle and the concept moksa standing for emancipation from this cycle ------------------------------

* In view of what we are going to say on the subject this omission must have been the result of a careless handling of the text on the part of later copyists.

were understandably of use, but what was needed besides was just one concept standing for what causes bandha and another one standing for what causes moksa. However, certain extraneous considerations necessitated the positing of not two but five concepts besides the fundamental concepts bandha and moksa. thus since fairly olden days asrava was understood as ordinary man's everyday conduct responsible for involvement in transmigratory cycle, samvara for an ideal monk's disciplined conduct responsible for emancipation from this cycle; but in the meanwhile were introduced two new concepts punya and papa, the former standing for good acts bringing about a happy rebirth the later for evil acts bringing about an unhappy one. Now it was felt that the two concepts asrava and samvara had one use, the two concepts punya and papa another; and so all the four were retained besides those fundamental concepts bandha and moksa. The fifth concept nirjara was retained for another special reason. Originally the concepts vedana and nirjara stood organically related and the two were prominently emphasized as a Jaina speciality. Thus the Jainas came to conceive karma as a type of physical stuff that got attached to a man's soul as a result of his good and evil acts and get purged off from this soul after the fruit of these acts was reaped. The process of reaping the fruit of a past act was called vedana, the process of karmic physical stuff purging off from a soul was called nirjara. Since it was believed that moksa cannot come about unless all part karma is purged off the idea was always understood that a monk's ideal conduct works out massive nirjara; but in gradual course it began to be emphasized that penance undertaken by a monk (or anybody) is exclusively instrumental in working out massive nirjara- this type of nirjara being distinguished from the ordinary type resulting from the fruit of a past act being reaped in an ordinary fashion. In the doctrine of nine tattvas nirjara was posited besides samvara because the former was taken to stand for the massive nirjara resulting from a monk's penance, the latter for the mere prevention of new karmic accumulation resulting from his remaining ideal conduct (as also from his penance). It is this understanding that is

behind Umasvati's aphorism 9.2 which says about certain ascetic acts that they bring about samvara and his aphorism 9.3 (cf. 8.24) which says about penance that it bring nirjara as well. This aspect of the matter was so much emphasized by certain theoreticians that they went to the extent of maintaining that the pathway to moksa has for its ingredients not only right faith, right cognition and right conduct but penance as well-a position (for example) taken in Uttaradhyayana chapter 28 which is one of the rare (and presumably late) texts where the doctrine of nine tattvas too makes its appearance. As we have seen, this position would not be endorsed by Umasvati who in addition introduced an amendment in the doctrine of nine tattvas itself. He must have argued to himself that if asrava is what bring about rebirth, punya what brings about a happy rebirth, papa what brings about an unhappy rebirth then punya and papa must be just two sub-species of asrava; hence his elimination of punya and papa from the catalogue of concepts retained by the doctrine of nine tattvas. However, reducing from seven to five the number of the fundamental ethical concepts was not the end of Umasvati's task but its mere beginning. For his real task was to arrange within the framework of the five concepts asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara, moksa the entire mass of old and new ethical discussion he had received in heritage. How he accomplished the task deserves close scrutiny.

Since the very beginning the Jaina authors were speaking of so many evil acts that bring about man's involvement in transmigratory cycle. In gradual course these acts were catalogued cycle. In gradual course these acts were catalogued in several ways, and in one context one catalogue would be held out prominently in another context another one. In his aphorism 6.6 Umasvati makes report about four such catalogues, and an independent perusal of the texts available to him does reveal that all these four catalogues were in a more or less extensive use. Thus here there are passages saying that five avratas bring about karmic bondage, passages saying the same thing about four kasayas, passages saying the same thing about a fivefold indulgence in sense-pleasure, passages saying the same thing about five kriyas (in fact about five pentads of kriyas thus numbering twenty five). True, Umasvati evinces no realization that each of these catalogues had a history of its own; e.g. the Sutrakrtanga, II. 2 discussion on kriya must belonged to a period when no pentad of his was yet formulated while three of this pentads must be so late that no earlier discussion mentions them-they being only recorded in that catalogue. Collection Sthananga Where they must be a recent addition. But in this Umasvati was erring in the company of all our old authors who all lacked a sense of history in almost equal measure. Then in the aphorism under consideration Umasvati speaks not of karmic bondage as such but of the samparayika type of karmic bondage, but for our present purpose that is not a material point. For the samparayika type of karmic bondage was contrasted to the iryapathika type (6.5) which was supposed to be brought about by an ideal monk's everyday acts and whose alleged speciality is

that the fruit concerned is reaped off then and there so that no rebirth is required for this reaping off. But since for our present purpose a karmic bondage that requires no rebirth is no karmic bondages we are justified in supposing that in the aphorism under consideration Umasvati is speaking of karmic bondage as such and not of a particular type of karmic bondage. Another difficulty of Umasvati is more serious. Thus in aphorisms 6.3-4 he tells bad karmas. But if, as we have been just told, all karmic bondage is due to evil acts like avrata, kasaya, indulgence in sense-pleasure, kriya it is difficult to see how any sort of good acts can bring about any sort of good karmic bondage. In aphorisms 6.11-26 the difficulty is solved as if by implication, for there we are about different type and sub-types of karmas that they are bound down through these and those types of acts of which some are obviously remains unsolved inasmuch as one fails to see hoe the good acts thus mentioned are a case of avrata, kasaya, indulgence in sense-pleasure or kriya. in fairness to Umasmati let it however be karma-specialists' treatment of the problem. For even if they pointedly divided karmas into good and bad ones (a division reported by Umasvati in aphorism 8.26) and even if in the aphorisms 6.11-28 Umasvati has simply followed in their very foot-steps their own standard list of acts supposed to bring about karmic bondage has for its items exclusively evil acts as much as that empirically drawn list of Umasvati. For this standard list has for ifs items mithyatva, avirati, pramada, kasaya and yaga (8.1)- where the first four items are of the from of an evil act while the fifth item- meaning an act as such- is ethically neutral and is there to allow for an ideal monk's acts supposed to bring about such karmic bondage as involves no rebirth, It might be pleaded that items in this list are graded in terms of their increasingly less evil character- which is not the case with Umasvati's list; that might be so, but since the items of this list are all of the form of an evil act the difficulty urged against Umasvati's list will remain there in this list too. Nor can it be said that Umasvati was not much seriously interested in the problem of good karmic bondage; for with importance having been attached to the ethical performance of a pious householder this problem had come to the forefront in a big way- it being presupposed that such a performance brings about not moksa (as does an ideal monk's ethical performance) but happy rebirth. That is why the doctrine of nine tattvas posited punya and papa by the side of asrava and samvara, and that is why Umasvati in spite of having eliminated punya and papa from the list of tattvas, deals at length with the ethical performance of a householder; his procedure is revealing in its own manner. Thus he devotes the whole of chapter seven to the problem of vratas-discussing under the title 'mahavrata' an ideal monk's ethical performance, under the title 'anuvrata' a pious householder's ethical performance. That had to be done because his general framework would not allow the twofold problem of vratas to be treated either under the title 'asrava' or under the title 'samvara '- not under the former title because mahavrata was a case of samvara not asrava, not under the title because anuvrata was a case of

asrava not samvara. As for the problem of samvara itself (treated in chapter nine) Umasvati adopts in its case the same procedure as he does in the case of the problem of asrava; that is, here too he makes report about the various catalogues of an ideal monk's disciplined acts supposed to bring about moksa, catalogues that had been drawn in different texts and were more or less old. Thus there was a catalogue of three guptis and five samitis apparently oldest, a catalogue of twenty-two parisahas considerably old, a catalogue of five caritras-not much old; then there was a catalogue of twelve anupreksas and one of ten dharmas which both must have been very recent. In addition there was a catalogue of twofold tapas with further subdivisions-which could have been old but not much so. the problem of nirjara is taken up in 9.47 where we are in effect told that the more ethically upright a man the more massive nirjara he works out- Umasvati's basic understanding on the question being what we have already hinted earlier. The details of how karmic bondage takes place and the details of how moksa takes place involve no problem of principle and stand described in chapters eight and ten respectively. This is how Umasvati arranged within the framework of the five concepts asrava, bandha, samvara, nirjara, moksa, the entire mass of ethical discussion he had received in heritage. The material thus collected was pretty comprehensive and the arrangement to which it was subjected was pretty systematic, but one fault of all this was that the author lacked a historical approach-as a result of which things old, new and intermediate got badly mixed up. But as things stood, what Umasvati has been able to offer us was perhaps the utmost that was possible under circumstances. [As for the material collected in chapters one to five, the author's lack of a historical approach does not affect the over-all situation much -this being why these chapters are an extremely worthwhile introduction to the Jaina positions pertaining to the problems here under discussion].

In the following pages is being offered (besides certain appendices prepared by others) an English version of Pt. Sukhlalji's Hindi-Gujarati translation of and commentry on Umasvati's text as also an English version of his general introduction to this text. Each part of Panditji's performance has its own outstanding merit. Thus his translation of Umasvati's text enables us to unmistakeably follow the wording of this text while his commentary enables us to correctly grasp the purport of what this text says. The commentary in fact incorporates the best that was contained in the old standard commentaries-particularly the Bhasya, Sarvarthasiddhi, Vrtti and Rajavartika. As such this commentary can be used by an elementary student of Jainism as a very good substitute for those old commentaries, by an advanced student of Jainism as a very good stepping-stone to those commentaries. About these old commentaries themselves and their relative merit much detailed and valuable information is conveyed by Panditji himself in the course of his general introduction. however, the chief merit of this general introduction lies in the historical assessment here made of Umasvati's text and of his

personality-as also in the critical comparison here instituted between so many Jaina positions developed by Umasvati and certain parallel positions developed by Umasvati and certain parallel positions maintained in various non-Jaina (i.e. Brahmanical and Buddist) circles.All this can form a very good starting for a serious research work on Jaina positions in general and on those positions as presently by Umasvati in particular.

K. K. DIXIT

THE AUTHOR'S FOREWORD
(From the Hindi Edition of 1952)

The present Explanation of Tattvartha was first published in Gujarati-in 1930 by the Gujarat Vidhyapith (Ahmedabad). A Hindi version of the same was published in 1939 in the form of the first volume of Shri Atmananda-janma-Satabdi-smaraka-granthamala (Bombay). In this version some version had been made in the Introduction; and its editors shri Krishnachandraji and Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania had respectively added to it a word-index and the text of aphorisms along with the available alternative readings. In the Introduction the question of Umasvati's sect was particularly to the Svetambara sect. On the basis of this Hindi version the second edition of the Gujarati Tattvartha was published in 1940 in Shri Punjabhai Jaina Granthamala (Ahmedabad); and with an addition of two or three special elucidations in the Explanation part the third edition of the same was published in the same granthamala in 1949.

The present second edition of the Hindi version including the just mentioned elucidations is being published by Shri Jaina Sanskriti Sanshodhaka Mandala (Banaras).

In the Introduction to the present edition there has been made some new revision based on the available material-as can be noted by comparing this Introduction with that of the earlier edition.

The essential part of the foreword to the first Gujarati edition (1930) is given below in a Hindi translation-from which three things can be chiefly gathered. First, what type of Explanation was originally intended to be written out and in what form was it actually written out in the end? secondly, even if the writing of the Explanation had begun in Hindi why and under what circumstances was it first completed in Gujarati and why afterwards was the whole of this Explanation has published in Gujarati? Thirdly, what type of readership has been had in mind while writing the Explanation , on what basis has it been written and what are its form and style?

The Original Plan :

Some twelve years back when I along with my goodhearted friend Shri Ramaniklal Maganlal Modi B. A. was at Poona we both jointly, after having entertained so many ideas about undertaking literary composition, formulated a clear-cut plan to write out three books. For as the need was felt to teach Jaina philosophy in the pathasalas, hostels and college daily growing in number among both the Svetambara and Digambara sects the demand simultaneously arose for books on Jaina philosophy written in a vernacular language and following a modern style and such as are acceptable to both the sects. In view of this we decided that the two

texts 'Tattvartha' and 'Sanmati' should be supplied with an explanation while a third book should be written independently under the title 'Jaina Paribhasika Sabdakosa' (=A Dictionary of the Jaina Technical Terms). In accordance with this original plan of ours we began work on the explanation to Tattvartha-eleven years back and at Agra.

We began work in accordance with that elaborate plan of ours and the needed collaborators went on becoming available at the spot, but even before they could settle down there they got scattered in various direction like birds in the sky. And subsequently to that in the nest of Agra I was left behind severely alone. The work on Tattvartha that had already been begun-as also the work on other projects- was beyond the capacity of myself alone, but on the other hand the determination that the work in hand has to be completed at any cost whatsoever was such as would allow no rest. Attracted by the prospect of collaboration and the availability of friends I left Agra for Ahmedabad. There I took up work on sanmati and whatever had been written at agra on two or three aphorisms of Tattvartha remained suspended just where it was.

"At Bhavanagar in 1921-22 while I was working on Sanmati the idea of that uncompleted work on Tattvartha would occur to me now and then and would make me a worried man .even if the necessary mental equipment was there but since the needed friendly formulated elaborate I had already set aside that originally formulated elaborate plan; to that extent the burden was no doubt reduced but otherwise the determination to complete the work was absolutely intact. So when on account of indisposition and with a view to taking rest I retired to the village Balukar near Bhavanagar I resumed the work on Tattvartha and having curtailed the elaborate plan related to it, followed a moderate course. During this period of rest the writing was done at various places. Of course, what could then be written out was rather little but an outline-a pattern of the whole work- now got fixed in my mind and a confidence was built up that at some future data I should be able to do the writing even if left alone.

"At that time I would stay and do the writing in Gujarat. The originally formulated plan had already to be curtailed; but the earlier mental impressions never vanish all at once-this psychological rule too was holding me in subjection. So the mental impression pertaining to the Hindi language that had been thought of and employed at agra was yet present in my mind; hence it was that I had started writing in that very language. Thus two chapters were written out in Hindi. But in the meanwhile the wheel of work on sanmati that was so long at rest started turning once more, and on account of its momentum the work on Tattvartha had to be left where it was. There was now no hope of physically continuing with this work, but the mind was neverthless ever more active. some amount of concretized from of it made its appearance two years afterwards at Calcutta during a vacation; and it progressed uptil four

chapters. After that, the mental and bodily it became difficult to carry forward the work on Tattvartha; three years at a stretch thus passed while I was busy with other jobs. During the summer vacation of 1927 I left for Limbdi; then the work on Tattvartha was taken up once more, it made some progress and reached uptil some six chapters. But ultimately I found that it would now be wise to resume work on Tattvartha only after completing that on sanmati. Hence I began working on Sanmati with a redoubled speed. But since I had stayed in Gujarat So long and since that is what the friends suggested I felt that a Gujarati edition of Tattvartha should be published first. This new mental impression was certainly strong while that old one had made me write out as many as six chapters in Hindi. Through I could myself translate Hindi into Gujarati and thought that was also desirable, Yet there was no time for that. But if I wrote the remaining portion in Gujarati what was to be the early portion written in Hindi? And it was no easy task to get hold of a competent translator. All these inconveniences were there, but fortunately an end came to them too. My good-hearted scholar friend Rasiklal Chotalal Parikh translated Hindi into Gujarati and the remaining four chapters I wrote out in Gujarati itself.1

" Thus it was that the determination made eleven years back got fulfilled in the end.

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1. The Hindi translation of these four chapters has been made by Shri Krishnachandraji.

" When the plan was originally formulated to supply an explanation to Tattvartha the idea at the back of it was that there should be made available at one place to a specialist student an account of Jaina philoshopy and Jaina ethics written in an authoritative from and following the order of evolution that has been traversed. The wall created between the specialists on Jaina and non-Jaina philosophies on account of the narrow difference of technical terminologies should break down as a result of a comparative treatment of topics, and the Jaina treasure-house should be enriched through an incorporation of the important principles that have so far been demonstrated and elucidated in the Indian systems of philosophy as also within the body of the western philosophical thought-with these aims in view was an explanation to be supplied to Tattvartha. In this plan there was no room for the translation or summary of just one commentary belonging to either sect; rather it provided not only for the essentials of the so many commentaries in question but also for a summary of the other important Jaina texts. But When this elaborate plan assumed the form of a moderate performance, then the idea that was at the back of it also got somewhat narrowed down. Even so, while working out the present explanatory style which follows a moderate course I have chiefly kept the following things in mind:

(1) Not giving the translation or summary of some one text and not following the views of some one sect to write out the explanation making an impartial use of all that has been so far studied or thought out in connection with Jaina philosophy.

(2) So that it satisfies the curiosity of the students of the universities and colleges and so that it is also liked by the students following the old style of teaching to retain the sectarian technical terminology but to analyes it out by making it simple.

(3) To the extent that it seems proper and is proper to conduct discussion by adopting the dialogue style while in the remaining part to do so in a simple from and without resorting to the dialogue style.

(4) In connection with the explanation to accent just one reading of an aphorism and that too the one accepted by the noticeable, there also to give the aphorism with a deference of meaning is noticeable, there also to give the aphorism with a different meaning and to provide meaning in a footnote1.

(5) To take up at a time one aphorism or many of them as might seem proper from the standpoint of meaning, them to give the meaning, and lastly to offer the explanation. While doing so, if the topic is lengthy then to analyse out the explanation by dividing it into subsections with their respective titles.

(6) To compare the Jaina technical terminology with the non-Jaina-where the comparison is too obvious and avoiding complications.

(7) When on some topic the Svetambaras, the Digambaras, or both hold so many positions then what is to be accepted and what to be left out this decision to be taken independently and without succumbing to the position maintained by some one sect but following What Jaina philosophy or what the aphorist says on the point-in this connection keeping in mind what stands closer to the intention of the aphorist as also the natural limitation of the explanation.

However, though so many things have been kept in mind, even then it is natural that the present explanation should particularly contain portions only from the Bhasya, its Vrtti, Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika. For it is only these texts that offer an elucidation by entering into the heart of an original aphorism. However, from among these too I have given prominence to the Bhasya, for being old and being a composition of the aphorist himself it much reveals the intention of the aphorist.

In the present explanation comparisons are not instituted- as was the part of the original elaborate plan. So with a view to making good this

deficiency to some extent as also with a view to following the interesting present-day style of teaching that gives prominence to comparisons the task of comparison has been undertaken in the Introduction. Outwardly viewing the reader might feel that this work of comparison is too small in extent-that is true, but those making a minute study can see that even if small in extent this comparison is much worthy of consideration. In a comparison worked out in the course of an Introduction there is no scope for lengthy topics and treatments. So the topics worthy of comparison have been first selected out and then in connection with them a comparison has been made with the Vedicist and Buddhist systems-as was possible in this or that case. To facilitate a detailed consideration of these topics reference has been made to the relevant portions of the texts pertaining to the systems concerned. Thus the specialist student will open out for him the path to a perusal of the other systems-this is what I hope."

Some 21 years after the Gujarati Explanation this second edition of the Hindi Explanation is being published. In the meanwhile literature pertaining to Tattvartha has been published in an adequate quantity. As for language it covers Sanskrit, Gujarati, English and Hindi-these four languages. And here too is included not only the publication of old texts but also a multifarious literature of the form of criticism, translation, research and explanation.

Among the old commentary-text the credit for publishing getting published in their entirety both the commentaries on the Bhasya- that by Siddhasena and that by Haribhadra-really goes to Shri Sagaranand Surishvara. He has also published in HIndi a critical essay in which he chiefly discusses the question whether Vacaka Umasvati was Svetambara or Digambar. There have also been published a Gujarati translation of the original aphorisms of Tattvartha by Shri Hiralal Kapadia M. A and a Gujarati translation along with explanation to the chapter one of Tattvarthabhasya by Pt. Prabhudas Bechardas Parekh. A Hindi translation of Tattvartha-which is in fact a literal translation of my Gujarati explanation-has been published by Shri Megharajaji Munot of Phalodhi (Marwar). The Sthanakavasi Muni Atmaramji Upadhyaya (now Acharya) has published two books entitled 'Tattvartha-Jainagama Samanvaya' -one containing the Agamic texts along with a Hindi translation, the other containing the same without a translation.

Shri Ravajibhai Doshi has published from Sonagarh a Gujarati explanation of Tattvartha. Prof. G. R. Jaina's explanation of the chapter five of Tattvartha-undertaken from the standpoint of modern sciences-has been published in english from Lucknow. Srutasagaracarya's commentary on Tattvartha edited by Pt. Mahendrakumarji, a Hindi translation of Tattvartha-sutra by Pt. Lalbahadur Shastri and a Hindi explanation by Pt. Phulchandji have been published from Benaras. Bhaskaranandi's Sukhabobhavrati on Tattvartha-edited. by pt. Shantiraj Shantiraj Shastri

-has been published in the from of the eighty-fourth volume of the Sanskrit serious of the oriental Library publication. This vrtti belongs to the 14th century. And the commentary entitled Tattvartha-Tattvartha-trisutri-prakasika which is written by Shri Vijaya Lavanya Suri and is published in the from of the twenty-second volume of Sri Vijayanemisuri-granthamala is a detailed explanation of the three aphorism utpadavyaya etc. of the chapter five (5.29-31), the Bhasya on these and Siddhasena's commentary on the Bhasya.

A Mention is here made of literature pertaining to Tattvartha that has been published and prepared within the space of the last twenty-one years, so that one might from an idea of how much more widespread now after twenty-one years is the practice of studying and teaching Tattvartha and what are the prospects of its further spread day by day. And how much credit goes to my Gujarati explanation of Tattvartha for the study pertaining to Tattvartha that has been undertaken during these last years within the fold of all the three sects-that is not for me to demonstrate. Even so, I can say this much that the competent authorities from all the three sects have owned my Gujarati explanation to an extent that was beyond my imagination even.

Since the publication of the first Hindi edition of Tattvartha a good number of articles have been published dealing with Tattvarthasutra , its Bhasya, Vacaka Umasvati, the so many commentaries on Tattvartha etc. etc.1 But here I have to say something only about Shri Nathuramji Premi's article. "Vacaka Umasvati ka Sabhasya Tattvarthasutra aur unkasampradaya (=Vacaka Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra along-with -its-Bhasya and his sect) "that has appeared in Bharatiya Vidya, Singhi Smaraka Anka. After a prolonged consideration of the issue he has come out with the view that vacaka Umasvati was a master belonging to the yapaniyas order. Many of his arguments are such as incline one to endorse his view; so with a view to examining this view to examining this view of his a special study of Bhagavati Aradhana along with its commentaries was made by Shri Dalsukh Malvania. Whatever notes he took done as a result of his study have been considered by me too in his company. And undertaking this consideration a necessary perusal was also made of the texts like Bhagavati Aradhana, its commentaries, Brhatkalpabhasya etc. The question was considered with an open mind as far as that possible. And in the long run we both arrived at the conclusion that Vacaka Umasvati was not a Yapaniya but one belonging to the sacela sect (= the sect allowing for the wearing of clothes)-as we have demonstrated in the Introduction. The conclusion of our perusal and consideration is in brief as follows :

(1) If the text Bhagavati Aradhana and its commentator Aparajita both belong to the Yapaniya sect, then the following turn out to the characteristic views of the Yapaniya order on the question of conduct:

(a) The general recommendation of the Yapaniya code of conduct is a renunciation of clothes or nakedness.

(b) In the Yapaniya order just like the monks the nuns too have a room as an aspirant for moksa; and under special circumstances nakedness is recommended for the latter as well.

(c) The Yapaniya code of conduct recommends eating things placed on one's palm and as a general rule it recommends the carrying of no external instrument except a kamandalu (=a bowl-like waterpot carried by the ascetics) and a piccha (=birds feather meant for clearing things and places)

Now these characteristic views do not at all tally with the account occurring in text like Umasvati's Bhasya, his Prasamarati, etc; for these texts clearly speak of a monk's clothes and utensils, nor do they recommend nakedness as a general rule. And as for the external instruments like kamandalu rule. And as for the external instruments like Kamandalu and piccha they are not even mentioned in them

(2) It is also one of the arguments advanced by Shri Premiji that Umasvati's position on the question of the auspicious karma-type etc. is found maintained in Aparajita's commentary. But history of the philosophical positions maintained by the sub-sects and sects reveals that even within the fold of one and the same sect there are often found maintained such general and minor positions are mutually contradictory. Not only that, even two sects considered to be mutual rivals are often found agreeing as to certain general and minor position of this nature. In view of this it should not be surprising if as regards certain positions Umasvati-a supported of clothes-and-untensils- agree with the Yapaniya order -an opponent of clothes-and-utensils.

Pt. Phulchandji, in the Introduction to his explanation of Tattvartha, has endeavored to make out that Grdhrapiccha composed the aphorism and Umasvati the Bhasya. But this endeavor is as much contradicted by logic as it goes against the findings of history. Thus when he says that among the preliminary Karikas there is not a single one which indicates Umasvati to be the author of the aphorism, then it seems that he is so much bent upon established his position seems that he is so much bent upon establishing his position that a clear meaning of words either does not occur to him or is ignored by him. Even ignoring the rest of these Karikas those numbered 22 and 31 are so transparent as to leave not the least doubt about Umasvati being the author of the body of aphorisms and the same being the author of the text devoted to the pathway to moksa.

Tattvarthasutra along with a Hindi translation by Pt.

Kailashchandraji has come out only recently. In the Introduction to it the views expressed by him as to Umasvati's authorship of Tattvarthabhasya and about the date of this Bhasya are such as cannot be treated as authoritative by an impartial historian examining the matter closely. Thus when panditji anywhere comes across a possible reference to the Bhasya being a work of the aphorist or when he comes across a possible reference to the Bhasya in Rajavartika etc. he baselessly surmises that these reference that the Bhasya is a late text. On this question the other Pandits like Pt. Phulchandji etc. too follow the same procedure.

When the first Hindi edition was out of stock and yet the demand for it was on the increase Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, the secretary of the Jaina Samshodhaka Mandal (Benaras) and a friend of mine, was thinking of bringing out a second edition. In the meanwhile he was introduced to the good hearted Shri Rishabhasji Ranka. The latter pressed home the idea at as cheap a price as possible, and he also made arrangement that was neccessary.For this I am thankful to him.

Shri Jamnalalji Jain- the editor of 'Jainajagat'- has done the proof-reading from the beginning uptil end. The press was at Wardha while Shri Malvania was at Benaras- so every thing considered the proof-reading from the proof-reading could have been done with particular convenience only at Wardha, a task which Shri Jamanalalji has performed with all possible attention. For this we are indebted to him.

Since very long I have lost all interest in taking a direct part in the work of re-publishing not only the Hindi Tattvartha but any of my books, booklets or articles in Gujarati or Hindi. For since long I have made up my mind that if for whatever reason what I have so far thought out and written out appears useful to any institution or any set of persons then it is upto them to do for it whatever they have to. Why should I now remain entangled with these articles etc. of mine? And having made up my mind thus I have been devoting to the needed new thinking etc. whatever length of time or energy is yet my lot. In view of this it was not possible at least for me to taken chief of interest in the publication at least for me to taken chief interest in the publication of the second edition of the Hindi Tattvartha. There is no doubt that if the burden was entrusted to me alone then this second edition would have come out never at all.

However, whatever responsibility in this connection was to be imposed on me was imposed on himself by Pt. Shri Malvania-voluntarily and enthusiastically; and uptil the end he also discharged it extremely well. Thus when literature had to be perused to make possible a proper publication of this new edition, when a consideration of issue had to be undertaken with a view to making needed alterations, when other practical problems had to be solved- then all that was needful was done by Shri

Malvania on his own inspiration. Relation between ourselves being what it is I do bot feel like expressing an obligation. Yet I am mentioning these things so that the readers might know the situation for what it is.

This year during summer vacation Shri Malvania came to Ahmedabad chiefly because I was here. Having gone through the necessary literature- new and old- whatever notes he had already taken down were considered by me in his very company and with as much impartiality as was possible; then whatever appeared worthy of reduction, expansion or alteration was duly treated for the sake of this new edition. this edition is now before the inquisitive readers; let them make use of it- as suits their inclination, as suits their understanding.
24-5-51

-Sukhlal

INTRODUCTION

(1) Umasvati-the Author of Tattvarthasutra

Family in respect of birth and family in respect of learning- these are the two type of family.1 Thus when a person's history of birth is to be considered then thought has to be given to the lineage comprising those having blood relationship with this person- that is, his father, grand-father, great grand-father, son, grand-son, great grand-son, on the theoretical text composed by him- is sought to be known then thought has to be given to the preceptorial lineage comprising those having educational relationship with this person -that is, his preceptor, grand-preceptor, great grand-preceptor, disciple, grand-disciple, great grand-disciple.

'Tattvartha' is a theoretical text pertaining to the Jaina branch of the India Philosophical science; so its history comes within the purview of the lineage related to 'family in respect of learning.' what learning the author of 'Tattvartha' has incorporated in his text he has received from

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1. Both these types of family have been well known to the Aryan tradition and the Aryan literature for thousands of years. Since prominence is given in connection with it to the maternal relationship 'family in respect of birth' is dependent on grhastha-asrama- that is, the life-stage characteristic of a householder; on the other hand, since prominence is given in connection with it to the educational lineage. Both the type of family find clear mention at least in the grammatical aphorisms of Panini. Thus we there have Vidyayoni-sambandhebhyo vun-4.3.77. Hence a clear a clear envisagement of these two types of family ought to be much earlier than panini even.

his preceptorial lineage , and with a view to making it specially useful he has given it a particular arrangement in conformity to his own way of looking at things. Of course, the particular arrangement given by him to the learning in question in this text called Tattvartha did not remain unchanged in the subsequent ages. For its specialist students and its commentators have, as per their respective capacities, borrowed much material from the current contemporary traditions and thus improved, augmented, supplemented and developed this thus improved, augmented, supplemented and developed this learning. Hence what need being introduced in this Introduction are not only Tattvartha and its author but also the commentaries on it-grown out of it in the form of a family-creeper- and their respective authors.

Since beginning and upto this day the author of the text called

Tattvarthadhigama has found equal recognition with all the sect developed within the Jaina community. Thus the Digambaras count him as one belonging to theirs. In the Digambara sect he is known by the belonging to their branch , the svetambara as one belonging to theirs. In the Digambara sect he is known by the manes Umasvamin as well as Umasvati while in the svetambara sect the only name current is Umasvati. By some moderns belonging to the Digambara sect Umasvati, the author of the text Tattvartha, is understood to be a disciple of Kunda-Kunda1 while among the Svetambaras the view is somewhat current that 'Svati' belonging to the Harita-gotra who was the preceptor on Syamacarya, the author of prajnapanasutra2. Both these types of position lack on authoritative basis and seem to have been a later growth. For no reliable Digambara text, pattavali, rock-inscription etc. composed earlier than the 10th century contain on the one hand a mention to the effect

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1. See Svami Samantabhadra p. 144 and further.

2. Aryamahagires tu sisyau bahulabalissahau yamalabhr atarau tatra balissahasya sisyah svatith, tattvarthadayo granthastu tatkrta eva sambhavyante, tacchisyah syamacaryah pranjapanakrt srivirat satsapatatyadhikasatatraye (376) svargabhak-dharmasagariya pattavali.

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that Umasvati was the author of Tattvartha and on the other hand one to the effect that the same Umasvati was a disciple of Kundakunda1. All the mentions to this effect that have so far been found in the Digambara literature belong to a period subquent to the 10th-11th centuries and seem to have no old trustworthy basis. And particularly noteworthy is the circumstance that the famous and great Digambara commentators of Tattvartha who flourished from the 5th to 9th centuries nowhere in the course of their commentary avow that Tattvarthasutra is a composition of Umasvati, nor do they mention this Umasvati as a Digambara, a Svetambara or a neutral2. On the other hand, in the Svetambara literature texts written in the 8th century, A.V. contain trustworthy mention to the effect that Tattvarthasutra is a composition of vacaka Umasvati was a Svetambara

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1. The rock -inscriptions from Sravana-belgola which call Umasvati both the author of Tattvartha and a disciple of kundakunda were all composed after the 11th century of the Vikrama era; see 'Jaina Silalekhasangraha' published by the Manikacandar Granthamala, inscriptions numbered 40, 42, 43, 47, 50, and 108.

The Pattavali of the Nadisamgha too, being very incomplete and devoid of historical facts, cannot be relied upon -this has been demonstrated by Pt. Jugalkishoreji in his examination of the matter. See Svami Samantabhadra

p. 144 and further. Hence the mentions available in this Pattavali and in the other such ones cannot treated as historical in the absence of other trustworthy evidences.

Similarly,

tattvarthasastrakartaram grdhrapicchopalaksitam
vande ganindrasamjatam umasvamimunisvaram

this couplet and the other Digambara quotations to the same effect -be they in prose or in verse-are devoid of all trustworthy and old basis; hence they too cannot be put forward as a final support.

2. For a special clarification see the 'Appendix' added to the present Introduction.

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bara 1. However, it exception be made of Dharmasagara's pattavali of the Tapagaccha-composed in the 16th and 17th centuries-then no Svetambara text, pattavali etc. contain even an indication to the effect that Vacaka Umasvati, the author of Tattvarthasutra, was the preceptor of Syamacarya.

It is matter of veritable puzzlement how so much misunderstanding could have become current when there was all the while available that eulogy-to-text appended to Tattvarthasutra, eulogy which composed by Vacaka Umasvati himself, which yields information about his familial as well as preceptorial lineage, which is vitiated by not even a trace of doubt. However, the riddle gets resolved when attention is bestowed on the sectarian befuddlement and the absence of a historical attitude that were characteristic of those older times. Really, for working out the history of Vacaka Umasvati the sole true means placed at our disposal is this brief eulogy composed by himself. Of course, there are numerous other incidents2 regarding which the two sects believe that they took place involving him, but the traditions connected with them are yet to be examined and cannot be taken to be literally true. Here is the eulogy in question followed by a summary of its content.

vacakamukhyasya sivasriyah prakasayasasah prasisyena |
sisyena ghosanandiksamanasyailadasangavidah || 1

vacanya ca mahavacakaksamanamundapadasisyasya |
sisyena vacakacaryamulanamnah prathitakirteh || 2

nygrodhikaprasutena vihatara puravare kusumanamni |
kaubhisanima svatitanayena vatsisutenarghyam || 3

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1. See present Introduction infra.
2. E. g. the Digambara narration related to grdhra-piccha (vulture's feather) and the Svetambara narration related to the composition on his part of 500-texts.
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arhadvacanam samyaggurukramenagatam samupadharya |
duhkhartam ca duragamavihitamatim lokamavalokya || 4

idam ucaair nagaravacakena sattvanukamoaya drbdham |
tattvarthadhigamakhyam spastam umasvatina sastram || 5

yas tattvabhigamakhyam jnasyati ca karisyate ca tatroktam |
sovyabadhasukhakhyam prapsyaty acirena paramarthan || 6

"He whose preceptor in respect of initiation was Ghosanandi-Ksamasramana-an expert in the eleven Anga-texts-and the grand-preceptor-i.e. the perceptor's preceptor-Vacaka-mukhya Sivasri, whose preceptor in respect of teaching- i.e. education-was the Vacakacarya named 'Mula' and the grand-preceptor Mahavacaka 'Mundapada', who was 'khubhisani' by gotra, who was born at Nyagrodhika, and who belonged to the branch 'Uccanagara1-that Umasvati Vacaka, having properly assimilated the supreme preaching of the Arhats -a preaching received through the preceptorial tradition-and having found that people were being miserable with their intellect dulled by the petty scriptural texts, composed this lucid text designated Tattvarthadhigama with a view to doing a favour to the people at large and while on tour in the great city of 'Kusumapura.' Whoever will gain acquaintance with this text designated Tattvartha and will act in conformity to its precepts will soon attain the summum bonum of moksa designated avyabadhasukha (lit. happiness devoid of all disturbance.)".

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1. The branch 'Uccairnagara' has got 'Uccanagara' for its prakrit equivalent. Now it seems obvious that branch was so designated after the name of some village or city. But it is difficult to decide as to what particular village or city this was. In numerous part of India there are numerous cities and villages which bear either the name'nagara' or a name ending in 'nagara'. E.g. 'Bara nagara (Vadanagara)'is an old and famous town of Gujarat. 'Bara' means big and 'big' can perhaps be treated also as a synonym for 'high' (Sanskrit Ucca). But the scholars are also of the view that the name 'Bara nagara' was adopted in Gujarat
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This eulogy contains the following six chief references which bear testimony to the historical situation :

(1) The name of the preceptor-in -respect-of-initiation and that of

the grand-preceptor, also the competence of this preceptor.

(2) The name of the preceptor-in-respect-of-education and that of the grand-preceptor.

(3) Gotra, the father's name, the mother's name.

(4) The name of the place-of-birth and that of the place where the text was composed.

(5) Indication as to the branch and the title.

(6) The name of the author-of-the-text and that of the text.

The eulogy whose summary has been given above and which is now available at the end of the bhasya is no

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in imitation of the same or a similar name borne by some city in the Eastern parts. Hence it cannot be emphatically asserted that the branch Uccanagara has relation with Baranagara itself. Besides, it is also worth considering as to whether at the times when the branch Uccanagara originated Baranagara was or was not in existence go to prove that at the time when the branch Uccanagara has relation with Baranagara does not retain much weight. In this connection Cunningham writes: "This geographical name is akin to that of the fort named 'Uccanagara' situated in the modern district Bulandshahar of the North-Western Province"-see Archeological Survey of India Report, Volume 14, p.147-(re-translated from Hindi-tr.)

In his article devoted to the origin of the nagaras Shri Manashankar, while tracing relationships of the word 'Nagara', mentions numerous villages bearing the name 'nagara'. So that too is a worthy of consideration in the present context-see report of the sixth Gujarati Sahitya Parishad.

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foundation whatsoever. Even a thinker like Dr. Hermann Jacobi takes this eulogy to be a composition of Umasvati himself as can be gathered from the Introduction which he has supplied to his German translation of Tattvartha. So to treat as fact this historical situation here referred to and to examine in the light of that the view traditionally current among the Digambara and Svetambara sects-that is only royal road to truth open for the present.

Of the six reference above pinpointed the first and second demonstrate to be false the Digambara supposition as to Umasvati's relationship with Kundakunda. Of the numerous names available for Kundakunda. Of the numerous names available for Kundakunda there is none which is the same as attributed by Umasvati either to his preceptor in-respect-of-initiation or to his preceptor-in-respect-of-education. So there remains no scope whatsoever for the supposition that there obtains between Umasvati and Kundakunda the preceptor-disciple relationship either

in Vacakatradition or in respect of education. Similarly, this enlogy clearly mentions Umasvati as belonging to the Vacakatradition and to the branch Uccanagara while it is a Digambara view that Kundakunda belonged to the Nandisamgha1; and there has been no information up to Nandisamgha1; and there has been no information up to date that a branch designated sect. So ever flourished within the fold of the Digambara sect. So even if Kundakunda be a historical figure the idea that it is he who composed the text designated Tattvarthadhigama, since it lacks a trustworthy basis, seems to be a later fabrication2.

The third of the above reference demonstrate to be false the Svetambara supposition as to Umasvati relationship with Syamacarya; for Vacaka Umasvati, by calling himself

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1. See svami Samantabhadra p. 158 and further also Appendix to the present Introduction.
2. See the present Introduction, p.17, footnote 1; also Appendix to the present Introduction.

'Kaubhisani', indicates that his gotra was 'Kaubhisana' while Svati mentioned in the pattavali as 'Syamacarya's preceptor has been said to belonged to the gotra Harita1. Besides, the author of Tattvartha is clearly mentioned as 'Vacaka' in the eulogy on the one hand refutes the mistaken notions that had been traditionally current among the Digambaras and the Svetambaras while on the other hand it presents a brief but true history of the author of our text.

(a) The Date of Vacaka Umasvati :

The above eulogy says nothing about the date of Vacaka Umasvati, nor is yet there at our disposal some other material that might enable us to following there things are being made use of with a view to giving some consideration to the problem in question.

(1) The mention of the branch.
(2) The date of the older commentators.
(3) A comparison with the other philosophical texts.

(1) It is difficult to say definitely as to when the branch mentioned in the eulogy as 'Uccairnagara Sakha' originated; yet the Sthaviravali pertaining to Kalpasutra does mention a branch designated 'Uccanagari'2. This branch originated from Arya Santisrenika. Now Arya Santisrenika belonged to the fourth generation coming after Arya Suhasti. Thus Arya Suhasti had for his disciples Susthita-Supratibuddha, the latter for

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1. hariyaguttam saim ca vamdimo hariyam ca samajjam 26-Sthaviravali pertaining to Nandi-sutra.
2. therehi into nam ajjasamtiseniehimto madharasaguttehimto ettha nam uccanagari saha niggaya. -Mula Kalpasutra-sthaviravali, p.55

For the earlier lineage Santisrenika see the preceding pages of Kalpa-sutra.

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there disciple Indradinna, the latter for his disciple Dinna, the latter for his disciple Santisrenika. In his turn this Arya Santisrenika was the preceptor of Arya Vajra and a co-disciple of Arya Silhagiri; hence he belongs to the first generation preceding Arya Vajra 584 years after Mahavira. And it is found mentioned that Arya Suhasti died 291 years after Mahavira, Arya Vajra 584 years after Mahavira. That is to say, within the period of 293 years that intervened in between the death of Arya Suhasti and that the Arya Vajra there are found to have flourished five generations in all. Thus on roughly assigning a period of sixty years for each generation it out that Santisrenika who belonged to the fourth generation coming after Suhasti began his career 471 years after Mahavira. At about this time- may be somewhat earlier or somewhat later- the branch Uccanagara might have originated from Santisrenika. However, ever while assuming that Vacaka Umasvati belonged to the branch Uccanagara originating from Santisrenika and even while accepting the date that has been conjectured for its origination it is difficult to say as to how long after this origination it is difficult to say as to how long after this origination of the branch Vacaka Umasvati actually flourished! For the names attributed in the eulogy by him to his preceptor-in -respect-of-initiation and his preceptor-in-respect-of-education-neither of them is to be found in the Sthaviravali pertaining to Kalpasutra or in any other similar Pattavali. So if anything has to be said about the date of Umasvati on the basis of the Sthaviravali in question the utmost will be that he flourished near about 471 years after Mahavira-that is, near about the beginning of the vikrama era- and not earlier. All further information in this connection is still in the dark.

(2) A ray projecting some obscure light in this darkness is represented by the date of the old commentaries the were written on Tattvartha, a date imposing a hitherto undefined later limit to the date of Umasvati. For if exception be made of the Bhasya which is of the from of an autocommentary then Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujyapada turns out to be the oldest among the presently available direct commentaries on Tattvarthasutra. Now the date of Pujyapada has been determined by the scholars to be the 5th -6th centuries A. V. So on the basis of that we can say that Umasvati flourished at some period before the 5th century A.V.

In accordance with the above manner of consideration the earliest date appropriate for Vacaka Umasvati turns out to be the 1st century A.V. The task of locating the definite date of Umasvati within this period of 300-400 years remains to be undertaken.

(3) Certain particular points emerge also from instituting a comparison between Tattvartha and its Bhasya on the one hand and the other

philosophical systems and the Jaina Agamas on the other, points likely to be of use in solving the problem of date that is at hand as also in further research work. These points are being put forward in the following. Of course, they are not such as can directly help us today in determining the correct date that is under search, but there is no doubt that in case other powerful evidences become available then they too on their part can render valuable help of their own. For the present, however, these points only lead us towards that very date which was conjectured just above.

(a) The Jaina Agamic text 'Uttaradhyayana' ought to be earlier that the aphorisms of Kanada-this possibility emerges from a consideration of the tradition as also in certain other ways. It is mostly maintained that the aphorisms of Kananda were composed in the 1st century B.C. Now among the aphorisms of Tattvartha composed on the basis of the Jaina Agamas, there are three are such as betray besides a reflection of Uttaradhyayana a kinship with certain aphorisms of Kanada. Of these three the first pertains to the definition of dravya, the second to that of guna, the third to that of kala.

Thus in the gatha 6 of the adhyayana 28 of Uttaradhyayana the definition of dravya is merely to the effect : gunanamsao davvam = gunanam asrayo dravyam (= dravya is that which is the support of gunas). On the other hand, samavayikaranata in addition to guna and thus says: kriyagunavat samavayikaranam iti dravyalaksanam-1.1.15 (=dravya is that which ia possessed of guna, is possessed of kriya, and is a samavayikarana). NOw Vacaka Umasvati, while retaining the word 'guna' occurring in the definition of Uttaradhyayana, replaces the word 'kriya' occurring in Kanada's aphorism by the word 'paryaya' well know in th Jaina tradition and thus formulates the definition of dravya in the from "gunaparyayavad dravyam "-5.37 (= dravya is that which is possessed of guna and is possessed of paryaya1).

In the gatha 6 of the adhyayana 28 of Uttaradhyayana the definition of guna is to the effect egadavvassia guna=ekadravyasrita gunah (= gunas are those which stand supported in one dravya). On the other hand, Kanada's definition of guna is particularly elaborate; thus it says:

"dravyasrayy agunavan samyogavibhagesv akaranam anapeksa iti gunalaksanam "-1.1.6 (= guna is that which stands supported in a dravya, is devoid of guna, is not an independent cause of samyogavibhaga). Now within the body of Umasvati's definition of guna there occurs besides the Uttaradhyayana definition of guna also the element nirguna which is a feature of Kanada's definition of guna; thus he says : " dravyasraya nirguna gunah" -5.40 (= gunas are those which stand supported in dravya and are devoid of guna).

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1. For particular information concerning the definition of dravya see Pramanamimamsa bhasatippana p.54; Introduction to Nyayavataravarttika

vrtti, p.25, 104, 119,

In the gatha 10 of the adhyayana 28 of Uttaradhyayana the definition of kala is merely to the effect " vattanalakkhano" =vartanalaksanah Kalah (= kala is that which is of the nature of perduration). As fro Kanada's definition of kala it does not contain the word 'vartana' but it does contain the word 'apara' among others; thus it says : "aparasminparam yugapacciram ksipram iti Kalalingani " -2.2.6. Now in Umasvati's definition of kala 'paratva' and 'aparatva' are two among the words that occur there besides the word 'vartana'; thus he says : " vartana kriya paratvaparatve kalasya".- 5.22.

The above quoted three aphorisms of Tattvartha laying down the definition of dravya,guna and kala do not receive from the ancient Svetambara Agamic text-that is, from an Anga- as much verbal support as they do from Uttaradhyayana. However, with the Prakrti utterances of Kundakunda supposed to have flourished in the 1st-2nd centuries A. V. -the Sanskrit aphorisms of Umasvati bear at times complete similarity, at time very little. For example, the Svetambara reading of the aphorisms contains just two aphorisms devoted to a definition of dravya viz. " utpadavyadhrauvyayuktam sat" -5. 29. "gunaparyayavad dravyam "- 5.37. but the Digambara reading of aphorisms contains besides these a third aphorism devoted to the same, viz. "sad dravyalaksanam"-5.29. Now all these three aphorisms belonging to the Digambara reading are present in their entirely in the following Prakrt gatha of kundkunda's Pancastikaya-

davvam sallakkhaniyam uppadavyadhuvattasam juttam |
gunapajjayasayam va jam tam bhannamti savvanhu || 10 ||

Besides, the verbal and conceptual similarity that obtains between Tattvarthasutra on the other can in no way be accidental.

The author of the presently available Yogasutra is understood to be Patanjali, but it is not yet ascertained as to whether patanjali, the author of Vyakarana- Mahabhasya, is or is not the same person as the author of Yogasutra. If Patanjali who composed Mahabhasya is the same person who composed Yogasutra then it can be said that the Yogasutra is a work belonging to the 1st-2nd centuries before VIKRAMA. It too is not certain as to when Vyasa's Bhasya on Yogasutra was composed, but, there is no reason to treat it as having originated earlier that the 3rd century A. V.

Between Yogasutra and its bhasya on the one hand and the aphorisms of Tattvartha and the bhasya thereon on the other the verbal and conceptual similarity is very close and it is attractive too.1 Even so, it is not possible to say definitely that either of these is influenced by the other. For the aphorisms of Tattvartha and the Bhasya thereon are in possession of the heritage received from the Jaina Agamic texts that are

earlier than Yogadarsana (= Yogasutra) even; similarly, Yogasutra and its bhasya are in possession of the heritage received from the ancient traditions like Sankhya, Yoga, Buddhist etc. Nevertheless, there is one discussion in Tattvartha which is not at present available in the Jaina Anga-texts and is yet available in the bhasya on Yogasutra.

The life-quantum earned earlier can be reduced- that is, can be interrupted in the middle- and also not be reduced-a discussion pertaining to this problem is found in the Jaina Anga-texts. But by way of supporting the view which concedes the possibility of the interruption in question the illustrations of wet cloth and dry hay have not been offered in the Anga-texts; on the other hand, in connection with this discussion these illustrations have been offered in the bhasya on Tattvartha and the same has been done also in the bhasya on Yogasutra. The beauty of the illustrations is that verbal similarity obtaining between the two bhasyas is extremely close. Another speciality noteworthy in this connection-

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1 For a detailed treatment of the question see the Introduction to my Hindi Yogasutra, pp.52 ff.

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is that the Tattvarthabhasya has also got a third illustration, viz. one pertaining to arithmatic that is not found in Yogasutra-bhasya. The wordings of the two bhasyas are respectively as follows.

Tattvartha

".. Sesa manusyas tiryagyonijah sopakrama nirupakramas capavartyayuso napavartyayusas ca bhavanti /.. apavartanam sighram antarmuhurtat Karmaphalobhogah, upakramo' pavartananimittan /.... <u>samhatasuskatrnarasidahanavat / yatha hi samhatasya suskasyapi trnarser avayavasah kramena dahyamanasya cirena daho bhavati pavanopakramabhihatasyasudaho bhavati</u>/tadvat/ yatha/ va sankhyanacaryah karanalaghavartham gunakarabhagaharabhyam rasim chedad evapavartayati na ca sankhyeyasyarthasyabhavo bhavati tadvad upakramabhihato maranasamudghatadhukhartah karmapratyayam anabhogapurvakam karanavisesam utpadyaphalopabhogalaghavartham karanasamudghataduhkhartah karmapratyayam anabhogapurvakam karanavisesam utpadya phalopabhogalaghavartham karmapavartayati na casyat/ <u>yatha va dhautapato jalardra eva samhatas cirena sosam upayati sa eva ca vitanitah suryarasmivayvabhihatah ksipram sosam upayati na</u>
ca samhate tasmin prabhutasnehagamo na pi vitanite krtsnasosah tadvat yathoktanimittapavartanaih karmanah ksipram phalopabhogo bhavati / na ca krtapranasakrtabhyagamaphalyani "

-Tattvarthabhasya 2, 52

Yogasutra

"ayarvipakam karma dvividham sopakramam nirupakramam ca/ tatra <u>athardram vstram vitanitam hrasiyasa kalena susyet tathasopakramam/yatha</u>

ca tad eve sampinditam cirena samsusyed evam nirupakraman/ yatha vagnih suske kakse mukto vatena samantato yuktah ksepiyasa kalena dahet tatha sopakraman| yatha va sa evagnis trnarasau kramaso' avayavesu nyastas cirena dahet tatha nirupakramam /tadaikabhavikam ayuskaram karma dvividham sopakramam nirupakramam ca/"

-Yogabhasya 3, 22

Aksapada's 'Nyayadarsana' (=Nyayasutra) is understood to have been composed nearabout the beginning of the Christaian era. Vatsyayana's bhasya on it one of the earliest works belonging to the Bhasya-period characterristic of this text are found in Tattvartha-bhasya. E.g. the doctrine of four pramanas advocated by Nyaya-drasana is referred to in the bhasya on Tattvartha 1.6 and 1.35.1

In the bhasya on Tattvartha 1.12 the refutation of the alleged pramanas arthapatti, sambhava, adhava, etc. is similar to that found in Nyaya-darsana (2.1.1) etc. The Nyayadrasana definition of pratyaksa countains the phrase " indriyarthasannikarsotpannam" (1.1.4); the same has been employed in the bhasya on Tattvartha 1.12. While seeking to incorporate within the fold of matijnana and srutajnana the allegedly independent pramanas like arthapatti etc.; thus we read there

"sarvanyetani matisrutayor antarbhutani indriyarthasannikarsanimittatvat/"

Similarly, the mannerism of employing the word 'anarthantara' instead of 'paryaya' (both meaning synonym) is found in Tattvartha 1.13. just as it is found in patanjali's Mahabhasya and Nyayadarsana (1.1.15).2

The views and words characteristic of the branches of Buddhist philosophy like Sunyavada, vijnanavada etc. are not found in Tattvarthabhasya as they are found in Sarvarthasiddhi; even so, certain common views of BUddhist philosophy are here referred to at one or two places in the form of

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1 " pratyaksanumanopamanasabdah pramanani " -Nyayadarsana, 1,1,7

" caturvidham ity eke nayavadantarena " -Tattvarthabhasya, 1,6 and

" yatha va pratyaksanumanopamanaptavacanaih pramanair eko' rthah pramiyate," -Tattvarthabhasya, 1, 35.

2 See Mahabhasya on 1.1.56; 2.3.1 and 5.1.59.

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views upheld by an alien system. Whether these views have been borrowed from the Pali-pitaka or from text with same topic-that is worth considering. Of such views the first mention has been made while giving out what according to the Jainas is the number of Naraka-bhumis and in this connection rejecting the corresponding number suggested by the Buddhists; we thus read

" api ca tantrariya asamkheyesu lokadhatusvasankhyeyah prthiviprastara ity adhyavasitah. "

- Tattvarthabhasya. 3, 1.

And the second mention has been made while giving out what according to the Jainas' is the definition of pudgala and in this connection rejecting the meaning attributed to the word 'Pudgala' by the Buddhists; we thus read:

pudgalan iti ca tantrantariya jivan paribjasante.

-Introductory bhasya to 5.23.

(b) THe Competence of Umasvati

Had not the Jaina masters preceding Umasvati developed the capacity to write in Sanskrit and had they not already struck the path of writing in that language, could then too Umasvati knit out in so lucid a Sanskrit style the sectarian views that had been traditionally elaboarated is a question; but the history of the entire presently available Jaina literature does on its part declare that the first among the Jaina

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1 Though in the Jaina Agama (Bhagavati 8.3 and 20.2) the word 'pudgala' has also been used as meaning jiva (= living being), yet in the technical terminology of Jaina phillosophy it is current only as meaning the inanimate atoms and the aggreates made therof; On the other hand, in the technical terminology jiva. It is keeping this diffrence of view in mind that the Vacaka here speaks of tantrantariya (= one upholding an alien system).

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masters to write in sanskrit is Umasvati himself. The lucid, terse and flawless style of his works stands withess to his mastery over Sanskrit language. The brief colloction presented by him in the Tattvarthadhigamaa-sutra of the views related to epistemology, ontology, ethics, georgraphy, astronomy etc. that hae been developed in the Jaina Agama testfies to the fact that he belonged to the family of Vacakas (lit. the studious ones) and the family of 'Vacaka' borne by him was meningful. The introductory verses of Tattvartha as also his other verse-compsitions indicate that he was an accomplished suthor of verse as of prose. A minute perusal of his aphorisms along with the bhasya thereon reveals his close, all-comprehensive study of the Jaina Agama as also his close study of the philosophical literaining to the systems like Vaisesika, Nyaya, Yoga, Buddhist etc. The grammatical aphorisms qupted by him in Tattvartha bhasya (1.5; 2.15) testify to his close study of panini's grammar.

Though in the Svetambara sect is famous as an author of 500 words1 and though at present certain works are even current as his alleged writing, yet we are not in possession of material that might enable us ot say something one can definitely say that 'Prasamarati' is a work by Umasvati2- as is evident from its language and its line of

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1. Jambudvipa Samasa-prakarana, Puja-prakrana, Sravaka-pranjnapti, Ksetravicara, Prasamarati. Siddhasena in his Vrtti (p.78, line 2) refers to his work named Sauca-prakrana which is however not available at present. 2.Siddhasena, the suthor of the Vrtti speaks of 'Prasamarati' as a work by the suthor of the bhasya. E.g.-

"yatah prasamaratau (ka. 208) anenaivoktam-paramanur apradeso, varnadigunesu bhajaniyah ", " vacakena tv etad eva balasanjnaya prasamaratau (ka.80) upattam." Bhasya Vrtti on 5.6 and 9.6

And goes without saying that in Siddhasena's eyes the author of the aphorisms and that of the bhasya are one and the same person,
E.g. " svakrtasutrasannivesamasrityoktam."-9.22

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thought, as also from the relevant references made by Siddhasena etc.

Umasvati calls himself 'Vacaka;' understanding this term to mean 'Purvavit' (= a connoisseur of purva-texts) the Svetambara masters have, since quite an early period, been taking Umasvati to be a purvavit.1

In the Digambara tradition too he has been called a sruta kevalidesiya (= a part-connoisseur of the scriptures.1

"its Srimadarhatpravancane tattvarthadhigame umasvativacakopajnasutrabhasye bhasyanusarinyam ca tikayam siddhasenaganiviractayam anagaragaridharmaprarupakah saptamo'dhyayah."
Umasvati's sect.

The Karika 120 of prasamarati has been quoted in Nisitha-curni after sayong 'acarya aha.' The date of Jinadasa Mahattara, the author of this surni, is the 8th century A. V- as has been mentioncd by him self in his curni, is Nandi-sutra; and on the basis of that one can say that Prasamarati is a specially old work. For this reason-as also for those given above- it might well be the case that 'Prasamarati' is a work by our Vacaka.

1. That the Purva-texts are fourteen in number- this information has been conveyed in the Agamic-texts Samavayanga etc. It too has been mentioned that constituted the fifth section of the twelfth Anga named Dr. stivada. The traditional view is that purva-sruta means the preaching delivered by Lord Mahavira first of all. On the other hand, the western scholors have in this connection surmised that the earlier mass of scriptures belonging to the tradition of Lord Parasvanatha which Lord

Mahavira and his disciples received in heritage is what is called purva-sruta. Gradually, this scriptural mass got mixed up with that originating from Lord Mahavira and began to be counted as a part of the latter. Obviously, therefore, those were conversant with this purva-sruta. However, since it used to be retained in oral memory alone as also for other reasons the purva-sruta gradually got lost and is to-day found quoted only as a nominal remnant in the form of a purvagata-gatha-that is, a stray verse that originally belonged to a purva text. Moreover, we have got have several works composed on the basis of a purva-text.

His work Tattvartha well acquaints us with his scriptural knowledge pertaining to the eleven Anga-texts, and so there remains no doubt whatsover as to his this much competence. All the tents upheld in the Jaina scriptures received by him in heritage have been complied by him in Tattvartha1- without leaving unmentioned even a sigle topic that might appear Umasvati as the to most among the authors of a compendium.2

Again, it is on account of this competence of his that so many Svetambara and Digambara masters have been impelled to write a commentary on Tattvartha.

(c) The Sect of Umasvati

The Digambaras, treating Vacaka Umasvati as one belonging to their own sect, accept as his composition just one work Tattvartha-Sutra; on the other hand, the Svetambaras, treating him as one belonging to their own sect, accept as his composition not only Tattvartha-sutra, but also the basya on it. Now the question arises as to which sect-the Digambara, the Svetambara or some third one -Umasvati actually belonged to. The question gets answered once it is decided as to who wrote the bhasya in question. And that the bhasya is a work by Umasvati himself is incontrovertibly proved on the grounds stated below.3

(Foot-note on last time of p. 32)

A Digambara rock-inscription -one numbered 46- received from the the Nagara taluk calls him Srutakevali-desiya, this as follows:

tattvarthasutrakartaram umasvatimunisvaram/
srutakevalidesiyam vande'ham gunamandiram//

1. For the scriptural origin of the topics dealt with in Tattvartha see Tattvartha-Jainagama-Samanvaya edited by Upadhyaya Atmaramji.

2, 'upomasvati sangrahitarah - Siddhahema, 2.2.39

3. See Shri premji's essay in the Singhi Memorial Number of 'Bharatiya Vidya', p.128.

He too has demonstrated that the bhasya is a work by the author of the aphorisms himself.

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1. Among the available commentaries on the bhasya the oldest is that by Siddhasena. And the following mentions made in it presuppose that the author of the bhasya is the same as that of the original aphorisms.

"pratijnatam canena, jnanam vaksyamah' iti / atas tad anurodhenaikavacanam cakara acaryah", part I, p. 69

" sastri ca granthakara eva dvidha atmanam vibhaajya sutrakara-bhasyakarenaivam aha. ", p. 205.

" iti srimadarhatpravacane tattvarthadhigame umasvativacakopajnasutrabhasye bhasyanusarinyam ca tikayam. ", part 2,II, p.120.

2. The eight from among the concluding verses of the bhasya has been quoted by Yakinisunu Haribhadracarya in his astravartasamuccaya as a composition by Umasvati.

3. Even Acarya Devagupta in the course of his commentary on the intial verses that from a part of the bhasya itself indicates that the bhasya and the original aphorisms come from the same author. See verses 1 and 2.

4. Within the body of the initial verses1-as also at certain other places in the bhasya2-there occur yerbal froms " vaksyami (I shall speak)' etc. in the first person, and in a subsequent aphorism things have been said in conformity to the promise thus made.

5. While one peruses the bhasya from beginning to the end one thing strikes one's mind viz. that nowhere are far-

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1. tattvarthdhigamakhyam bahvartham sangraham laghurantham |
vaksyami sisyahitam imam arhadvacanaikadesasya ||22||

narte ca moksamargad vratopadeso'sti jagati Krtsne'smin |
tasmat param imam eveti moksamargam pravaksyami ||31||

2. 'gunan laksanato vaksyamah' -the bhasya on 5.37, the concerned subsequent aphorism 5.40 " anadiadimams ca tam parastad vaksyamah"- the bhasya on 5.22, the concerned subsequent aphorism 5.42. fetched meanings attributed to the words of an aphorism, nowhere has been a doubt espressed or alternatives fromulated while giving out the meaning of an aphorism, nowhere has been an aphorism explained keeping in mind an earlier commentary on the same, and nowhere has been an alternative reading adopted fro an aphorism.

The state of affairs justifies the iedea so long current1 that the aphorisms and the bhasya thereon come from the same author. Certainly, such state of affairs does not obtain in the case of such texts dealing

with philosophical matters as are well established and have found recognition with a number of sects. Take for example, the text 'Brahmasutra' well estab;ished within the fold of Vedicist philosophy. Had its author been also a commentator of it then the far-fetched constructerize a bhasya on it would never have been possible. Similarly, had the author of Tattvartha-sutra also written a commentary such as 'Sarvarthasiddhi', 'Rajavartika', 'Slokavartika', or the like, then too the attribution of far-fectched meanings, distortion of words, words superadded from one's own side, doubt as to an explanation, alternative reading of an aphorism2- which all are found in these commentaries would never have been possible.

All these can be well understood by having a glance at texts in whose case the author of the original and that of a

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1. Agastyasimha in his Curni on Dasakaliya quotes Sutra and Bhasya giving the name of the author Umasvati p. 85 In Nayacakra-text the Bhasya is quoted, p. 596, and its Tika also quoted Sutra and Bhasya, p.17, 114, 596. The Nayacakra is dated Vikram 484, see Introduction by Muni Jambuvijaya p.60.

2. See example, Sarvarthasiddhi "caramadeha iti va pathah"-2, 53 "athava ekadasa jine na santiti vakyasesah kalpaniyah sopaskaravatsutranam"-9, 11. and "lingena kena siddhih? avedatvena tribhyo va vedabhyah siddhir bhavato na dravyatah, dravyatah pumlingenaiva athavanirgranthalngena sagranthalingena va siddhir bhutapurvanayapeksaya"-19, 9.

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commentary are definitely known to have been identical. So much consideration leaves us with the definite conviction that the suthor of our aphorisms and that of its bhasya are one and the same person.

An ascertainment to the effect that the author of the aphorisms and that of its bhasya are and the same person is of much help in answering the question as to which sect this author belonged to.

The following arguments are adequate to yield the conclusion that Umasvati did not belong to the Digambara sect.

(1) There is not a single proof to substantiate the suggestion that a branch named Uccanagara or Nagara-the branch mentioned in that eulogy-ever pertained to the Digambara sect.

(2) The aphorism (5.38) To the effect that kala is a real substance according to some, as also the account of it given in the bhasya, stand opposed to the Digambara view of the matter (5.39). Again, the simple view maintained in the bhasya (9.11) that eleven parisahas pertain to a kevalin and the clear mention made in the same of clothes, utensils etc. equally go against the corresponding traditional Digambara positions-9.5,

9.7, 9.26. Lastly, while treating of a siddha what is said bhasya in connection with the items linga and tirtha is opposite of what the Digambara sect would maintain in this connection.

(3) The difference of opinion as to the presence in a kevalin of another type of upayoga besides kevalajnana-a diffrence of opinion referred to in the bhasya (1.31) is not found in the Digambara texts.

The above arguments go to prove that Vacaka Umasvati did not belong to the Digambara sect, yet it remains to be seen as to which sect he in fact belonged to. The following arguments would tend to make out that he belonged to the Svetamber sect.

(1) The branch Uccanagari mentioned in the eulogy is found referred to in a svetamber pattavali.1

(2) Even while evincing diffrence of opinion-or even opposition-in connection with a particular view mentioned in the bhasya there have no ancient or modern Svetambara masters who- like their Digambara counterparts-have altogether denied recognition to this text.

(3) In a text like prasamarati2- whose authorship on the part of Umasvati admits of not the slightest doubt- there occurs a systematic account of a monk's clothes and utensils, as account acceptable to the Svetambara sect without dispute.

(4) The mention of the lineage Vacaka to which Umasvati belonged as also that of other masters belonging to the same are found in the Svetambara pattavalis, pannavana and the Sthaviravali pertaining to Nandi.

These arguments demonstrate that Umasvati belonged to the Svetambara sect, and all the Svetambara masters up to date have been already treating him as one belonging to their own sect. My own understanding that Vacaka Umasvati belonged to the Svetambara sect and not to the Digambara has remained unshaken after much reading and pondering over the matter. With a view to reading this understanding particularly clear light ought to be thrown on certain question related to the history of the Digambara-Svetambara split. The first question is as how far back goes the ancient root of the Digambara-Svetambara difference or opposition as to the validly of a scriptural mass or an item of conduct-also as to what was the issue around which this ancient root was centers. The second question is as to whether there ever was a mass of scriptural texts commonly acceptable to both these sects and if there was one how long it continued to receive allegiance of both- also as to when a difference of opinion arose on this question and when as a

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1.See the present Introduction, p. 19 and 22.

2.See karikas 135 onwards.

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result of this difference there came into existence such scriptural mass as was wholly acceptable to one sect and wholly unacceptable to the other. The third and the last question as to the code of conduct characteristic of which sect was observed by Umasvati himself and as to whether the scriptrual mass on whose basis Tattvartha was composed was wholly acceptable to both the sects in question or it was wholly acceptable to one of them and wholly unacceptable to the other.

(1) Whatever historical material has been available uptil now indisputably makes it clear that Lord Mahavira belonged to the tradition of the Parsvites1 (lit. descendents of Parsva) and that through his own personality tempered by a journey on the path of sever renunciation he imparted a new life to the path of severe renuciation he imparted a new life to the hitherto customary loose or moderate path of renunciation.1 A number of Parsvite monks and subsequently joined the order of Lord Mahavira.2 In conformity to his liberal yet truth-oriented outlook-befitting a leader- Lord Mahavira provided definite room in his order for both the parties in question3-viz. to one that stark naked and pursued a severe code of conduct and ot one that did not

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1. Acarangasutra, Sutra 178.

2. Kalasavesiyaputta (Bhagavati 1.9), Kesi (Uttaradhyayana, Adhyayana 23), Udakapendhalaputta (Sutrakrtanga, 2.7), Gangeya (Bhagavati 9.32) etc. For details see Utthana Mahaviranka p.58. Certain parsvites went to the extent of accepting even nakedness along with the five Mahavratas and Pratikramana- information to his effect is yet preserved in the Anga-texts; for example, see Bhagavati 1.9

3. In Acaranga we find an account of both the types of monks-viz. those who put on clothes and those who went without them. For an account of the monks who went without clothes see the sutras 183 onwards of the sixth adhyayana of the first Srutaskandha; for the rules of conduct pertaining to clothes binding on the monks who put on clothes see the fifth adhyayana of the second Srutaskandha. And an interesting account of how a monk- whether putting on clothes or going without them -should gain victory over delusion is given in Acaranga 1.8.

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go entirely naked and pursued a moderate code of conduct. These two parties two pursued a moderate code of conduct. These two parties had among themselves difference on the question of going naked or otherwise as also on a few other question of conduct,1 yet on account of the personality. It is in this old synthesis of the severe and moderte paths of renuciation that there lies the root of the Digambara-Svetambara split.

In that older time there were not current in the Jaina tradition words like Digambara, Svetambara etc. Yet words indicative of a diffrence in code of conduct are actually found employed there -e.g. those like

nagma, acela (Uttaradhyayana 23. 13, 29), jinakalpika, pani-pratigraha (Kalpasutra 9.28), panipatra etc. fro the party of severe renunciation; those like sacela, pratigrahadharin (kalpasutra 9.31), etc. for the party of moderate renunciation.

(2) Even while the parties in question had difference as to the code of conduct they had none whatsoever as to the scripture that constituted the very life-breath of the loard's order; for both equally gave recognition to the scripture which was then current and was reckoned to be of the form of twelve Anga-texts. This situation characterized by some difference as to the code of conduct and total unanimity as to the scripture continued to orevali, to a greater or lesser extent, for some hundred-and-fifty years after the Lord. However, let it be remembered that even in the meanwhile a number of competent masters belonging to the two parties composed works, big and small, based on that very scripture-of-the-from-of-Anga-texts, works which found recognition generally with the followers of both the parties and particularly with the disciples of the author of such a work who would lay special emphasis on it treating it as a composition of their preceptor or grand-preceptor.

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1. See Uttaradhyayana, adhyayana 23.

It is this works which found currency under the title Angabahya, Ananga or Upanga.1 And the two retained so much reverent and loyal attitude towards the scripture that even while both the Anga-texts and the Angabahya-texts were treated as equally authoritative by them neither ever minimized the importance of the line dividing an Anga-text from an Angabahya-text, a line that remains firmly drawn in the prsent day literature of both the parties.

What then happened was that the earlier arisen difference of opinion on the question of conduct like going naked, wearing clothes, etc.-a difference uptil now suppressed owing to the spirit of gradually accentuated. The result was that in connection with this diffrence of opinion the two parties began to seek support for their respective stands chiefly in the scripture-of-the-from-Anga-texts; at the same time each began to employ for the same purpose the particular scriptural texts of the Anga-bahya type that had the been comosed by its own members. thus the party-difference that got perpetuated on the basis of a difference that chiefly pertained to the questions within the fold of the order. Hence was convened (c. 160 A. M.) a recitation -session at pataliputra2. Till the time of this rcitation-session and even afterwards there was in existence a commaon scripture-of-the-from-of-Anga which was acceptable to our two parties, both of which however went was gradually undergoing diminution. At the same time both went on composing works that would lend support to their respective stands on the question of conduct. This scriptural mass aimed at buttresting party-stands on the questions of conduct ultimately

gave rise to a difference of

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1. Dasavaikalika, Uttaradhyayana, Pranjnapana, Anuyogadvara, Avasyaka, Rsibhasita etc.

2. Parisistaparva Canto 9, Verse 55 onwards; Viranirvana Samvat Aur Jaina-Kalganana p.94,

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opinion as to the old common Angic scripture itself, a difference which originally consisted in merely offering an alternative interpretation but which culminated in surmising as alternative reaging, an interpolation and the like. Thus the difference of opinion that had produced difference on the questions of conduct also produced difference in the hitherto common understanding maintained by the parties began to hold -and make others hold -that the common original angic scripture had veritably disappeared to a very great extent while what had remained of it was not free from artificialities and later interpolations. However, even while saying all this the party did not altogether renounce the original Angic scripture; at the same it began to specially compose the scriptural texts that would lend support to its own code of conduct and through them to propagate its partisan viewa. The other party on its part noticed that the first one complained that the artificialities had gained entrance into the original Angic scripture but that it neither renounced this scripture altogether nor joined in the task of safeguarding it. Noticing all this it held a gathering at Matthura.1 Here finalization of the textual reading , classification, contraction, expansion etc. were undertaken in relation to the original Angic scripture as also in relation to the Anga-bahya scripture acceptable to the party in question, a performance remaining on the whole authoritative in the eyes of the elders who took part in that gathering. Even if this edition of the Angic-cum-Anangic Scripture was rather new and inspite of drawing a dividing line between Angic and Anangic texts it contained in the Anangic texts2-a state of affairs indicative of the equally authoritative character

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1.Some time in between 827 and 840 A.M. See Viranivana Samvat Aur Jaina Kalaganana, p. 104

2.For example, Bhagavati refers to Anuyogadvara, prajnapana, Jambudvipaprajnapti, Jivabhigamasutra and Rajaprasniya. See Bhagavati part, IV, Parisista.

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of the two sets of texts-and even if its classification and its finalization of the textual reading were different from what they might have been originally, yet this new edition was extremely close to that original Angic Scripture; for all those positions contained in this original scripture which went to support the opposite party's code of conduct were retained in this edition. After the time of this Mathura edition our two parties began to differ greatly so far as it concerned their undertanding- hitherto maintained in common-as to the original Angic

scripture, a circumstance that laid the foundation of a sharp difference of opinion as to what texts are genuinely scriptural. The party advocating the renunciation of clothes began to declare that the original Angic Scripture had disappeared altogether while all the scriptural texts that were in possession of the party advocating the wearning of clothes as also those that were in its own possesion were not original- that is, not composed by the Gandharas-but a composition or compilation of the latter-day masters belonging to one or the party. The adherents of the latterday masters had certainly composed so many types of new scriptural texts and had also made new compilations but that they had introduced no change or purging in the ideas of original Angic scripture. Viewing minutely and judging by the historical crtierion one apparently finds much truth in the contention made by the party advocating the wearing of clothes; for even while being a partisan and an advocate of the wearing of clothes this party has not purged out from within the Angic Scripture a passage advocating or dilating on the renunciation of clothes.1 Thus just as the party advocating the renunciation of clothes maintained that the original Angic scripture had disappeared, similarly the party advocating the wearing of clothes confornted the former with the position that jinakalpa-that is, the code of conduct characteristic of a Jina according to which hands are used as utensils and clothes are renounced-had only disappeared the times being different now.1 Even so, we find that in the scriptural texts revised, collected and newly compiled by the party of clothes all the passages basic for an advocacy of no-clothing-as also the commentaries favouring the same-have been left intact. Certainly, the strongest proof in support of the fact the Aagic scripture favoured by the party of clothes stands extremely close to its original version is the circumstance that this scripture takes up the standpoint of a general prescription-where all the exceptional or specific ways of conduct advocated by the party of no-clothing stand fully recommended upto this day. On the contrary, the scripture favoured by the party of no-clothing- a scripture advocating the practice of going stark naked-is not of the form of a general prescription; for it exclusively recommends the practice of no-clothoing. The scripture pretaining to the party of clothes treats as pathway to moksa both the practice of wearing clothes and that of noclothing -nay, it even attributes real primacy to it; its specificity only consists in its denial of the timeliness of this latter practice. On the contrary, the scripture pertaining to the party of no-clothing does not treat as pathway to moksa the practice of wearing clothes-nay, it even considers this practice to be a hindrance obstructing moksa.2

In view of this all it is obvious that the scripture pertaining to the party of clothes stands much closer to the original Angic scipture than does that pertaining to the party of no-clothing.

The scripture was again revised at Valabhi3 after it had been at mathura. And whatever differnce of opinion was

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1. gana-paramohi-pulse aharaga-khavaga-uvasame kappe|
samjama-tikevali-sijjhana ya jambummi vucchinna || Visesa. 2593
2. Sarvarthasiddhi declares no-clothing to be the chief and un-obstructed cause of moksa, p.248.
3.Some time in between 827 and 840 A.M. See Viranirvana Samvat Aur Jaina Kalaganana, p.110

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left unresolved within the fofld of the party of elders-the party of clothes-was but nominal. But on the other hand, this party now faced a much strong opposition from the side of the party of no-clothing. For certain members belonging to this latter party now resolved to give up the lingering attitude of indifference and advocate a total discarding of the scripture pertaining to the party of clothes.

(3) Vacaka Umasvati certainly practised the code of conduct advocated by the party of elders-the party of clothes; other wise his bhasya and his prasamarati could not have contained an account that is line with the duties prescribed by the party of clothes. For no prominent monk belonging to the party of no-clothing-has exclusively advocated the practice of no-clothing.1 So the idea makes no sense that a monk favouring no-clothing and belonging to the lineage of Kunda Kunda shold offer an account that is compatible with the practice of wearing clothes. The attributing of the authorship of prasamarati to Umasvati, too, is trustworthy. Similarly, the mention of the branch Uccana. gara and the title Vacaka- both appropriate to Umasvati-in an old and trustworthy genealogy of the party of elders indicates that he belonged to this very party. Whatever might have been the period in between the 3rd and 5th centuries A.V. when Umasvati actually flourished the fact remains that the Angic-cum-Anagic scripture which he adopts as the basis for the composition of his Tattvartha had found recognition with the party of elders.2 As for those belonging to

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1. See Pravacanasara, adhikara 3.
2. The scripture pertaining to the party of elders which was followed by Siddhasena-the author of the version of the same which was followed by Umasvati originated in an earlier period and was probably one complied at the Mathura recitation-session. Hence it is that Siddhasena often senses an anti-Agamic not in the bhasya.

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the party of no-clothing they were either indifferent towards this scripture or had already renounced it altogether. Thus if Umasvati flourished some time before the Mathura recitation-session then one should say that the Angic-cum-Anangic scripture followed by him was subjected to an attitude of almost indifference on the part of the party of no-clothing; on the other hand, if he flourished nearabout the time the same scripture was subjected to an attitude of certain ones belonging to

the same party.

Here the question must arise as to why, when the scripture followed by Umasvati was not acceptable to a certain section of the party of no-clothing, his Tattvartha was so much favoured by the adherents of the same party. The answer is got from a comparison of the bhasya and sarvarthsiddhi and a perusal of the original ophorisms. That scripture followed by the party of clothes which Umasvati had adopted described and respected nakedness-as is indicated by the word nagnya (=nakedness) occuring in an aphorism (9.9) Notably, not the entire lot of scriptural texts which in his bhasya is referred to as Anga-bahya has found mention in Sarvarthasiddhi, For the texts like Dasasrutaskandha, Kalpa Vyavahara etc. do not favour the party of clothes. However, Sarvarthasiddhi does mention Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana which even while not definitely the works of a master belonging to the party of no-clothing are not clearly hostile to this party.

Having found that Umasvati'soriginal aphorisms were so attactive and that a mere discarding of thebhasya would under them capable of lending support to his own party Pujyapada composed such a commentry on those aphorisms as would exclusively delineate the duties appropraite to the practice of no-clothing and would clearly refute those apporopraite to the practice of wearing clothes. Not only that, but Punjyapadaswamin also clearly hinted at the un-authoritativecharacter of the eleven Anga-texts and the Angabahya scriptural texts followed by the party of clothes, texts that have been given their present from at the valabhi recitation-session. Thus he said that to admit that a kevalin consumes gross food and to apeak of meat-eating are respectively the cases of a defamation of the kevalin and a defamation of the scripture.1 The situation seems to be that subsequently to the composition of Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi -a text which in the main clearly expounds duties appropriate to the practice of no-clothing- the entire lot of scripriate texts followed by the party of clothes was so finally and absolutely discarded by a section of the party of no-clothing as had not been done before. Hence it is that subsequently to the composition of Sarvarthasiddhi the acceptance on the part of the party of no-clothing of scripture pertaining on the part of the party of clothes remained but nominal-as is evident from the pursuit of scriptural studies undertaken by the latter-day Digambara scholars. If there are exceptions to it they are negligible.2 Really, nearabout the time of Pujyapada the mutual tug-of-war and rank partisanship so much characterised the party of no-clothing and that of clothes that subsequently to the composition of Savarthasiddthi Tattvarthabhasya ceased to receive even that little regard from the party of no-clothing which it had managed to retain time. Even much consideration does not yet provide an answer to the question as to why, when the party of clothes could somehow or other, in some from the party of clothes could somehow or other, in some from of other, and upto this day keep intact the Angic

scripture, the party of no-clothing-a party not inferior to the

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1. Keeping in mind the passages related to meat-eating that occur Bhagavati (Sataka 15), Acaranga (along with the commentary of Silanka pp.334,335,348,352,364), Prasnavyakarana, (pp.148,150) etc. the author of Sarvarthasiddhi declared tht to admit the occurrence of such passages in the Agama is to defame the scripture. And keeping in mind the account of a kevalin's taking of food that occurs in Bhagavati (sataka 15) he declared that that is tantamount to defaming the kevalin.

2. Akalanka, Vidyananda etc. continued to be conversant with the writings of Siddhasena. See Rajavartika, 8.1.17, Slokavartika, p.3.

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party of clothes as regards intellect, devotion to the scripture, lack of negligence-allow the whole of this scripture to fade away. When the party of whole of this scriptural texts composed by its leaders like kundakunda,Pujyapada, Samantabhadra etc. then there is no reason why it could not do the same in relation to some section of the Angic scripture. And leaving aside the Angic scripture, even when we cast a glance at the Angabahya texts the question arises as to why the small texts like Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana-texts referred to by Pujyapada-could disappear from among the scripture pertaining to the party of no-clothing -this at a time when even bigger texts remained intact with this party. Considering all this I have arrive at the definite conclusion that the flow of the original Angic scripture, even while subject to the strokes of inevitable change, has been yet current and is to-day totally accepted by the Svetambara sect though totally rejected by its Digambara counterpart.

In connection with this problem of the scripture the attention of the historical minded scholars ought to be drawn towards one question. Pujyapada and Akalanka refer to Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana. Not only that, so far as dasavaikalika is concerned even a commentary on it was composed by Aparajita Acarya, a supporter of nakedness.1 He has also composed a commentary on Bhagavati-aradhana. Inspite of all this how did it come about that Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana ceased to remain current within the Digambara sect? And when we find that numerous texts like Mulacara and Bhagavati-aradhana which by way of exception recommend for a monk external possessions like clothes etc., which even expound a code of conduct appropriate to nums, and whose practical recommendations for a monk are in no way more server than those of Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana are unanimously accepted by the Digambara sect

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1.see Bhagavati-Aradhana, p.1196; also 'Anekanta', Vol2; no.1,p.57.

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and have commentaries in Sanskrit and vernacular (Hindi) composed on them by famous Digambara scholars-then the question just posed by us becomes

still more pressing. The Digambara sect which includes within the scripture texts like Mulacara and Bhagavati-aradhana-why does it not accord recognition to Dasavaikalika and Uttaradhyayana? To put it in another way, the Digambara sect which has discarded Dasavailika and Uttaradhyayana- how can it accord recognition to Mulacara etc.? THis question of an anomaly is easy to answer and also difficult to answer. For when considered from the standpoint of history it is easy to answer, when considered exclusively from the standpoint of a closed-door sect it is difficult to answer.

Those who are not conversant with history often think that the Digambara sect- the party of no-clothing-does or can accept only nakedness as a part of a monk's practice. So on their view the acceptance of even a slight external possession is no part of the practice characteristic of a Digambara. And ever since the ideas advocated by the sub-sect Terapantha have gained upper hand within the fold of the Digambara sect- the remaining sects having been forced either to lead a nominal existence or to be overwhelmed by the influence of Terapantha-sincethen those closed-door sectarians have become still more confirmed in their convication that nakedness alone-and not the acceptance of even a slight external possession- is a part of a monk's practice and that precisely because of the impossibility of nakedness on her part a woman is not entitled to the practice of a num. Such closed-door sectarians can in no way find a true solution for the amomaly above hinted at. For them the only way open is to declare that all the texts which recommend external possessions for a monk are either outright Svetambarite or are composed by scholars who were under the influence of the Svetambara-sect or they are not aimed at expounding the code-of-conduct appopriate to a full-fiedged Digambara monk. However, even this declaration cannot save them a number of complications. So it is diffcult for them to get at a correct answer to our question.

On the other hand, there is no such difficulty for one who studies and ponders over the many aspects of the history of the Jaina tradition. The history of the Jaina tradition reveals that even within the fold of the sect called advocate-of-no-clothing or Digambara there have been numerous orders or sub-sects which are not unanimous on the question as to whether the absolute renuciation of an external possession is not a part of a monk's practice. Thus here there have been sub-sects which while theoretically advocating nakedness and the use of hands as utensils in practice did accept some external possession or other. In a way they represented the mild of moderate wing of the party of no-clothing. Side by side, there were other sub-sects which theoretically advocated just nakedness and in practice too adopted the same. It is they who represented the hard or extreme wing of the same. It is they who reprsented the hard or extreme wing of the party of no-clothing.It too appears that all these sects adopted in common the practice of using hands as utensils-which is

why they were all considered to be Digambara. It was natural that in the texts composed by the schplars or monks belonging to these diffrent sud-sects representing a moderate or an extreme wing mutually conficting views be expressed on the questions of nakedness, clothes etc. Besides,there were orders like Yapaniya which were not considered either afull-fledged adherent of the party of clothes or that of the party of noclothing. And when such orders disappeared from the scenethen several texts composed by the masters belongingto them which specially favoured the Svetambara sect were chiefly safeguarded by this sect while several of them remained current only within the fold of the Digambara sect and in due course came to be looked upon as Digambarite. SO if in the texts composed by teh scholars belonging to the different Digambara sub-sects-some old and some medieval, some moderate and some extremist-there is at places found an absolute defence of nakedness and at place a defence of a limited acceptance of external ppssessions-them there is nothing anomalous about it. At present there is nothing anomalous about it. At present there is predominence within the Digambara sect of the ideas advocated by the subsect Terapantha with its absolute defence of nakedness, ideas which are a growth of the past two to nakedness, idea which are a growth of the past two to three hundred years. Excluively on the basis of these ideas it is never possible to find an explanation for all the old texts supposed to be Digambaraite. The texts like Dasavaikalika etc. are so much well estabarite. The texts like Dasavaikalika etc. are so much well established within the fold of the Svetambara sect that their rejection on the part of the Digambara sect came about automaticlly. Perhaps, had the texts like Mulacara etc. too been fully owned by the Svetambara sect then it would have been hardly likely that they occupied in the eyes of the Digambara sect the status they do at present.

(a) The caste of Umasvati **and His Place of birth**

The eulogy contains no mention clearly referring to caste; even so, the designation 'Vatsi' indicative Kaubhisani too is indicative of gotra. This mention of gotra indicates that Umasvati belonged to the brahmin-caste-an assertion to this effect the familial lineages of the Bramin-caste so tenacious about its claim of relatedness to a praticular gotra-tradition. In the from of Vacaka Umasvati's place of birth the eulogy mentions the village 'Nyagrodhika'. Where this Nyagrodhika lies, what has been its history, what is its present state-all this is shrouded in darkness. And an investigation into it should prove interesting. In the form of the place where Tattvartha was composed the eulogy mentions 'Kusumapura'. This very Kusumapura is Patna of the present-day Bihar. Again, the eulogy says that Tattvartha was composed while the author was on tour in patna; on the basis of it the following ideas strile the mind.

(1) At the time of Umasvati-also somewhat earlier and somewhat later-

there must have been a good deal of touring on the part of Jaina monks in Magadha; and in that part of the country the Jaina order must be possesing some considerble amount of strength and power-of-attraction.

(2) The Jaina monks writing on a particular branch of theoretical learning had kept intact their tradition of nonregular residence-thus turining their family (= entourage) in to averiable 'Seminary on the move.'

(3) Generally speaking,the place of birth Nyagrodhika should not have been much far from the touring region of Pataliputra (patna) and Magadhadesa.

2. The Commentators of Tattvarthasutra

The commentators of Tattvartha have belonged to both the sects Svetambara and Digambara; but the difference is that in the Svetambara sect there has been a perdodominance of commentaries on Tattvartha-along-with-the-bhasya while in the Digambara sect there have only been commentators belonging to both the sects some are such competent scholars as deserve to be counted among the Indian philosophers in general; so it is only some of such competent commentators that are being briefly introduced below.

(a) Umasvati

The author of a commenatary on Tattvartha in the form of a bhasya is the aphorist Umasvati himself; hence there is no need to write about him separately-things about him having been said already. Like Siddhasena-ganin1 Acarya Haribhadra too identifies the author of the bhasya with

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1. See the present Introduction p.31, foot note 2 and p.33.
2. " Etannibandhanatvat samsarasyeti svabhiprayam abhidha matantaram upanyasann aha-eke tvityadina" p. 141.

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that of the aphorims -this becomes clear on a perusal of his bhasya-tika. And Prasamarati is treated by Haribhadra as a work by the author of this bhasya himself.1 In view of this all the present-day supposition to the effect that the bhasya is not of the form of an auto-commentary turns out to be mistaken. No old Digambara commentary turns out to be mistaken. No old Digambara commentator like pujyapada, Akalanka etc. has said a thing that might go against the bhasya being of the form of an auto-commentary.

(b) Gandhahastin2

In the form of an author of a commentary or bhasya on Vacaka Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra two. Gandhahastins are famous in the Jaina tradition. Of these, one is supposed to have been a Digambara master, the other a Svetambara one. Now the term 'gandhahastin' is an adjective. And

this adjective is understood to have been brone by Samantabhadra, the famous scholar of the Digambara sect-so that the implied assertion is that Svami-samantabhadra, who wrote Aptamimamsa and who bore the title gandhastin composed a commentary on Vacaka Umasvati's Tattvarthsutra. On the other hand, in the Svetambara sect the view is now current that Siddhasena Divakara, the disciple of Vrddhavadin, bore the adjective 'gandhahastin' -so that the ilplied assertion is that SIddhasena Divakara, the author of Sanmati and the disciple of Vrddhavadin, composed a commentary on Vacaka Umasvati's Tattvarthsutra. Both these understandings and

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1. Prasamarati Karikas 210 and 211 have been quoted by Haribhadra in his bhasya-tika after saying 'Yathoktam anenaiva surina prakaranantare.

2. In the old hymn 'Namotthunam'- famous as Sakrastava-the adjective 'gandhahastin' has been assigned to the revered tirthankara by referring to him as 'Purisavaragamdhahatthinam.' And in the Digambara rocks-inscriptions belonging to the 10th-11th centuries of the Saka era an alias 'gandhahastin' is found to have been assigned to a valiant soldier. The name of a Jaina temple, too,is 'Savati gandha-varana Jinalaya '; see 'Jaina-Silalekha-Sangraha' edited by Dr. Hiralal Jain , pp.113 and 129, Rock-inscriptions from the mountain Candragiri.

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the respective assertions implied by them by lack authorization and so cannot be accepted.The adjective 'gandhahastin ' is found attributed to a work by the Digambara master Samantabhadra-as can be clearly seen in Laghu-Samantabhadra's Astasahasri-tippana. This Ladhu-Samantabhadra1 is understood to have been flourished nearabout the 14th-15th centuries A.D. But no definite proof corroborative of his present statement has yet been availoable. As a result of my up-todate reading and reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that we have in the Digambara literature only stray references at place to bhasya, at place the name of svami-samantabhadra has been mentioned in the company of Tattvarthamahabhasya. Seeing all this the later, modern authors formed a mistaken conviction that Svami-samantabhadra had composed a mahabhasya called gandhahastinon Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra. And this conviction misled them into making corresponding assertions. As a matter of fact, they had before them neither an old basis nor such a work as would prove that a commentary called gandhahastin on Umasvati's Tattvarthasutra was composed by Samantabhadra. The highsounding words like bhasya, mahabhasya, gandhahastin etc. were of course,there; and so the idea naturally to occur was that none except a great master like Samantabhadra could compose a work such as that -this particularly at a time when no work composed by a latter master like Akalanka etc. could be difinitely ascretained to be designated gandhahastin-bhasya. Had an author like Samantabhadra composed a work, big or small, on Umasvati's so well known Tattvartha then utter absence of a mention of it or a quotation from it in the highly theoretical commentaries like Sarvatha-siddhi, Rajavartika etc. would

never have been possible. It too is not possible that a work like that disappeared altogether by the time of Sarvarthasiddhi etc., a time when the other famous

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1. See Jugalkishoreji's Swami Samantabhadra, pp.214-20

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works of Samantabhadra were yet in existence. Be that as it may, I am now in no doubt whatsoever that there never was a bhasya named gandhahastin on Tattvartha composed by Samantabhadra.

Pt. Jugalkishoreji says-in Anekanta (VolI, p.) -that Dhavala mentions gandhahastin-bhasya, but we have reliably learnt ffrom Pt. Hiralalji Nyatirtha-who has made the original copy of Dhavala-that there is in Dhavala no mention of gandhahasti-bhasya.

The Svetambara undersstanding that it is Siddhasena Divakara, the disciple of Vrddhavadin, who is gandhahastin has become current on the basis of a reference1 made by the famous scholar Upadhayaya Yasovijayaji belonging to the 17th-18th centuries A.D.1 In his 'Mahavirastotra' Yasovaijayaji has quoted a gatha from Siddhasena Divakara's 'Sanmati' in the from of an utterance by gandhahastin. On the basis of that one nowadays maintains that it is Siddhasena Divakara who is gandhahastin. But this reference made by Yasovijayaji is a product of mistake, and to prove this two clear evidences are at hand. The first is the circumastance that no old or modern author come before Yasovijayaji employs the adjective gandhahastin while referring to Siddhasena Divakara, or to the works definitely known to be his composition, or to a quotation from his works. It is only Yasovijayaji who has empolyed the adjective gandhahastin while referring to a quatation from a work of Siddhasena Divakara. So the reference made by him is devoid of all old basis. Besides, whatever old and modern prabandhas2 containing a life-sketch of Siddhasena Divakara are now available nowhere employ the term gandhahastin while, on the other hand, the term Divakara is found employed in the old parbandhas as

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1. "ancnaivabhiprayenaha gandhahasti sammatau" -Nyayakhandakhadya verse 16, p.16.

2. Siddhesena-prabandha in Bhadresvara's Kathavali, SIddhasena-prabandha by another author, Siddhasena-prabandha within vrddhavadi-prabandha in prabhavaka-carita, Vikrama-prabhandha in prabandha-cintamani and Caturvimasati-prabandha.

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also in the works of other masters.1 The other powerful and irrefutable evidence is the circumstance that whatever quotations from gandhahastin are found in so many works2 composed before Yasovijayaji are also found-either without the slighest alteration or with an agreement as to meaning- in the commentary on Tattvarthabhasya composed by Siddhasena, the

disciple of Bhasvamin and grand-disciple of Simhasuri.

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In the life-sketches of Siddhasena we come asross the alias Divakara as also a supporting evidence for the same, but nothing of the sort is found in connection with the term gandhahastin. Had the term gandhahastin been in use so olden times the question is as to why the old authors did not employ the term gandhahastin-as they did employ the term Divakara- while referring to Siddhasena or to a work definitely known to be his composition.

1. See Haribhadra's Pancavastu-gatha 1048, p.156.

2. For a comprison observe: "nidradayo yatah samadhigataya eva darsanalabdheh upayogaghate pravartane caksurdarsanvarnadicatustayam tudgamocchedivat mulaghatam nihani darsanalabhim" iti Tattvarthabhasya Vrtti,p.135, line 4, part II.

"aha ca gandhahasti nidradayah samadhigataya eva darsanalabddher upaghate vartante darsanavaranacastayam tudgamoccheditvat samulaghatam hami darsanalabdhim iti"- Siddhaseniya Vrtti on pravacanasarobdhara, p.358, line 5. Malayagiri's Sittaritika, gatha 5. Devendra's Tika on Karmagrantha I, gaths 12.

" ya tu bhavasthakevalino dvividhasya sayogayogabhedasya siddhasya vadarsanamohaniyasaptaksayad apayasaddravyaksayac codapadi sa sadir aparyavasana iti" -Tattvarthabhasya Vrtti, p.59.

" yad aha gandhahasti-bhavasthakevalino dividhasya sayogayogabhedasya siddhasya va darsanamohaniyasaptakaksayavirbhuta samyagdrstih sadir aparyavasana iti"- Navapadavrtti, p.88.

" tatra yapayasaddravyavartini srenikadinam saddravyapagame ca bhavati apayasahacarini sa sadisaparyavasana." Tattvarthabhasya Vrtti, p. 59, line 27. " yad uktam gandhahastina-tatra yapayasaddravyavartini- apayo matijnanamsah saddravyani- suddhasamyaktvadalikani tadvartini srenikadinam ca saddravyapagame bhavatyapayapasahacarini sa sadisaparyavasana iti"- Navapasdavrtti, p.88.

On the basis of that this much is irrefutably proved that the person treated as gandhahastin is not Siddhasena Divakara, as is understood by the current tradition but Siddhasena, the disciple of Bhasvamin, who wrote the presently available commentary on Tattvarthabhasya. On account of the similarity of names as also on account of a consideration that only Siddhasena Divakara famous as a mightly disputant and a competent author could be gandhahastin Yasovijayaji was misled in to committing the mistake of applying the adjective gandhahastin to Divakara- that is quite possible.

The above arguments clearly enable us to see that the person famous

as gandhahastin in the Svetambara sect is none but Siddhasena, the author of the persently available voluminous commentary on Tattvarthabhasya. Thus we are 9th-10th centuries, in the cource of his commentary1 twice refers

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"pranapanav ucchvasanihsvasakriyalaksanau" -Tattvarthabhasya vrtti, p.161, line 13.

"yad aha gandhahastin-pranapanau-ucchvasanihsvasau iti"- Dharmasangrahanivrtti, p.42, line 2.

"ata eva ca bhedah pradesanam avayavanam ca, ye na jatucid vastuvya tirekenopalabhyante pradesah, ye tu visakalitah parikalitamurtayah prajnapatham avataranti te'vayavapradesayor gandhahastyadisv bhedo'sti "- Syadvadama njari, p.63, verse 9.

1. At the end of his commentary on the 1st gatha of the kanda two of Sammati Abhaydeva quotes the aphorisms for a commentary on the same says:

" asya ca sutrasamuhasya vyakhya gandhahastiprabhrtibhir vihiteti no pradarsyate" p.595, line 24.

Sililarly , while explaining the term 'hetuvada' occurring in the gatha 44 of the kanda three he quotes

" samyagdarsanajnanacaritrani moksa- margah " and about it too says:
" tatha gandhahastiprabhrtibhir vikrantam iti neha pradarsyate vistarabhayat" p.657.

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to gandhahastin and recommends a persual of his commentary on Tattvartha , he is referring to none but the author of the presently available comentary by gandhahastin on Tattvartha recommended by Abhayadeva in his commentary on Sanmati we need not now cast a glance at the perished or unavailable literature. This very investigation also makes it necessary to maintain that the vivarana by gandhahastin1 referred to by S1lanka2- of the 9th-10th centuries -in his commentary on Acarangasutra ought to be a work of Siddhasena, the author of the commentary on Tattvarthabhasya; for it is impossible that S1lanka and Abhayadeva who had flourished at so close an interval should apply the adjective gandhahastin to two diffrent masters. And it is diffcult to suppose that a highly learned scholar like Abhayadev did not come across the commentary on Acarangasutra the foremost among the Agamic texts- composed by s1lanka who had flourished only a little earlier than himself. Moreover, when s1lanka himself in the course of his commentaries quotes gathas from Siddhasena Divakara's Sanmati he nowhere employs the term gandhahastin; hence the person understood by s1lanka to be gandhahastin is not Divakara -this much is clear. The conclusion here reached on the basis of the above mode of argumentation3

now stands fully corroborated by a reference made by Yasobhadrasuri's disciple who had completed the incomplete commentary of Haribhadra. Thus he says;

suriyasobhadrasya [hi] sisyena samuddhrta svabodhartham |
tattvarthsya hi tika jadakayarjnoddhrtyardha ||1||

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1. " sastraparijnavivaranam atibahanam ca gandhastikrtam " and "sastraparijnavivaranam atibahugahanam itiva kila vrtam pujyaih / srigandhahastimisrair vivrnomi tato'ham avasistam ||'" -Acarangatika, p.1 and p.82.

2. See the Introduction to "jitakalpa edited by Acarya Jinavijayaji, p.19,; and also 'Appendix for further details about s1lankacarya.

3. See Gujarati Tattvarthavivecana, Paricaya,p.36.

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haribhadracaryenarabdha vivrtardhasadadhyayams ca|
puiyaih punar uddhrteyam tattvarthaddhasya tikanta ||2||

iti "etad uktam bhavati-haribhadracaryenardhasannam adhyayanamadyanam tika krta, bhagavata tu gandhahastina siddhasenena navya krta tattvarthatika navyair vadasthanair vyakyla, tasya eva sesam sesam uddhrtam cacaryena (sesam maya) svabodhartham sa'tyantagurvi ca dupdupika nispannety alam prasangena" 1, p. 521.

(c) Siddhasena

At present two commentaries on Tattvarthabhasya composed by Svetambara masters are available in their entirety. Of these one is comparatively bigger, the other comparatively smaller. It is Siddhasena, the author of this bigger commentary, who is under consideration here. He was the disciple of Bhasvamin who in his turn was the disciple from the eulogy supplied by him at the end of his commentary on the bhasya.

From the arguments offered in connection with considering the identity of gandhahastin it can be gathered that it is this SIddhasena who is gandhahastin. So long as no new evidence particularly pressing is forthcoming there ought to be no doubt about taking two works to be his composition- one the vivarana on Acarananga which is at persent unavailable and the other the bigger commentary on Tattvarthabhasya which is at persent available. Who gave him the title gandhahastin and why -that is only a matter for conjecture. He himself on his part has not employed the term gandhahastinin the eulogy composed by him; and from this it appears likeky that what has taken place in the case of so many others has taken place in his case as well-viz. that some

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1. This reading has been corrected with the help of another manuscriptsee Atmanandaprakasa, 45.10, p.193.

2. It is this Simhasuri who is the famous commentator of Nayacakra.See Atmanandaprakasa 45.10, p.191.

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of his disciples and devoted followers made him famous under the title gandhahastin. This becomes still clearer from the above quoted reference made by Yasovijayaji's disciple. The reason for the state of affairs seems to be that this Siddhasena was a Siddhantist (=advocate of the positions maintained in the Siddhanta- i.e. Agamic-texts) and besides being in possession of a vast knowedge of the Agamic texts was in the habit of vehemently refuting whatever positions, howsover logical in themselves, seemed to go against the Agamic texts and of thus vindicating the corresponding Siddhanta (i.e. Agamic) positions. Besides, the commentary on Tattvarthabhasya which he composed, being equivalent to 18000 slokas in extent. must have been the biggest of all commentary and the advocacy of the Agamic positions undertaken therein some disciple or devoted follower of his attributed to him, during his life-time or sfterwards, the adjective 'gandhahastin' -that appears to be the situation. It is not yet possible to say anything definitive about his date but doubtless he must centuries A.V. for in his commentary on the bhasya he has mentioned numerous Buddhist scholars like Vasubandhu etc.1 Of these one is Dharmakirti2 who belonged to the 7th century, and that makes it definite that he did not flourish before the 7th century. On the other hand, the 9th century scholar s1lanka refers to him under the name 'gandhahastin'3-on which ground he ought to

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1. The famous Buddhist scholar Vasubandhu has been referred to by him as 'Amisagraddha'; thus he says : 'tasmadenahpadam etat vasubandhor amisagrddhasya grdhrasyevapreksyarinah " " jatir upanyasta vasubandhuvaidheyena " -Tattvarthabhasyavrtti, p.68, lines 1 and 29. The five sins designated Anantarya which are dealt with in Nagarjuna's Dharmasangraha, p.13 and which are described by s1lanka in his commentary on sutrakrtanga (p.215) are also mentioned by Siddhasena -Bhasyavrtti p.67.

2. "bhiksuvaradharmakirtina'pi virodha uktuh pramanaviniscayadau" Tattvarthabhasyavrtti, p.397, line 4.

3. See the persent Introduction, p.57, footnote 1.

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have flourished some time before the 9th century. Siddhasena was the grand-disciple of Simhasurigani-Ksamasramana, the commentator of Nayacakra. And Simhasuri was certainly alive about the middle of the 7th century. So it appears that the time of Siddhasena was some period lying in between the last quarter of the 7th century and the middle of the 8th. In his commentary Siddhasena refers to a text named Siddhiviniscaya (p.37) which may be of Akalanka or more probably of Sivasvami. Sivasvami's Siddhiviniscaya is quoted by Sakatayana in his commentary on Strinirvanaprakarana, p.19.

(d) Haribhadra

Haribhadra, the author of the above mentioned small commentary on

Tattvathbhasya is here under consideration. This small commentary has been published by the organization shri Rishabhadevaji Kesarimalji of Ratlam. This commentary is not a work of Haribhadra alone, but three masters at least1 have taken part in its composition. Of these Haribhadration here. In the Svetambara sect there have been numerous masters of the name haribhadra2 -of whom one famous under the title
Yakinisunu (= the son of the Yakini) and the author of hundreds of works is supposed to be the present small commentary. but no evidence free of doubt is yet at hand on this score. Muni-shri Jambuvijayaji has with one another

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1. The commentary can have for its authors even more than three persons. For the names of three of them-viz. Haribhadra, Yasobhara and Yasobhadra's disciple are certain but on the basis of the enclosure supplied to the chapters 8 and 9 an additional author can as well be thought of; thus it says: " iti sritattvarthatikayam haribhadracaryaprarabdhayam dupdupikabhidhanayam tasyam evanyakartrkayam navamo'dhyayah samaptah"

2. See the Introduction to Dharmasangraham by Muni Kalyanavijayaji, pp.2 ff.

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the commentaries of Haribhadra and Siddhasena and has maintained that Haribhadra and Siddhasena and has maintained that Haribhadra has followed the commentary of Siddhasena.1 If that be so then Haribhadra's commentary ought to have been composed after that of Siddhasena.

(e) Devagupta, Yasobhadra and Yasobhadra's Disciple

Devagupta has written a commentary only on the Sambandha-kariks of the Bhasya. There have been many Acaryas having the name of Devagupta and in the absence of the name of his preceptor it is diffcult to identify him.

The above Haribhadra had composed commentary on five chapters and a half. And commentary on the subsequent chapters of Tattvarthabhasya seems to have been certainly composed by two persons at least-of whom one is the master named Yasobhadra and the other his anonymous disciple. This anonymous disciple of Yasobhadra has composed commentary on the bhasya pertaining to just the last aphorism of the chapter ten; the entire earlier portion of the bhasya left uncommented by Haribhadra has been commented on by Yasobhadra. All this is evident from the words of that disciple of Yasobhadra himself.2

In the Svetambara sect there have been numerous authors of the name Yasobhadra.3 As to who among them is our present Yasobhadra is unknown. There is nothing decisive to prove that he was a disciple of Haribhadra, the author of that incomplete commentary on the bhasya. Nay, as against a conjecture to that effect it might be argued that if this Yasobhadra was a

disciple of that Haribhadra then the disciple of Yasobhadra who completed the commentary in question and who has informed us that his preceptor Yasobhadra had completed the incomplete commentary of Haribhadra could have hardly omitted to attribute to his

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1. See Atmanandaprakasa, Vol.45, no.10,p.193.
2. See the present Introduction, p.57.
3. See M.D. Desai. Jaina Sahityano Sanksipta Ltihasa-the Appendix part pertaining to Yasobhadra.

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preceptor an adjective 'Haribhadra's disciple' or the like. Be that as it may, it yet remains to be considered as to where this Yasobhadra flourished and whether or not he composed certain other works as well. It too is to be considered as to why Yasobhadra could not compose commentary on just the last aphorism -a task that had to be undertaken by his disciple.

On comparison it appears that the commentary on bhasya by Yasobhadra and his disciple was based on the commentary by gandhahastin.

There has been one Yasobhadra who composed commentary on Haribhadra's monograph Sodasaka and it is a question worth consideration whether he is the same person as our present Yasobhadra or someone else.

(f) Mayagiri

The commentary on the Tattvartbhasya composed by malayagiri is unavailable1. He was one of the most prominent Svetambara scholars of the 12th-13th centuries A.V. He is famous as a contemporary of Acarya Hemacandra and the best among the commentators. Scores of works by him are available.2

(g) Cirantanamuni

Cirantanamuni is an anonymous Svetambara monk. He has composed an ordinary Tippana on Tattvartha. He flourished some time after the 14th century A.V., for in his Tippana on the ahporism 31 of the chapter five he mentions Syadvadamanjari, a work by Mallisena of the 14th century.

(h) Vacaka Yasovijaya

Of the commentary on the bhasya composed by Vacaka Yasovijaya an incomplete part pertaining to the chapter one

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1. The view that Malayagiri had composed a commentary on Tattvartha

has become current on the basis of the following mention made by him. self in his commentary on prajnapana -as also on the basis of similar other mentions : "tac capraptakaritvam tattvarthatikadau vistarena prasadhitam iti tato'vadharaniyam", pada 15, p.298.

2. See the Introduction to Dharmasangrani, p.36.

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isavailable. He is famous as the last most authoritative scholar of not only the Svetambara sect but the Jaina community in general. his numerous works are available1. Assimilating the development of logic that had taken place by the 17th-18th centuries he has given logical from to the Jaina scriptural positions, and composing monographs on different topics he has smoothed the way for a minute study of Jaina philosophy.

(i) Gani-Yasovijaya

Gani-Ysovijaya is different from the just mentioned Vacaka Yasovijaya. As to when he flourished is not known. And any other historical onformation about him is equally unavailable. In the form of his work just the Gujarati TabaTippana on Tattvartha is available uptil now. As to whether he also composed any other work is not known. In view of the language and style of his Tippana he seems to have belonged to the 17th-18th centuries. Two of his specialities are worth mentioning.

(1) Just as the Svetambara scholars like Vacaka Yasovijiya etc. have composed commentaries on the Digambara texts like Astasahasri etc. so also Gani-Yasovijaya adopted the Digambara reading of the text-the reading accepted in Sarvarthasiddhi-and has composed TIppana (=explanatory note) on it by way of just supplementing the meaning of aphorisms; and in the course of composing this Tippana whenever he came across a case of difference or confict between the Digambaras and Svetambaras he has offered an explanation that is in line with the Svetambara tradition. Thus even while his reading of the text is Digambarite his explanation is Svetambarite.

(2) Of those writing a Tippana on Tattvartha in Gujarati language this Yasovijaya is the only one. For nothing written by any one else in Gujarati Tattvartha has yet come to night.

That Gani-Yasovijaya is a Svetambara is definite, for a mention to that effect1 occurs at the end of his Tippana. And a second powerful corrobarative evidence for the same is the Tippana itself named Balavabodha. THus evenwhile accepting the same reading of nowhere offers an explanation that is in line with the Digambara tradition. Nevertheless, the question does arise, "How could Yasovijaya, being himself a Svetambara, adopt the Digambara reading of aphorisms? Was he not acquainted with the Svetambara reading or even if he was did he find great merit in Digambara reading than in its Svetambara counterpsrt? " A proper answer to the question would be that he must have been acquainted with the

Svetambara reading and in his eyes this reading would have possessed merit too, for otherwise he would not have composed a Tippana that was in line with the Svetambara tradition. Even then if he adopted the Digambara reading of aphorisms the reason must be that he wanted to impress upon the partisana of Digambara tents that it was quite possible and tenable to give an explanation exactly in line with the Svetambara dradition to that very reading of aphorisms on the basis of which the digambara csholars had been, for one thousand years, offering an explanation that was in line with the Digambara

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1. iti sri Svetambaracarya-sri-umasvamigana (i) krtatattvarthsutram,tasya balavabodhah sriyasovijayaganikrtah samaptah/-The manyuscript of the Tippana preserved in the text-collection of PRavartaka Shri Kritivijayaji.

2. To this there are ofcourse exceptions thought slight. For example, the aphorism 19 of the chapter four is not adopted by him from the Digambaras the number of heavens is sixteen and so on adopting the Digambaras the number of heavens is sixteen and so an adopting the Digambara reading of the aphorism in question loyalty to Svetambara tenets could not have been retained. Hence at this place he has adopted the corresponding Svetambara reading with its mention of twelve heavens.

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tradition1 and opposed to the Svetambara Agamas. At the same time he wanted to say to the Svetambara students, "Whether you sdopt the Digambara reading of aphorisms or its Svetambara counterpart the Digambara reading is the same and one in line with the svetambara tradition. So there is no necessity to get excited against the Digambara reading of aphorisms accepted by Sarvarthasiddhi, the essential thing is the same in both cases." Thus on the one hand with a view to telling the Digambara scholars as to what true meaning is simply yielded by their own reading of aphorisms and on the other hand with a view to teaching the Svetambara students that goaded by a partisan spirit they should not get excited against the Digambara reading of aphorisms this Yasovijaya seems to have composed his Tippana discarding the Svetambara reading of aphorisms and accepting its Digambara counterpart.

(j) Pujyapada

Pujyapada's real name is Devanandin. He flourished in 5th-6th centuries A.V. He has composed works on numerous topics like grammar etc. of which some are available.2 The information is that Sivakoti3 is the only Digambara commentary on Tattvartha coming before Pujyapada. It is his commentary on Tattvarth named Sarvarthasiddhi and lending support to Digambara tents which acted as basis for the entire lot of the latter-day Digambara scholars.

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1. See Sarvarthasiddhi, 2.; 9.11;109.

2. See Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka, part I, p.83.

3. The commentary composed by sivakoti on Tattvarth or quotations etc. from it are not now available. The information that he had written something on Tattvartha is conveyed by the eulogy pertaining to certain rock inscriptions. The view is that Sivakoti was a disciple of Samantabhadra. See Svami Samantabhadra, p.96.

(k) Bhatta Akalanka

Bhatta Akalanka is a scholar of the 7th-8th centuries A.V. After Sarvarthasiddhi it is his commentary on Tattvartha that is now availoable, and it goes under the title Raja Vartika. He is one of the foremost schloars who laid the foundation of the Jaina school of Logic. His numerous works are available1 and they are of value for every student of Jaina Logic.

(l) Vidyananda

This Vidyananda flourished in the 9th-10th centuries A.V. His numerous works are available.2 He was a proficient student of the systems of Indian philosophy; composing a detailed verse-commentary-called Slokavartika-on Tattvartha he has vied with the famous Mimamsa scholars like Kumarila etc. and has offered a powerful reply to the terrible attack launched by the Mimamsakas Jaina philossophy.

(m) Srutasagara

The Digambara savant named srutasagara has composed a commentary on Tattvartha. He is a scholar of the 16th century. He has composed numerous works.3

(n) vibudhasena, Yogindradeva, Yogadeva, Laksmideva, Abhayanandisuri etc.

Numerous Digambara scholars have composed ordinary commentaries on Tattvartha. I myselff have not been able to collect special information regarding them. Besides these so many Sanskrit commentaries there have been Digambara scholars who composed on Tattvartha commentaries in vernacular languages-of whom some write in Kunda, some in Hindi.4

1.See the Introduction to Nyayakumudacandra.

2.See the Introduction to Astasahasri and Tattvarthaslokavartika.

3.See the Introduction to Srutasagara's commentary published by Bharatiya Jnanapitha, p.98.

4. See the Introduction by Shri Nathuramji to the Hindi translation of Tattvartha bhasya.

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(3)Tattvarthasutra

With a view to getting specially familiarized with the exterior and the interior of the text called Tattvarth the following four topics are being considered below on the basis of the original text.

(a) the material serving as the source of inspiration;
(b) The purpose of composition;
(c) the style of composition;
(d) The treatment of subject-matter.

(a) The Material Serving as the Source of Inspiration

The material which inspired the author to compose Tattvartha can be divided into four classes:

(i) The heritage of Agamic Knowledge Like vedas in the case of the Vedicist systems of philosophy the Agamic texts are considered to be the chief authority by the Jaina system of philosophy; as for the remaining texts their authoritive character consists only insofar as they follow the Agama. And the heritage of this Agamic knowlwdge-a heritage till then transmitted by way of a historically developed tradition- Vacaka Umasvati had received in a proper manner; hence his knowledge of all the Agamic topic was clear and systematic.

(ii) The Sanskrit language

Since he used to tour in the regions of Kasi, Magadha, Bihar etc.-also perhaps since he belonged to the Brahmin caste- Vacaka Umasvati had made a throught study of Sanskrit which was the chief language of his time. As a result of the door of Sanskrit language-besides that of Prakrit language-having been opened for him he gained an opportunity to study the vedicist and Buddhist philosophical systems; and making a meaningful use of this opportunity he well augmented his stock of learning.

(iii) The Influence of the Other Systems of Philosophy

As a result of gaining entrance into the Vedicist and zBuddhist philosophical literature he got acquainted with ever newer contempopray writings-from which he came to learn of new subject-matters and new modes of thought; all this exerted a deep influence on him, and this influence inspired him to compose a text in a concise aphorist style and in Sanskrit language- a style and a language till then unknown to the Jaina literature.

(iv) Genius

Even if the just mentioned three causes were operative but he was

devoid of genius, then Tattvartha could not have come into existence in its present from. So it will not do not to include his genius too-just like the just mentioned three causes-in the material that served as his source of inspiration.

(b) The Purpose of Composition

Whenever an Indian theorecian composes a text dealing with his subject-matter he presents moksa as the ultimate aim to be served by his treatment of the subject-matter concerned-be this subject-matter something pertaining to things material like economics, erotics, something pertaining to things spiritual like philosophy or yoga. So in the case of the theoretical texts dealing with any of the chief subject-matters moksa has been declared, at the very begining, as the ultimate aim to be served by the discipline concerned; and at the end too it is assereted that the discipline concerned is ultimately aimed at moksa.

Kanada, the author of Vaisesikadarsana, before undertaking his treatment of the world of congnisibles, first avers that this branch of learning is a means of moksa and then takes it up.1 Similarly Gautama, the aphorist (lit. stage-manager) of Nyayadarsana, only after submitting that a knowledge of the means of valid cognition is the pathway to moksa, takes up the treatment of these means.1 The systematizer of Sankhyadarsana too undertakes a treatment of his cosmogony by way of supplying knowledge that serves as a means of moksa.2 Similarly , the account of the Brahman and the means of moksa. In Yogadarsana the account of the yoga-procedure as also that of some incidental matters is there Similarly, the theoretical texts of those adhering to the path of bhakti (=devotion) -texts undertaking a treatment of the path of bhakti and thereby ultimately brining about the attainment of moksa. The treatment of things material as well things spiritual finding place in the doctrine of momentarism or that of four nobletruths pertaining to the Buddhist system of philosophy is aimed at nothing save moksa. The theoretical texts of the Jaina system of philosophy too have been composed adopting this very procedure. Thus Vacaka Umasvati too, having presented forth moksa as the ultimate aim, undertakes in his Tattvartha a treatment of the totalityof certain particular selected topics just by way of supplying a means for this very aim.3

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1. Nyayadarsana 1.1.1.
2. See Isvarakrsna's Sankhyakarika, Karika 2.
3. Vacaka Umasvati's plan for composing Tattvarth seems to have been indebted to been indebted to the chapter 28 of Uttaradhyayana. The title of this chapter is ' Moksamarga' (= the pathway to moksa)"; and in it there occurs an indication of the pathway to moksa followed by a very brief account of Jaina philosophy in the form of the specific subject-matter of those pathways. This very subject-matter has been

expanded by Vacaka Umasvati who in this connection systematically compiled the topics treated in the totality of Agamic texts. In the very begining of his text of aphorisms there occurs the aphorism laying down the pathways to moksa. And in the Digambara tradition Tattvartha is extremely well-known under the title Moksa Sastra (= the treatize on moksa). In the Buddhist tradition

(c) The Style of Composition

Since early days the style of composition of the Jaina Agamas-like that of the Buddhist Pitakas-was that of long descriptive sutras; and the language it adopted was Prakrit. On the other hand, the style of composition of the form of brief sutras initiated by the Brahmin scholar in Sanskrit language gradually became extremely well established; Vacaka Umasvati was attracted by this style and was inspired to write adopting the same. So far as our knowledge goes Umasvati is the first in the Jaina tradition to have composed brief sutras in Sanskrit; after him, such a sutra-style became extremely well established in the Jaina tradition and the scholars belonging to both the Svetamabara and Digambara sects composed adopting this style and in Sanskrit language works on so many topics like grammar, rhetorics, ethics, polity, logic etc.

Umasvati's Tattvartha aphorisms are divied into ten chapters like Kanada's Vaisesika aphorisms; the number of aphorisms with him is 344 while that of Kanada's aphorisms is 333. These chapters are not sub-divided into Ahnikas as are aphorisms of Vaisesika etc. and they are not sub-divided into padas as are Brahmasutras etc. The tradition of writing adhyayas instead of adhyayanas too was intiated in the Jaina literature by none but Umasvati. And the division into Ahnikas and padas-a division not initiated by him - was also initiated by his followers like Akalanka etc. However, even while particularly akin to Vaisestka-sutra as regards its external construction Tattvartha-sutra also exhibits a noteworthy difference - such as throws light on the traditional mentality that has

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there is a very famous text Visuddhimarga which was composed near about the 5th century by Buddhaghosa in Pali and which contains the essence of the totality of Pali Pitakas; a work preceding it and named Vimuktimarga too was there in the Buddhist tradition and it is available to-day in its Chinese version. Both Visuddhimarga and Vimuktimarga are a synonym for moksamarga (all meaning 'pathway to moksa').

found expression in the Jaina system of philosophy. Thus Kanada, having put forward his theses in the aphorisms, does not - as does Aksapada Gautama - prove his case by speaking of a prima facie view and the corresponding final view and yet often enough he does offer reasons by way of subtantiating those theses on his; on the other hand, Vacaka

Umasvati nowhere offers an argument, illustration or reason by way of proving even a single one of his theses. He rather goes on describing - as does Patanjali, the author of Yogasutra - his view in the form of a finally established thesis without offering an argument or reason and without speaking of a prima facia view and the corresponding final view. On comparing the aphorisms of Umasvati with those of the Vedicist systems of philosophy an impression is left on the mind - viz, that the Jaina tradition chiefly relies on faith and literally accepting a statement made by the personage believed by it to be omniscient, it sees no occasion to resolve a doubt raised in this connection. The result is that so many intelligible topics capable of revision, supplementation or development remained undiscussed even in the age of Logic and are yet intact on the basis of faith alone.[1] On the other

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1. Of course, it cannot be denied that the development of Logic and logical discussion undertaken by so many profound logicians like Siddhasena, Samantabhadra etc. occupied a prominent place in the development of Indian thought; so the assertion made above has to be understood from the stand-point of the predominent and the subordinate and from that of a difference of outlook. If that is to be grasped with the help of a few illustrations then compare the Tattvarthsutras with Upanisads etc. The commentators of Tattvartha - even when they are profound logicians and are divided into different sects - undertake a treatment and employ the power of logic only with a view to elucidating or supporting earlier established Jaina thesis. None of these commentator created a new thought or introduced a difference in the essential understanding of the Svetambara or Digambara sect. On the other hand, the commentators of Upanisads, Gita and Brahmasutra undertake so much independent discussion based on the power of logic that they have become polar opposites of each other so far as it concerns an essential understanding of the matter. What

hand, the Vedicist philosophical tradition, chiefly relying on intellect, examines the these upheld by itself; it undertakes discusssion with a view to resolving some doubt that has been raised and too often it so happens that on the basis of logical reasoning the earlier accepted theses are thrown over-board and new ones established instead or the former are subjected to revision and supplementation. The sum and substance of the whole matter is that the Jaina tradition has not taken as much part in new creation as in keeping intact the traditionally inherited views on the questions of philosophy and ethics.

(d) The Treatment of Subject-matter

(i) The Choice of the Subject-matter

In so many systems of philosophy the subject-matter is chiefly an

investigation into the sphere of cognisables; this for example in the Vaisesika, Sankhya and Vedanta systems of philosophy. Thus the Vaisesika system of philosophy while offering from its own standpoint an account of the world, tells us as to how many chief substances there are in the world, what they are, how many and what are the other entities standing related to these substances etc. - in this manner chiefly undertaking an investigation into the congnisables verties pertaining to the world. However, in certain other systems of philosophy the chief thing is an investigation into conduct; this for example in the Yoga and Buddhist Systems of

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is the merit and what the defect of this state of affairs - that is not our present concern; for just now we are only interested in presenting the state of affairs as it obtains. So far as merits and defects are concerned they can well be present in both the traditions and they can also well be absent in both.

philosophy. Thus what is purity of life? how to realize it? what are the obstacles standing in the way - these and similar questions pertaining to life have been answered by the yoga system of philosophy through its account of the four vyuhas - viz. what is worthy of rejection (i.e. misery), the cause of what is worthy of rejection (i.e. the cause of misery), rejection (i.e. the moksa), the means of rejection (i.e. the cause of moksa) - and by the Buddhist system of philosophy through its account of the four noble truths. That is to say, the former class of philosophical systems has got for its subject matter an investigation into the cognisable verities, the latter class an investigation into conduct.

Lord Mahavira has, in his investigation, provided equal room for the cognisable verities and conduct; so his investigation into verities, through an account of jiva (=soul) and ajiva (=not soul), describes the nature of the world while on the other hand, through an account of verities asrava (=inflow), samvara (=protection) etc., it demonstrates the nature of conduct. In connection with this investigation the Lord has presented forth nine verities and an unshakable faith in the same has been described by him as the first condition of being a Jaina. Thus whether a world - renouncer or a house - holder a person can be treated as a true follower of Mahavira's path only in case he is possessed at least of a faith in these nine verities - if not also of an adequate knowledge regarding the same; that is to say, this person must be possessed of an inclination to the effect 'whatever verities have been described by the Jina - they alone are true verities.' That is why the Jaina system of philosophy attaches to nothing whatsoever as much weight as it does to the nine verities in question. It is on account of this very consideration that Vacaka Umasvati chose these nine verities as the subject matter of his present text and

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reducing their number to seven he offered an account of them in his aphorisms - to which he gave the meaningful title 'Tattvatthadhigama'. In an investigation of these nine verities Umasvati found a synthesis - i.e. of the class laying emphasis on the cognisables and that laying emphasis on conduct. Even then he realized the utility of undertaking an investigation into the means of valid congnition - an investigation particularly current in his times. So with a view to making his text full with all the investigations that were likely to draw attention he incorporated within the body of his own aphorisms in the form of his subject matter besides an investigation into those nine verities an investigation into cognition - thus making it clear as to what that Jaina investigation into cognition was which was to replace the Nyaya investigation into the means of valid cognition. Thus taken as a whole, the subject matter chosen for his aphorisms by Vacaka Umasvati is an investigation - undertaken from the Jaina standpoint - into cognition, the cognition, the cognisables as well as conduct.

The classification of the subject-matter

The subject matter chosen by Umasvati has been divided by him into his ten chapters as follows :

(i) The chapter one is devoted to an investigation into cognition;
(ii) The next four chapters - i.e. the chapters two to five are devoted to an investigation into the cognisables; and
(iii) The last five chapters - i.e. the chapters six to ten - are devoted to an investigation into conduct. In the following we take up these three investigations one by one, in each case first giving its essential points and then comparing it with the corresponding performance of the other systems of philosophy.

The essential points of the investigation into cognition

In the chapter one there are eight chief points related to cognition and as follows :
(1) The classification of cognition into naya and pramana;
(2) The five types of cognition mati etc. well known from the Agama and their classification into two types of pramana, pratyaksa and paroksa;
(3) The causes of orgination in the case of mati-jnana, its types and sub-types, and the classification indicative of the order of their origination;
(4) The description in the form of sruta-jnana of the Agamic texts considered to be authoritative in the Jaina tradition;
(5) The three types of divine (=extra ordinary) perception, their types and sub-types, and their mutual difference;
(6) The indication of the object of these five types of jnana with a view of laying down the mutual relativity of their extent; the

simultaneous possibility of these different types of jnana;

(7) The position that certain types of jnana can possibly be mistaken, and the causes responsible for the truth and falsity of a piece of jnana;

(8) The types and sub-types of Naya.

Points of Comparison

The treatment of jnana found in the present investigation into jnana is not of that logical and philosophical style which is characteristic of the corresponding treatment found in the Jnanadhikara of Pvavacanasara.

It is rather akin to the treatment found in Nandisutra - a treatment which, being of the Agamic style, simply describes all the types and sub-types of jnana and their respective objects while also drawing the dividing line between jnana and a-jnana.

The order of origination of the ordinary types of jnana avargraha, tha etc. indicated here reminds of the process of nirvikalpaka-savikalpaka jnana described in the Nyayasutra and the process of origination of jnana described in the Buddhist Abhidhammattha-sangaho. And its account of the three types of divine perception avadhi etc. reminds of the jnana characteristic of a siddha, a yogin and God that is found described in the Vedicist and Buddhist systems. Its account of manahpryaya - a type of divine perception - reminds of the paracittajnana (=knowledge of another person's mind) that is found described in the Yoga and Buddhist systems. Its twofold classification of pramana into pratyaksa and paroksa is a synthesis of the two-fold classification of the Vaisesika and Buddhist systems, the threefold classification of the Sankhya and Yoga systems, the four-fold classification of the Nyaya system, the sixfold classification of the Mimamsa system, etc. etc. The distinguishing between jnana and a-jnana in this investigation into jnana is akin to that between yathartha and ayathartha buddhi in the Nyaya system and that between pramana and viparyaya in the Yoga system.

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1. 1.15-16
2. See Muktavali Karikas, 52 ff.
3. See pariccheda 4, paras 88 ff.
4. 1.21-26,30
5. Prasastapada-Kandali, p. 187
6. 3,19.
7. Abhidhammatthasangaho pariccheda 9, para 24 and Nagarjuna's Dharmasangraha, p. 4,
8. 1.10-12.
9. Prasastapada-Kandali, p.213, line 12 and Nyayabindu 1.2.
10. Isvarakrsna's Sankhyakarika, karika 4 and Yogadarsana, 1.7.
11. 1.1.3

12. Sabara's bhasya, 1.5.
13. 1.33.
14. Tarkasangraha-buddhinirupana,
15. Yogasutra, 1.6.

A clear account of Naya as is found in it is not found in any other system. In brief we can say that in the present investigation into cognition Vacaka Umasvati has demonstrated in details as to what is the Jaina system's substitute for the investigation into pramana found undertaken in the Vedicist and Buddhist systems.

The essential points of the investigation into the cognisables

The investigation into the cognisables contains an account of the two basic verities of the world - viz. jiva (=soul) and ajiva (=not soul). Of these, the verity jiva alone is found treated in the chapters two to four - i.e. in three chapters in all. In the chapter two we find besides an account of the general nature of the verity jiva an account of its types and sub-types as also numerous allied matters. In the chapter three there is an account of the hellish beings residing in the lower loka-region and that of the human beings, animals and birds residing in the middle loka-region-it thus yielding besides multifarious information regarding these species of living beings also a complete geographical account of the nether world and the world of human beings. In the chapter four there is an account of the species of heavenly beings - it thus yielding besides an astronomical account an account of the heavenly quarters and the prospeirty characteristic of them. In the chapter five there is an account of the general nature of substances through describing the qualities and properties characteristic of this substance and that - at the same time there being presented a detailed treatment of all the substances by way of pointing out their similarities and dissmilarities.

This investigation into the congisables covers sixteen points and as follows -

Chapter two :

1. The nature of the verity jiva;

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1. 1.34,35.

2. The types of worldly jivas;

3. The types and sub-types of sense-organs, their names, their respective objects, and the distribution of sense organs among the mass of jivas;

4. The state intervening in between death and a new birth;

5. The types of births and birth-places and their distribution among

the various species of living beings;

6. The types of bodies, their relative superiority and inferiority, their respective possessors, and the possibility of their simultaneous presence;

7. The distribution of sexual characteristics among the species of living beings, and the mention of those enjoying such a life-quantum as is incapable of being interrupted in the middle.

Chapters three and four :

8. The sub-regions of the lower loka-region, and the general condition, life extent etc. of the hellish beings residing in it.

9. A geographical account of the middle loka-region by way of describing the oceans, continents, mountains, continental sub-regions etc., and a mention of the life-extent of the human beings, animals, birds etc. residing in it;

10. The different species of the heavenly beings, their entourage, the gradation of the pleasures enjoyed by them, their prosperity, their life-extent, and an astronomical account by way of describing the heavenly bodies.

Chapter five :

11. The types of substances, their mutual similarities and dissimilarities, their area of occupation, their respective functions;

12. The nature of pudgala (=matter), its types, and the causes of their origination;

13. A reasoned account of the nature of what is real and what is unreal;

14. The capacity and incapacity for paudgalika combination;

15. The definition of substance in general, the view held by some that kala (=time) is a substance, and the nature of kala according to these some;

16. The definitions of quality and transformation, and the types of transformations.

Points of comparison

Of the above points many are covered in the Agamic and monographic

texts; however, in those texts - unlike in the present one - they are not found briefly compiled and at the one place but lie scattered here and there. The jneyadhikara of Pravacanasara and the dravyadhikara of Pancastikaya have got the same subject matter as the chapter five as above described, but their treatment of the same is different from that of the present text. Thus in Pancastikaya and Pravacanasara there is a development of the logical mode of argumentation while the present chapter five merely has a brief and simple description.

The above given essential points of the chapters two, three and four - nothing akin to them is found in so continuous, systematic and comprehensive a manner in any of the original philosophical aphoristic texts of the Brahmins or Buddhists. Nevertheless, the account given by Badarayana in chapters three and four of Brahmasutra is in many respects comparable to what has been said in the present chapters two, three and four; for the former chapters contain an account of the post-mortem state, of transmigration, of the different species of living beings, of the different world regions.

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1. See Hind-Tattvajnanano Itihasa, p. 162, ff.

In the present chapter two upayoga is presented as the definition of jiva and it is nothing different from jnana or caitanya which is presented as such a definition by all the philosophical systems positing soul. And though the account of sense organs offered in the present chapter two is apparently different from that offered by the Vaisesika and Nyaya systems, the types of sense organs posited by it, their nature and their respective objects are all almost literally the same as found in these latter systems. Similarly, the account offered by the Vaisesika system of the earth-made, water-made, fire-made, and air-made bodies and the account offered by the Sankhya system of the subtle and gross bodies though apparently different from the account of bodies offered in Tattvartha, are in fact indicative of the different aspects of one and the same experience. Lastly the account offered in Tattvartha of the life-quantum capable of being interrupted in the middle and that not thus capable, and the reasoning advanced by it in this connection are literally similar to those found in Yoga-sutra and its bhasya. And though the geographical information contained in the present chapters three and four is not touched upon by the aphorist of any other philosophical system, yet we have in the bhasya to Yoga-sutra 3.26 a detailed account of the hellish-grounds, the elements water, air, akasa etc. supporting these grounds, the hellish beings residing in those grounds, the middle loka-region, the mountains Meru, Nisadha, Nila etc.. the world regions Bharata, Ilavrta etc., the continents and ocean

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1. 2.8.
2. 2.15-21.

3. Nyaya-Sutra 1,1.12 and 14.
4. See Tarksangraha, the account of earth, water, fire, air.
5. Sankhya karikas, karikas 40-42.
6. 2.37-49.
7. 2.52.
8. 3.22; for details, see the present Introduction, pp. 23-29.

like Jambudvipa, Lavanasamudra etc., the various heavens belonging to the upper loka-region, the species of heavenly beings residing in those heavens, the life-extent of these heavenly beings, their means of enjoyment like women, entourage etc., their manner of living - an account which however appears to be less extensive than the description of the three loka-regions found in the chapters three and four of Tattvarth. Similarly, the account offered by the various Buddhist texts of the continents, oceans, nether-worldly regions, cold and hot hells, and the various heavenly beings - that too is brief as compared to the description of the three loka regions found in Tattvarth. Nevertheless, the verbal similarity and the similarity of thought process exhibited by these different accounts inspire one to seek for the common root of the different branches of the Aryan philosophical systems.

The chapter five, in respect of its style and techincal terminology, exhibits greater similarity with the Vaisesika and Sankhya systems than with any other. Its doctrine of six dravyas reminds of the Vaisesika doctrine of six padartha. The style that consists of exhibiting similarities and dissimilarities - a style employed here - seems to be a reflection of Vaisesika sutra. Again, though the two substances dharmasti-kaya and adharmasti-kaya have not been posited by any other system
-------------------- 1. Dharmasangraha, pp 29.31 and Abhidhammatthasangaho, pariccheda 5, paras 3 ff.
2. In his Introduction to Srutasagara's commentary on Tattvartha Pt. Mahendrakumara has quoted a detailed account of Loka culled from the different Buddhist and Vedicist texts, an account worthy of perusal on the part of those interested in the ancient geography and astronomy.
3. 1.1.4.
4. Prasastapada, p 16 onwards,
5. 5.1 and 5.17; for details see Jaina Sahitya Samsodhaka, Volume III, nos. 1 and 4.
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builder and though the nature of soul posited by the Jaina system, too is different from that posited by all others, yet so many things said here in connection with the doctrine of soul and that of pudgala exhibit much similarity with the systems like Vaisesika, Sankhya etc. Like the Jaina, system the systems like Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya etc. too posit a plurality of souls. The Jaina systems's doctrine of pudgala gives the

impression of being a synthesis of Vaisesika system's doctrine of atom and the Sankhya system's doctrine of prakrti; for it combines the features of the doctrine of arambha (=new creation) as well as the doctrine of parinama (=transformation). On the one hand Tattvartha refers to a sectional view according to which kala is a substance while on the other it mentions features which on this view characterize kala - noticing which both one is tempted to surmise that the systematizers of Jaina philosophy were clearly influenced by the Vaisesika as well as Sankhya views as to the substantial character of kala; for on the Vaisesika system's view kala is an independent substance while on the Sankhya system's view it is not. The two views indicated in Tattvartha as to an independent existence or otherwise of kala - views which were later on respectively upheld by the Digambara and Svetambara sects - were there in the Jaina system from the very beginning or they found room there at some later date as a result of

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1. Tattvartha, 5.15-16
2. Tattvartha 5.2.
3. "vyavasthato nana", 3.2.20.
4. Purrusabahutvam siddham - Sankhyakarika, 18.
5. Tattvarth, 5.23.28.
6. See Tarkasangraha, the account of the elements earth etc.
7. Sankhyakarika, karikas 22 ff.
8. 5. 22.
9. 2.2.6.
10. See the account of Pravacansara, and Pancastikaya, and Sarvarthasiddhi, 5.39.

the thought struggle going on between the Vaisesika and Sankhya systems-this question is worthy of investigation. However, one thing is as clear as daylight - viz. that the account of the features of kala found in the original Tattvartha and commentaries is literally similar to that found in Vaisesika-sutra. As for the Tattvartha definition of what is real and what is eternal, if it exhibits similarity with any system of philosophy it is with the Sankhya and Yoga systems; for the account of what is parinami-nitya (=eternal amidst transformations) that is found in these systems is literally similar to the account of what is real and what is eternal that is found in Tattvartha. The capacity for originating the substances attributed to atoms by the Vaisesika system is altogether different from the capacity for paudgalika comibantion - that is, for originating the substances - described in Tattvartha. The Tattvartha definition of dravya and guna is much similar to the corresponding, definition offered by the Vaisesika-sutra. The definitions of parinama offered by Tattvartha on the one hand and the Sankhya-Yoga system on the other are pretty similar. The Tattvartha demarcation of a sat (lit. real) entity as being of the form of dravya, guna and paryaya reminds the Sankhya doctrine of sat and parinama as also of the Vaisesika tendency to treat dravya, guna and karma as the chief types of sat.

The Essential Points of the Investigation-into-conduct

What tendencies observable in life are worthy of rejection, what is the basic root of such tendencies, what consequences are reaped in life by those nurturing such tendencies, if the renunciation of such tendencies is at all possible then what

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1. See Bhasya-vritti, 5.22, and the present Introduction, p. 26.
2. Prasastapada, the account of air, p.48.
3. 5.32.35.
4. 5. 37 and 40.
5. The present Introduction, pp. 25 and 26.

are the means for the same, in place of such tendencies what positive ones are to be introduced in life and what consequence is produced - gradually and in the end - by these latter tendencies - all these considerations are present there in the investigation into conduct occuring in the chapters six to ten. Since these considerations are couched in an altogether unique technical terminology and follow a sectarian style it outwardly appears as if they have no similarity whatsoever with the views of any other system, but those making a minute study of the Buddhist and Yoga systems cannot help noticing that the Jaina investigation into conduct exhibits a maximum and surprising similarity with the corresponding views of these two systems characterized by an emphasis on the problems of conduct. This similarity conveys an idea of the common ethical heritage of the Aryan community - a heritage divided into different branches, organized around different technical terminologies, and more or less developed within the fold of the branches in question.

There are eleven chief points related to this investigation into conduct and as follows :

Chapter six :

(1) The nature of asrava (=karmic inflow), its types, and an account of what karmas are bound down as a result of succumbing to what asrva.

Chapter seven :

(2) The nature of vrata (=ethical vow), the gradation among those adopting a vrata, and the means for stabilizing a vrata that has been adopted;

(3) The nature of defilements like violence etc.;
(4) The possible defilements of a vrata;
(5) The nature of donation and the causes for a gradation within it.
Chapter eight :

(6) The basic causes of karmic bondage and the types of karmic bondage.

Chapter nine :

(7) Samvara (=protection against karmic inflow), its various means and their types and sub-types;

(8) Nirjara (=cleansing off of the accumulated karmas) and its means;

(9) The spiritual realizers with different degrees of competence and gradation of these degrees;

Chapter ten :

(10) The causes of kevala-jnana (=all comprehensive cognition) and the nature of moksa (=emancipation);

(11) An account of what is the destination of an emancipated soul and how it proceeds towards it.

Points of Comparison

The Tattvartha investigation into conduct is different from the account of conduct found in Pravacanasara. For this latter text - unlike Ttttvartha - does not undertake a treatment of the verities like asrva, samvara etc.; it rather offers an account of the life-situation of a monk and that too in such a way as particularly suits a Digambra monk. On the other hand, Pancastikaya and Samayasara undertake an investigation into conduct on the basis of the verities like asrava, samvara, bandha etc. - as is done in Tattvartha. However, these two investigations, too, differ from one another. Thus in the Tattvartha account there emerges a picture that has been drawn from the practical rather than definitive standpoint; hence here there are said all things connected with the verities in question and here there are described such rules and regulations of conduct as are appropriately meant for a renunciation-minded house-holder and a monk - this being indicative of the actual organizational situation of the Jaina order. On the other hand, Pancastikaya and Samaysara do nothing of the sort; for they merely offer a treatment of the verities like asrava, samvara etc. that has been undertaken from the definitive standpoint and is full of demonstrative reasoning - thus unlike in Tattvartha here there being no description of the current vows of a house holder and of those of a monk.

The comparison of the present investigation into conduct with Yoga-sutra is as much interesting as it is wide in scope. However, a detailed such comparison, since it is a fit subject matter for an

independent essay, is not in place here. Even then, with a view to drawing the attention of the specialists and with faith in their own power of drawing comparison we are giving below a catalogue of essential points that are worthy of comparison.

Tattvatha-sutra Yoga-sutra

(1) Asrava (=karmic inflow) (1) Karmasaya (=the pertaining to body, spech and accumulated stock of karmic manas. (6.1) impressions). (2.12)

(2) Mental asrava. (8.1) (2) The modes of citta supposed to be the object of suppression.
(1.6)

(3) The two types of asrava (3) The two types of karmasya that possessed of kasaya that possessed of klesa (=passion) and that devoid of it
(6.5)

(4) The auspicious and (4) The auspicious and inauspicious asrava productive inauspicious karmasayaof pleasure and pain. 6.3-4) productive of pleasure and
pain. (2.14)

(5) The five causes of (5) The five klesas productive bondage - viz. mithyadarsana of bondage - viz. avidya(=false faith) etc. (8.1) (=nescience) etc. (2.3)

(6) Mithyadarsana being the (6) Avidya being the chief of chief of the above five. the above five. (2.4)

(7) The peculiar (7) The peculiar association association of a soul and karmas of a purusa and prakrti - that- that is bondage. (8.2-3) is bondage. (2.17)

(8) Bondage is the cause of (8) The association of a the auspicious and inauspicious purusa and prakrti is thefruit of karma that is to be got cause of misery - that is torid of it.
be got rid of (2.17)

(9) The beginningless (9) The beginningless bondage depends upon association depends on avidya.mithyadarsana.
(2.24)
(10) In the case of a karma (10) In the karmas the basis the basis of

bondage in respect   of fruit being yielded isof intensity of fruit
is kasaya.   klesa. (2.13)   (6.5)

(11) The cessation of (11) The suppression of the asrava - that is
samvara   modes of citta - that is Yoga.(=protection). (9.1)
(1.2)

(12) Gupti, samiti etc, and (12) Yama, niyama etc. and the the
various penances etc. -   constant-practice, dispassionthese are the
means of samvara.   etc. - these are the means of(9.2.3)
Yoga. (11,2 to 2.29)

(13) The great vratas (13) The universal yamas (=vows) like
non-violence etc.   (=restrains) like non-violence(7.1)
etc. (2.30)

(14) Having noted the this-(14) To suppress the worldly and
other-worldly   reflections pertaining todangers following from the
acts   violence etc. by means oflike violence etc. to desist
constantly presenting beforefrom such acts. (7.4)   mind
their respective counter
positives. (2.33-34)

(15) Renouncing the(15) In the eyes of the wise   defilements
like violence etc.   the entire karmasaya is of theby reflecting that
they are of   form of but misery. (2.15)   the form of but misery.
(7.5)

(16) The four reflections   (16) The four reflectionsmaitri
(=friendliness) etc.   maitri (=friendliness) etc.(7.6)
(1.33)

(17) The four sub-types of (17) The four samprajnata the sukla type
of dhyana - viz.   samadhis - viz. savitarka,prthaktva - vitarka -
savicara,   nirvitarka, savicara,ekatva-vitarka-nirvicara etc.
nirvicaraka. (1.16 and 41-44) (9. 41-46)

(18) Nirjara and moksa. (18) Partial riddance (9.3 and 10.3)
(cessation of bondage) and
total riddance. (2.25)

(19) Conduct along with (19) Discriminatory knowledge knowledge is
the cause of   along with yoga including all nirjara and moksa. (1.1)
its means is the means of a
total riddance of misery (2.26) --------------------

1. In the Buddhist tradition these four reflections are called "Brahmavihara" and are much emphasized,

2. These four types of dhyana are also known to the Buddhist system.

3. In the Buddhist tradition the same is called nirvana and is of the form of the third noble truth.

(20) The superordinary (20) The similar sort of acquisitions of the form superordinary acquisitionsjatismarana (=recollection of born of samyama. (2.29 andthe past birth), the divine 3.16 ff.) cognition like avadhi etc., caranavidya (=super ordinary capacity for movement) etc. (The bhasya on 1.12 and 10.7)

(21) All-comprehensive (21) The emancipartory cognition. (10.1) knowledge born of
discrimination. (3.54)

(22) The four alternative (22) The four species of karma types of karma - viz. - viz. white, black, white cumauspicious, inauspicious, black, neither white notauspicious cum inauspicious black. (4.7) neither auspicious nor inauspicious.

Besides, there are so many things from among which one is emphasized by one system another by another - the result being that they have become famous as the respective special subject-matters or specialities of these systems. Take for example the doctrine pertaining of karma. The basic doctrines pertaining to karma are of course present there in the Buddhist and Yoga systems; in the Yoga system they are even described in details. Even so, it is in the Jaina system that there has come into existence a detailed and thoroughgoing discipline devoted to these doctrines - something that has not happened in the case of any other system. That is why in the course of his investigation into conduct Vacaka Umasvati, while offering an account of the

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1. In the Buddhist tradition there occur five abhijnas in the place of these. See Dharmasangraha. p.4 and Abhidhammatthasangaho, pariccheda 9, para 24.

2. See 2.3 - 14.

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karma-doctrine, introduces, though briefly, the entire Karmasastra (=the descipline devoted to karmas) of the Jainas. Likewise though from the standpoint of the essentials the investigation into conduct undertaken by the three systems Jaina, Buddhist and Yoga pursues an identical course, yet for certain reasons they are found to differ from one another as to the question of practice. And it is this difference that has assumed the form of the speciality of the adherents of these systems. Thus according to them all right conduct consists of a renunciation of klesa (=affliction) and kasaya (=passion); but from among the so many possible means for realizing it one lays emphasis on one, another on another.

Within the body of the ethical discipline of the Jainas bodily torture seems to dominate, within that of the Buddhists emphasis is laid on meditation instead of bodily torture, within that of the mendicants adhering to the Yoga system emphasis is laid on breath-control, purity etc. If bodily torture, meditation and breath control etc. are properly made use of with a view to realizing right conduct - which is the main thing - then each of them is as important as another; but when these external subsidiaries turn into practical routine and there vanishes from them the aspect of being a means of realizing right conduct - and aspect which is their very soul - then they smack of mutual conflict and then one sect dismisses as useless the conduct recommended by another. Thus in Buddhist literature the Jaina's penance dominated by bodily torture is found condemned before the adherents of Buddhism, while in the Jaina literature the Buddhist's ease loving life and meditation and the mendicant's breath-control, purity etc. are found subjected to ridicule before the adherents of Jainism. In view of this it is but natural that the account of practical life found in the texts devoted

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1. Tattvartha, 6-11-26 and 8.4-26.
2. "dehadukkham mahaphalam" - Dasavaikalika, 8.27
3. Majjhimankaya, sutta 14.
4. Sutrakrtanga commentary on 3.4.6. and the original 7.14 ff.

to one system's investigation into conduct is particularly different from that found in the texts devoted to another system's investigation into conduct. That is why in the Tattvartha investigation into conduct we find not a single aphorism on breath control or purity; and as for meditation through a detailed account of it is given here there does not occur here - as it does in the Buddhist and Yoga systems - an account detailing the practical means necessary for undertaking meditation. Similarly, the type of detailed and thorough going account of parisaha (=hardships) and penance that is there in Tattvartha is absent from the Yoga or Buddhist investigation into conduct.

Besides, in connection with the investigation into conduct one thing is particularly noteworthy - viz. that even while all the three systems in question allow room for knowledge as well as conduct (=practice) the Jaina, treating conduct as the direct means of moksa, accepts knowledge as but a subsidiary to it while the Buddhists and Yoga, treating knowledge as a direct means of moksa, accept conduct as but a subsidiary to it. This state of affairs cannot help being noted by one undertaking a minute study of the literature belonging to these three systems as also of the life practice pursued by the adherents of these systems. In view of this it is but natural that the Tattvartha investigation into conduct should describe at length the practices aimed at realizing right conduct and the types and subtypes of these practices.

To render the comparison complete it is also necessary to note as to how the systems thus far taken into consideration view moksa that is the ultimate aim of all investigation into conduct. Since the idea of moksa has arisen out of the idea of getting rid of pain all the systems view moksa as but a state of absolute cessation of pain. Now the four systems Nyaya, Vaisesika, Yoga and Buddhist are of

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1. See 1.1.22.
2. See 5.2.18.

view that besides cessation of pain there is no positive factor whatsoever in moksa; hence on their view if there at all be present some sort of pleasure in moksa it cannot be something positive but something just of the form of that cessation of pain itself. On the other hand, the Jaina system - just like the Vedanta system - maintains that the state of moksa is not a state of mere cessation of pain but that there is present in moksa an independent something of the form of a natural pleasure born independently of all object; nay, the Jaina system posits in moksa not only the manifestation of pleasure but also that of certain other natural qualities like cognition etc., a position not in accord with the line of thinking adopted by the other systems. As for the place where moksa is to be realized the Jaina view is utterly singular. Since the Buddhist system does not clearly provide room for an independent verity of the form of soul there is altogether no scope for the hope that it should consider the question related to the place where moksa is to be realized. As for the entire lot of the old Vedicist systems, since they view soul as something ubiquitous they too can in no way conceive of a separate place where moksa is to be realized. But the Jaina system posits soul in the form of an independent verity and yet does not view soul as something ubiquitous; so it is bound to consider the question as to where moksa is to be realized and it has actually considered it. Thus towards the close of Tattvartha Vacaka Umasvati says, "The emanciated souls, having got rid of each type of body, move upwards ultimately to get seated at the end-part of loka and they stay there for ever."

4. The Commentaries on Tattvartha

In connection with its sectarian commentaries Tattvartha dhigama-sutra stands comparison with Brahmasutra. Just as numerous masters holding utterly different views on so many question composed commentaries on Brahmasutra and sought to demonstrate their respective views from within it itself and on the basis of the Upanisadic texts, similarly, the scholars belonging to both the Digambara and Svetambara sects have composed commentaries on Tattvartha and have sought to derive even their mutually conflicting views from within it itself and on the basis of the Agamic texts. From this consideration just one common point emerges. Thus finding Brahmasutra to be a text of well established repute within the fold of Vedanta literature brilliant masters holding mutually different

views felt the necessity of demonstrating their special views basing themselves on Brahmasutra and with the help of this very text; similarly, finding Tattvartha dhigama to be a text of well established repute within the fold of Jaina literature the scholars of both the sects have felt the necessity of expressing their views basing themselves on this text. However, inspite of this much broad similarity there is one important difference between the sectarian commentaries of Brahmasutra and Tattvartha. Thus as regards the basic topics of philosophy like world, soul, God etc. the famous commentators of Brahmasutra hold very different views and often enough their views seem to be polar opposite to each other; but that is not the case with the commentators of Tattvartha belonging to the Digambara and Svetambara sects. For as regards the basic topics of philosophy they exhibit no difference whatsoever and whatever little difference does obtain in this connection pertains to extremely ordinary matters and is not such as excludes compromise - that is, such as obtains between views that polar opposite of each other. Really speaking, as regards the basic principles of philosophy there has not been at all any particular difference of opinion between the Digambara and Svetambara sects; hence the difference of opinion, observable in their commentaries on Tattvartha - that too is not counted as much serious.

There are numerous commentaries on Tattvartha - some ancient, some modern, some small, some big, some in Sanskrit, some in local vernaculars. But only four of them that are presently available are such as are of historical importance, as have taken prominent part in systematizing and developing Jaina philosophy, as are of particular philosophical importance. Of these three belong to the Digambara sect and have been composed by the Digambara scholars at a time when not only the difference - among - sects but also the antagonism among sects had already become acute; and the fourth is the auto-commentary by the aphorist Vacaka Umasvati himself. So it seems proper that first of all some thought be given to these very four commentaries.

(a) The Bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi

Before saying anything about the two commentaries bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi it is necessary to consider their respective readings of aphorisms. Though really the reading was just one, yet as a result of a sectarian difference two of them have become current - of which one is known as the Svetambara reading, the other as the Digambara reading. However, the alleged Svetambara reading, since it exactly tallies with the bhasya, can be designated 'bhasya-manya' (=one acceptable to the bhasya) while the alleged Digambara reading, since it exactly tallies with Sarvarthasiddhi, can be designated 'Sarvarthasiddhi-manya' (=one acceptable to Sarvarthasiddhi).

And all the Svetambara masters follow the bhasyamanya reading of aphorisms while all the Digambara masters follow its Sarvarthasiddhi-manya

counterpart. In connection with the reading of aphorisms it is necessary to note the following four things : (1) The number of aphorisms; (2) The difference of meaning; (3) The difference as to an alternative reading; (4) The genuineness.

(1) The Number of Aphorisms

The number of aphorisms in the bhasyamanya reading is 344, that in the Sarvarthasiddhi-manya reading 357.

(2) The difference of Meaning

Though the number of aphorisms is different in the two readings and though at places even the respective verbal constructions are mutually different in them yet there are only three cases where an important difference of meaning obtains between them; (for the rest there obtains no particular difference of meaning even when the readings concerned happen to be mutually different). Of the three cases in question the first pertains to the heavens being sixteen in number (4.19), the second to the independent existence or otherwise of kala (5.38), the third to the inclusion or otherwise of the four karma-types hasya etc. among the auspicious karma-types (8.26).

(3) The Difference as to an Alternative Reading

Besides the mutual differences obtaining between the two readings of aphorisms there are difference as regards the reading of individual aphorisms. If exclusion is made of the alternative readings indicated by the author of Sarvarthasiddhi, then it can generally be said that no Digambara commentator indicates an alternative reading in relation to Sarvarthasiddhi-manya reading of aphorism. So it can be said that at the time of composing Sarvarthasiddhi whatever reading of aphorisms Pujayapada had before him or whatever improvement and expansion he introduced in it - the same was accepted by all the latter day Digambara commentators. But that is not the case with the bhasyamanya reading of aphorisms; for though this reading is certainly one in the form of the Svetambara reading it at times presents a bhasya sentence in the form of an aphorism, at

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1. See 2.53.

times presents an aphorism in the form of a bhasya sentence, at times presents one aphorism in the form of two aphorisms, at times present two aphorisms in the form of one aphorism - which all can be clearly gathered from the discussion as to an alternative reading of aphorism that is present there in the two presently available commentaries on the bhasya.

(4) The Genuineness

The question naturally arises as to which of the two readings of aphorisms is genuine and which has undergone a transformation. My own

up-to-date reflection convinces me that it is the bhasya-manya reading of aphorisms that is is genuine - or rather it is this reading that is very much closer to the genuine reading than is its Sarvarthasiddhi-manya counterpart.

After so much discussion about the readings of aphorisms it seems necessary to give some thought to the two commentaries first composed on them - viz. the bhasya and Sarvartha-siddhi. That the bhasyamanya reading of aphorisms is genuine or close to genuine and that (as already shown) Vacaka Umasvati himself is the author of the bhasya - on both these questions it is natural for the Digambara masters to keep silent. For all the Digambara masters coming after Pujyapada have for the basis of their respective commentaries the very Sarvarthasiddhi and the reading of aphorisms accepted by it. So if they concede that the bhasya or the bhasyamanya reading of aphorism is a composition of Umasvati then the reading of aphorisms accepted by Pujyapada and his commentary cease to remain fully authoritative. Certainly, in the eyes of the Digambara sect Sarvarthasiddhi and the reading of aphorisms accepted by it are an acme of authoritativeness. Hence the present Introduction will remain incomplete if the relative authoritativeness of the Bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi is not subjected to a searching examination.

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1. See 2.19, 2.37, 3.11, 5.2-3, 7.3 and 5 etc.

Now even if there is no doubt whatsoever as to the bhasya being a work of the aphorist himself, yet granting for argument's sake that is not the case one can certainly say without fear of contradiction that the bhasya is older than Sarvarthasiddhi and is the very first commentary on Tattvarthasutra; for it is not sectarian in the manner of Sarvarthasiddhi. To grasp this essential point the following three things are being considered below :

(a) The difference of style;
(b) The development of meaning;
(c) Sectarianism.

(a) The Difference of Style

One keeping before himself the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi on one and the same aphorism and studying the two from a comparative standpoint cannot help feeling that the style of the bhasya is older than that of Sarvarthasiddhi and that on each step Sarvarthasiddhi betrays a reflection of the bhasya. So long as no adequate evidence is available to the effect that there was a third commentary different from and older than the two in question, till then those comparing the bhasya with Sarvarthasiddhi cannot help saying that Sarvarthasiddhi has been composed with the bhasya before eyes. Though the style of the bhasya is lucid and thoughtful, yet if seems doubtless that from the standpoint of philosophical content the style of

Sarvathasiddhi is more developed and more learned than that of the bhasya. The writing in Sanskrit language in general and the philosophical style, cultivated in the Jaina literature in particular had reached a certain level of development by the time Sarvarthasiddhi was composed, and that level of development is not observable in the bhasya; even so, the fact that the language of one of these texts betrays a reflection of that of the other clearly indicates that the bhasya is older of the two.
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For example, the bhasya on the first aphorism of the chapter one says about the word 'samyak' that it is either a particle or a formation of the verbal root 'anca' with the prefix 'sam' added to it. On the same subject the author of Sarvarthasiddhi says : The word 'samyak' is either without an etymology - that is, impartite or it is possessed of an etymology - that is, is formed as a result of the coming together of a verbal root and a suffix; thus when the suffix 'kvip' is added to the verbal root 'anca' then we have 'samyak' in the form of 'sam+ancati'. Of these two styles of accounting for the word 'samyak' that adopted by Sarvarthasiddhi is marked by greater clarity than that adopted by the bhasya. Similarly, by way of offering the etymology of the word 'darsana' the bhasya only says that the word is a formation of the verbal root 'drsi' whereas in Sarvarthasiddhi a threefold etymology of the same has been clearly presented. Again, the bhasya offers no etymology of the words 'jnana' and 'caritra' whereas in Sarvarthasiddhi a threefold etymology of each has been clearly presented and in the end this etymology has been vindicated from the Jaina standpoint. Similarly, the bhasya contains no discussion for the question as to which of the two words 'jnana' and 'darsana' should come first in a compound, but this discussion is clearly present in Sarvarthasiddhi. Lastly, in the bhasya on the second aphorism of the chapter one there are only indicated two meanings whereas Sarvarthasiddhi offers the rationale of both the meanings while also demonstrating as to how the verbal root 'drsi' is to be taken to mean faith, a topic absent in the bhasya.

(b) The Development of Meaning

Viewed from the standpoint of meaning too Sarvarthasiddhi appears to be more modern than the bhasya. When a topic already occurs in the bhasya then Sarvarthsiddhi

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1. For example, compare the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi on 1.2, 1.12, 1.32, 2.1 etc.

presents it in an expanded form - that is, by discussing it in greater details. And the discussions pertaining to grammar as also those pertaining to the other systems of philosophy are not as frequent in the bhasya as they are in Sarvarthasiddhi. Similarly, a brief yet firm elucidation of the Jaina technical terminologies and an analytical exposition of the theses maintained and undertaken in Sarvarthasiddhi in a

manner whose barest rudiments are visible in the bhasya. The logical content of Sarvarthasiddhi is richer than tht of the bhasya and, unlike the latter, it refers to the views of the Buddhist Vijnanavadins etc. while its refutation of the rival systems is particularly pronounced. All this goes to prove that the bhasya is older than Sarvarthasiddhi.

(c) Sectarianism

As compared to the just discussed two points that related to sectarianism is more important. Thus Sarvarthasiddhi has been composed at a time after the acute difference of opinion on the questions relatted to the verity kala, the food-intake on the part of the kevalin, the renunciation of clothes, woman's competence for moksa, etc. had not only arisen but had also assumed the form of a sectarian dogmatism; on the other hand, this element of sectarian dogmatism is absent in the bhasya. In connection with all those questions where the Digambara sect comes in conflict with the dogmatized Svetambara sect the author of Sarvarthasiddhi has made the sectarian endeavour to derive out of the relevant aphorisms a meaning favourable to the Digambara sect - this even at the cost of altering the the wordings of an aphorism or assigning a far-fetched meaning to these wordings or introducing in the form of implied insertions untenable insertions from his own side or at any cost, an endeavour absent in the bhasya. From this it clearly appears that Sarvarthasiddhi has been composed after the atmosphere of sectarian conflict had been created while the bhasya is free from such an atmosphere.

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1. See the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi on 5.39, 6.13, 8.1, 9.9, 9.11, 10.9 etc.

But now the question arises as to why, if the bhasya was thus an old text, the Digambara sect discarded it. The answer should be that a refutation of the Svetambara views which the author of Sarvarthasiddhi was looking for was not there in the bhasya; not only that, in most cases the bhasya was not such as should lend support to the dogmatized Digambara sect while in many cases it rather went much against the Digambara sect. Hence leaving the bhasya on one side Pujyapada composed an independent commentary on the aphorisms; while doing so he introduced needed improvements and expansions in the reading of aphorisms and when in the course of commenting he came across a point that involved a difference of opinion he clearly upheld the Digambara position, a performance in connection with which Kundkunda seems to have served as basis for him. In view of this the Digambara sect accepted Sarvarthasiddhi as its chief authority while, naturally, the bhasya remained acceptable, only to the Svetambara sect. No Digambara monk composed a commentary on the bhasya and so it remained unavailable to the Digambara sect. On the other hand, numerous Svetambara masters have composed commentaries on the bhasya and even while at places dissenting from the views maintained in it they have treated it as authoritative on the whole; hence it is that in the eyes of the Svetambara sect it is an

authoritative text. Even so, we have to remember that the attitude now-a-days taken by the Digambara sect towards the bhasya was not that of the old Digambara masters. For even the famous Digambara masters like Aklanka have, when possible, sought to demonstrate the compatibility of

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1. The bhasya, on 9.7 and 24 mentions clothes, that on 10.7 mentions Tirthakaritirtha (=the era of a female Tirthankara's spiritual overlordship).

2. The question arises as to why those aphorisms were not altogether removed away where a far-fetched meaning had to be assigned to the wording or where - as in the case of one related to pulaka - the explanation did not fit the wording. The probable answer is that the concerned reading of aphorisms was extremely well established and a removal of aphorisms was open to the charge of unauthoritativeness.

their own view with that of the bhasya, thus indicating the authoritativeness of this text (See Rajavartika, 5.4.8); more over, they nowhere refute the bhasya making an express mention of it or seek to demonstrate its un-authoritativeness.

(b) Two Vartikas

Even the naming of texts is not an accidental act, for if search be made it too reveals a history of its own. It is taking inspiration from the feeling harboured by the preceeding and contemporary scholars as also from the current of naming process following in literature that the authors assign names to their texts. Thus the reputation of Patanjali's Mahabhasya on grammar exerted influence on numerous latter-day authors - this we can gather from the name 'bhasya' assigned by them to their works. It is likely that this very influence inspired Vacaka Umasvati to assign the name 'bhasya' to his own work. I have memory that in the Buddhist literature ther has been a text bearing the name 'Sarvarthasiddhi' - where chronological relationship with the present Sarvarthasiddhi is however unknown. But as regards the Vartikas this much is certain that in the Indian literature there once ensued the age of Vartikas and then numerous works bearing the name Vartika were composed within the fold of different sects and on different topics. The influence of the same is observable on the name assigned to the present Vartikas on Tattvartha. Thus Akalanka named his commentary 'Tattvarthavartika' - which is famous as Rajavartika, And that Vidyananda's commentary on, Tattvartha is name 'Slokavartika' in imitation of Kumarila's 'Slokavartika' admits of no doubt whatsoever.

Akalanka's 'Rajavartika' on Tattvarthsutra and Vidyananda's 'Slokavartika' on the same - both these texts have for their basis the very Sarvarthasiddhi. Had Akalanka not had Sarvarthsiddhi at his disposal his Rajavartika would

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1. In the Sankhya literature too there was a text named Rajavartika.

not have had the excellent form it actually has and had not Vidyananda had Rajavartika for his basis his Slokavartika too would not have exhibited the excellence it actually does - this much is certain. Though both Rajavartika and Slokavartika and indebted to Sarvathasiddhi - either directly or through intermediaries - they are definitely more developed than the latter. Like Uddyotakara's 'Nyayavartika' Tattvarthavartika is in prose while like Kumarila's 'Slokavartika', Dharmakirti's 'Pramanavartika' and Sarvajnatmamuni's 'Sanksepasariakavartika' 'Slokavartika' is in verse. As compared to Kumarila, a speciality of Vidyananda is that he has himself composed also a commentary on his verse-vartika. As compared to Kumarila, a speciality of Vidyananda is that he has himself composed also a commentary on his verse-vartika. Though almost the whole of Sarvarthasiddhi is incorporated within the body of Rajavartika the latter is possessed of so much novelty and brillance that even when read side by with Sarvarthasiddhi it gives no impression of being a repetitive performance. Thus all the special sentences taken from Sarvarthsiddhi of Pujyapada - who was an expert in coining definitions - have been turned into Vartikas by Akalanka through analysis and classification; at the same time, he has composed new Vartikas dealing with points worthy of expansion and with similar questions. And to all the prose-vartikas he has himself supplied a lucid explanatory comment. Thus taken as a whole, Rajavartika - even while being of the form of an explanatory comment on Sarvarthasiddhi - is in fact an altogether independent text. The level of philosophical expertise obervable in Sarvarthasiddhi attains a much greater height in Rajavartika. Thus it is a constant practice of Rajavartika that whatever statement dealing with whatever topic it has to make it does on the basis of the doctrine of anekanta (=non-extremism). Really, the doctrine of anekanta is the very key for each and every discussion undertaken in Rajavartika. Akalanka has raised the noble structure of his Rajavartika with a view to refuting the objections raised against and the deficiencies pointed out in the doctrine of anekanta by the scholars belonging to the different sects uptil his own time and with a view to presenting forth the true nature of this doctrine - this on the basis of the reputed Tattvarthasutra and with the help of Sarvarthasiddhi with its well chiselled definitions. Too much expansion of the Agamic topic observable in Sarvarthasiddhi has been reduced by the author of Rajavartika - who on his part has given exclusive prominence to the philosophical topics.

Residing in Southern India Vidyananda noted that there remained much to be answered in the attacks launched on Jaina philosophy by the numerous non-Jaina scholars - of an earlier time as of his own time; in particular, he could in no way help answering the refutation of Jaina philosophy that had been undertaken by the Mimamsaka Kum rila etc. Hence it is that he composed his Slokavartika; and we see that he has in fact realized his aim. The refutation of Mimamsa philosophy as has been undertaken - and so strongly - in Slokavartika is not to be found in any other commentary of Tattvartha. No important topic discussed in Sarvarthasiddhi and

Rajavartika has been left untouched in Slokavartika; nay, in many cases the Slokavartika discussion is more extensive than the corresponding performance of Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika. And the discussion of so many topics is altogether a novelty of Slokavartika. If the philosophical expertise of Rajavartika is characterized by elaborateness then in Slokavartika an element of subtely appears in addition to this element of elaborateness. Certainly, Rajavartika and Slokavartika are two of those few works belonging to the Jaina literature which are truely important. Among the commentatorial texts related to Tattvarthasutra that we find in the whole Svetambara literature there is not a single one which can stand comparison with Rajavartika or Slokavartika. The ordinary philosophical expertise observable in the bhasya becomes somewhat deep in Sarvarthasiddhi, it becomes particularly intensified in Rajavartha and gets

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1. Compare Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika on 1.7-8.

thoroughly entrenched in Slokavartika. A historical minded student of Rajavartika and Slokavartika can easily see that in the Southern India there came a time of philosophical learning and competition and there was developed a multifareous scholarship, a situation which we find mirrored in these two texts. These two Vartikas are an adequate means for an authoritative study of Jaina philosophy; but of these Rajavartika, being in prose, easy and detailed is such as serves whatever need might be served by the entire lot of commentary-texts. Certainly, had these two Vartikas been not composed then the excellence developed and reputation gained by the Digambara literature by the tenth century would have remained incomplete. Even if sectarian in character, these two Vartikas are in many respects such as should occupy a place of prominence in the Indian philosophical literature in general. A perusal of them throws a historical light on so many topics and and so many texts pertaining to the Buddhist and Vedicist traditions.

(c) Two Vrttis

Having got briefly familiarized with the commentaries composed on the original aphorisms it is not time to do the same about the commentaries composed on these commentaries. Two such sub-commentaries are now available in their entirety and both are Svetambarite. In brief the chief similarity of the two lies in that both take up word by word the bhasya that is Umasvati own composition and explain the same. And while explaining the bhasya always to expound the Agamic matter on the basis of the bhasya and whenever the bhasya goes against the Agama to lend support to the Agamic tradition in the end - this is the common aim of the two vrttis in question. However, inspite of this much similarity there also obtains one difference between the two. Thus one of them - which is bigger in size - is a work by one single master, while the other - the smaller one - is a joint work of three masters. At the end of the chapters

of the bigger Vrtti - about 1800 slokas in extent - we mostly find mention to the effect that it is bhasyanusarini (=one following the bhasya); but the smaller vrtti has got at the end of its different chapters mentions that are somehow or other different from one another. Thus at one place (i.e. in the closure of chapter one) we have Haribahdraviracitayam (=in the one composed by Haribhadra), at another place (i.e. at the end of the chapters two, four and five) we have Haribhadroddhrtayam (=in the one begun by Haribhadra), at a third place (i.e. at the end of chapter six) we have Haribhadrarabdhayam (=in the one begun by Haribhadra), at the fourth place (i.e. at the end of chapter seven) we have 'prarabdhayam' instead of 'arabdhayam'; again at one place (i.e. at the end of chapter six) we have Yasobhadracaryaniryudhayam (=in the one restored by the master Yasobhadra), at another place (i.e. at the end of chapter ten) we have Yasobhadrasurisisyanirvahitayam (=in the one got restored by Yasobhadrasuri's disciple); and meanwhile at one place (i.e. at the end of chapter eight) we have taccaivanyakartrkayam (=in the same composed by someone else), at another place (i.e. at the end of chapter nine) we have tasyam evanyakartrkayam (=in that itself composed by someone else).

In the view of linguistic style of these mentions and the absence of a proper compatibility among the same one is compelled to maintain that they are not made by the concerned author himself. Thus had Haribhadra himself composed the closures to his five chapters he would not have employed two words - meaning two things - viracita and uddhrta - so that one cannot unambiguously make out whether the portion concerned was a new composition by Haribhadra himself or it represented a recovery - brief or detailed - on his part of one or more old commentaries. Similarly, there is no compatibility among the closures supplied to the chapters composed by Yasobhadra; thus when there already occurs the phrase 'Yasobhadranirvahitayam' then further mention of anyakartrkayam is either useless or indicative of some other meaning.

In view of all this confusion I am led to surmise that the mentions made at the end of the chapters have been interpolated by one or more copyists at one or different times. And the basis of all these mentions is that verse-cum prose passage of Yasobhadra's disciple which he gives at the beginning of his part of composition.

The surmise that mentions in question are a later interpolation is also supported by the circumstance that the word 'dupadupikayam' found at the end of the chapters is missing in many cases. Be that as it may, for the present the following points emerge from these mentions:

(1) Haribhadra composed a commentary on Tattvartha which is of the form of a recovery of the earlier or contemporary smaller commentaries - available in their entirety or but in parts; for in this commentary these latter one have been duly incorporated.

(2) The incomplete commentary of Haribhadra was completed by Yasobhadra and his disciple on the basis of that by Gandhahastin.

(3) This commentary was named - if it was really so named and by the authors concerned - 'dupadupika' possibly because it was composed piecewise and was not a single complete work by some one author. The word dupadupika has not been seen or heard of anywhere else besides here. Maybe it is a corrupt reading, maybe it is a vernacular word.

My first guess was that the word perhaps means boat and a scholar friend of mine too had suggested that it is a corrupt reading for udupika. (=small boat). However, on

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1. The Introduction to my Gujarati Tattvarthavivarana, p.84,

further reflection it now appears that that guess and that suggestion are not to the point. And positively, the sentence written by Yasobhadra's disciple at the end rather gives the impression that this small commentary, since one part of it was composed by one author - another part by another, assumed the form of a dupadupika - i.e. a rag in patches -, so to say.

As for Siddhasena's vrtti, when it is compared with Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika then it becomes clearly apparent that it lacks the lucidity of language, the clarity of construciton, and the analysis of meaning that are characteristic of these latter texts. For this there are two reasons - viz. the different mental make-up of each different author and the circumstance that one of these texts is a dependent composition. Thus what the authors of Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika have to say about the aphorisms they say in an independent fashion. On the other hand Siddhasena, since he follows the bhasya word by word, has to move in a dependent fashion. But in spite of this much difference a perusal of Siddhasena's commentary does indeed leave on the whole two impressions on the reader's mind. Thus firstly the philosophical competence of Siddhasena's commentary is not inferior to that of Sarvarthasiddhi and Rajavartika. Certainly, in spite of a difference of style it taken as a whole exhibits the same heritage of the discussion pertaining to the Nyaya, Vaisesika, Sankhya, Yoga and Buddhist systems as the latter two texts. And secondly, even while undertaking a philosophical and logical discussion in the course of his commentary Siddhasena, like Jinabhadragani-Ksamasramana in the end powerfully vindicates Agamic tradition and the vindication gives ample demonstration of his comprehensive study of things Agamic. From a perusal of Siddhasena's commentary it appears that by his time numerous commentaries on Tattvartha had been composed. Thus sometimes while explaining the bhasya on one single aphorism he refers to even five or six alternative views on the

question under consideration, a situation that provides ground for the supposition that at the time when Siddhasena composed his commentary he had before him at least five other commentaries on Tattvartha. The developed heritage of ideas as well as language pertaining to the topics of Tattvartha that one finds exhibited in Siddhasena's commentary - from that one well gathers that by the time this commentary was composed a good amount of literature pertaining to Tattvartha had been composed and been propagated.

(d) An Incomplete Vrtti

The third vrtti on the bhasya is by Upadhyaya Yasovijaya; had this been available in its entirety then it would have served as a model of the development attained by the Indian philosophical science by the 17th - 18th centuries - this one feels like saying as one merely goes through that small portion of this commentary which alone is available at present. This portion does not cover even chapter one in its entirety, and in it - as in the just described two commentaries - explanation is offered following the bhasya word by word; even then the deeply logical treatment of problems, thoroughgoing learning, the application of hidden ideas - these features of it convey a definite idea of the logical proficiency of Yosovijaya. Had this commentary been composed by him in its entirety then one hesitates to concede that it altogether perished within a space of just 250 years; so the endeavour to be made by way of searching for it should not go waste.

(e) The Tippana of Ratnasimha

In Anekanta, Vol. 3, Kirana 1 (1939 A.D.) Pt. Jugalkishoreji has introduced a manuscript of Tattvarthadhigamasutra along with a Tippana. From that one gathers that this Tippana touches upon the original aphorisms alone. The date of the author of the Tippana - the Svetambara Ratnasimha -

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1. See Siddhasena's commentary on 5.3, p. 321.

is not known but from the language and style of the passages quoted in the introduction in question it appears that he hardly could have flourished before the 16th century. This Tippana is as yet unpublished and the manuscript consists of eight leaves.

The introduction here given to the few texts pertaining to Tattvartha that are important and worth study - that is only by way of rousing the curiosity of serious students. For as a matter of fact, the introduction to each one of these texts demands an independent essay while a joint introduction to them all demands a big volume which all lies beyond the limit here imposed at present. So content with this much introduction I

deem it proper to take leave of the reader.

Sukhlal

APPENDIX

Certain questions related to Umasvati and Tattvartha I had placed before Pt. Nathurmaji Premi and Pt. Jugalkishoreji Mukhtar. The main part of the answers that I have received from them I am giving below in their own language - this among with my own questions. Both these dignitaries are historial-minded among the present-day Digambara scholars and their competence regarding historical matters is of a high grade. So in view of the usefulness of their ideas for a specialist student they are being presented here in the form of an Appendix. What I myself have to say about a certain portion of Pt. Jugalkishoreji's answer I say below under the title 'My Own Understanding' immediately after having presented forth this answer itself:

(a) Questions

(1) Umasvati was a direct disciple - or a latter descendant - of Kundakunda - a mention to this effect you have so far come across in which oldest text, pattavali, rock-inscription etc.? To put it in other words, which text, pattavali etc. earlier than the 10th century has been so far found to mention Umasvati as a direct disciple - or a latter descendant of Kundakunda?

(2) What according to you is the date of Pujyapada? The Svetambara bhasya on Tattvartha - is it or is it not, according to you, a composition of the aphorist himself? If it is not, what are your important arguments in support of of a view like that?

(3) Has there ever been in the Digambara sect a branch named Uccanagara? And has there ever been in ancient time a community of monks belonging to the family Vacaka or bearing the title Vacaka? If there has been such a community where is it found described or mentioned?

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1. Original letters are in Hindi language.

(4) I myself doubt that Umasvati, the author of Tattvartha, was a disciple of Kundakunda - for I have not yet come across an old evidence corroborative of a view like that. Whatever evidences are actually with me in this connection are all the later than the 12th century. Hence my question posed above. Let me have whatever broad answer occurs to you.

(5) The well known text Tattvartha is a composition of Umasvati, a disciple of Kundakunda - in support of a view like this are there any evidences or mentions older than the 10th century? If there are what are

they? Is there in the the Digambara literature a mention older than the 10th century which hints or asserts that Tattvartha was composed by Umasvati, a disciple of Kundakunda?

(6) The verse "Tattvarthasutra-kartaram grdhrapicchopalaksitam" etc. - where does it occur and how old is it?

(7) Do the old commentators like Pujyapada, Akalanka, Vidyananda etc. anywhere mention Umasvati as the author of Tattvartha? If they do not, why did a view like that become current later on?

(b) Premiji's Letter

"Received your kind letter dated 6th instant. I do not in the least believe that Umasvati was a descendant of Kundakunda. The idea of his being such a descendant originated at a time when the commentaries on Tattvartha like Sarvarthasiddhi, Slokavartika, Rajavartika etc. had already been composed and the Digambara sect had thoroughly owned this text. No mention made in this connection earlier than the 10th century I have yet come across. I am convinced that hardly any of the great scholar-authors produced by the Digambara sect occupied the post of hardship at a matha or with a family of disciples. But the people who wrote out guravavalis and pattavalis had their head filled with the idea that whoever is a master or an author must be the head of some family of disciples or other. Misled by this mistaken notion they concocted information registers about all the earlier scholars and turned them into the heads of this or that family of disciples. They had no inkling as to when Umasvati and Kundakunda had actually flourished, but since both were great masters and were ancient they were brought into relationship with one another and the former made into a disciple of the latter or vice versa. They did not take the trouble of considering the circumstance that Kundakunda was a resident of the village Kundakunda of the Karnataka region like Umasvati would tour about in the region of Bihar. Really, any idea of a mutual relationship between the two is well nigh impossible.

The lineage of old masters that is given in the old texts like Srutavatara, Adipurana, Harivamsapurana, Jambudvipaprajnapti etc. does not at all mention Umasvati. Srutavatara does mention Kundakunda and there he is said to be a great commentator, but there too we find no mention of Umasvati either before or after him. This Srutavatara of Indranandin is not particularly old but it appears to be a transformation of some old work and in view of that a statement made by it is to be deemed authoritative. Darsanasara is a work of 990 A.V. and it mentions Padmanandin or Kundakunda but not Umasvati. By the time Jinasena Rajavartika and Slokavartika had already been composed but he too while eulogising scores of masters and authors makes no mention of Umasvati - for he did not treat the latter as belonging to his own tradition. One

point more. The authors of Adipurana, Harivamsapurana etc. do not mention even Kundakunda, a circumstance that is worth consideration.

My own understanding is that Kundakunda was the founder of a particular ideological sub-sect; he sought to shape Jaina religion after the mould of Vedanta. It appears that till the time of Jinasena etc. his standpoint had not won universal recognition and so he was not held in regard by these authors.

The verse "Tattvarthasutrakartaram grdhrapicchopalaksitam" etc. occurs where and how old it is - this I do not know. It is found in the original manuscripts of Tattvarthasutra. At places even Kundakunda has been given out as grdhrapiccha; and another master of the name grdhrapiccha too has been found mentioned. Please also get read out the articles on Kundakunda in Jainahitaisi, Vol. 10, p.369 and Vol. 15, No. 6.

Please also get read out the Introduction to Satpahuda.

Srutasagara has completed his commentary on Asadhara's Mahabhiseka in 1582 A.V. So he belongs to the 16th century A.V. It is he who is the author of a Vrtti on Tattvartha and a tika each on Satpahuda and Yasastilaka. I know of no other Srutasagara.

(c) Mukhtar Jugalkishoreji's letter

"To your questions a broad answer of some sort I am giving below

(1) Whatever Digambara pattavalis - different from the gurvavalis given in the texts etc. - that have been available so far appear to have been composed later than the 12th century A.V. - to say this will be correct. Of these which one is the oldest and when it was composed - about this I cannot say anything just now. In most pattavalis there is no mention at all of the date of composition etc. and it too is discovered that in some of them the closing portion or some other portion is a later interpolation.

There are so many rock-inscriptions and eulogies speaking of the relationship between Kundakunda and Umasvati but they are not all with me at present. However, I do have the collection of Jaina rock-inscriptions from Sravana-belgola - a collection which is the 28th volume of the Manikchand Granthamala. Here the incriptions numbering 40, 42, 43, 47,
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50, 105 and 108 - that is seven of them in all - mention the name of both as also their mutual relationship. Thus the first five employ the phrase 'tadanvaye' and the last the phrase 'vamse tadiye' while mentioning Umasvati as a descendant of Kundakunda. The relevant passages have also been quoted in foot-note to 'Svamisamantabhadra', p. 158. Of these, the

oldest incription is that numbered 47, it being a composition of the year 1037 of the Saka era.

(2) The date of Pujyapada is the 6th century A.V.; for further details of the matter please see Svamisamantabhadra, pp. 141-43. As for the Svetambara bhasya on Tattvartha, I am not yet convinced that it is a composition of the aphorist himself. So many doubts arise in this connection, but I am not just now prepared to mention them all.

(3) I do not yet know whether among the monks of the Digambara sect there has been a branch named Uccanagara, nor do I know anything particular about the monks belonging to the family named 'Vacaka' or bearing the title 'Vacaka'. But in the text Jinendrakayanabhyudaya in the course of its account of 'anvayavali' the adjective Vacaka has been employed for both Kundakunda and Umasvati - as is evident from the following verse occuring there :

puspadanto bhutabalirjinacandro munih punah /
kundakundamunindromasvativacakasamjnitau //

As for the relationship between Kundakunda and Umasvati, it has already been referred to in the above para 2. I am yet of the view that Umasvati was a close descendant of Kundakunda - not his direct disciple. Maybe he was a grand-disciple of the latter, and the matter has already been taken up by me in Svamisamantabhadra, pp. 158, 159. Please make a reading of two articles - viz. 'Umasvatisamaya' and 'Kundakundasamaya' - included in said the history.

(5) I have not come across any mention earlier than the 10th century according to which Umasvati was a disciple of Kundakunda.

(6) The verse Tattvarthasutrakartaram grdhrapicchopalaksitam etc. is found at the end of so many manuscripts of Tattvarthsutra, but where it first occurs and how old it is - that cannot be made out for the present.

(7) I cannot yet say anything exact about Pujyapada and Akalanka but Vidyananda has certainly mentioned Umasvati as the author of Tattvarthasutra; in Slokavartika grdhrapiccha has been given as his alternative name and in the Aptapariksa commentary etc. the name Umasvati too is perhaps mentioned.

Here is an answer to both your letters that was just now possible. A detailed consideration should be possible some time later on."

(d) My Own Understanding

The Digambara master Vidyananda belonging to the 9th-10th centuries in his auto-commentary on Aptapariksa (sloka 116) says 'tattvarthasutrakarair Umasvamiprabhrtibhih' and the same master in his auto-commentary on Tattvarthaslokavartika (p. 6 line 31) says "etena

grdhrapicchacaryaparyantamunisutrena vyabhicarita nivarita". These two statements indicte that the text named Tattvartha is a composition of Umasvati and that Umasvati and Grdhrapicchacarya are one and the same person - this seems to be the view of Pt. Jugalkishoreji. But the view is open to considertion and so it will be proper if I briefly place forth my own understanding of the matter.

In the first statement the adjective Tattvarthasutrakara (=The author of Tattvartha aphorisms) qualifies the masters like Umasvati etc. and not Umasvati alone. So if it is understood as Mukhtarji suggests then its net meaning ought to be that the masters like Umasvati etc. are an author of Tattvartha-sutra. Now if the word Tattvarthasutra here stands for the text named Tattvarthadhigama then the net meaning in question proves to be defective, for the text named Tattvarthadhigama is understood to be a composition by just Umasvati and not one by the numerous masters like Umasvati etc. So the word Tattvartha occuring in the adjective in question should stand not just for the text designated Tattvartha but for the totality of texts expounding the fundamental principles laid down by the Jina. And not the net meaning of the statement in question would be referring to the masters like Umasvati etc. who composed texts expounding the fundamental principles laid down by the Jina. Then in the light of this net meaning we can only say that in the eyes of Vidyananda Umasvati too was the author of some text expounding the fundamental principles laid down by the Jina.

It might well be that in the eyes of Vidyananda this text was that named Tattvarthadhigama, but the statement in question unless supported by additional evidences does not directly yield this idea. So this statement of Vidyananda occurring in Aptapariksa directly allows us to gather only this much that Umasvati must have composed some text dealing with the Jaina fundamental principles.

The second of the statements above referred to occurs in connection with the inference-based discussion seeking to prove that the first aphorism of the text named Tattvarthadhigama - an aphorism dealing with the pathway to moksa - is composed by a personage who is omniscient and is devoid of passion. The subject is 'aphorism dealing with the pathway to moksa', the probandum 'being composed by a personage who is omniscient and is devoid of passion', the probans 'being an aphorism'. It is while dispelling the logical defect vyabhicara (=the case of too extended a probans) which might possibly vitiate the probans in question that Vidyananda makes the statement 'etena' etc. Now the logical defect vyabhicara possibly occurs in a locus that is different from the subject concerned. And in the present case the subject is that Tattvartha-aphorism dealing with the pathway to moksa. So in the eyes of Vidyananda the aphorism composed by the sages down to Grdhrapicchacarya - an aphorism which is here a possible locus of the logical defect vyabhicara - must be different from Umasvati's first aphorism dealing with the pathway to moksa - an aphorism which is here the subject - this is something which an

expert in logic is hardly to be told about. Since in Vidyananda's eyes Umasvati's aphorism acting as the subject is different from the aphorism possibly acting as a locus of the logical defect vyabhicara, that is why, when after dispelling this logical defect he seeks to dispel that called asiddhata (=the case of an impossible probans), he usese the words 'prakrtasutre'. 'Prakrta' means that which is under consideration - so that prkrtasutre means Umasvati's aphorism dealing with the pathway to moksa. Thus while dispelling the logical defect asiddhata he assigns the adjective 'prakrta' to the aphorism and does not do so while dispelling the logical defect vyabhicara; nor does he say that vyabhicara does not characterize the aphorism which is here acting as the subjet. Nay, he on the contrary clearly says that vyabhicara does not characterize the aphorisms composed by the sages down to Grdhrapicchacarya. All this incontrovertibly proves that in the eyes of Vidyananda Grdhrapiccha and Umasvamin were one and the same person then he would not have referred to the latter by the namer Umasvamin at one place and by a mere adjective grdhrapiccha at another; rather at the latter place he would have added the word Umasvamin to the adjective grdhrapiccha. If this my understanding of the two statements in question is not mistaken then the net situation is that in the eyes of Vidyananda Umasvamin could well have been the author of the text named Tattvarthasutra but Grdhrapiccha and Umasvamin must have been two different persons.

The construction of the adjectives like grdhrapiccha, balakapiccha, mayurapiccha etc. became current because of that advocacy of the renunciation of clothes - an advocacy rooted in the endorsement of utter nakedness. So in case Vidyananda was definitely of the view that Umasvamin was a Digambara, then he must have employed along with the latter's name one of the latter-day adjectives grdhrapiccha etc. One must therefore conclude that Vidyananda has not at all indicated whether Umasvamin was a Svetambara, a Digambara or an adherent of some third sect.

Sukhlal

HINTS FOR SPECIAL STUDY

A student or a teacher, Jaina or otherwise, desirous of making an authoritative special study of Jaina philosophy asks as to what one book is there which can be studied in brief or in details and whose study should familiarise one with all the points related to the topics dealt with in Jaina philosophy. By way of answering this question one cannot refer to any other book except Tattvartha. It is on account of this capacity of Tattvartha that now a days here and there it occupies the foremost place in the curriculum of Jaina-philosophy. Even so, the general technique of study that is currently pursued in this connection does not seem to be much fruitful. So it will not be out of place to offer here a few hints about the requisite technique of study.

Generally speaking, the Svetambara students of Tattvartha do not go through its Digambara commentaries and the Digambara students of it do not go through its Svetambara commentaries. The cause of this over all situation might be a narrow outlook, a sectarian prejudice, an absence of relevant information, or whatever else. But if this impression of mine is correct than as a result of this over all situation how much narrow remains the knowledge of a student, how much unsatisfied remains his curiosity, how much blunted remains his capacity for a comparative study and a weighing of issues, and hence how little authoritativeness attaches to what is learnt of Tattvarthasutra - to see all this one need not go much far away from the students coming out of any Jaina institute whatsoever functioning at present. If the path of knowledge, the field of inquisitiveness, the investigation of truth are vitiated by a closed-door attitude - that is, by a narrowness of outlook and a sectarian befuddlement - then the aim set forth remains altogether unrealized. Those who get afraid by a mere idea of comparative study - they are either doubtful as to the authoritativeness or strength of their position, or they lack energy to face a rival position, or they hesitate to accept a true position after having given up a false one, or they are not possessed of the intellectual power and patience adequate for vindicating even a true position of theirs. The very meaning of knowledge is that one broadens one's spiritual vision by overcoming narrowmindedness, restrictions and obstacles and delves deep into what is true. That is why I am below placing forth before teachers a technique of study. They are not to treat it as the last word but to introduce in it whatever improvement is suggested by their own experience; really, it is they who are to get themselves readied - by employing as instrument the students seeking instruction from them.

(1) First take up an original aphorism and assign to it whatever meaning is easily possible.

(2) Of the two commentaries the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi treat one as main, teach it first and the other immediately afterwards.

In connection with this teaching the following particular points must be brought to the notice of students :

(a) What topics are similarly treated in the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi? And in spite of this similarity what difference has arisen there as to language and the style of exposition?

(b) What topics are present in one but not in the other or are present in the latter in an altered form? What topics of one are left out in the other and what topics are newly introduced in the latter? How to account for this state of affairs?

(c) When in the line with the just offered suggestions both the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi have been analyzed out, then the specially competent students should be inspired to look for points of comparison with the other systems of Indian philosophy - in this connection following the procedure adopted in the 'Introduction'. As for the moderately competent students, they should be provided with a good number of interesting points of information - so that they are in a position to take up the task of comparison some time afterwards.

(d) After they are given a lesson in line with the just offered suggestions the students should be asked to read out for themselves Rajavartika related to the aphorism under study. They on their part, after they have completed the reading, should note down on a paper the questions to be asked and the points needing clarification and these questions and these points needing clarification and these questions and these points should be placed before the teacher the next day. At the time of discussing them the teacher should, as far as possible, make the students themselves say in the course of a mutual exchange of thought all that he ought to have said (in this connection himself acting as a mere neutral helper). The aim is to polish out the understanding of the students so that they can see for themselves as to what points of the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi have been left out in Rajavartika, what points have been additionally introduced in it, what is new about these additional points.

(3) After the special study of the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi is thus buttressed by a perusal of Rajavartika, then a catalogue should be made of the points that are absent in all these three texts, are worthy of attention and are discussed in Slokavartika; and then as might be convenient these points should be taught to the students or they should be asked to read them out for themselves. All this done, it should be explained to the students as to how much and what advancement has been gradually made by the four commentaries in question and is doing so how much profit each has derived from the other systems of philosophy - and how much contribution has been made by each commentary to the other systems of philosophy.
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(4) If for some reasons the self-reading or teaching of Rajavartika is not possible, then too a catalogue should be made of such points of Slokavartika as are also well discussed in Rajavartika and are of extreme importance from the Jaina standpoint; and these points at least should be taught to the students. That is to say, the two texts the bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi must be a compulsory part of the curriculum and so also the specially important topics of Rajavartika and Slokavartika that are not taken up in these two; all the remaining topics ought to be an optional part of the curriculum. For example, the discussion in

Rajavartika of saptabhangi (=the doctrine of sevenfold predication) and anekantavada and the discussion in Slokavartiaka of sarvajna (=omniscient), apta (the authoritative personage), jagatkarta (=ths world-creator) etc., nayavada, prthvibhramana (=rotation of the earth). Similarly, from within Siddhasena's commentary on Tattvarthabhasya portions dealing with specially important topics should be selected out and they too should be taught. For example, the commentary to the bhasya on 1.1, 5.29, 31 etc.

(5) Before starting his teaching the teacher should give his students an interesting talk introducing them to the interior and exterior of Tattvartha, and thus should create in them an interest for the subject. And from time to time as occasion arises suitable talks should be organized with a view to drawing the attention of the students to the history and the gradual evolution of the different systems of philosophy.

(6) As regards teaching the chapters three and four devoted to an account of geography, astronomy, heavens and hells, there are two views strongly opposite of one another. Thus one view insists that a teaching of these chapters be denied a place in the curriculum while the other view feels that without teaching them a special study of the philosophy propounded by an omniscient personage remains but incomplete. Both these are extreme view. So the teacher while teaching these chapters should seek to introduce a change in the outlook related to them - this is the only course proper for our time. All the accounts contained in the chapters three and four have come from an omniscient personage, they cannot be altered in the least, the present-day scientific discoveries and views, since they go against the Jaina scriptural texts, are all false and worth discarding - instead of offering these grounds by way of emphasizing the desirability of teaching the chapters in question, if they are taught from a historical standpoint laying bare as to what views pertaining to heavens, hells, geography and astronomy were once current among the Aryan systems of philosophy and what stand the Jaina system takes vis-a-vis these views then much worth learning remains in the disciplines recommended to be thrown aside as false and a new field of inquisitiveness is created for the search of truth. And it is thus that one is inspired to test on the touchstone of intellect whatever is in fact true.

(7) Keeping in view the high grade students and researchers I might offer two more suggestions. First adopting a historical standpoint one should find out as to what ancient Svetambara and Digambara texts contain the source-point of the topics occuring in Tattvarthasutra and its bhasya; and then one should make a comparative study of the two versions of the topics in question. Secondly, one should find out as to what the Buddhist Pitakas and certain Mahayana texts have to say regarding those very topics and how they develop them. At the same time, one should seek in this connection a direct information from the original aphorisms and bhasyas of

all the Vedicist Systems of philosophy; and here too the relevant points of comparison should be noted. Having done so I have myself learnt from experience that in the field of philosophy and ethics the Indian soul is but one. Be that as it may, the full significance of Tattvartha cannot be grasped without undertaking a specialized study of this sort.

(8) If Tattvartha is to be taught with the help of the present English explanation itself, then the teacher should take the aphorisms one by one and first orally explain all that is there. And when the students have thus well assimilated the material they should be asked to read out the present explanation for themselves. With a view to making sure that the students have really grasped the points the teacher should put to them a question or two.

(a) When with the help of the present explanation aphorisms uptil the end of a particular topic or uptil the end of a chapter have been taught, then the teacher should neatly place before the students the relevant points of comparison - in this connection following the procedure adopted in the Introduction.

Certainly, if lessons are given in line with the suggestions just offered then an additional burden is imposed on the teacher, but unless such a burden is assumed enthusiastically and intelligently the teacher cannot attain a high status and the student community too remains poor in thought. So it is incumbent on the teachers that they should make the best possible preparations of theirs it is indispensable that they should prepare the mind of their students. From the standpoint of acquiring pure knowledge all this is of course indispensable but it is also indispensable from the practical standpoint of attaining a status of equality with others and at a time when the current of knowledge is flowing all around as mightily as at present.

Sukhlal

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

The Subject-matter under Investigation

Infinite is the number of living beings and all without exception desire happiness. And even though not all share the same notion of happiness it is possible to divide into two classes the living beings and the happiness appropriate to them - keeping in view the lesser or greater development attained by these beings. The first class comprises those beings with a lesser development whose notion of happiness is confined to but external means. On the other hand, the second class comprises those beings with a higher development who, not identifying happiness with the acquisition of external or physical means, identify it with the attainment of meritorious spiritual qualifications alone.

Here the happiness envisaged by one class differs from that envisaged by the other in that the former is dependent on what is other than oneself, the latter dependent on oneself alone.

The happiness dependent on what is not oneself is called kama or worldly enjoyment, that dependent on oneself alone moksa or disentanglement from worldliness. Kama and moksa - these two alone are the possible purusarthas or goals of human aspiration, for nothing save them can be a thing chiefly aimed at by a being. Thus when artha or economic possession and dharma or religious conduct are enumerated among the purusarthas they are viewed not as something chiefly aimed at but as means to kama and moksa respectively. Certainly, artha is the chief means of kama, dharma that of moksa. The treatize under consideration has moksa for its chief subject-matter. Hence the author divides into three departments the dharma that is the means of moksa and thus refers to it in his first aphorism.
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Samyak-darsana or right inclination, samyak-jnana or right cognition, samyak-caritra or right conduct - these three combined are the means of moksa. 1

In this aphorism there is a bare indication of the means of moksa. Although the nature and the possible sub-types of each are in the sequel going to be described in details here is a brief account of their essential nature.

The Nature of Moksa

The perfect spiritual development resulting from an absence of bondage and of its causes is called moksa. That is to say, the supreme level of knowledge and of the state of dispassion is moksa.

The Nature of the Means of Moksa

That qualification or power whose development brings about a realization of truth-that is, of the nature of things as they are-or whose development brings about an inclination towards valid discrimination between what is worthy of rejection and what is worthy of acceptance is samyak-darsana or right inclination. A valid comprehension of the fundamental verities like soul etc. - a comprehension arrived at through the instrumentality of naya and pramana - is samyak-jnana or right cognition.

The free enjoyment of one's own nature that results from a cessation of all defiled mental states, that is, of all attachment and aversion, and of all yoga - a cessation preceded by right cognition - is samyak-caritra or right conduct.

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1. The cognition which is expressible through words-that is, in which a thing is reflected in the form of a subject and a predicate - is naya, the cognition in which a thing is validity apprehended - completely or in part without bifurcation into a subject and a predicate is pramana. For further details see chapter one, aphorism 6; also Nyayavatara vv 29-30 Gujarati translation.

2. Yoga stands for activity, be it of a mental, vocal or bodily type.

3. A renunciation of the vices like violence etc. is usually called samyak-caritra. That is so because through it is brought about the cessation of all

The Concomitance of the Means of Moksa

When all the above three means are available in a perfect form only then is complete moksa possible, never otherwise. So long as imperfection vitiates even a single of these three means complete moksa remains an impossibility. For example, in the thirteenth gunasthana samyak - darsana and samyak - jnana are available in a perfect form and yet there is no complete moksa - that is, no realization of the state of disembodiment - because samyak - carita is here still imperfect; on the other hand, there is possibility of complete moksa in the fourteenth gunasthana because here there is available perfect caritra in the form of the state of sailesi, an availability that signifies the perfection of all the three means in question.

The Necessary Concomitance

Of the above three means the first two - i.e. samyak-darsana and samyak-jnana necessarily go together.

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attachment and aversion while such a cessation automatically results in a renunciation of the vices and an implementation of the great vows.

1. In the thirteenth gunasthana caritra is perfect in so far as it is of the form of a state of dispassion, but it is imperfect because perfect caritra is supposed to comprise both a state of dispassion and an absence of yoga. Perfect caritra thus conceived is available in the fourteenth gunasthana and it immediately brings about the state of disembodiedness. The state of sailesi is that particular state of a soul in which as a result of the supreme performance of meditation there comes about a Meru-like absence of all wavering. For further details see-Hindi Dusara Karmagrantha - p. 30.

2. There is also a view according to which darsana and jnana go together not necessarily but only optionally. On this view it is well possible that there is no jnana at the time when darsana takes its rise. The meaning is that in the case of the gods, the hellish beings, the animals and certain human beings it so happens that even when they come to acquire samyaktva (=samyak-darsana) they are devoid of the special scriptural cognition - i.e. of cognition of the texts like Acaranga etc. which go to constitute the class called Anga. Thus according to this view the absence of jnana possibly obtaining at the time of the rise of darsana is the absence of the special scriptural cognition.

Just as the heat and light of the sun cannot be found in isolation from each other so also do samyak-darsana and samyak-jnana; but it is not necessary for these two to be accompanied by samyak-carita, for even in the absence of samyak-carita, samyak-darsana and samyak-jnana can be present there for a while. On the other hand, it is a demand of the law of successive progress that samyak-caritra must necessarily be preceded by samyak-darsana and samyak-jnana.

Question : If moksa consists in a development of spiritual qualifications and its means like samyak-darsana etc. too consist in a development of such and such spiritual qualifications then where is the difference between moksa and its means?

Answer : There is no such difference at all.

Question : If so, then how to speak in this connection of the relation of means and end - that is, how to say that moksa is an end while the triple jewel in the form of samyak-darsana etc. is its means? For certainly, the relation of means and end can obtain only between things that are mutually different?

Answer : When it is said that the relation of means and end obtains

between the triple jewel and moksa it is done from the standpoint of the state of the seeker not from that of the state of the accomplished. For the seeker has for his aim moksa which is of the form of the triple jewel like samyak-darsana etc. brought to perfection, and the attain-

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As against this the view according to which darsana and jnana go together necessarily is purported to maintain that the same wrong cognition of the form of mati etc. which was present there before the rise of darsana is transformed into right cognition of the form of mati etc. - as soon as right darsana takes its rise with wrong darsana coming to a stop. On this view, by right cognition is to be understood not just the special scriptural cognition but whatever type and whatever quantity of cognition of determinate form that might be present there at the time of the rise of samyaktva (=samyak-darsana).

ment of moksa thus conceived takes place through a gradual development of the triple jewel. The present treatize is meant for the seeker not for the accomplished. Hence it speaks of the difference obtaining between an end and its means, a difference that is certainly of use to a seeker.

Question : In the worldly life we actually see that happiness is attained through means like wealth, woman, progeny etc., why then recommend not this happiness but that which is of the form of moksa and as such is beyond the ken of vision?

Answer : Moksa is recommended because it yields real happiness. The worldly life, on the other hand, yields happiness no doubt but that is pseudo - happiness not real happiness.

Question : Moksa yields real happiness while the worldly life yields pseudo-happiness - how is it so?

Answer : The worldly happiness arises through the fulfilment of desire. But it is the very nature of desire that as soon as - rather even before - one of them is fulfilled hundreds of others crop up. Now it is impossible for all these new desires to be fulfilled, and even if that be possible there will meanwhile arise thousands of other desires whose fulfillment will remain certainly impossible. All this means that in the worldly life the unhappiness born of the non-fulfillment of desires always weighs heavier than the happiness born of the fulfilment thereof. Hence it is that the happiness in question is called pseudo-happiness. On the other hand, moksa is so conditioned that it involves an absence of all desires and an emergence of natural contentment. This moksa time happiness born of contentment is alone happiness, real happiness. 1

The definition of Samyak-darsana :

The inclination towards validity determining the nature of things is

samyak-darsana. 2

The causes of the origination of samyak-darsana :

That (i.e. samyak-darsana) originates either by nature, that is, in the automatic course of affairs - or through attainment - that is, through external means like instruction etc. 3

The inclination towards validity cognizing the nature of the things of the world might be the result of a worldly ambition or of a spiritual one. That curiosity to cognize the nature of things which is aimed at fulfilling a worldly passion like wealth, honour, etc. is not samyak-darsana, for that brings about not moksa but an entanglement in worldliness. On the other hand, that inclination towards determining the nature of things which is aimed at sheer spiritual satisfaction, spiritual development is verily samyak-darsana.

The Definitive and Practical Standpoints Differentiated

That qualitative transformation of a soul - resulting from spiritual development - which is of the form of an inclination towards validly cognising all that is cognizable, renouncing what is worthy of rejection, taking up what is worthy of acceptance is samyak-darsana as viewed from the definitive standpoint. On the other hand, the faith in things religious resulting from the inclination in question is samyaktva (=samyak-darsana) as viewed from the practical standpoint.

The Distinguishing Marks of Samyaktva (=Samyak-darsana)

The distinguishing marks of samyak-darsana are understood to be five viz. prasama or spiritual calmness, samvega or spiritual agitation, nirveda or spiritual detachment, anukampa or compassion, astikya or religiosity. Here (i) the calming down of the vices the wrong insistence etc. that result from a misplaced partisanship of philosophical views that is prasama; (ii) the fear of worldly bondage - that is samvega; (iii) the lessening of attachment towards things worldly - that is nirveda; (iv) the desire to remove the misery of those in misery - that is anukampa; (v) the belief in the existence of entities like soul etc. which are supersensuous and yet rationally demonstrable - that is astikya.

The Different Causes

As soon as the level of spiritual evolution capable of producing samyak-darsana is reached samyak-darsana makes its appearance. However, in the case of one soul this appearance requires the aid of some external means, in the case of another one it does not. It is only too wellknown that one person learns an art like sculpture etc. with the aid of an instructor etc., while another one does the same by himself and without

requiring the aid of someone else. Thus even though the internal cause of samyak-darsana is identical in all cases the present aphorism divides it into that originating by nature, and that originating through attainment keeping in view its dependence or non-dependence on an external means. And the external means in question are of various types. Thus one person attains samyak-darsana through a mere sight of some religious article like image etc., another one does so through listening to the instructions of the preceptor, another one through reading or listening to the scriptural texts, another one through entering into the company of saintly personages.

The Order of Origination

Experiencing various sorts of miseries in the beginningless course of its worldly career a worthy soul sometimes comes to attain such a purified qualitative transformation as is unprecedented for it. The attainment of this purified qualitative transformation is called apurva-karana or accomplishing the unprecedented. Apurva-karana puts and end to that acuteness of attachment and aversion which is a hindrance to the partisanship of right ascertainment - to the agraha or insistence on satya or truth. And as soon as this acuteness of attachment and aversion disappears the soul concerned becomes wide awake to the reception of truth. It is this spiritual awakening that is called samyaktva (=samyak-darsana). 2-3

The fundamental verities mentioned by name :

Jiva or soul, ajiva or non-soul, asrava or inflow, bandha or bondage, samvara or protection, nirjara or cleansing off and moksa or emancipation - these are the fundamental verities. 4

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1. For an elucidation of the order of origination see Hindi usara Karmagrantha p. 7 and the introduction to cautha Karmagrantha p. 13.

In many texts punya or spiritual merit and papa or spiritual demerit are counted among the fundamental verities which thus total nine. But here their number is seven because here both punya and papa are included in the verity asrava or the verity bandha. And the inclusion in question is to be understood as follows. Both punya and papa are of two types viz. a dravya-type i.e. physical type and a bhava-type i.e. mental type. The auspicious Karmic matter is punya of the physical type, the inauspicious Karmic matter is papa of the physical type. Hence punya and papa of the physical type are included in the verity bandha - for it is the Karmic matter adjoined to a soul or the specific adjunction of the Karmic matter to a soul that is called bandha of the physical type. On the other hand, the auspicious mental endeavour that causes punya of the physical - type is punya of the mental type while the inauspicious mental endeavour that causes papa of the physical type is papa of the mental type - and these

two also are included in the verity bandha, for it is a soul's state of the form of passionate mental endeavour - a state which causes bondage that is called bandha of the mental type.

Question : The five verities from asrava upto moksa are, unlike jiva and ajiva, neither independent nor beginningless and endless. For they are simply either a possible state of a jiva or a possible state of an ajiva. Why then are they counted as fundamental verities along with jiva and ajiva?

Answer : That precisely is how things stand. This is to say that in the present context by a fundamental verity is to be understood not an entity that is beginningless, endless and

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1. What the Buddhist philosophy understands by the four aryasatyas (or noble truths) viz. duhkha or misery, samudya or the cause of misery, nirodha or the cessation of misery, and marga or the path to the cessation of misery, what the Samkhya and Yoga philosophies understand by the four vyuhas (or arrays) - viz. heya or that to be rejected, heyahetu or the cause of that to be rejected, hana or rejection, and hanopaya or the means of rejection, and what the Nyaya philosophy understands by the term artha (or object worthy of investigation) - the same is understood by the Jaina philosophy by the five of the verities here catalogued - viz. those from asrava upto moksa.

independent but an entity whose cognition is useful in attaining moksa. Certainly, moksa being the chief subject-matter of the present treatize only those things are here enumerated as fundamental verities whose cognition is extremely necessary on the part of those desirous of knowing about moksa.

As for moksa it is the chief end to be aimed at and so it goes without saying that without knowing it as also its causes one desirous of attaining moksa cannot take up the path leading to moksa. Similarly, in case such a one does not know the entity that stands opposed to moksa or that which causes this entity he cannot proceed on his chosen path without stumbling. And one desirous of attaining moksa has to know first of all that if he is competent to attain moksa then what are the entities that share features characteristic of him and what are those that do not do so. It is in order to make this knowledge available that the seven fundamental verities have been mentioned. By mentioning the verity jiva it is made out as to who is competent to attain moksa. By mentioning the verity ajiva it is indicated that there is also in the world an entity which being inanimate is incompetent to receive instruction regarding the path leading to moksa. By mentioning the verity bandha is pointed out the entity that stands opposed to moksa, by mentioning the verity asrava that which causes this entity. By the verity samvara is indicated the cause of moksa, by the

verity nirjara the procedural order of moksa. 4

The niksepas or manners of positing indicated by name :

They - that is, samyak-darsana etc. on the one hand, jiva etc. on the other - are subjected to the process of niksepa or nyasa (i.e. positing) or vibhaga (i.e. classification) in the form of nama or name, sthapana or representation, dravya or potency, and bhava or reality. 5

All practical intercourse or exchange of knowledge has language for its chief instrument. And a language is made
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up of words. Now one and the same word is employed to yield several meanings depending on the purpose or context. In any case, four meanings at least are had by each and every word. It is these four meanings that are the four classifications of its general meaning. And these classifications are what are called niksepas or nyasas. Knowing them one finds it easy to follow the intention of a speaker. Hence it is that in the present aphorism there is made mention of those four niksepas pertaining to meaning, so that it might be clearly specified as to what meaning - and no other - is to be assigned to the words standing for samyak-darsana etc. that are of the form of the pathway to moksa and for jiva etc. that are of the form of the fundamental verities. Here are the four niksepas in question : (i) The meaning that is not derived etymologically but is gathered on the basis of the convention set up by the father, mother or some other people is meaning of the type called nama-niksepa; for example, a person who possesses no qualification appropriate to a sevaka (Sanskrit for servant) but whom somebody has given the name Sevaka. (ii) The thing which is a copy, statue or picture of the real thing or which is conventionally made to stand for this real thing is what signifies meaning of the type called sthapana-niksepa; for example, the picture, photograph or statue of a sevaka. (iii) The thing which is an earlier or a later form - that is, an earlier or a later condition - of the thing signifying bhava-niksepa is what signifies meaning of the type called dravya-niksepa; for example, a person who, though not performing a seva (Sanskrit for service) for the present, has done so in the past or is going to do so in the future. (iv) The thing which properly satisfies the ground of etymology or the ground of usage of the corresponding word is what signifies meaning of the type called bhava-niksepa; for example, a person who is performing acts appropriate to a sevaka.

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1. Briefly speaking words are of two types-yaugika or composite and rudha or conventional. 'Cook', 'goldsmith' etc. are yaugika words, 'cow', 'horse' etc. are rudha words. Thus he who cooks is a cook, he who fabricates things out of gold is a goldsmith.

Also in the case of the words standing for samyak-darsana etc. that

constitute the pathway to moksa and for jiva etc. that constitute the fundamental verities it is possible to discover four niksepas each. But in the present context they are to be taken in their bhava-form (i.e. as yielding meaning that corresponds to bhava-niksepa).

The means of knowing the fundamental verities :

Things are cognised through the instrumentality of pramanas and nayas. 6

The Difference Between the Pramanas and Nayas

Both a naya and a pramana are certainly of the form of cognition but they differ from each othe inasmuch as the former acquaints us with but one aspect of a thing while the latter with a number of them. That is to say, a thing is possessed of numerous properties and when it is ascertained on the basis of but one of these properties the ascertainment concerned - e.g. the ascertainment, on the basis of the property eternity, in the form 'A thing - e.g. a soul, a lamp or the like - is eternal' - is naya. On the other hand, when

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Here the act of cooking and that of fabricating things out of gold constitute the ground of etymology for the words 'cook' and 'goldsmith' respectively. That is to say, the words in question are formed on the very basis of the acts in question - which is why such an act is called the ground of etymology for such a word. Applying the same rule to Sanskrit words we are to understand that the words like pacaka (cook, lit. he who cooks,) kumbha-kara (Potter. lit. he who makes a jar) etc. have for their ground of etymology the acts like cooking, making a jar etc. The idea is that in the case of yaugika words the concurned ground of etymology is also the ground of usage, but that is not so in the case of rudha words. For the rudha words are employed not on the basis of their etymology but on the basis of convention. Thus the words like 'cow' (Sanskrit go), 'horse' (Sanskrit asva) etc. have got no particular etymology and even if they are somehow assigned an etymology the fact remains that they are employed on the basis of convection, not on the basis of an etymology. In the case of the rudha words like 'cow', 'horse' etc. the ground of employment is the corresponding form or class-character; hence in their case this form or class-character is called not the ground of etymology but the ground of usage.

a thing is ascertained on the basis of numerous properties the ascertainment concerned - e.g. the ascertainment, on the basis of the properties eternity, transcience etc. in the form 'A thing - e.g. a soul, a lamp or the like - is multiformed because of its multifarious properties like eternity, transcience etc.' - is pramana. In other words, a naya is but a part of the corresponding pramana while a pramana is but an

aggregate of the corresponding nayas; for a naya grasps a thing from but one viewpoint while a pramana does the same from numerous viewpoints. 6.

The mention of certain 'gateways to consideration' conducive to a detailed knowledge of the fundamental verities :

Things like samyak-darsana etc. are known on the basis of (questions relating to) nirdesa or mention, svamitva or possessorship, sadhana or instrument, adhikarana or location, sthiti or duration and vidhana or classification; again, on the basis of (questions relating to) sat or existence, sankhya or number, ksetra or field of occupation, sparsana or field of touch, kala or time, antara or interval, bhava or condition resulting from the presence or otherwise of karma and alpabahutva or relative numerical strength. 7-8.

In the case of yaugika words (standing as an adjective) the meaning of the form of the ground of etymology should be treated as bhava-niksepa, while in the case of rudha words (standing as a class-name) the meaning of the form of the ground of usage should be so treated.

1. To penetrate into a thing means to acquire knowledge concerning it and to consider over it. The chief means of doing so is to raise various questions relating to it. The better these questions are answered the greater will be the penetration into the thing in question. Hence it is questions that are the gateways to a penetration into things - that is, to the process of reaching their depth to means of consideration. Thus the phrase 'gateway to consideration (=investigation), should be taken to stand for questions. In the scriptural texts (=theoretical treatizes) they are called anuyogadvaras; here anuyoga means interpretation or elucidation, dvara means question (so that the whole phrase means questions relating to interpretation or elucidation).

Whenever a person, big or small, who is eager to gain knowledge sees or hears about a new thing - say, an aeroplane - his curiosity is aroused and he raises various questions regarding this thing hitherto unseen or unheard of. Thus he raises questions as to the name of this thing, its colour and form, its owner, its means of construction, its seating quarter, its maximum durability, its types - and receiving an answer to his questions augments his stock of knowledge. Similarly an internally oriented person, when he hears about the pathway to moksa or about the spiritual verities that are worthy of rejection or acceptance raises various questions regarding these all and through them augments his stock of knowledge. It is this idea that is expressed in the present two aphorisms. For example, the following is a brief consideration of samyak-darsana made on the basis of the fourteen questions - i.e. questions relating to nirdesa etc. catalogued in the aphorisms in question

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(1) Nirdesa or mention - i.e. svarupa or nature - samyak-darsana is of the nature of an inclination towards truth. (2) Svamitva or possessorship - i.e. adhikaritva or the state of being authorized - one authorized to attain samyak-darsana must be a soul, not a not-soul, for it is a property or state of but soul. (3) Sadhana or instrument - i.e. karana or cause - the subsidence, the destruction cum subsidence and the destruction of the darsanamohaniya karma - these three are the internal causes of samyak-darsana. On the other hand, its external causes are numerous - e.g. the scriptural knowledge, the recall of a past birth, the sight of an image, the company of saintly personages. (4) Adhikarana or locus - i.e. adhara or substratrum - the substratum of samyak-darsana is a soul, for being a state of soul it resides in a soul.

Since samyaka-darsana is a property its possessor and locus are not mutually different, but when consideration is bestowed on the possessor and the locus of a substance like soul etc. the two can well be mutually different. For example, viewed from a practical angle the possessor (i.e. owner) of a soul must be another soul but its locus must be the place where it is seated or its own body - (5) Sthiti or duration i.e. kala-maryada or temporal limit - the minimum duration of samyak-darsana is a period measuring less than a muhurta, its maximum duration a period that is possessed of a beginning but is endless. All the three types of samyakta (=samyak-darsana) originate at a particular time and so they are all possessed of a beginning or an early limit. However, the aupasamika and the ksayopasamika types (i.e. the first two types) do not endure for ever and so they two are also possessed of an end or a later limit; on the other hand, the ksayika type (i.e. the third type), when once born, never disappears, and so it is without an end. It is on the basis of these considerations that samyak-darsana has to be generally under-stood as 'possessed of both a beginning and an end', and 'possessed of a beginning but of no end.' (6) Vidhana or classification - i.e. prakara or type - samyaktva (=samyak-darsana) is of three types - aupasamika, ksayopasamika, ksayika. (7) Sat or existence : the property samyaktva qua something existent is present there in all the souls but its manifestation as such is possible only in the 'worthy' souls (i.e. souls destined to attain moksa) not in the unworthy ones (i.e. souls destined not to attain moksa). (8) Sankhya or number : the number of samyaktva is the same as the number of those who have attained it. Uptil now ananta (=infinite) souls have attained samyaktva and in future too ananta of them will do so. Viewed thus samyak-darsana is ananta of them will do so. Viewed thus samyak-darsana is ananta in number. (9) Ksetra or field of occupation : the field of occupation of samyak-darsana is not the total lokakasa (i.e. that portion of space which is the locus of the portion of the universe called loka), but only this total divided by the number asankhyata (=innumrable). Whether we consider the case of one soul that has attained

samyak-darsana or that of the ananta souls that have done so the field of occupation of samyak-darsana will turn out to be the total loka divided by asankhyata. For even the field collectively occupied by all the souls that have attained samyak-darsana measures but the total loka divide by asankhyata. Of course, there will be found a difference inasmuch as the field collectively occupied by all the souls that have attained samyak-darsana is bigger than that occupied by one such soul, for the number asankhyata is itself of asankhyata types all mutually differing in quantity. (10) Sparsana or field of touch - by touching is to be understood the touching of those space-units that surround the portion of space acting as the locus of the thing concerned. Thus the field of occupation covers only that part of space which acts as the locus of the thing concerned, while the field of touch covers also those space-units which surround the space acting as locus and so are touched by the thing concerned. Herein lies the difference between the field of occupation and the field of touch. In the case of samyak-darsana its field of touch too would measure the total loka divided by asankhyata, but it extent will be somewhat bigger than that of the concerned field of occupation inasmuch as the former field also includes the borderline units that surround the latter field. (11) Kala or time : When the period of samyak-darsana is calculated in the case of one particular soul it turns out to be either a period that is possessed of both a beginning and an end or a period that is possessed of a beginning but of no end. But when the same is calculated in the case of all the souls taken together it ought to be a period that is possessed of neither a beginning nor an end. For throughout the past there was no period of time when there was no soul possessed of samyaktva, and the same is true of the future. That is to say, samyak-darsana has been making its appearance since a beginningless time and it will continue to do so till an endless time. (12) Antara or interval : when the empty interval - i.e. interval devoid of samyak-darsana is calculated in the case of one particular soul it turns out to be antarmuhurta at the least and apardhapudgala-

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1. Antarmuhurta is the period of time greater than an avali and less than a muhurta. An avali plus one samaya makes up the minimum antarmuhurta,

paravarta at the most.

For samyaktva, when vomitted-that is, lost once, can be regained after an antarmuhurta at the earliest; and if that does not happen it must necessarily be regained by the end of an apardha-pudgalaparavarta. However, when calculation is made in the case of all the souls taken together then there is no empty interval at all so far as samyak-darsana is concerned, for amongst the so many souls there must always be some that are possessed of samyak-darsana. (13) Bhava or condition - resulting from the presence or otherwise of karma-samyaktva is to be found under three karmic conditions - viz. that resulting from the subsidence of a karma,

that resulting from its subsidence-cum-destruction, that resulting from its destruction. These conditions are respectively generated by the subsidence, subsidence-cum-destruction and destruction of the darsanamohaniya karma that acts as concealment of samyaktva. It is these conditions that are indicative of the relative purity of the different cases of samyaktva. Thus samyaktva resulting from the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma in question is purer than that resulting from its subsidence while that resulting from its destruction is purer than the former.

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a muhurta minus one samaya makes up the maximum antarmuhurta, the intermediate periods constitute the medium antarmuhurta. This is according to the Digambara tradition. See Tiloyapannatti 4-2-88; Jivakanda gathas 573-575. According to the Svetambara tradition nine samayas make up the minimum antarmuhurta all the remaining periods being treated as the same (i.e. as non-minimum antarmuhurta).

1. A soul appropriates material particles and transforms them into body, speech, manas or internal organ, and breath. When in the case of a particular soul it so happens that it appropriates all the existing material particles of the universe and releases them after transforming them into each of the types of body except the aharaka type-also into speech, manas and breath-then the period of time required for all this is the period technically called pudgalaparavarta. A period somewhat lesser than this is called aparadha pudgalaparavarta.

2. Here when samyaktva resulting from subsidence-cum-destruction is declared to be purer than that resulting from subsidence what is had in

Besides the above three there are two more conditions - viz. that resulting from the manifestation of a Karma and that which is natural (i.e. that which has nothing to do with Karma). But samyaktva is not to be found under either of these conditions. That is to say, samyaktva cannot make its appearance at a time when the darsanamohaniya karma is manifesting itself; similarly, inasmuch as it is not found in a soul unconcealed since a beginningless time - this in contrast to the class-character soul-ness that is actually so found in a soul - samyaktva is also not a natural condition of soul. (14) Alpabahutva or the relative numerical strength - Of the above three types of samyaktva that resulting from subsidence is numerically smallest, for the souls possessed of this type of samyaktva are always fewer than those possessed of the other two types. Samyaktva resulting from subsidence - cum - destruction is asankhyata times greater than that resulting from subsidence while that resulting from destruction is ananta times greater than the former. Samyaktva resulting from destruction is ananta times greater because it characterizes all the souls that have attained moksa while the number of such souls is ananta. 7-8

Types of Right Cognition :

Mati, sruta, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala - these five are the types of cognition. 9

Unlike samyak-darsana, samyak-jnana has not been defined through a special aphorism. That is because when the definition of samyak-darsana is once known that of samyak-

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mind is not the quality but the duration of the two. For so far as quality is concerned it is the latter that is purer; that is so because pradesodaya (i.e. a particularly mild type of manifestation) of mithyatva (i.e. the Karma in question = the darsanamohaniya karma) is possible at the time when the former is present, but no type of udaya (i.e. manifestation) of mithyatva is possible at the time when the latter is present . However, the possible duration of the former is much greater than that of the latter, and in this respect the former can even be said to be purer than the latter.

jnana can be known as a matter of course. To wit, it can well happen that a particular soul is devoid of samyak-darsana but it never happens that it is devoid of cognition; thus this soul must possess some cognition or other and the same is turned into right-cognition or samyak-jnana as soon as samyak-darsana makes its appearance. So the only difference between the cognition of the form of samyak-jnana and that of the form of not-samyak-jnana is that the former is accompanied by samyaktva while the latter is devoid of the same - that is, the latter is accompanied by mithyatva (i.e. the quality opposed to samyaktva).

Question : What is it that lends so much competence to samyaktva that so long as it is absent all cognition, howsoever extensive and howsoever free from illusion, is called false cognition or not-samyak-jnana, while, on the other hand, as soon as it appears there even that cognition which is somewhat indistinct and illusory is called samyak-jnana?

Answer : The present treatize is concerned with matters spiritual. And so the discrimination between samyak-jnana and not-samyak-jnana is made here from a spiritual view-point and not, as in the science of logic or epistemology, from an objective viewpoint. Thus in the science of logic only that cognition is called samyak-jnana or pramana whose object is true to the concerned factual situation while that cognition is called not-samyak-jnana or pseudo-pramana whose object is false to the same. On the other hand, in the present treatize concerned with matters spiritual the distinction between samyak-jnana and not-samyak-jnana that is proposed by the science of logic is no doubt admitted but is treated as secondary. For in such a treatize that distinction is primary according to which

samyak-jnana is the cognition that is conducive to spiritual upgrading or development while not-samyak-jnana is the cognition that is conducive to an increment in worldly entanglement or spiritual degradation. Thus it is just possible that owing to a lack of necessary means a person who is possessed of samyaktva might perchance be in doubt concerning the nature of an object or be under illusion concerning it or be having indistinct cognition concerning it, but inasmuch as he is a seeker after the truth and one free from all false prepossessions he is always eager to correct himself - and does correct himself - with the help of an expert personage who is superior to and more authoritative than himself; besides, he chiefly employs his knowledge not for a satisfaction of his carnal desires but in the interest of his spiritual development. In contrast, the nature of a person devoid of samyaktva is just the opposite of it. Thus owing to the availability of all necessary means such a person might have cognition that is definitive, more extensive and distinct, but being by nature under the grip of false prepossessions he assumes arrogance and belittles the ideas even of an expert personage - all this culminating in his employing his knowledge not in the interest of his spiritual progress but for the satisfaction of his worldly ambitious. 9

A Discussion related to Pramanas or Instruments of Valid Cognition :

The above mentioned cognition of five types is of the form of two pramanas. 10

Of these, the first two types are pramana of the paroksa or indirect variety. 11

The remaining types are pramana of the pratyaksa or direct variety. 12

The Classification of Pramanas

The five types of cognition - viz. mati, sruta etc. that are mentioned above are broadly divisible into two varieties of pramana - viz. pratyaksa and paroksa.

The Definition of Pramanas

The general definition of pramana has already been offered - viz. that cognition is pramana which comprehends so many aspects of the object concerned. The particular definitions run as follows ;

(i) That cognition which originates without the aid of the sense-organs and manas (i.e. the internal organ) and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone is pratyaksa or direct;

(ii) On the other hand, that cognition which originates with the aid of the sense-organs and manas is paroksa or indirect.

Of the above mentioned five types of cognition the first two - that is, mati and sruta - are called paroksa because they both originate with the aid of the sense-organs and manas.

On the other hand, avadhi, manahparyaya and kevala - these three types of cognition are pratyaksa because they originate without the aid of the sense-organs and manas and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone.

In the science of logic pratyaksa and paroksa are defined in a different fashion. Thus there the cognition born of sense-organs is called pratyaksa, while the born of probans and words etc. is called paroksa; but these definitions are not accepted here. For here the cognition depending on a soul alone is to be called pratyaksa, while that depending on the sense-organs and manas - i.e. depending on something other than a soul - is to be called paroksa. According to this all, the two types of cognition mati and sruta ought to be treated as paroksa because depending on the sense-organs and manas, while the remaining three types of cognition avadhi etc. ought to be treated as pratyaksa because originating without the aid of the sense-organs and manas and on the basis of the capacity of a soul alone. In certain places the type of cognition mati born of the sense-organs and manas is called

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In the treatizes on logic like Pramanamimamasa etc. avagraha etc. born of the sense-organs and manas are described as samvyavaharika pratyaksa - i.e. pratyaksa practically speaking. For special details see - Introduction to the Gujarati translation of the Nyayavatara, the section 'Evolution of the Jaina Treatment of Pramana.'

pratyaksa but that is in accordance with the above definition proposed by the science of logic - that is, in accordance with the standpoint of common-sense. 10-12

Synonyms Standing for the Type of Cognition Mati :

Mati, smrti, samjna, cinta, abhinibodha - these words are synonyms with each other. 13

Question : What type of cognition is called mati?

Answer : That type whose object is something present.

Question : Do smrti, samjna and cinta also have something present for their object?

Answer : No. To recail an object experienced earlier is smrti or memory; so that has something past for its object. Again, to detect identity between an object experienced earlier and one that is being experienced at present is samjna or pratyabhijnana i.e. recognition; so that has something past as well as something present for its object. Lastly, to think of an object that is to appear at a later time is cinta or anticipation; so that has something future for its object.

Question : But then the words mati, smrti, samjna and cinta cannot be synonymous inasmuch as they mean mutually different things.

Answer : Of course, the respective objects of the types of cognition mati, smrti, samjna and cinta are mutually different and so also some of their means of origination. But in the case of each the internal means of origination is one and the same, - viz. the subsidence-cum-destruction of the matijnanavaraniya karma. It is keeping this commonness in mind that mati etc. are here said to be mutually synonymous.

Question : But nothing has yet been said about abhinibodha. What type of cognition is that? That too should be explained.

Answer : Abhinibodha is a generic term and it stands for each of the types of cognition, mati, smrti, samjna and cinta; that is to say, all the types of cognition that originate as a result of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the matijnanavaraniya karma are commonly called abhinibodha, while the words mati etc. stand for this or that particular type of cognition thus originating.

Question : But then abhinibodha turns out to be a general class whose several species are mati etc. How then are these words mutually synonymous?

Answer : Here the words in question are called mutually synonymous by ignoring the difference that obtains between a class and its species. 13

The Nature of the Type of Cognition Mati :

The mati-jnana originates through the instrumentality of the indriyas or sense-organs and anindriya or not-sense-organ. 14

Question : Here the indriyas and anindriya these two are declared to be the cause of mati-jnana. Now it is well-known that eye etc. are the sense organs. But what is to be under-stood by the not-sense-organ?

Answer : By the not-sense-organ is to be understood manas or internal organ.

Question : When eye etc. on the one hand and the manas on the other are equally an instrument of mati-jnana, then why call the former sense-organs and the latter not-sense-organ?

Answer : Eye etc. are an external instrument while the manas is an internal instrument. This distinction is the ground of the distinction obtaining between the designations indriya and anindriya. 14

The Sub-Types of Mati-jnana :

Avagraha, tha, avaya and dharana - these four are the sub-types of mati-jnana. 15

All mati-jnana, whether born of a sense-organ or born of the not-sense-organ, has four sub-types. Thus considering that each of the four sub-types avagraha etc. might be born either of one of the five sense-organs or of the manas it turns out that the total sub-types of mati-jnana are twenty-four in all. The following is how they are to be named.

Tactile	avagraha	tha	avaya	dharana
Gustatory	"	"	"	"
Olfactory	"	"	"	"
Visual	"	"	"	"
Auditory	"	"	"	"
Manas-born	"	"	"	"

The Above Four Sub-types Avagraha etc. Defined

(1) The cognition of a thing as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, etc. is avagraha. For example, when in deep dark one suddenly strikes against something one has cognition to the effect that something ought to be here. In this cognition one does not realize as to what particular thing it is that has been touched; so this unspecified cognition is called avagraha.

(2) The thought-process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertaining the general object that has been grasped by avagraha is called tha. For example, as soon as a doubt arises as to whether the touch in question belongs to a snake or to a rope the thought intervenes that it ought to belong to a rope; for-so one cogitates-had it

belonged to a snake the reptile could not help hissing when struck so hard. It is this thought-process that is called sambhavana, i.e. entertaining a possibility-or tha.

(3) When through further attentiveness or concentration final ascertainment takes place as to the particular feature grasped at the stage of tha that is avaya. For example, when after thinking over the matter for a while and examining it one finally ascertains that the touch in question must belong to a rope not to a snake - that is avaya.

(4) The final ascertainment of the form of avaya stays there for a while and then disappears because the mind then switches over to some other object; however, while thus disappearing it leaves behind such an impression as makes possible the memory of the object concerned at a later occasion in case necessary accessories are available. The constant stream of this final ascertainment, the impression left behind by it, and the memory made possible by this impression - all this operation of the form of mati-jnana is dharana.

Question : Is there some meaning or not behind the order that has been followed above while naming the four sub-types?

Answer : There is a meaning : For the idea is that the order followed by the aphorism in naming these sub-types is also the order of their successive origination. 15

The Sub-Types of Avagraha etc. :

Mati-jnana of the forms avagraha, tha, avaya and dharana has for its object something that is many in number or one in number, possessed of many forms or possessed of one form, grasped fast or grasped slowly, grasped on the basis of a ground or grasped not on the basis of a ground, grasped without doubt or grasped with some doubts, grasped inevitably or grasped not inevitably. 16

The four forms of mati-jnana - viz. avagraha, tha, avaya and dharana - are each possibly born of one of the six means - viz. the five sense organs and manas - and thus we have twenty four sub-types in all of mati-jnana. Now each of these twenty four is possibly of twelve varieties depending on the variation of the object concerned or of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned. Thus we have

Bahu-grasping	Six types of avagraha	Six types of tha	Six types of avaya	Six types of dharana

Alpa-grasping	"	"	"	"
Bahuvidha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Ekavidha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Ksipra-grasping	"	"	"	"
Aksipra-grasping	"	"	"	"
Anisrita-grasping	"	"	"	"
Nisrita-grasping	"	"	"	"
Asandigdha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Sandigdha-grasping	"	"	"	"
Dhruva-grasping	"	"	"	"
Adhruva-grasping	"	"	"	"

Here bahu means many, alpa means one. Thus the successively arising four forms of mati-jnana-viz. avagraha, tha etc. that have two or more books for their object will be called bahu-grasping avagraha, bahu-grasping tha, bhau-grasping avaya, bahu-grasping dharana. On the other hand, the same having one book for their object will be called alpa-grasping avagraha, alpa-grasping tha, alpa-grasping avaya, alpa-grasping dharana.

Bahuvidha means that possessed of many forms, ekavidha means that possessed of one form. Thus the successively arising four forms of mati-jnana in question having for their object books differing in size, colour, thickness etc. will be called bahuvidha-grasping avagraha, alpa-grasping tha, alpa-grasping avaya, alpa-grasping dharana. On the other hand, the same having for their object books agreeing in colour, size, thickness etc. will be called ekavidha-grasping avagraha, ekavidha-grasping tha, etc. That is to say, bahu and alpa have to do with the number of units, bahuvidha and ekavidha with that of forms or types. That is how the two pairs differ among themselves.

The four forms of mati-jnana in question that cognize their object fast will be called ksipra-grasping avagraha etc., those that cognize it

slowly will be called aksipra-grasping avagraha etc. It is often found that even when the external means like the sense-organ, object etc. are equally available to two persons, one of them, on account of the intensity of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned, cognizes the object concerned fast, while the other, on account of the mildness of this subsidence-cum-destruction, cognizes the object slowly.

Anisrita means that grasped not on the basis of a ground - that is that not demonstrated through a probans, nisrita means that grasped on the basis of a ground. Thus the successively arising four forms of mati-jnana in question that cognize juhi-flowers (juhi-the name of a flower) employing as probans their earlier experienced cold, soft, smooth touch will be called nisrita-grasping avagraha etc. (i.e. avagraha etc. grasping on the basis of a probans); on the other hand, the same in case they cognize these flowers without employing this probans will be called anisrita-grasping avagraha etc. (i.e. avagraha etc. grasping not on the basis of a probans).

The above given meaning of the terms anisrita and nisrita is to be found also in the commentary to the Nandi-sutra; but there the author Malaygiri has offered another meaning as well - viz. that grasping a thing as mixed with alien properties is nisrita-grasping, grasping it as not thus mixed is anisrita-grasping. See p. 183 of the edition published by the Agamodaya Samiti.

The Digambara texts have the reading anihsrta. Accordingly, they offer explanation to the effect that grasping material particles that are not fully manifest is anihsrta-grasping, grasping material particles that are fully manifest is nihsrta-grasping. See Rajavartika no. 15 on this very aphorism.

Asandhigdha means definitive, sandigdha means non-definitive. Thus the four forms of mati-jnana in question that cognize a touch in a definitive form - e.g. cognize it asserting that it must belong to a piece of sandal-wood not to a flower - will be called asandigdha avagraha etc.; on the other hand, the same in case they, on account of not detecting a distinguishing mark, cognize this touch in a doubtful form - e.g. cognize it asserting that it must belong either to a piece of sandal-wood or to a flower inasmuch as both are cold - will be called sandigdha-grasping.

Dhruva means that happening inevitably, adhruva means that happening possibly. It is often found that even when the means of cognition in the form of sense-object contact and attentiveness are equally available to two persons one of them cognizes the object concerned inevitably while the other sometimes cognizes it and sometimes does not. The four forms of mati-jnana avagraha etc. in case in the presence of the necessary means of cognition they cognize the object concerned inevitably will be called dhruva-grasping; on the other hand, the same in case under these very

conditions they, on

Here the Digambara texts have the reading anukta. On their explanation, anukta-grasping covers the case of a person who has heard just one syllable of a word surmising the whole word and telling the speaker that the latter is going to pronounce that particular word - or that of a person who has listened just to the first stroke of a lute, i.e. even before a tune has been set on it, telling the musician that the latter is going to strike that particular tune. The opposite of anukta-grasping. See Rajavartika No. 15 on this very aphorism.

Among the Svetambara texts the Nandi-sutra has only the reading asandigdha and in its commentary the term has been explained as above, see p. 183. But the commentary to the Tattvarthabhasya also gives the reading anukta and explains it in the manner of the Rajavartika passage just quoted. But the commentator goes on to add that on accepting the reading anukta it will turn out that the type of avagraha etc. and not also those of tactile avagraha etc. and the rest. It is keeping this shortcoming in mind that the other authorities have accepted the reading asandighda. See Tattvarthabhasyvrtti p. 58 edited by Mansukh Bhagubhai, Ahmedabad.

account of the mildness of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned, sometime cognizes it and sometimes do not will be called adhruva-grasping.

Question : Of the above twelve varieties which ones are based on a variation of the object concerned and which ones on a variation in the form of relative intensity or mildness of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned?

Answer : Bahu, alpa, bahuvidha and ekavidha - these four are based on a variation of the object concerned, the rest on that of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the Karma concerned.

Question : So how many sub-types in all do we have by now?

Answer : Two hundred and eighty eight.

Question : How?

Answer : The four forms avagraha etc. each possibly born of one of the six means - viz. the five sense-organs and manas-make the total twenty-four (6 x 4 = 24), and these twenty four each possibly varying in twelve ways as just elaborated make the total two hundred eighty eight (24 x 12 = 288). 16

The general object of avagraha etc. :

The four forms of mati-jnana - viz. avagraha, tha, avaya, dharana - grasp an artha - that is, an entity. 17

Artha means entity. Now an entity is inclusive of a dravya or substance that is something generic and the corresponding paryayas or modes that are something specific. And so the question arises whether avagraha, tha etc. that are born of the sense-organs and manas grasp an entity in the form of a substance or the same in the form of the corresponding modes.

Answer : The above described cognitions of the form of avagraha, tha etc. chiefly grasp modes and not a substance as a whole. The substance itself they only notice through the medium of its modes. That is so because the sense-organs and manas have modes for their chief object. Of course, the modes are but a part of a substance. And so when a sense-organ or manas notices the modes that constitute its particular object it partly notices the corresponding substance itself in the form of these modes. For a mode is not to be found apart from the corresponding substance, nor a substance apart from the corresponding modes. For example, the particular object of the visual sense-organ are colour, configuration etc. which are so many modes of the material substance. So when an eye grasps a mango fruit what happens is that it notices the latter's modes like colour, configuration etc. And since its colour, configuration etc. are not separate from a mango it can roughly be said that the mango has been seen by the eye, but we soul remember that the eye has not grasped the mango as a whole. For apart from colour, configuration etc. the mango contains numerous other modes like touch, taste, smell etc. which an eye is incapable of grasping. Similarly, when the tactile, gustatory and olfactory sense-organs grasp an entity like hot jalebi (a sweetmeat) they really only notice its several modes - viz. hot touch, sweet taste and good smell respectively. For no sense-organ taken singly can grasp all the modes belonging to an entity. Even the auditory sense-organ grasps only the mode of the form of sound belonging to the material particles that have assumed the shape of speech and no other mode belonging to them. Similarly, the manas too reflects over only some particular aspects of an object; for certainly it is incapable of simultaneously reflecting over all the aspects of this object. All this goes to prove that all the four forms of cognition avagraha etc. that are born of a sense-organ or manas chiefly have a mode for their object while they notice the corresponding substance only through the medium of this mode.

Question : How does the present aphorism stand related to the preceding one?

Answer : The present aphorism gives out something general, the preceding one something specific. For the present aphorism generally lays down that cognition of the form of avagraha etc. grasps an entity in the

form of a mode or of a substance, while in the preceding aphorism the same entity has been specified in the form of bahu, alpa etc. through an analysis based on the consideration of number, form etc. 17

The sub-classes of avagraha resulting from the difference that obtains between the different sense-organs as to their respective modes of producing cognition :

The contact of a sense-organ-acting in its capacity as what is technically called upakaranedriya-with its object is called vyanjana and when vyanjana takes place there ensues but avagraha. 18

In the case of the visual sense-organ and of the manas there takes place no vyanjana to be followed by avagraha. 19

Just as a lame man needs the assistance of stick for walking, so also does a soul's concealed power of consciousness need - on account of its dependence on something other than itself - an assisting medium for producing cognition. An external such medium are the sense-organs and manas. However the different sense-organs and manas are not all of the same nature and so the successive order exhibited in the course of the emergence of the stream of cognition is also not the same in the case of them all. Thus this successive order is of two kinds - a slow one and a fast one.

In the slow order of succession the cognition concerned ensues as soon as the object concerned comes in contact with the appropriate sense-organ acting in its capacity as upakaranendriya - this contact being technically called vyanjana.

However, in the beginning the degree of the cognition in question is so meagre that it does not allow even a general apprehension to the effect 'there is something here', but with the maturation of the sense-object contact in question there is an increment in this degree. After a while this contact-technically called vyanjana-grows so much mature that

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1   For the details of this concept see Chapter 2, aphorism 17

there takes place a general apprehension-technically called arthavagraha-to the effect 'there is something here'. Here the entire cognitive operation preceding arthavagraha - an operation which is born of a vyanjana and which grows mature with the maturation of this vyanjana - is called vyanjanavagraha inasmuch as it needs a vyanjana for its production. This prolonged cognitive operation of the form of vyanjanavagraha, in spite of its ever growing maturation, is so meagre is strength that it does not allow even a general objective apprehension to the effect 'there is something here'. Hence it is called a most

indistinct, a relatively indistinct, an indistinct cognition. And when this cognitive operation grows so much mature that it allows a general apprehension to the effect 'there is something here' then that very sector of cognition which allows this general apprehension is called arthavagraha.

Really speaking, arthavagraha is but the utmost mature sector of vyanjanavagraha itself, for the former too stands in need of a sense-object contact. Even then it is mentioned apart from vyanjanavagraha and is given the designation arthavagraha because the cognizer concerned is in a position to pay attention to the type of objective apprehension made possible by this sector of cognition. In the wake of arthavagraha there successively take place a curiosity to cognize the particular features of the object apprehended by arthavagraha, an ascertainment of these particular features, a continous stream of this ascertainment, an impression left behind by this stream of ascertainment, a memory engendered by this impression - a whole lot of cognitive operation which has earlier been described in its triple division tha, avaya and dharana. Here it should not be forgotten that when in the case of this slow order of succession mention has been made of the need for a sense-object contact-to be precise, an upakaranendriya-object contact this need is understood to persist only upto arthavagraha that is the ultimate sector of vyanjanavagraha. After arthavagraha has taken place - that is to say, during the course of the cognitive operation comprising tha, avaya etc. - the contact in question is not needed inevitably, for inasmuch as this cognitive operation is directed towards particular features it is characterized by a dominance of mental attentiveness. That is why the present aphorism has been above interpreted in an exclusive fashion by saying 'when vyanjana takes place there ensues but avagraha', the idea being that vyanjana is needed only for avagraha - that is, for indistinct cognition - not for tha etc.

In the fast order of succession the contact of a sense-organ in its capacity as upakaranendriya - with its object is not needed at all. In this case the sense - organ, even when distant, far distant from its object, grasps this object by its mere presence at a suitable place, and as soon as this grasping takes place there arises at the very beginning through the instrumentality of the sense-organ in question a general cognition of the form of arthavagraha in relation to the object in question. Thereafter, the cognitive operation comprising tha, avaya etc. ensues in due order in this case as in that of the slow order of succession. The idea is that in the case of the fast order of succession the stream of cognition emerges without there being a contact of the sense-organ with the object to be grasped, a stream whose initial sector is arthavagraha and the ultimate sector dharana in its capacity as memory. On the contrary, in the case of the slow order of succession the stream of cognition ensues only after there has been a contact of the sense-organ with the object to be grasped, a stream whose initial sector is a most

indistinct, relatively indistinct cognition of the form of vyanjanavagraha, the second sector a cognition of the form of arthavagraha and the ultimate sector a cognition of the form of dharana in its capacity as memory.

Illustrations

The stream of cognition pertaining to the slow order of succession - a stream whose emergence requires sense-object contact - can be clearly understood with the help of the illustration of an earthen bowl. Thus the extremely dry earthen bowl that has just been taken out of a kiln absorbs the single drop of water inserted inside it - so much so that no trace whatsoever is left of this drop. In a like manner this bowl absorbs numerous other drops that have been subsequently inserted inside it one by one. However, in the end there comes a time when the bowl is incapable of absorbing the drops inserted inside it and becomes wet with those drops which are now there to be seen in the form of an accumulated mass.

When the wetness of the bowl became apparent for the first time, even earlier than that there was water in the bowl but it had been so much absorbed by the bowl that it had disappeared altogether and so was invisible; nevertheless, the water was certainly there in the bowl all the while. Only when there was an increase in the quantity of water and a decrease in the bowl's capacity to absorb water did the wetness become visible; then it so happened that the water that had not been absorbed within the body of the bowl began to accumulate at its bottom and became visible. In a like manner, when a sleeping person is addressed the words uttered seem to disappear in his ears. But when as a result of his being addressed twice or thrice his ears become full enough with the words of the form of material particles then like the earthen bowl first becoming wet with the drops of water these ears full with words become capable of cognizing these words in a general form 'there is something here'; it is this general cognition that first clearly apprehend the words in question. Then ensues the ordered succession of the cognitions of a particular form. All this is to say that just as the dry earthen bowl, as a result of receiving the drops of water for a while, gradually becomes wet and the water becomes visible inside it so also do the ears of a sleeping person, as a result of coming in contact for a while the words of the form of material particles, become full with these words and so are capable of cognizing them in a general form while later on they come to cognize their particular features. This ordered succession of cognitive processes takes place in the case of a waking person as much as it does in that of a sleeping person, but in the former case it is so swift that one hardly takes note of it. That is why it is the similarity of a sleeping person with the earthen bowl that is pointed out.

For the fast order of succession the illustration of a mirror is apt.

Thus as soon as a thing finds itself in front of a mirror its reflection appears in this mirror and is visible; for this there is no need of a contact between the ears and the words heard. All that is needed is the co-presence in a suitable place of the mirror that is to reflect and the thing that is to be reflected; as soon as such a co-presence is available the reflection appears there and is immediately visible. In a like manner, as soon as a coloured thing is placed in front of an eye and this thing - just as man is in need of a contact between the ears and the words heard. All that is needed is the co-presence of the mirror and the thing reflected. That is why in the case of the fast order of succession it is arthavagraha that is treated as the starting-point.

The stream of cognition pertaining to the slow order of succession has a place for vyanjanavagraha but not so that pertaining to the fast order of succession. Hence the question arises : "Through which sense-organs does vyanjanavagraha take place and through which it does not?" It is this question that has been answered in the present aphorism. No vyanjanavagraha takes place through the eye and manas, for these two cognize their appropriate object without coming in contact with it - that is, through a mere suitable co-presence with this object and through attentiveness. Certainly, who does not know that an eye grasps the tree, mountain etc. that are distant, far distant and that, similarly, a manas reflects over a thing that is far, far distant? That is why the eye and manas are classified as apraypakarin or 'active-without-coming-in-contact' and the stream of cognition produced by them is treated as that characterized by the fast order of succession. On the other hand, four sense-organs - viz. the auditory, gustatory, olfactory, tactile - give rise to the stream of cognition that is characterized by the slow order of succession, for these four are prapyakarin or 'active-through-coming-in-contact' - that is, they grasp their object only through coming in contact with it. Certainly, it is the experience of everybody that unless the word enters an ear, the sugar touches a tongue, the dust of flower enters a nose, the water touches a body there will be no hearing of this word, no tasting of this sugar, no smelling of this dust, no feeling of a cold or hot sensation in relation to this water.

Question : So how many sub-types does mati-jnana have in all?

Answer : Three hundred and thirty six.

Question : How?

Answer : The four forms arthavagraha etc. each possibly produced by one of the six instruments - viz. the five sense-organs and manas, yield the number twenty-four (4 x 6 = 24). To them are to be added four vyanjanavagrahas produced by the four sense-organs belonging to the class prapyakarin, thus the total number becomes twenty-eight (24 + 4 = 28).

Each of these twenty eight can possibly have objects belonging to those twelve varieties bahu, alpa, bahuvidha, alpavidha, etc. and thus we get the grand total three hundred thirty six (28 x 12 = 336). Of course, this enumeration of sub-types is based on a rough consideration. For as a matter of fact there are innumerable such sub-types depending on the clarity or otherwise of the accessories like light etc., the multiplicity of objects, the diversity of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned.

Question : Those earlier enumerated twelve varieties bahu, alpa etc. are applicable only to the particular objective features; on the other hand, arthavagraha has for its object something that is utterly general. How can then one speak of those twelve varieties in the case of arthavagraha?

Answer : To tell the truth, arthavagraha is understood to be of two types - viz. vyavaharika or that considered from a practical standpoint, and naiscayika or that considered from a definitive standpoint. And when one speaks of those twelve varieties bahu, alpa etc. they ought to refer to the former type, not to the latter. For in the latter type what is reflected is something utterly general - that is, something devoid of the particular features like class, quality, action; so there is no possibility of the particular features like bahu, alpa etc. being grasped by this type.

Question : What distinguishes the vyavaharika arthavagraha from the naiscayika?

Answer : The arthavagraha which for the first time grasps something in general is naiscayika arthavagraha. On the other hand, the avaya-cognition which grasps some one particular feature and is followed by a curiosity as to some other particular feature and by an avaya-cognitions of it is to be called an avaya-cognition grasping both the general and the particular. It is the type of avaya-cognitions which are called vyavaharika arthavagraha. Thus only that avaya-cognition is not a vyavaharika arthavagraha which is not followed by a curiosity as to some new particular feature; on the other hand, all avaya-cognitions which produce curiosity as to ever newer particular features are to be treated as vyavaharika arthavagraha.

Question : As to the twelve varieties bahu, alpa etc. belonging to arthavagraha it has just been said that they ought to be treated as belonging to its vyavaharika, not to its naiscayika type. Even then the question remains as to how we get three hundred thirty six sub-types of mati-jnana. For it is the twenty-eight forms of mati-jnana each possibly belonging to twelve varieties that yield the number three hundred thirty six. But these twenty-eight forms also include the four vyanjanavagrahas which, inasmuch as they come earlier than even the naiscayika arthavagraha

are of an extremely indistinct nature. Thus the forty-eight sub-types (4 x 12 = 48) belonging to them will have to be excluded from the total three hundred thirty-six.

Answer : In the case of arthavagraha those twelve varieties can be clearly exhibited by positing the type vyavaharika. And so the above answer was given based on a rough consideration. But really speaking, even in the case of naiscayika arthavagraha and of vyanjanavagraha preceding it the varieties in question will have to be assumed. And that on the basis of the principle of the identity of the cause and the effect. Thus naiscayika arthavagraha is the cause of the vyavaharika arthavagraha while vyanjanavagraha is the cause of the former - so that if the particular features bahu, alpa etc. are clearly reflected in vyavaharika arthavagraha then a similar reflection will have to be assumed also for naiscayika arthavagraha which is its immediated cause and for vyanjanavagraha which is its proximate cause, however difficult to be noticed because indistinct be this latter reflection. But whether distinct or otherwise inasmuch as a reflection like this is possible in the case of these the twelve varieties in question will have to be assumed also in their case. 18-19.

The nature of Sruta-jnana or Verbal Cognition and Its Sub-types :

Sruta-jnana is invariably preceded by mati-jnana. It is of two types, many types, twelve types. 20

Mati-jnana is the cause while sruta-jnana is its effect, for it is from mati-jnana that sruta-jnana is produced. That is why it is said about mati-jnana that it nourishes and supplements sruta-jnana. However, even while mati-jnana is a cause of sruta-jnana it is only an external such cause; as for the internal cause of sruta-jnana it is nothing save the subsidence-cum-destruction of the concerned srutajnana-varaniya karma. For even when mati-jnana has taken place in relation to some object there will be no sruta-jnana in relation to it in case there has been no subsidence-cum-destruction of the concerned srutajnanavaraniya karma.

Question : As in the production of mati-jnana so also in that of sruta-jnana the assistance of the sense-organs and manas is needed; wherein then does lie the distinction between the two? So long as this distinction is not made clear it does not make much sense to say that sruta-jnana is invariably preceded by mati-jnana. This distinction is not made better understood even by the statement that the cause of mati-jnana is the subsidence-cum-destruction of the mati-jnanavaraniya karma while that of sruta-jnana the subsidence-cum-destruction of sruta-jnanavaraniya karma, for the concept of subsidence-cum-destruction is not comprehensible to common sense.

Answer : Mati-jnana has for its object something that exists at

present time while sruta-jnana has for its object something that exists at any of the three periods of time present, past, future. Apart from this distinction that has to do with their respective objects another one is that there is an employment of words in sruta-jnana while there is no such employment in mati-jnana. So by way of final definition we might say that, that cognition born of the sense-organs and manas which is accompanied by an employment of words.

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1. 'Being accompained by an employment of words' means being in practice produced as a result of grasping the connotative potency of the words concerned. That is to say, while at the time of the production of sruta-jnana it is required that the conventional meaning of the words concerned be remembered and the text concerned that is heard be followed at the time of the production of the forms of mati-jnana, tha etc. nothing like that is required.

is sruta-jnana while the same which is not so accompanied is mati-jnana.

The idea is that mati-jnana and sruta-jnana are similar as both require the assistance of the sense-organs and manas, but the objective sphere of sruta-jnana is definitely greater than that of mati-jnana and it is also characterized by greater clarity. For there being a predominance of mental operation in sruta-jnana there is also in it a great proportion of reflection and a greater clarity as to this reflection; similarly, there is also in it a proper contextual adjustment of what comes earlier and what comes later. Or in other words it might be said that a prolonged cognitive operation born of the sense-organs and manas has mati-jnana for its initial immature sector and sruta-jnana for a later mature and clear sector. Hence it might also be said that the cognition which is capable of being expressed through words is sruta-jnana while the same insofar as it, being inadequately mature, is incapable of being so expressed is mati-jnana. Thus if sruta-jnana stands for a milk preparation mati-jnana stands for milk.

Question : It has been said that sruta-jnana is of two types, many types, twelve types. How is that?

Answer : Sruta-jnana is of two types - viz. anga-bahya or that excluded from the class of texts called anga and angapravista or that included in the class of texts called anga. Of these, the former is of many types depending on whether it is utkalika - that is, that which may be studied at any time - or kalika - that is, that which must be studied at a particular time. And the latter is of twelve types iin the form of Acaranga, Sutrakrtanga etc.

Question : What is the ground for distinguishing the anga-bahya from the anga-pravista?

Answer : The ground is the difference as to the speaker. Thus the knowledge revealed by the tirthankaras which was received by their highly intelligent direct disciples designated ganadharas and was given by them the form of the twelve Sutra-texts technically called anga is anga-pravista. On the other hand, the pure-witted masters coming after the ganadharas took into consideration the deficiency in intellect, power and age-limit which is a result of the bad times that are prevalent and hence composed systematic treatizes on various topics taken from the twelve anga-texts and with a view to benefitting the common folk; it is these systematic treatizes that are called anga-bahya. That is to say, the systematic treatizes which have the ganadharas for their authors are anga-pravista, the same which have the other masters for their authors are anga-bahya.

Question : Which are the twelve anga-texts? And which of the ancient texts are prominently included in the multifarious class anga-bahya?

Answer : Acara, Sutraka, Sthana, Samavaya, Vyakhyaparajnapti (Bhagavati), Jnatrdharmakatha, Upasakadasa, Antakrddasa, Anuttaraupapatikadasa, Prasanavyakarana, Vipakasutra and Drstivada - these twelve are the anga-texts. Similarly Samayika, Caturvimsatistava, Vandanaka, Pratikramana, Kayotsarga and Pratyakhyana - these six Avasyaka texts on the one hand and Dasavaikalika, Uttaradhyayana, Dasasrutaskandha, Kalpa, Vyavahara, Nisttha and Rsibhasita, etc. these treatizes on the other are included in the class anga-bahya.

Question : This classification has to do with the systematic treatizes that collect knowledge in an organized fashion. But then are there only so many systematic treatizes?

Answer : No. There were many systematic treatizes, there are many of them; many of them are being composed, many of them will be composed. However, here only those of them are enumerated which constitute the chief support of the

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1. That which is uttered by the rsis or saintly personages like pratyekabuddhas etc. is rsibhasita. E.g. in the Uttaradhyayana the eighth adhyayana called Kapiliya.

Jaina canonical discipline. But even besides these many systematic treatizes have been composed, many of them are being composed. And they all ought to be included in the anga-bahya. The only requirement is that they should have been composed by an intelligence that is pure and in a spirit of even-handedness.

Question : These days so many systematic treatizes are composed relating to various sciences and to the secular pursuits like poetry,

drama etc. Are they too be treated as sruta?

Answer : Of course, they too are sruta.

Question : But then being of the nature of sruta they too ought to be of use for attaining moksa?

Answer : To be or not to be of use for attaining moksa is not the fixed nature of a systematic treatize, for that depends on the capacity of the connoisseur concerned. If the connoisseur concerned is competent and is desirous of attaining moksa then he can make use of even secular treatizes for attaining moksa; on the other hand, if he is not a fit person then he would downgrade himself even with the help of the treatizes that are generally considered spiritual. Nevertheless, the superordinary sruta holds a special position on account of its subject-matter as also the competence of its author.

Question : Sruta is of the nature of knowledge. Why then is the designation sruta given to the systematic treatize of the form of language as also to the paper etc. on which they are written down?

Answer : All that is done figuratively. For as a matter of fact sruta is but of the nature of knowledge. But language is a means of revealing such knowledge and it is also a product of such knowledge; similarly, paper etc. are a means of writing down this language and of retaining it in an organized form. That is why language and the paper etc. are figuratively called sruta. 20

The Sub-types of Avadhi-jnana and Those Authorized to Acquire It :

Avadhi-jnana is of two types. 21

Of these two, one - viz. Bhava-pratyaya or that owing to birth is found among the hellish beings and the heavenly beings. 22

On the other hand, the other type which owes its origin to a particular cause - that is, the type originating as a result of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned - is of six kinds and is found among the remaining types of beings - that is, among the animals and the human beings. 23

Avadhi-jnana is of two types - viz. bhava-pratyaya or that owing to birth and guna-pratyaya or that owing to a meritorious qualification. The type of avadhi-jnana which appears there as soon as the being concerned is born-that is to say, the type for the appearance of which there is no need of an implementation of the ethical vows, the self-imposed restrictions

etc. - is present there ever since birth and is called bhava-pratyaya. On the other hand, the type of avadhi-jnana which is not present there ever since birth but which appears there after the being concerned is born and as a result of an implementation of the meritorious requirements like ethical vows, selfimposed restrictions etc. is called guna-pratyaya - that is, ksayopasama-janya or the type originating as a result of the subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned.

Question : Does the bhava-pratyaya type of avadhi-jnana originate without ksayopasama?

Answer : No. Ksayopasama is certainly required for it too.

Question : But then even the bhava-pratyaya type of avadhi-jnana turns out to be ksayopasama-janya. So wherein lies the distinction between the types bhava-pratyaya and guna-pratyaya?

Answer : Whatever be the type of avadhi-jnana it cannot appear without there taking place the appropriate ksayopasama. Hence ksayopasama of the avadhijnanavaraniya karma is the common cause of all avadhi-jnana whatsoever. Thus even while ksayopasama is the common cause of all of them some cases of avadhi-jnana are called bhava-pratyaya and others ksayopasama-janya or guna-pratyaya on account of the variation in the cause that produces the required ksayopasama. Among the embodied beings there are some classes the birth in which is immediately followed by a generation of the necessary ksayopasama and of the consequent avadhi-jnana. That is to say, the beings belonging to these classes heve to undertake no meritorious performance like penance etc. by way of acquiring the ksayopasama necessary for the avadhi-jnana. Hence it is that all the beings belonging to the classes in question must possess some quality or other of such avadhi-jnana as is present there ever since birth and stays there throughout life. On the other hand, there are also classes of beings concerning which it is not necessary that birth in them must be followed by an acquisition of avadhi-jnana. Those belonging to these latter classes must undertake meritorious performances like penance etc. by way of acquiring the ksayopasama necessary for the generation of avadhi-jnana. Hence it is that avadhi-jnana does not invariably appear in all the beings belonging to these classes; it appears in only those of them who have developed in themselves the meritorious qualifications necessary for the generation of avadhi-jnana. Thus even while all the cases of avadhi-jnana have a common internal cause in the form of ksayopasama it is for the sake of convenience that some of them are called bhava-pratyaya and others guna-pratyaya in view of the fact that the beings belonging to certain classes acquire avadhi-jnana just as a result of being born in these classes while those belonging to certain others acquire it as a result of undertaking meritorious performances like penance etc.

The embodied beings are divided into four classes viz. narakas or hellish beings devas (i.e. gods) or heavenly beings animals, human beings. Of these, the beings belonging to the first two classes possess the bhava-pratyaya type of avadhi-jnana - that is, they possess avadhi-jnana ever since birth; on the other hand those belonging to the last two classes possess the guna-pratyaya type of avadhi-jnana that is they possess avadhi-jnana as a result of some meritorious performance.

Question : When all the beings possessing avadhi-jnana are embodied beings then why is it that some of them happen to possess it ever since their birth - that is, without any special endeavour on their part - while others come to possess it as a result of some special endeavour on their part?

Answer : It is a matter of common experience that the effects are of multifarious types. Who does not know that a being born in the class of birds acquires the capacity to fly in the air as soon as it is born in this class, while, on the other hand, one does not acquire the capacity to fly in the air by a mere birth in the class of human beings - unless, of course, one takes recourse to an aeroplane etc.? Or take another example. Certain persons happen to possess poetic power ever since their birth, while certain others do not come in possession of it except through a special endeavour on their part.

Avadhi-jnana to be found among the animals and human beings is of six kinds viz. - aungamika or that which accompanies, ananugamika or that which does not accompany, vardhamana or that which increases, hiyamana or that which decreases, avasthita or that which remains constant, anavasthita or that which does not remain constant.

(1) Just as the colour applied to a thing like a piece of cloth etc. when placed at a particular place remains attached to this thing even when it is transferred to another place, similarly, avadhi-jnana which continues to belong to the being concerned even when he leaves the place where this jnana was generated and transfers himself to another place is anugamika.

(2) Just as some person's knowledge of astrology is such that he can correctly answer a question when seated at one particular place but not when seated at another place, similarly avadhi-jnana which ceases to belong to the being concerned when he leaves the place where this jnana was generated is ananugamika.

(3) Just as the spark of fire produced by a match-stick or a pieceof churning wood is extremely small in bulk and yet it undergoes gradual augmentation as a result of consuming more and more dry fuel etc., similarly avadhi-jnana which covers few objects at the time of its

generation but gradually comes to cover more and more of them as there is augmentation in the spiritual purification of the being concerned is vardhamana.

(4) Just as the fire feeding upon a limited number of burning objects undergoes gradual diminution when it no more receives new such objects, similarly avadhi-jnana which covers more objects at the time of its generation but gradually comes to cover less and less of them as there is dimination in the spiritual purification of the being concerned is hiyamana.

(5) Just as the sex like male etc. or certain numbers of good or bad impressions left by past deeds accompany a soul in its next birth or stay with a soul throughout one life, similarly avadhi-jnana which persists in a soul even in its next birth or stays in it till the generation of omniscience or throughout one life is avasthita.

(6) Like the waves of water avadhi-jnana which now increases, now decreases, now appears, now disappears s anavashita.

Even though a tirthankara as such and so also certain other persons happen to possess avadhi-jnana ever since their birth this avadhi-jnana should be treated as belonging to the type guna-pratyaya, for in the absence of an appropriate meritorious qualification this avadhi-jnana fails to remain there throughout one life - just as it does so remain in the case of the heavenly beings and the hellish beings. 21, 22, 23

The sub-types of Manahparyaya and their Mutual Difference :

Rjumati and vipulamati - these two are the types of manahparyaya. 24

They differ from one another in respect of purity and of an absence of fall back. 25

The living beings possessed of a manas - techincally called sanjnin - think over an object with the help of their manas. Now at the time of thinking the manas engaged in thinking process assumes different shapes corresponding to the different objects that are thought of. It is these shapes that tare the paryayas or modes of a manas and the cognition which directly apprehends these shapes of a manas is manahparyaya-jnana. Thus with the help of this type of cognition what is apprehended are the shapes of the manas engaged in thinking but not objects thought of.

Question : Is it then that the person possessed of manahparyaya-jnana is altogether incapable of apprehending the objects thought of by a manas?

Answer : No, he can certainly apprehend them but only later on and

with the help of an inference.

Question : How is that?

Answer : Just as an expert in psychology directly perceives the face or facial expressions of a person and on the basis of it makes inference as to the mental states or capacity of this person, similarly a person possessed of manahparyaya-jnana directly perceives the states of manas belonging to a person and then as a result of constant practice is in a position to make inference to the effect. "This person has thought of such and such an object because his manas is associated with shapes that invariably appear when this object is thought of."

Question : What is meant by rjumati and vipulamati?

Answer : The type of manahparyaya which apprehends the general form of an object is rjumati that which apprehends its particular features is vipulamati.

Question : But if rjumati apprehends the general form of an object then it turns out to be a type of darsana. Why then treat it as a type of jnana?

Answer : When we say that rjumati apprehends the general form of an object we only mean that it apprehends the particular features of this object though not so many of them as does vipulamati.

The vipulamati type of manahparyaya is purer than the rjumati type inasmuch as it is in a position to clearly apprehend the subtler and more numerous particular features of an object than is the latter. Besides, another difference between the two is that the latter type when once produced can possibly take leave of the being concerned but not so the former type; for the former type necessarily persists in a soul uptil the time of the attainment of omniscience.

The Difference Between Avadhi and Manahparyaya :

Avadhi and manahparyaya differ in respect of purity, spatial extent, person authorized, object. 26

Though both avadhi and manahparyaya are of the nature of genuine perception of a partial type, they differ from one another in so many respects. Thus they differ as to purity, spatial extent, person authorized, object.

(1) Manahparyaya-jnana apprehends its object much more clearly than

does avadhi-jnana, hence the former is purer than the latter.

(2) The spatial extent of avadhi-jnana stretches from a finger-measure divided by asamkhyata upto the entire loka, but that of manahparyaya-jnana stretches only up to the mountain manusottara.

(3) Beings belonging to all the four classes are authorized to acquire avadhi-jnana but only human beings who have undergone a certain measure of discipline are authorized to acquire manahparyaya-jnana.

(4) All the coloured substances along with the several of their modes can possibly be an object of avadhi-jnana, but only one out of ananta of them - that is to say, only the substances in the form of manas - can possibly be an object of manahparyaya-jnana.

Question : So manahparyaya has got a less extensive sphere of objects than avadhi. Why then is it considered to be purer than the latter?

Answer : The ground of purity is not a lesser or greater extent of the sphere of objects but the knowledge of a lesser or greater number of subtle features of the objects concerned. Thus if among two persons one is conversant with a number of disciplines and the other with only one and if the latter is better conversant with the subtelities of his discipline than the former is with those of his then it is the latter's knowledge that is considered to be purer; similarly, manhparyaya is considered to be purer than avadhi because even if its sphere of objects is less extensive than that of the latter it is better conversant with the subtelities of the objects concerned. 26

Objects to be Grasped by the Five Types of Cognition :

Mati-jnana and sruta-jnana operate in relation to - that is, have for their object - all the substances along with not all their modes - that is, along with a limited number of their modes. 27

Avadhi-jnana operates only in relation to the coloured - that is, tangible - substances along with not all their modes. 28

Manahparyaya-jnana operates in relation to one out of ananta coloured substances along with not all their modes. 29

Kevala-jnana operates in relation to all the substances along with all their modes. 30

Through mati-jnana and sruta-jnana can be cognized all the substances, whether coloured or otherwise, but thus can be cognized only several - not - all - of the modes belonging to these substances.

Question : From what has been just said it appears as if there is no numerical difference between the objects to be grasped by mati-jnana and

those to be grasped by sruta-jnana. Will that be correct?

Answer : There is of course no numerical difference between the objects to be grasped by the two insofar as these objects are viewed in their capacity as substances,but there is certainly such a difference insofar as they are viewed in their capacity as modes. But even while there is a numerical difference between the modes grasped by the two there is a similarity between them insofar as both grasp only a limited number of the modes in question - not all of them. Since mati-jnana grasps only what is present it, in accordance with the power of the sense-organs and the capacity of the soul concerned, cognizes several of the present modes of the substances; on the other hand, since sruta-jnana grasps what might be present, past or future it cognizes several of such modes as might be present, past or future.

Question : Mati-jnana is produced through the instrumentality of the sense-organs like eye etc. while these sense-organs are capable of grasping only the tangible substances. How then is it that all substances whatsoever are declared to be a possible object of mati-jnana?

Answer : Mati-jnana is produced through the intrumentality of manas also - just as it is produced through that of the sense-organs. And one's manas can think of all the substances whether perceived by oneself or learnt by one from the scriptural texts, whether tangible or otherwise. Hence keeping in view-jnana that is produced by manas one finds no difficulty about declaring that all substances whatsoever are a possible object of mati-jnana.

Question : But then in relation to the objects perceived by oneself or learnt by one from the scriptural texts one's manas will produce mati-jnana as well as sruta-jnana. So what will distinguish the two?

Answer : When thinking on the part of manas is accompanied by an employment of words the result is sruta-jnana, when it is not so accompanied the result is mati-jnana.

Even paramavadhi-jnana which is avadhi-jnana of the supreme type and can even cognize asankhyata such material particles as are situated in aloka and are collectively equivalent to loka in size - can perceive only tangible substances, not the intangible ones. Similarly, even of these tangible substances it cannot perceive all the modes.

Manah-paryaya-jnana too perceives only tangible substances but not as many of them as does avadhi-jnana. For while avadhi-jnana can grasp all the material substances manahparyaya can grasp only those among them that are of the form of manas; and these latter too are grasped by manahparyaya only insofar as they happen to lie within the limits of the area called

manusottara (i.e. the area surrounded by the mountain manusottara). That is why the sphere of objects pertaining to manahparyaya-jnana is said to be equivalent to that pertaining to avadhi-jnana divided by ananta. Again, even manahparyaya-jnana, howsoever pure it might be, cannot cognize all the modes belonging to the substances it can possibly grasp. Lastly manahparyaya-jnana directly perceives only a tangible manas engaged in the process of thinking but with the help of a subsequent inference it is possible to cognize all the objects - tangible or otherwise - which this manas thinks of.

The four types of cognition mati etc., howsoever pure they might be, are incapable of grasping all the states of even a single object and that is because they are of the form of but incomplete development of the power of consciousness. On the other hand, it is a rule that the type of cognition which grasps all the states of even a single object can grasp all the states of all the objects; it is this type of cognition that is complete cognition, and it is this that is technically called kevala-jnana. This type of cognition makes its appearance at the time when there takes place a complete development of the power of consciousness. That is why this type of cognition is not divided into sub-types, a division born of incompleteness. There is no object or a state of it which is incapable of being grasped by the type of cognition in question. That is why it is maintained that kevala-jnana operates in relation to all the substances along with all of their modes. 27-30

An Account of the Types of Cognition that can be Simultaneously Present in a Soul :

In a soul there can possibly be present from one to four types of cognition alternatively - that is, without any of the four alternatives being necessarily present there. 31

In some soul there can possibly be present only one type of cognition, in some other two types, in some other three, in some even four; but all the five types of cognition cannot possibly be present in a soul. When only one type of cognition is present in a soul it must be kevala-jnana; for kevala-jnana being a complete type of cognition no incomplete type of cognition whatsoever can co-exist with it. When two types of cognition whatsoever can co-exist with it. When two types of cognition are present in a soul they must be mati and sruta, for among the five types of cognition they alone necessarily go together; so far as the remaining three types are concerned they can well exist in isolation from one another. When three types of cognition are present in a soul they must be either mati, sruta and avadhi or mati, sruta and manahparyaya; for three types of cognition are possible only in an incomplete state of perfection, while in such a state mati and sruta must be present irrespective of whether the third coexisting type is avadhi or

manahparyaya. When four types of cognition are present in a soul they must be mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya; for all these four types being possible in an incomplete state of perfection all of them can exist together. The reason why kevala-jnana does not co-exist with any other type of cognition is that the former is possible only in a complete state of perfection while the remaining types are possible only in an incomplete state of perfection. Certainly, a complete state of perfection and an incomplete such state being mutually contradictory coexist in a soul.

Again, when two, three or four types of cognition are declared to be possibly coexistent they are so declared only in respect of potency not in respect of activity.

Question : What does that mean?

Answer : For example, at the time when a person possessing the two types of cognition mati and sruta or one possessing the three types mati, sruta and avadhi is actively engaged in cognizing some object through mati-jnana he is certainly possessed of the potency to have sruta-jnana or of that to have avadhi-jnana, but at that same time he cannot put either of these potencies to use with a view to cognizing objects through the corresponding type of jnana. Similarly, at the time of being actively engaged with sruta-jnana he cannot put to use the potency to have mati-jnana or that to have avadhi-jnana. The same applies to the potency to have manahparyaya. The idea is that even when there exist in a soul the maximum number of cognitive potencies - that is, four of them - then too an active engagement in the form of having cognition is possible on the part of just one of them at a time; for at that time the remaining potencies lie defunct.

At the time of kevala-jnana there do not take place that four types of cognition mati etc. - this principle is admitted on all hands but it is interpreted in two ways. Thus some authorities are of the view that at the time of kevala-jnana the four cognitive potencies - corresponding to mati etc. - are certainly present there but being overpowered by kevala-jnana - just as the light of planets, stars etc. is overpowered by solar light - they are not in a position to undertake active engagement in the form of having cognition. That is why at the time of kevala-jnana there arise no cognitive mental states of the form of mati etc. even while the corresponding potencies are then certainly present there.

The other authorities are of the view that the four cognitive potencies mati etc. are not natural to a soul but being of the form of the ksayopasama of the karma concerned they are something accidental - that is, something dependent on karma. Hence when there is a total disappearance of the jnanavaraniya-karma as it is there at the time of kevala-jnana there is no possibility whatsoever of the accidental potencies in question being present. Hence it is that at the time of

kevala-jnana no cognitive potency except that pertaining to kevala-jnana is possibly present - nor an active engagement in the form of having cognition on the part of one such potency. 31

Laying Down the Nature of False Cognition and the Causes of Falsity in Cognition :

Mati, sruta and avadhi - these three are also of the form of false-cognition, technically called ajnana. 32

Since the cognizer concerned does not know how to discriminate the real from the unreal, even true cognition on his part is in fact false cognition because it is thus a case of accidental - i.e. thoughtless - cognition just like a madman's cognition. 33

The five forms of cognition mati, sruta etc. are so many modes of the power of consciousness, and to illumine their respective objects is their specific function. Hence it is that they are all designated cognition. But the first three of them are understood to be of the form of jnana as well as ajnana. Thus we have mati-jnana as well as mati-ajnana, sruta-jnana as well as sruta-ajnana, avadhi-jnana as well as avadhi-ajnana - techincally called vibhaga-jnana.

Question : When the three modes mati etc. are called jnana inasmuch as they make possible the apprehension of their respective objects they why are the same also called ajnana? For the two words jnana and ajnana, being mutually contradictory, cannot apply to the same object - just as light and darkness cannot exist at the same place.

Answer : All the above three modes are to be called jnana so far as the worldly convention is concerned but when they are here called jnana as well ajnana that is done in conformity to the convention of a systematic discipline. For it is a convention of the spiritual discipline that the three cognitive modes mati, sruta and avadhi as belonging to a mithyadrsti person (i.e. a person devoid of samyakdarsana) are but ajnana while the same as belonging to a samyak-drsti person (i.e. a person possessed of samyak-darsana) are jnana.

Question : It is not possible that only the samyak-drsti persons carry on authentic cognitive intercourse and not also the mithya-drsti ones. It is also not possible that a samyak-drsti person never has false cognition in the form of doubt or illusion while a mithya-drsti person always has nothing but false cognition of this sort. Nor is it possible that the instruments of cognition like sense-organs etc. must be perfect and free from defect in the case of a samyak-drsti person while the same must be imperfect in the case of a mithya-drsti person. And who can say

that all the persons who happen to throw unprecedented light on subjects like science, literature etc. and who arrive at authentic conclusions regarding the same are samyak-drsti? So the question arises as to what is the basis of the present convention as to the terms jnana and ajnana resorted to by the spiritual discipline.

Answer : The basis of the spiritual discipline is the spiritual standpoint and not the worldly one. Thus souls are of two types - viz. those directed towards moksa and those directed towards a worldly life. The persons directed towards moksa are possessed of a sense of impartiality and self-discrimination, hence they make use of all their cognition with a view to buttressing their sense of impartiality - not to buttressing the worldly cravings. And that exactly is why their cognition is to be called jnana even in case it is mearge from the worldly standpoint. On the contrary, the cognition belonging to the person directed towards a worldly life, howsoever extensive and lucid it might be from the worldly standpoint, is to be called ajnana precisely to the extent it tends to buttress not the sense of impartiality but the worldly cravings. Just as a madman by taking gold to be gold and iron to be iron does occasionally attain true cognition, but on account of his madness he is incapable of discriminating the true from the false and so all his cognition - whether true or false - is deemed thoughtless or false cognition, similarly the person directed towards a worldly life, howsoever extensive might be his stock of knowledge, is in the dark as to the nature of soul and so all his worldly knowledge is but ignorance from the spiritual standpoint.

The idea is that even if a madman is in possession of much property and even if on occasions he attains true cognition his madness is always on the increase; similarly, the mithya-drsti person, who suffers from an intensity of attachment and aversion and is ignorant as to the nature of soul, employs even the vast stock of his knowledge just for buttressing his worldly cravings. That is why his cognition is to be called ajnana. On the contrary, the samyak-arsti person, who suffers from no intensity of attachment and aversion and is possessed of knowledge concerning soul, employs even the small stock of his knowledge just for spiritual satisfaction. That is why his cognition is to be called jnana. This how things are viewed from the spiritual standpoint. 32-33

The types of Naya :

Naigama, sangraha, vyavahara, rjusutra and sabda these five are the types of naya. 34

Of these, the first - that is naigama - and sabda have got two and three sub-types respectively. 35

There is no one fixed tradition as to the number of types pertaining to naya. Rather three traditions are found to be current in this connection. The first of these directly posits seven types - viz. naigama, sangraha, vyavahara, riusutra, sabda, samabhirudha, evambhuta; it is upheld by the Jaina Agamic texts and by the Digambara texts. The second tradition is upheld by Siddhasena Divakara; he posits only six types - that is, the above seven minus naigama. The third tradition is upheld by the present aphorism and by the bhasya on the same; according to it, there are five basic types of naya while among these the first type naigama has got (according to the bhasya) two sub-types - viz. desapariksepin and sarvapariksepin - and the fifth type sabda three sub-types - viz. samprata, samabhirudha, and evambhuta.

The Idea Behind the Delineation of Nayas :

Concerning one thing or many things the views of one person or many persons are of diverse kinds. That is to say, if the views concerning even one single thing are enumerated they will appear to be limitless. And hence it becomes impossible to make acquaintance with all of these views concerning this thing. So to undertake not a very brief nor a very detailed but a medium elaboration of these views is what the delineation of nayas comes to. Thus the delineation of nayas means a classification of views; and the doctrine of naya means an investigation into views. The doctrine of naya not only discusses what the respective causes of the different views are, what their respective consequences are, what their respective subject-matters are, but its chief aim is to look for the seed of compatibility among views that appear to be mutually contradictory but are not really so. So the doctrine of naya can be briefly interpreted as follows. It is the discipline which looks for the seed of real compatibility among views that appear to be mutually contradictory and which thus synthesizes these views. For example, mutually contradictory views are found propounded concerning soul itself. Thus at some place it is said 'the soul is one', at another place it too is said 'the souls are many!' Now oneness and manyness appear to be mutually contradictory, and so the question arises : 'Is this mutual contradiction among these statements real or not? If it is not real, why? ' The answer to this query has been found out by doctrine of naya and the following is the syntheses it has worked out. Qua individual units the soul are many but if attention is fixed on the aspect of pure consciousness they are all one. Working out such syntheses the doctrine of naya demonstrates the mutual compatibility - the possibility of standing together - among even such statements as are mutually contradictory. Thus on the basis of the doctrine of naya there is demonstrated the mutual compatibility among so many views concerning soul that appear to be mutually contradictory - e.g. the view that it is permanent and the view that it is transient, the view that it is active and the view that it is inactive, and so on and so forth. The seed of such compatibility lies in the viewpoint - the intention of the thinker

concerned. And the word apeksa appearing in this discipline stands just for viewpoint thus understood; hence the doctrine of naya is also called the doctrine of apeksa.

Why the Separate Enunciation of the Doctrine of Naya and How Is It a Specializing Feature of Jainism :

In the earlier given account of cognition the type called sruta has already been discussed. Now sruta is a cognition of the nature of considered views and since naya too is a variety of cognition of the same nature the latter turns out to be a part and parcel of the former. So first there arises the question as to why when account of sruta has already been offered there should follow apart from this account an enunciation of the doctrine of naya. Again, one specializing feature of Jaina philosophy owes its origin to its doctrine of naya, but the doctrine of naya is of the nature of sruta while sruta is a name for agama-pramana-that is, the valid

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1. See Chapter One, aphorism 20.

cognition called scripture. Now the non-Jaina systems of philosophy too discuss pramana or valid cognition and in that connection they offer an account of agama-pramana. So naturally a second question arises as follows : When an account of agama-pramana is available even in other systems of philosophy then why should it be treated as a specializing feature of the Jaina system that it enunciates the doctrine which is included in agama-pramana? In other words, the question is as to what was the intention of the founders of the Jaina system of philosophy behind propounding the doctrine of naya apart from sruta-pramana.

Both sruta and naya are certainly of the form of a cognition of the nature of considered views. And yet they differ from one another as follows : A considered view which touches upon-or attempts to do so - some subject matter - in all its aspects is sruta while a considered view which is content to touch upon some one aspect of the same subject-matter is naya. That is why naya cannot be independently called a pramana and yet it is not a case of no pramana. Just as the tip of a finger cannot be called a finger and yet we cannot even say that it is no finger - for after all it is a part of a finger - similarly, naya too is a part of sruta-pramana. The order followed by the origin of considered views and the practice resulting from it - these two are the viewpoints in accordance with which naya has been treated apart from sruta-pramana. For whatever be the thing under consideration it is the considered views relating to its various aspects that culminate in hugeness or completeness. And the same order which is followed by the origin of the considered views in question should be followed by an account of them qua a means of ultimate enlightenment. When this is conceded a treatment of naya apart from sruta naturally turns

out to be in place. Again, however complete be a piece of cognition relating to a thing, in practice this cognition is invariably employed part by part. And this too is why it is in place to treat apart from each other naya that is of the nature of considered views taken partwise and sruta that is of the nature of the same taken in their totality.

Though agama-pramana has been discussed even by the non-Jaina systems of philosophy, yet the doctrine of naya which is included in the same parmana is established separately by the Jain system and that for the following reason, a reason sufficient to account for something that is special for this system. Generally, a man's cognitive operation is but partial in its coverage while he suffers from too much egoism and conceit. The result is that whatever little consideration he bestows on a subject tends to be treated by him as final and complete. And on account of the tendency in question he loses patience to give thought to the views of others. So ultimately he comes to mistakenly view his partial cognition as complete cognition. This mistaken view, in its turn, renders impossible a feeling of accord among persons holding true but different views concerning one and the same thing. The net result is that the door to a complete and true cognition is effectively barred.

When on any topic - e.g. the nature of soul - a system of philosophy treats as totally true the partly true view of a person deeemed authoritative by it, then the other systems of philosophy which hold views that are true but opposite to its own are held in contempt by it as unauthentic. Similarly, some other system of philosophy holds this first system in contempt, and both hold in contempt some third system. The result is that in place of mutual accord there crop up discord and conflict. So it is with a view to opening the door for a true and complete cognition and with a view to eliminating conflicts that the doctrine of naya has been established. Thereby it is indicated that each thinker, before he attributes the status of agama-pramana to a view of his, should make sure whether or not this view manages to cover all aspects of the matter under consideration and as such deserves to be classed as pramana. The indication in question made through the doctrine of naya is a speciality of Jaina philosophy.

A General Definition :

Whatever be the subject-matter a view which offers a relatively true account of it is naya.

In brief the nayas are divided into two types - viz. dravyarthika and paryayarthika.

The so many things of the world, big and small, are neither absolutely similar to one another nor absolutely dissimilar. Thus they all

contain in their make-up both an aspect of similarity and one of dissimilarity. This exactly is why it can be said that all things whatsoever are of the form of both something generic and something specific. And man's intellect inclines sometimes towards the generic aspect of things, sometimes towards their specific aspect. When it grasps the generic aspect its view is called dravyarthika naya, when it grasps the generic aspect its view is called dravyarthika naya, when it grasps the specific aspect the same is called paryayarthika naya. However, not all the views pertaining to the generic nor all of them pertaining to the specific are of an identical nature; each group has got internal differences. To make this out the two viewpoints are briefly subdivided once more. Thus there are three divisions of the dravyarthika and four of the paryayarthika - that is to say, seven divisions in all; and these very are the seven nayas. Of course, it is not the case that the dravyarthika view takes no account whatsoever of paryaya or the specific aspect or that the paryayarthika view takes no account whatsoever of dravya or the generic aspect. For the division of view-points is to be understood on the basis of a consideration of the chief and the subordinate.

Question : Please explain both the above mentioned nayas with the help of convenient illustrations.

Answer : When at any time, at any place or under any condition eye is fixed on the ocean and what is attended to are not the specific features of water like its colour, taste, depth or shallowness, extent and limits but only water as such, then we have before us a generic consideration having only water for its subject-matter; and this precisely is the dravyarthika naya pertaining to water.

On the contrary, when what is attended to are the specific features of water like its colour, taste etc. then the consideration in question, inasmuch as it has the specific features of water for its subject-matter, is called the paryayarthika naya pertaining to water.

What has just been said concerning water can be understood also in the case of all other physical things. Thus just as in relation to the different things of an identical nature that are located in different places - e.g. in relation to all water - it is possible to have both a generic and a specific consideration, similarly in relation to a single thing that is spread out on the limitless time - plank with its three divisions past, present and future - e.g. in relation to a soul - it is possible to have both a generic and a specific consideration. When the different formations resulting from a difference of time and condition are disregarded and attention is fixed on the different states of consciousness resulting from a difference of place, time etc. then we have before us the paryayarthika naya pertaining to consciousness.

The Nature of the Particular Types of Naya :

(1) The view which results from following the popular convention or the popular worldly course is naigama naya.

The two sub-types of naigama indicated by Umasvati are to be interpreted as follows : When on the basis of a word like 'jar' or 'cloth' that is indicative of something generic just a few of the corresponding specimens - i.e. just a few jars or just a few pieces of cloth - are called to mind the resultant view is desapariksepin-naigama i.e. naigama encompassing a part; on the other hand, when on the basis of the same word the entire corresponding class - i.e. the entire class of jars or the entire class of pieces of cloth - is called to mind then the resultant view is sarvapariksepin-naigama, i.e. naigama encompassing the whole.

(2) The view which on the basis of some one generic feature whatsoever subsumes under one form the things of various types or the numerous particular units of them is sangraha naya.

(3) The view which with some practical purpose in view distinguishes from one another the things subsumed under one form on the basis of some one generic feature is vyavahara-naya.

All these three nayas have their origin in the grounds of the dravyarthika and so they are all understood to be of the nature of the dravyarthika.

Question : Before proceeding on to interpret the remaining nayas please explain well with the help of illustrations these three nayas themselves.

Answer : Depending on the variety of types of place, time and the nature of peoples the popular conventions as also the impressions left behind by them are of numerous types. Hence the naigama naya originating from them too is of numerous types - which is why its illustrations of various types are to be met with. And new illustrations of the same sort can well be construed.

A person going there with a view to undertaking some job is asked by someone 'where are you going?" And the former replies 'I am going to fetch an axe or a pen.'

Here the person replying is in fact going to fetch either wood for preparing an axe-handle or reed to prepare a pen and yet he formulates his reply as above and the person enquiring too immediately catches his meaning. This is just a form of popular convention.

When a person who having given up caste rules has become a monk is introduced in terms of the Brahmin caste to which he belonged in his

earlier life-stage, then too the statement concerned 'Here is a Brahmin monk' is understood immediately. Similarly, the ninth and thirteenth dates of the bright half of the month Caitra are treated by people as the birthday of Ramacandra and Mahavira respectively who were actually born thousands of years back, and treating these dates as such they organize corresponding festivals in this connection. This too is a form of popular convention.

When a certain particular human groups happen to be engaged in fight among themselves then others think as if it is the respective residing places of these human groups that are fighting, and so, they say 'India is fighting', 'China is fighting' etc. The intention behind such statements is immediately understood by the hearers.

Thus whatever views originate on account of the impressions left behind by the popular conventions are collected together in the first category under the title naigama naya.

Sangraha Naya

When one keeps in view the one generic feature 'existence' that is common to the numerous particular things of a physical or a conscious type - thus disregarding the other specific features that are equally present there - and treating all these things as of one form reflects 'The entire universe is of the form of existence - for there is nothing that is devoid of existence', then what we have before us is sangraha naya. Similarly, when paying no attention to the variety of types and the multiplicity of units characterizing the pieces of cloth that are present there one keeps in view just one generic feature clothness and reflects 'Just cloth is present here' , then too what we have before us is sangraha naya.

In accordance with the greater or lesser extent of the concerned generic feature one can construe numberless illustrations of sangraha naya. Thus the move extensive the concerned generic feature the more extensive will be the resultant sangraha naya; similarly, the less extensive the concerned generic feature the less extensive will be the resultant sangraha naya. The idea is that whatever views operate by unifying various things on the basis of a generic feature are fit to be placed in the category sangraha naya.

Vyavahara Naya

Even after various things have been subsumed under one form if it is required that they be introduced to someone in a specific form - or if the occasion arises for making a practical use of them - then they have to be distinguished from one another on the basis of a specific form. For example, by being told of just cloth one cannot be made acquainted with the various types of cloth taken separately. Again, he who wants khadi -

that is, the handspun and woven cloth - cannot get it without introducing distinction among cloths; for certainly cloths are of numerous types. Hence it is that distinctions like the khadi cloth, the mill-made cloth, etc. too have to be introduced. Similarly, in the field of philosophy one says : 'The thing of the form of existence is of two types - viz. the physical and the conscious; again, the conscious thing is of two types - viz. one entangled in the worldly life and one emancipated from it.' And further distinctions of the same sort have to be made. All such views with a tendency towards making distinction are to be placed in the category vyavahara naya.

In the above illustrations it can be seen that the basis of naigama naya is popular convention while popular convention in its turn is based on a transfer of epithet; and a transfer of epithet has for its basis something that is generic. This being the case it becomes absolutely clear that naigama naya is something that grasps the generic. Similarly, sangraha naya being of the form of a unificatory cognitive operation is obviously something that grasps the generic. As for vyavahara naya even though it involves a cognitive operation which tends towards making distinctions the basis of its activity is something generic; hence it too should be treated as something that grasps the generic. All this explains why the three nayas in question are regarded as divisions of the dravyarthika naya.

Question : What is the mutual distinction among these three nayas and what is the mutual relationship among them?

Answer : The sphere of naigama naya is most extensive of all, for in accordance with the concerned popular convention it grasps both the generic and the specific - sometimes in a chief form, sometimes in a subsidiary form. And since sangraha is directed only towards the generic its sphere is less extensive than that of naigama. As for vyavahara, its sphere is less extensive than even that of sangraha, for on the basis of certain particular features it only introduces distinctions in that very sphere that has been covered by sangraha and is therefore something that is directed only towards the specific. Thus there is a relative order of succession among these three naya inasmuch as their sphere is growingly less extensive. Naigama naya familiarizes us with the generic, the specific and the relation between the two; from this originates sangraha while it is on the wall of sangraha that the painting of vyavhara is drawn.

Question : In this very manner please interpret the remaining four nayas as well, adduce illustrations relating to them, and give other information regarding them.

Answer : (1) The view which, disregarding the past and the future, grasps only the present in rjusutra.

(2) The view which chiefly depending on words keeps its attention fixed on so many properties of words and posits a corresponding difference of meaning is sabda-naya.

Of the three sub-types of sabda-naya indicated by Umasvati in the aphorism the first is samprata. That is to say, the generic word sabda-naya singly covers all the three sub-types, samprata, samabhirudha and evambhuta; but in all the current traditions the word sabda-naya conventionally stands for the first sub-type samprata and so the word samprata-naya is there replaced by the word sabda-naya. That is why we have given a general interpretion of samprata-naya at just this place and have employed the word sabda-naya while offering a special elucidation of the same. And this elucidation is the same as the elucidation of samprata offered in the bhasya.

(3) The view which posits a difference of meaning on the basis of the etymology of the word concerned is samabhirudha-naya.

(4) The view which applies a word to a thing only in case this thing satisfies the meaning yielded by this word never otherwise - is evambhuta.

Rjusutra-Naya :

Though man's imagination cannot absolutely ignore what is past or what is future it often happens that man's intellect, keeping its attention fixed on an immediately present consequence, begins to operate only in relation to what is present. Under such a situation man's intellect begins to suppose as if only that what is present is real, is efficacious while that which is past or that which is future, being not efficacious at present, is as good as void. Thus a prosperity that is present can alone be called prosperity because it alone is a means of happiness; on the other hand, the memory of a past prosperity or the anticipation of a future prosperity cannot at all be called prosperity - because neither is a means of happiness at present. Similarly, a son who is present and who serves his parents is a son; on the other hand, a son who existed in past or will exist in future but does not exist at present is not at all a son. Thus the views which exclusively pertain to the present phase of time are to be placed in the category rjusutra.

Sabda-Naya :

When an understanding penetrating into the depths of thought is once bent upon rooting out the past and the future, then at another time it proceeds still further and gets ready to root out something else as well. Hence sometimes it operates on the basis of words alone and reflects that if the present is alone real on the simple ground that it is different from the past and the future then why a word should not yield a different meaning when associated with a different gender, tense, number case-ending, person or prefix. Just as there is no one single thing

running like a thread into all the three phases of time but the thing that exists at present is alone a thing, similarly the things denoted by words that involve different gender, number, tense etc. are to be understood to be really different. Thinking thus the understanding in question comes to posit a difference in meaning on the basis of a difference in tense, gender etc.

For example, in a scriptural text there occurs the statement 'There was a town named Rajagrha.' The broad meaning of this statement is that the town named Rajagrha existed there in the past but does not exist there at present. However, as a matter of fact, Rajagrha existed there even at the time of the statement in question. But if it was present there at that time, then why was it written 'It was there?' This question is answered by sabda-naya by maintaining that Rajagrha that exists at present is different from Rajagrha. that existed in the past, and that since the context requires an account of the latter the statement 'Rajagrha was there' was made. This is an illustration of the difference of meaning based on a difference of tense.

As an example of the difference of meaning based on a difference of gender take the words 'kua' (Hindi for the Sanskrit kuda - i.e. 'well') and kuin (Hindi for the Sanskrit kupika - i.e. a diminutive well). Here the first word is in masculine gender, the second in faminine gender. And the difference of meaning supposed to underlie them too is well known in practice. Again, so many taras or heavenly bodies are called naksatras or specific constellations of stars, but according to sabda-naya one is not authorized to make statements like 'That particular tara is naksatra' 'That is the naksatra magha' for according to this naya since a difference of geneder yields a difference of meaning no one thing can be referred to by both the words tara and naksatra or by both the words magha and naksatra.

Similarly, when the same verbal root yields a different meaning when associated with a different prefix - e.g. in the case of words samsthana (=shape), prasthana (=moving away), upasthana (=presence) etc. or in the case of the words arama (=grove), virama (=rest) etc. - then we have something that builds a ground for sabda-naya. Thus the so many suppositions that are current as to the difference of meaning based on the different properties of words are all to be placed in the category sabda-naya.

Samabhirudha Naya :

The same understanding which posits a difference in meaning on the basis of a difference in some property of words now proceeding still further takes its stand on a difference in etymology and goes to the extent of maintaining that even in those cases where certain different

words are supposed to yield the same meaning they cannot in fact have the same meaning but must have different meanings. Its argument is that when a difference in gender, number etc. can form the basis of a difference in meaning then why a difference in the word employed should not do the same.

Thus arguing it attributes on the basis of etymology different meanings to the synonymous words like raja, nrpa, bhupati etc. (all meaning 'king'); its contention is that one who is decorated with royal insignia is raja, one who protects the people is nrpa, one who maintains the earth - i.e. makes it prosperous - is bhupati. Thus this view which on the basis of etymology posits differentiation within one and the same thing that is denoted by the three synonymous words in question is called samabhirudha-naya. All the suppositions which posit a difference of meaning in the case of the different synonymous words are to be placed in this very category.

Evambhuta Naya :

When the understanding specially accustomed to penetrate into the depths of the matter reaches the ultimate depth it reflects that when a difference in etymology can yield a difference in meaning then it too should be conceded that a word stands for a thing only in case this thing satisfies the etymology of this word and that only in such a case - not otherwise - has this thing to be denoted by this word.

On this supposition a man is not to be called raja if he has only earned the right to be decorated by royal insignia at some time or other, nor is he to be called nrpa is he has only been entrusted with the responsibility, he is to be called raja only in case he is actually carrying the royal sceptre and is shining with the glory on that account; similarly, he is to be called nrpa only in case he is actually protecting the people. All this is to say that it would be proper to call a man raja or nrpa only in case he is actually satisfying the etymology of the word concerned.

Similarly, only at a time - or at the times - when a person is actually performing some service is he to be called sevaka (Sanskrit for 'one who serves'). Thus all the suppositions which employ a word standing for some qualifier or one standing for some qualificand only in case the activity with which this word is related is actually being undertaken are to be called evambhuta-naya.

Remaining Remarks :

The difference that obtains among the just described four categories of views should be obvious from the illustrations cited in connection with each. So there is no need for pointing that out separately. Only this much

has to be understood that each succeeding naya is subtler than the one preceding it; hence it is that the subject-matter of a succeeding naya depends on that of the preceding one. And the basis of all these four nayas is paryayarthika-naya. This has to be said because rjusutra accepts only the present phase of time - not the past or future; hence it is obvious that its subject-matter comes into view not as something generic but as something specific. That is to say, it is really from rjusutra that paryayarthika-naya - that is, the view directed towards the specific - makes its start. The three nayas coming after rjusutra are increasingly more directed towards the specific; hence their being paryayarthika is but obvious.

Her it too must be understood that even among these nayas when a succeeding one is said to be subtler than that preceding it then to that extent this preceding naya is more directed towards the generic than that succeeding one. Similarly, the three nayas, naigama etc. which take their stand on the ground of dravyarthika are increasingly more subtle and to that extent among them too a succeeding one is to be taken to be more directed towards the specific than that preceding it.

Nevertheless, when the first three nayas are called dravyarthika and the last four paryayarthika then the idea is that in the first three the generic element and a consideration of it are relatively more obvious inasmuch as they are relatively crude; on the other hand, the last four nayas are relatively subtle and in them the specific element and a consideration of it are relatively more obvious. It is on the basis of this obviousness or non-obviousness of the generic and specific elements - and on the basis of their dominant or subordinate status - that the seven nayas are divided into two types - viz. dravyarthika and paryayarthika. But when consideration is bestowed on the real state of affairs then it is found that the generic and specific elements being two indissoluble aspects of one and the same thing it is impossible to absolutely distinguish the subject-matter of one naya from that of another.

Naya-drsti or the viewpoint of naya, vicarasarani, or the methodology of consideration, sapeksa abhipraya or the relative purport - these three phraseologies mean one and the same thing. From the above account it ought to be clear that in relation to one and the same subjet-matter whatsoever there can be a number of methodologies of consideration. However, whatever be the number of such methodologies they have been briefly divided into seven types in the manner indicated. Among those seven too the second exhibits greater subtlety than the first, the third greater than the second. The greatest subtlety is to be found in the last methodology that has been designated evambhuta. That precisely is why the seven methodologies in question are divided into two types in another manner also - that is, they have been divided into the types designated vyavahara-naya and niscaya-naya. Vyavahara means that directed towards the

crude or that in which there is the predominance of a transfer of epithet, niscaya means that directed towards the subtle or that which touches upon what is essential. Really speaking, the final limit of niscaya is reached in evambhuta.

In a third manner too seven nayas are divided into two types - that is, they are divided into the types sabda-naya and artha-naya. Thus that which chiefly considers an artha or a thing is artha-naya, that which chiefly considers an artha or a thing is artha-naya, that which chiefly considers a sabda or a word is sabda-naya. Thus the first four nayas upto rjusutra belong to the type artha-naya, the remaining three to the type sabda-naya.

There are good many more viewpoints besides those described above. Thus life has got two divisions - one that is devoted to recognising the truth, the other that is devoted to digesting the truth. The division which only thinks over the truth - that is, which makes acquaintance with what is essential - is jnana naya or the viewpoint of knowledge; on the other hand, the division which attaches finality to the digesting of one's acquaintance with truth is kriya-naya or the viewpoint of action.

The above described seven nayas, inasmuch as they are all devoted to a consideration of truth, are to be placed in the category jnana-naya. And the viewpoint of realizing in life the truth investigated through the instrumentality of these nayas is the viewpoint of action. Here action means rendering life replete with truth. 34, 35

CHAPTER TWO

In the first chapter the seven fundamental verities have been indicated by name; in the next nine chapters they have to be specially described one by one. Hence first of all the essential nature of the fundamental verity soul has been delineated in the present chapter while an account of the various topics connected with it - e.g. its sub-division into types - continues upto the fourth chapter.

The five bhavas - that is, the characteristic conditions resulting from the presence or otherwise of the karma concerned -, their types and illustrations :

Aupasamika (i.e. that which results from a subsidence of the karma concerned), ksayika (i.e. that which results from a destruction of the karma concerned), the mixed or ksayopasamika (i.e. that which results from a subsidence-cum-destruction of the karma concerned) - these three plus two more - viz.audayika (i.e. that which results from a manisfastetion of the karma concerned) and parinamika (i.e. that which having nothing to do with karma appears naturally) - thus five in all are the types of bhava and they constitute the nature of a soul. 1

These five types have got 2, 9, 18, 21 and 3 sub-types respectively. 2

Samyaktva or right inclination and caritra or right conduct - these two are aupasamika. 3

Jnana or determinate cognition, darsana or indeterminate cognition, dana or donation, labha or gain, bhoga or immediate consumption, upabhoga or recurrent consumption, virya or endeavour, and samyaktva or right inclination and caritra or right conduct - these nine are ksayika. 4

Four types of jnana or right determinate cognition, three types of ajnana or false determinate cognition, three types of darsana or indeterminate cognition, the five above enumerated fortunes dana etc., samyaktva or right inclination, caritra or complete discipline and samyamasamyama or partial discipline - these eighteen are ksayopasamika. 5

The four types of gati or birth-species, the four types of kasaya or passions, the three types of linga (also called veda) or sexual feeling, one mithyadarsana or wrong inclination, one ajnana or lack-of-cognition, one asamyama or lack-of-discipline, one asiddhatva or state of non emancipation, and the six types of lesya or spiritual colouring - these twenty one are audayika. 6

Jivatva or being a soul, bhavyatva or being worthy of moksa and abhavyatva or being unworthy of moksa-these three, as also several others, are parinamika. 7

The present aphorism is aimed at elucidating the difference of opinion as to the nature of soul that obtains between the Jaina system of philosophy on the one hand and the other systems on the other. Thus the Sankhya and Vedanta systems treat a soul as absolutely permanent and so posit in it no transformation whatsoever; according to them, the transformations like cognition, pleasure, pain etc. belong rather to prakrti or avidya. The Nyaya and Vaisesika systems do treat cognition etc. as qualities of a soul, but still a soul is according to them absolutely permanent - that is, such as undergoes no transformation whatsoever. The neo-Mimamsa view too is akin to that of the Vaisesika and Nyaya. According to the Buddhist system, a soul is but a flow of transformations that are absolutely momentary - that is, such as leave no residue whatsoever.

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1. At different moments there is an experience of the transformations like pleasure and pain, or of those like the cognitions with their objects mutually differing more or less; now to treat these transformations as alone real and not to admit the existence of a continuously abiding substance as running in their midst like a thread - that is the notion of a flow of such transformations as leave no residue whatsoever.

As against all these, the Jaina system maintains that just as in the physical objects of nature there is neither absolute permanence nor absolute momentaries but permanance in the midst of transformations, similarly a soul is permanent in the midst of transformations.

Hence the modes like cognition, pleasure, pain etc. ought to be treated as pertaining to a soul itself.

Not all the modes of a soul are found characterized by one and same condition; thus some of them are found characterized by one condition, some others by another. It is these different conditions possibly characterizing a mode that are called bhava; and the modes of a soul can be characterized by five types of bhava at the most. These five types are as follows ;- (1) aupasamika, (2) ksayika, (3) ksayopasamika, (4) audayika, (5) parinamika.

The Nature of Bhavas

(1) The aupasamika bhava is that which is born of upasama or subsidence. Upasama is a sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of a complete cessation of the manifestation of some karma which is yet in existence - just like the clarity appearing in water in which dirt has gathered at the bottom.

(2) The ksayika bhava is that which is born of ksaya or destruction. Ksaya is the supreme sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of a complete dissociation from karma - just like the clarity appearing in water that has been rendered absolutely free of dirt.

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1. However frequently might a hammer strike against the anvil the latter remains fixed in its place; in the same manner, not to suffer any change whatsoever in spite of the change pertaining to place, time etc. - that is the state of kutasthnityata (the Sanskrit word for 'absolute permanence'). When the basic entity persits there in all the three phases of time and yet there is change pertaining to place, time etc. - that is the state of parinaminityata (the Sanskrit word for permanance in the midst of transformations).

(3) The ksayopasamika bhava is that which is born of both ksaya and upsama. Ksayopasama is a sort of spiritual purification that comes about as a result of destruction through pradesodaya or nominal manifestation of a part of some karma. This purification is a mixed sort - just like that of the water-washed rice kodrava whose intoxicating power partly vanishes and partly remains.

(4) The audayika bhava is that which is born of udaya or manifestation. Udaya is a sort of spiritual blemish or pollution that comes about at the time of an effective manifestation of karma - just as dirtiness appears in water in which dirt has been mixed.

(5) The parinamika bhava is that transformation of a substance which is automatically called forth by a mere existence of this substance. That is to say, the natural self-transformation undergone by a substance is called its parinamika bhava.

It is these five types of bhava that constitute the nature of soul; that is to say, whether a soul be worldly or emancipated its modes must be characterized by one of these five types of bhava. On the other hand, modes characterized by these five types of bhava cannot possibly be found in a not-soul and so these five types of bhava cannot constitute the nature of a not-soul. Of course, it is not necessary that all these five types of bhava be found together simultaneously in all the souls that are there. Thus all the emancipated souls are possessed of just two types of bhava - viz. ksayika and parinamika. As for the worldly souls, some among them are possessed of three of these types, some possessed of four, some possessed of five; however, none of them is possessed of just two types of bhava. All this to say that the modes of an emancipated soul are characterized by the just mentioned

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1. The experincing of karmic particles rendered void of flavour is

pradesodaya or nominal manifestation; the experiencing of those yet possessed of flavour is vipakodaya or effective manifestation.

two types of bhava while those of a worldly soul are characterized by three to five types. So when it is said that the five types of bhava constitute the nature of a soul the statement is to be understood either to refer to the whole lot of souls that are there or to refer to the possibility of these five types in one particular soul.

The modes characterized by audayika bhava are accidental, those characterized by the remaining four types of bhava are natural. 1

The present aphorism enumerates 53 sub-types of the above five types of bhava while the next aphorisms name these sub-types group by group and tell us as to how many and which modes are characterized by this or that type of bhava. 2

The Sub-types of Aupasamika-bhava :

Right inclination results from a subsidence of the darsanamohaniya karma, right conduct from that of the caritra-mohaniya karma. Hence right inclination and right conduct, these two modes are alone to be treated as characterized by aupasamika bhava. 3

The Sub-types of Ksayika-bhava :

Kevala-jnana or all-comprehensive determinate cognition results from a destruction of the kevala-jnanavaraniya karma, kevala-darsana or all-comprehensive indeterminate cognition from that of the kevala-darsanavaraniya karma. Again, the five fortunes, donation, gain, immediate consumption, recurrent consumption and endeavour result from a destruction of the five types of antaraya karma, right inclination from that of the darsanamohaniya karma. Hence these nine modes kevalajnana caritramohaniya karma. Hence these nine modes kevalajnana etc. are to be treated as characterized by ksayika bhava. 4

The Sub-types of Ksayopasamika-bhava :

Mati-jnana, sruta-jnana, avadhi-jnana, and manahparyayajnana result from a ksayopasama of the mati-jnanavarana karma, sruta-jnanavarana karma, avadhi-jnanavarana karma and manahparyaya-jnanavarana karma respectively; false mati-jnana, false sruta-jnana, false avadhi-jnana (also called vibhaga-jnana) from that of the mati-jnanavarana karma, sruta-jnanavarana karma, avadhi-jnanavarana karma respectively; visual indeterminate cognition, non-visual indeterminate cognition, avadhi-type of indeterminate cognition from that of the caksurdarsanavarana karma respectively; the five fortunes donation etc. from that of the five types

of antaraya karma. Again, right inclination results from a ksayopasama of the anantanubandhi sub-type of four kasaya karmas on the one hand and that of the darsanamohaniya karma on the other; carita or right conduct (of a complete type) - or sarvavirati - i.e. complete discipline results from a ksayopasama of the three sub-types - viz. anantanubandhi, apratyakhyanavarana, pratyakhyanavarana kasaya karmas; samyama-samyama - i.e. restrain-cum-unrestrain or desavirati - i.e. partial discipline - from that of the two sub-types - viz. anantanubandhi and apratyakhyanavarana - of four kasaya karmas. Hence the eighteen modes mati-jnana etc. are alone to be treated as characterized by ksayopasamika bhava. 5

The Sub-types of Audayika-bhava :

The four types of gati or birth-species, hellish, animal-type, human and heavenly result from a manifestation of the gatinamakarma; the four kasayas or passions from that of the kasayamohaniya karma; the feminine, masculine and neuter sex-feelings from that of the vedamohaniya karma; mithya-darsana - i.e. lack of cognition from that of the jnanvarana karma. Again, unrestrain or a complete lack of discipline results from a manifestation of the twelve sub-types anantanubandhi etc. of caritramohaniya karma; asiddhatva - i.e. non-emancipation or sariradharana - i.e. embodiment - from that of the vedaniya, ayu, nama and gotra karmas. Lastly, the six types of lesya - viz. the black, blue, grey, red, yellow and white - (which are of the form of an activity produced by passion) result from a manifestation of the kasaya or from that of the sarira-nama-karma responsible for activity. Hence it is that the above twenty-one modes gati etc. are to be treated as characterized by audayika bhava. 6

The Sub-types of Parinamika-bhava

Jivatva or being worthy of moksa, abhavyatva or being unworthy of moksa - these three modes are natural; that is to say, these modes result neither from a subsidence, nor from a destruction, nor from a subsidence-cum-destruction of karma but are present there since a beginningless time - that is, their presence follows from the existence of a soul. Hence it is that these modes are to be treated as characterized by parinamika bhava.

Question : These three modes - are they alone characterized by parinamika bhava?

Answer : No, there are also others that are such.

Question : Which ones?

Answer : There are so many of them; e.g. existence, separateness, actorship, enjoyership, being possessed of qualities, being possessed of constituent-units, being possessed of an asankhyata number of constituent units, being non-ubiquitous, being devoid of colour.

Question : Why then are those three alone enumerated here?

Answer : The purpose here is to lay down the nature of a soul and that can be done only through a mention of its unique properties. Hence along with the modes characterized by aupasamika bhava etc. only those modes characterized by parinamika bhava are here mentioned which are unique to a soul. The modes exitence etc. are no doubt characterized by parinamika bhava but they belong to a not-soul as much as they do to a soul. So they are not unique to a soul. And that is why they are not mentioned here. Even so, it is they that are indicated by the word adi (=etc.) occuring at the end of the concerned word-compound; and the same meaning is derived by the Digambara sect from the word ca (=and) occuring in the aphorism. 7

The Defining Characteristic of a Soul :

Upayoga or cognitive operation is the defining characteristic of a soul. 8

The Jiva or soul - also called atman or conscious entity - is an independent substance existing there ever since a beginningless time. Since ultimately speaking it is devoid of colour its knowledge cannot be had through sense-organs-though it can well be had through a self-cognitive perception or an inference. Even so, to an average investigator such a defining characteristic ought to be pointed out as should enable him to recognise a soul. It is with this end in view that the defining characteristic of a soul has been laid down in the present aphorism. The soul is what is to be defined - the object to be known, upayoga its defining characteristic - the means of knowing. The universe is a conglomerate of numerous entities, physical and conscious. Among these if a discriminitive ascertainment is to be made as to what is physical and what is conscious that can be done only through the instrumentality of upayoga. For to some extent or other upayoga is invariably found in all souls. Certainly, a physical entity is one that is devoid of upayoga.

Question : But what is this upayoga?

Answer : It is nothing but an operation of the form of cognition.

Question : The activity designated cognition is found in a soul but

not in a physical entity. Why is it so?

Answer : The cause of cognition is the power of consciousness; so cognition can be found only in that which is possessed of this power. And this power is possessed only by a soul, not by a physical entity.

Question : A soul is an independent substance and so it ought to be possessed of a number of qualities. Why then is upayoga alone declared to be its defining characteristics?

Answer : Certainly, a soul is possessed of an infinite number of qualities and modes, but upayoga is the most prominent of them all. For being of such a nature as enlightens itself as well as what is not itself upayoga is alone in a position to acquaint us with itself as also with the remaining modes. Besides, whatever things present or absent are cognized by a soul, whatever ascertainment and reservations are made by it, whatever pleasure and pain are experienced by it are so dealt with by it through the instrumentality of upayoga. Hence upayoga is the most prominent of its modes.

Question : Is the defining characteristic of a thing different from its nature?

Answer : No.

Question : But then those five types of bhava which are above declared to be constituting the nature of a soul are equally its defining characteristic. What is the use then of mentioning another defining characteristic in this connection?

Answer : The unique properties too are not all alike. Thus some of them are such as doubtless reside in the definiendum concerned but they sometimes do so and sometimes do not; again, some are such as do not reside in all the cases of the definiendum. As against these, some unique properties are such as reside in the definiendum in all the three phases of time and reside in all of its cases. Now upayoga is alone to be found in all the cases of the definiendum in question - that is, in all the souls - in all the three phases of time. That is why it alone is separately mentioned as the defining characteristic and thereby it is indicated that the types of bhava upasama etc. doubtless constitute the nature of a soul but that neither are they found in all the souls nor are they found there in all the three phases of time. Thus the one parinamika bhava, jivatva or being a soul - which is tantamount to upayoga - is alone what is found in all the souls and found there in all the three phases of time. That is why it is it alone which is here separated out from the remaining types of bhava and mentioned as the defining characteristic of a

soul. As for the remaining types of bhava, inasmuch as they are occasional - that is, are sometimes to be found and sometimes not, - are found only in some cases of the definiendum, and are dependent on karma, they can only be an upalaksana or indicative mark of a soul but not its laksana or defining characteristic. Here is what distinguishes a laksana from an upalaksana. A laksana is that which is found in all the cases of the definiendum, is found there entirely and in all the three phases of time; e.g. heat as a laksana of fire; on the other hand, an upalaksana is that which is found in some cases of the definiendum and not in the rest, which is sometimes found and sometimes not, which is not natural; e.g. smoke as an upalaksana of fire. Thus the above mentioned fifty two sub-types of bhava - that is, all of them minus jivatva - are in fact so many upalaksana of a soul. 8

The Multiformity of Upayoga :

This upayoga is of two types, eight types and four types. 9

Even though the power of cognition - that is, consciousness - is equally present in all the souls the cognitive activity or operation - that is, upayoga - is not similar in the case of all the souls. The multiformity of cognitive operation depends on the variety of the concerned causal aggregate, external as well as internal. The difference as to object, the difference as to the means like sense-organ etc., the difference as to place and time - these among others constitute the variety of causal aggregate of the external type. The lesser or greater intensity or mildness of the concealment concerned - this constitutes the variety of causal aggregate of the internal type. On account of this diversity as to the concerned causal aggregate one and the same soul undertakes different cognitive activites at different times - so also do the different souls undertake different cognitive activities at one and the same time. This difference as to cognitive activities is a matter of common experience. And to briefly put it down through a classification is the aim of the present aphorism.

All cognitive operation is generally divided into two types - viz. sakara or determinate and anakara or indeterminate. On further specification the determinate cognitive operation is divided into eight sub-types, the indeterminate one into four. Thus it is that cognitive operation has got twelve sub-types in all.

The following are the eight sub-types of determinate cognitive operation; mati-jnana or right determinate cognition of the nature of mati; sruta-jnana or right determinate cognition of the nature of sruta; avadhi-jnana or right determinate cognition of the nature of avadhi; manahparyaya-jnana or right determinate cognition of the nature of manahparyaya; kevala-jnana or right determinate cognition that is all-comprehensive; mati-ajnana or wrong determinate cognition of the nature of mati; sruta-ajnana or wrong determinate cognition of the nature

of sruta; vibhanga-jnana or wrong determinate cognition of the nature of avadhi. Similarly, the following are the four sub-types of indeterminate cognitive operation; caksurdarsana or indeterminate cognition had through the visual sense-organ, acaksurdarsana or indeterminate cognition had through a non-visual sense-organ, avadhidarsana or indeterminate cognition of the nature of avadhi, kevaladarsana or indeterminate cognition that is all-comprehensive.

Question : What is meant by determinate cognition and indeterminate cognition?

Answer : The cognition that apprehends the object concerned in a specific form is determinate cognition, the cognition that apprehends the same in a generic form is indeterminate cognition. The determinate cognition is also called jnana or savikalpaka-bodha, the indeterminate cognition is also called darsana or nirvikalpaka-bodha.

Question : Of the above mentioned twelve sub-types,how many are a function of a fully developed power of consciousness and how many that of a partly developed power of consciousness?

Answer : Kevalajnana and kevaladarsana - these two are a function of a fully developed power of consciousness, the remaining types a function of a partly developed power of consciousness.

Question : When development is incomplete a diversity of cognitive operation is possible on account of a diversity of the incompleteness in question, but how can there be a diversity of cognitive operation at a time when development is complete?

Answer : The reason why a twofold diversity of cognitive operation in the form of kevalajnana and kevaladarsana is attributed to the state of complete development is that all object of cognition is possessed of two forms - that is, it is possessed of a general form and a specific form - from which it follows that the all-comprehensive conscious operation pertaining to them two is also possessed of a twofold diversity in the form of jnana and darsana.

Question : Among the eight sub-types of determinate cognition, how is jnana distinguished from ajnana?

Answer : In no other way except on the basis of the copresence or otherwise of samyaktva or right inclination.

Question : Then why do the two remaining types of jnana have no counter-positive in the form of two corresponding types of ajnana and why

does darsana have no counter-positive in the form of adarsana?

Answer : The two types of jnana manahparyaya and kevala are never possible except in the presence of samyaktva, and so there is no question of there being a counter-positive corresponding to them. Among the types of darsana kevala is not possible except in the presence of samyaktva. However, the remaining types of darsana are possible even in the absence of samyaktva; but even in their case the corresponding counter-positives in the form of types of adarsana are not posited because darsana is a form of cognition that grasps something merely generic-with the result that no difference can be pointed out between darsana had by one possessed of samyaktva and that had by one devoid of the same.

Question : How are the twelve sub-types in question to be defined?

Answer : The nature of the eight sub-types of jnana has already been laid down.

And the following is an account of the nature of the four sub-types of darsana : 1. That cognition of something merely generic which is had through the visual sense-organ is caksurdarsana. 2. That cognition of something merely generic which is had through a non-visual sense-organ is acaksurdarsana. 3. That cognition of something merely generic pertaining to things tangible which is had through the superordinary power of avadhi is avadhi-darsana. 4. That cognition of something merely generic pertaining to all things that there are which is had through the superordinary power of kevala or omniscience is kevaladarsana. 9

The Classification of the World of Souls :

The samsarin or worldly and mukta or emancipated-these two are the classes of souls. 10

The souls are infinite in number. And they are all similar insofar as the possession of consciousness is concerned. So when they are here divided into two classes that is done on the basis of the presence or otherwise of a particular

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1. See Chapter One, aphorisms 9 to 33.

mode; that is to say, here one class consists of the souls possessed of the mode called samsara, the other class consists of those not possessed of this mode. Thus the souls belonging to the first class are called samsarin, those belonging to the second class mukta.

Question : But what is samsara?

Answer : Samsara is but the bondage of the dravya and bhava types-that is, of the physical and mental types. A specific associatedness with the karmic particles is the dravya or physical type of bondage, an associatedness with the cravings like attachment, aversion etc. is the bhava or mental type of bondage. 10

The Types and Sub-types of the Worldly Souls :

The worldly souls are those possessed of manas or internal organ and those devoid of it. 11

Again, they are of the type trasa or mobile and the type sthavara or static. 12

The earth-bodied, the water-bodied and the plant-bodied souls belong to the type static. 13

The fire-bodied and the water-bodied souls on the one hand and the two-sensed, three-sensed, four-sensed and five-sensed souls on the other belong to the type mobile. 14

The wordly souls are infinite in number. In brief they are divided into two types and that in two ways. The first division depends on the possession or otherwise of manas; that is to say, in this case one type includes the souls possessed of manas, the other type those devoid of it, and these two types cover the whole lot of worldly souls. The other division depends on the character of being static and that of being mobile; that is to say, in this case one type includes the static souls, the other the mobile ones, and these two types too cover the whole lot of worldly souls.

Question : But what is this manas?

Answer : Manas is that spiritual capacity through which reflection is undertaken, and a kind of subtle atoms which are of help to this capacity in its task of reflection - they too are manas. The former is called bhava-manas or manas qua something mental, the latter dravya-manas or manas qua something physical.

Question : And what is meant by the character of being mobile and that of being static?

Answer : To be possessed of a capacity to purposely move about or turn away from one place to another - that is being mobile; not to be possessed of this capacity is being static.

Question : The souls that are declared to be devoid of manas - are they devoid of all manas, whether of the dravya type or of the bhava type?

Answer : No, they do possess manas but only of the bhava type.

Question : But then all the souls turn out to be possessed of manas. Why then declare some of them to be possessed of manas and the rest to be devoid of it?

Answer : In that connection what is had in mind is dravya-manas. Just as an extremely old man, even if possessed of legs and of the capacity to move about, cannot move about without the assistance of a stick, similarly bhava-manas cannot undertake clear reflection without the assistance of dravya-manas. Thus assigning prominence to dravya-manas and keeping in mind the presence or otherwise of this type of manas the souls are divided into those possessed of manas and those devoid of it.

Question : Is not it the case that the second twofold division is meant to suggest that all the mobile souls are possessed of manas, while all the static ones are devoid of it?

Answer : No. Among the mobile souls too it is only some - not all - that possessed of manas; as for the static souls, they are all devoid of manas. 11, 12

The type static is subdivided into the earth-bodied, the water bodied, the plant-bodied souls; the type mobile is divided into the fire-bodied and air-bodied souls on the one hand and the two-sensed, three sensed, four sensed and five sensed souls on the other.

Question : What is meant by a mobile soul and by a static one?

Answer : The soul in which there is a manifestation of the karma type designated trasa-nama is a trasa or mobile soul, that in which there is a manifestation of the karma type designated sthavara-nama is a sthavara or static soul.

Question : How to recognize the state characterized by a manifestation of the karma type trasa-nama and that characterized by a manifestation of the karma type sthavara-nama.

Answer : The clear-cut exhibition and otherwise of a tendency to renounce pain and to attain pleasure-these two respectively are the signs of a manifestation of the karma type trasa-nama and of that of the karma type sthavara-nama.

Question : The fire-bodied and the air-bodied souls-are they too-just like the two-sensed souls and the others-seen to make a clear-cut exhibition of the tendency in question, so that it might be proper to place the former too under the type mobile?

Answer : No, they are not.

Question : Why then are they not placed under the type static, just like the earth-bodied souls and the others?

Answer : So far as the present definition is concerned they are in fact static. However, keeping in view the similarity in respect of motion that they exhibit with the two-sensed souls and the others have been placed under the type mobile. That is to say, the trasa or mobile souls are of two varieties - viz. labdhi-trasa or full-fledged trasa and gati-trasa or trasa in respect of motion. The souls characterized by a manifestation of the karma-type trasa-nama are labdhi-trasa and it is they alone who are trasa in a true sense of the term; such are the souls possessing two to five sense-organs. On the other hand, the souls which though characterized by a manifestation of the karma-type designated sthavara-nama are called trasa on account of their trasa-like motion or gati-trasa. Those are trasa in a figurative sense of the term; such are the fire-bodied and air-bodied souls. 13, 14

The number of indriyas or operative organs, their types and sub-types, and their names :

The indriyas are five in number. 15

Each of them is of two types. 16

The type dravyendriya is of the form of nivrtti and of the form of upakarana. 17

The type bhavendriya is of the form of labdhi and of the form of upayoga. 18

Upayoga takes place in relation to the objects like tangible etc. 19

The tactile, the gustatory, the olfactory, the visual and the auditory - these are the names of the five indriyas. 20

Here the number of indriyas is mentioned with a view to making it possible to find out on its basis as to how many are the possible divisions of the worldly souls. The indriyas are five in number. However, not all the worldly souls possess all the five indriyas. For some of these

possess one indriya, some two, some three, some four and some five. Those who possess one indriya are designated ekendriya, those who possess two dvindriya, those who possess three trindriya, those who possess four caturindriya, and those who possess five pancendriya - thus it is that there are five divisions of the worldly souls.

Question : But what is meant by an indriya?

Answer : That through the instrumentality of which one can attain cognition is indriya.

Question : Are there no indriyas more than five?

Answer : No, there are not. For there are but five jnanendriyas or organs of cognitive operation. Though in disciplines like Sankhya etc. speech, hands, feet, anus, procreative organ - these too are called indriya, but they are karmendriyas or organs of active operation. In the present context, on the other hand, the organs of cognitive operation are alone sought to be mentioned, and they are certainly not more than five in number.

Question : Now what is meant by a jnanendriyas and by a karmendriyas?

Answer : That through the instrumentality of which one chiefly attains cognition useful in daily life is jnanedriya, that through the instrumentality of which one undertakes activity useful in daily life - e.g. nourishment, locomotion, evacuation - is karmendriyas. 15

Each of the five indriyas is of two types - viz. the dravya type and the bhava type. The inanimate indriya made up of physical particles is the dravyendriya type, the indriya of the form of a transitory spiritual state is the bhavendriya type. 16

The dravyendriya is again of two sub-types - viz. that of the form of nivrtti and that of the form of upakarma. Those shapes of the cognitive organs which are outworldly visible in a body and which are of the form of a specific construct made out of physical aggregates are called nirvrttindriya, that external and internal capacity of a nirvrttindriya without which it is not in a position to produce cognition is upakaranendriya. 17

The bhavendriya too is of two sub-types - viz. labdhi and upayoga. That ksayopasama of the karmas like mati-jnanavaraniya etc. which is a sort of transitory spiritual state is labdhindriya, that indeterminate and determinate cognition which takes place in relation to objects like visible etc. at a time when labdhi, nivrtti, and upakarana - these three combine together is upayogendriya. The upayogendriya is of the form of the

jnana-type mati and the darsana-types caksu and acaksu. 18

The upayoga of the form of mati-jnana which has been called bhavendriya cannot cognize objects devoid of colour (i.e. intangible objects). It can certainly cognize objects possessed of colour (i.e. tangible objects) but it cannot cognize all their qualities and modes; for what it is in a position to cognize are only the modes touch, taste, smell, colour and sound.

Question : Each of the cognitive organs has been said to be of two types - viz. the dravya-type and the bhava-type; again, the dravya-type has been said to be of two sub-types - viz. nivrtti and upakarana - while the bhava type has been said to be of two sub-types - viz. labdhi and upayoga. Now please tell what successive order is followed in the acquisition of these types and sub-types.

Answer : Only when the labdhindriya has been acquired is the acquisition of the nivrtti possible. Similarly, when the nivrtti has been acquired is the acquisition of the upakarana and upayoga possible while when the upakarana has been acquired is the acquisition of upayoga possible. The idea is that a later type can be acquired only when an earlier type has already been acquired, but it is not the case that an earlier type can be acquired only when a later type has already been acquired.

The Names of the Cognitive Organs :

The tactile cognitive organ - skin, the gustatory cognitive organ - tongue, the olfactory cognitive organ - nose, the visual cognitive organ - eye, the auditory cognitive organ - ear, each of these five is of four types in the form of labdhi, nivrtti, upakarana and upayoga. That is to say, it is the collective totality of these four types that constitutes a cognitive organ - e.g. the tactile - taken in its entirety. Thus precisely to the extent this collective totality is deficient the corresponding cognitive organ too is deficient.

Question : But upayoga is a specific form of cognition that is something resulting from a cognitive organ; how then is it itself called a cognitive organ?

Answer : Though upayoga is in fact something resulting from the collective totality of labdhi, nivrtti and upakarana it has been called a cognitive organ is a figurative sense - that is, as a result of attributing to an effect a feature which in fact belongs to its cause. 20

The Respective Cognizables or Objects of the Cognitive Organs :

Touch, taste, smell, colour and sound - these five are the respective cognizables or objects in the case of the above mentioned five cognitive organs. 21

In the case of anindriya or manas the corresponding object is sruta. 22

Not all the objects of the world are of the same nature. For some of them are tangible, some intangible. Those possessed of colour, smell, taste, touch etc. are tangible and it is tangible objects alone - not the tangible ones - which can be cognized through the cognitive organs. The five things that have been separately mentioned as the respective objects of the cognitive organs are not absolutely different from each other nor of the nature of a basic stuff - that is, of the nature of a substance; on the contrary, they are different aspects - that is, modes - of one and the same substance. That is to say, the different cognitive organs are engaged in cognizing the mutually different specific states of one and the same substance. Hence the five things which in the present aphorism are enumerated as the respective objects of the five cognitive organs should be treated not as mutually different entities but as aspects of one and the same tangible - that is, physical - substance. Thus, for example, a laddu (a sweatmeat) is cognized by all the five cognitive organs in

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1. For a special consideration of all this see, Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha, p. 36, the appendix pertaining to the term 'indriya'.

mutually different forms. Here the finger through touching indicates its touch like cold, hot etc., the tongue through tasting indicates its taste like sour, sweet etc., the nose through smelling its good or bad smell, the eye through seeing its colour like red, white etc.; similarly, the ear cognizes the noises resulting from the eating etc. of that hard sweetmeat. It is not the case that here in one and the same sweetmeat the five objects in question - viz. touch, taste, smell etc. - are seated in different quarters of their own; for in fact they are all co-present in all its different parts. That is so because they are so many inseparable modes of one and the same substance. In their case differentiation is made by intellect and that is done through the instrumentality of the cognitive organs. Certainly, the cognitive organs have got different capacities. Thus however efficient one of them might be it is never in a position to cognize an object that is not its own specific cognizable. That is why the five objects of the five cognitive organs are mutually unmingled - that is, mutually separated.

Question : When the five cognizables touch etc. invariably go together, then why is it that in certain objects there are not available all the five of them but just one or two? For example, in the light of the

sun etc. colour is apparent but not touch, taste, smell etc. Similarly, in the air unmingled with flower etc. touch is apparent but not taste, smell etc.

Answer : The above mentioned five modes touch etc. are present there in each and every physical substance, but only that among them is grapsed by a cognitive organ which is intense in measure. In certain objects all the five modes touch etc. are manifested in an intense measure, in certain others just one of them, two or so on. In the case of the latter the remaining modes, being present in a mild measure, are not grapsed by the corresponding cognitive organs; but they are present there nevertheless. Even the efficiency - the grasping power - of a cognitive organ is not the same in the case of all the species of living beings. Nay, even in the case of the being to one and the same species the efficiency of a cognitive organ is of various forms. So a consideration of the intensity and mildness of touch etc. also depends on the greater or lesser efficiency of the corresponding cognitive organs. 21

Besides the above mentioned the five cognitive organs there is one more which is called manas. Certainly, the manas is a means of cognition; however, unlike the tactile organ etc. it is not an external such means but an internal one. That is why it is called antahkarana or internal organ. Unlike what is the case with the external cognitive organs the object cognized by the manas is not limited in extent. Thus the external cognitive organs grasp just tangible entities and those too only in part; on the other hand, the manas grasps all entities whatsoever, whether tangible or otherwise, and those too in various ways. The function of the manas is to reflect and depending on its level of development -that is, on its capacity - it reflects over all objects whatsoever, whether grasped by the cognitive organs or not. It is this reflection that constitutes sruta. That is why it has been said that the object of the anindriya is sruta; that is to say, the nature of all elements whatsoever, whether tangible or otherwise, constitutes the field of operation in the case of manas.

Question : If what you call sruta is a function of the manas and it is a lucid cognition and one that grasps something specific then why does mati-jnana not take place through the instrumentality of the manas?

Answer : It does take place. But the general grasping of an object which initially takes place through the instrumentality of the manas and which involves no consideration of the word-meaning relation or of the contextual succession, nor a speciality of the form of conceptualization - that precisely is the mati-jnana in question. On the other hand, the subsequently arising stream of reflection that involves the said speciality is sruta-jnana; that is to say, in the case of the cognitive operation produced by the manas the initial minor portion is of the form of mati-jnana while the subsequent major portion is of the form of

sruta-jnana. The crux of the matter is that through the instrumentality of the five cognitive organs tactile etc. mati-jnana alone takes place but through that of the manas mati as well as sruta. But in the latter case sruta is more prominent than mati. That is why in the present context sruta has been said to be the object of the manas.

Question : But why has the manas been called anindriya?

Answer : Though it too, being a means of cognition, is an indriya, yet in order to operate in relation to the objects like colour etc. it has to depend on the indriyas like eyes etc. It is on account of this dependence that it has been called anindriya or no-indriya - that is, part-indriya or indriya like.

Question : Does the manas too like eyes etc., reside in some particular part of the body, or is it present throughout the body?

Answer : It is present everywhere inside the body not at some particular part of it. For the manas operates in relation to all objects whatsoever grasped by the cognitive organs present in the different parts of the body, a phenomenon that is un-accountable except on the supposition that the manas is co-extensive with body. That is why it has been said 'manas is present wherever there is breath.

Those Possessed of the Cognitive Organs :

The living beings upto the air-bodied ones are possessed of but one cognitive organ. 23

An insect, an ant, a black bee, a man or the like - those respectively possess one plus one, one plus two, one plus three and one plus four cognitive organs. 24

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1. This is how the Svetambara tradition views the matter. According to the Digambara tradition, on the other hand, the seat of the manas is not the entire body but heart alone.

The possessors of samjna are those who are the possessors of manas. 25

In the thirteenth and fourteenth aphorisms the worldly beings are divided into two types - viz. the static and the mobile. There are of them nine species in all; that is, the earth-bodied beings, the water-bodied, the plant-bodied, the fire-bodied and the air-bodied - these five on the one hand and the beings possessed of two cognitive organs, those possessed of three, those possessed of four, those possessed of five - these four on the other. Of these, the species upto the air-bodied are possessed of but

one cognitive organ - viz. the tactile.

An insect, a leech, etc. are possessed of two cognitive organs - viz. the tactile and the gustatory. An ant, a gnat, a bug etc. are possessed of those two plus the olfactory organ - that is, three of them in all. A black bee, a fly, a scorpion, a mosquito, etc. are possessed of those three plus the visual organ - that is, four of them in all. A man, an animal, a bird, a heavenly being, a hellish being possess those four plus the auditory organ - that is, five of them in all.

Question : Do these numbers concern the dravya type of cognitive organs, or the bhava type, or both the types?

Answer : These numbers concern the dravya type of cognitive organs; for so far as the bhava type of them are concerned all the five of them as possessed by all the species of living beings.

Question : Is it then possible for the insects etc. to see or to hear with the help of the concerned bhava type of cognitive organs?

Answer : No. A bhava type of cognitive organ taken alone is not in a position to perform its appropriate function; for that it requires the help of the corresponding dravya type of cognitive organ. That is why even if in possession of all the cognitive organs of the bhava type the insects, the ants, etc. are not in a position to see or to hear - for they possess no cognitive organs of the dravya type in the form of eyes and ears. However, on account of the efficiency of whatever cognitive organs of the dravya type they happen to possess they do manage to conduct their specific course of life.

The eight species of beings - viz. from the earth-bodied ones upto those possessed of four cognitive organs - are not at all possessed of manas; but even in the case of those possessed of five cognitive organs not all are possessed of it. Thus there are four sub-species of those possessed of five cognitive organs - viz. the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings, the animals. Of these, the first two sub-species are such that all their members are possessed of manas; but in the case of the last two only those members are possessed of it who are born of a womb. That is to say, the human beings and the animals are, each, of two sub-types - viz. those born of a womb and those born as a result of an agglutination of matter. Of these, the human beings and animals born as a result of an agglutination of matter are devoid of manas. To sum up the matter, among the beings possessed of five cognitive organs all the heavenly beings, all the hellish beings, those human beings and animals that are born of a womb - these alone are possessed of manas.

Question : This particular species is possessed of manas and that one

is not, how to recognize that?

Answer : The recognition takes place on the basis of the existence or otherwise of samjna.

Question : Now samjna means behavior and behavior of a more or less advanced type is exhibited by all beings whatsoever. For the insect, the ants, etc. too exhibit behavior that is impelled by a need for nourishment, fear and the like. Why then is it not conceded that they too are possessed of manas?

Answer : In the present context samjna means not ordinary behavior but a specific type of it. This specific type of behavior is of the form of that reflection over the merits and demerits of things which enables one to attain what is beneficial and avoid what is harmful. It is the specific type of behavior which the theoretical texts designate sampra-dharana-samjna. This form of samjna is the function of manas and is such as is clearly found to be exhibited only in the case of the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings born of a womb, the animals born of a womb. That is why they alone are considered to be possessed of manas.

Question : Is it not the case that the beings like insects, ants etc. too undertake endeavour with a view to attaining what they desire and avoiding what they disdain?

Answer : They do.

Question : Then why are they not considered to be possessed of the sampradharana-samjna and manas?

Answer : In the case of the insects etc. too manas of an extremely subtle type does exist. And it is on account of it that they manage to move towards what is beneficial and to move away from what is undesirable. But this manas of theirs is of use for a bare maintenance of body - not for anything else. In the present context, on the other hand, by manas is understood such an advanced type of it as enables one, when suitable means are available, to undertake reflection that goes beyond the question of a bare maintenance of body - that is, such as enables one even to recall one's past birth. It is the capacity to undertake reflection of this type that is called sampradharana-samjna. And such samjna is possessed only by the above enumerated species of beings - that is, by the heavenly beings, the hellish beings, the human beings born of a womb, the animals born of a womb. That

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1. For the details of the question see Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha, p.

38, the appendix pertaining to the term samjna.
2. See Jnanabindu-prakarana (Yasovijaya Jaina Granthamala), p. 144.

is why it is they alone who are here counted as those possessed of manas. 23-25

With a view to specially acquainting with the transmigratory motion an account offered of the five topics yoga - that is, activity - etc. :

At the time of the transmigratory motion there takes place only one type of yoga or activity - viz. that pertaining to karma. 26

All motion takes place following a sreni or a straight line. 27

The motion of a soul - meaning, that of a soul which is in the process of being emancipated - is invariably devoid of a turning. 28

On the other hand, the motion of a worldly soul may be devoid of a turning or it might exhibit the same. And the number of possible turnings is less than four - that is, there at the most. 29

The duration of the absence of turning is but one samaya- that is to say, the motion devoid of a turning is of the duration of one samaya. 30

A soul remains without nourishment for a duration of one samaya or two. 31

All the systems of philosophy that posit rebirth are faced with the following five questions related to the transmigratory motion :

(1) At the time when a soul undertakes motion either with a view to assuming a new birth or with a view to attaining moksa - that is, at the time when it undertakes transmigratory motion - it being devoid of a gross body how is effort possible on its part?

(2) When a mobile body undertakes motion what is the rule that it follows in doing so?

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1. For a particularly clear understanding of the matter see Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha, p. 143, the appendix pertaining to the term anaharaka.

(3) How many are the types of motion and which souls are entitled to one of these types and which to another?

(4) What is the minimum and maximum duration of the transmigratory

motion and what is the rule that determines this duration?

(5) Does a soul take nourishment at the time of transmigratory motion or it does not; of it does not, what is the duration of this period of no nourishment and what is the rule that determines this duration?

These questions ought to be considered even by those systems of philosophy which posit an ubiquitous soul; for with a view to accounting for rebirth they are bound to posit the moving of a subtle body and transmigratory motion. But these questions must necessarily be considered by the Jaina system inasmuch as the soul posited by it is body-sized. It is the consideration that is here undertaken in an ordered fashion, and it runs as follows :

Yoga or Activity :

The transmigratory motion is of types - viz. straight and curved. While migrating to another place through straight motion a soul has not to undertake a new effort; for when it leaves the former body it receives a momentum produced by that body and with the help of this momentum it, without undertaking a new effort, straightway reaches the new place like an arrow shot from the bow. The other type of motion is curved and so a soul moving through this type requires a new effort; for the momentum produced by the former body is effective only upto the place where the soul has to take a turning. As soon as the place of turning is reached the momentum produced by the former body gets slowed down. So from this place onward effort is undertaken with the help of the subtle body which happens to be accompanying the soul even at this juncture. It is this effort produced by a subtle body that is called karmana-yoga, or activity pertaining to karma. Hence it is that it is said in the aphorism that at the time of transmigratory motion there takes place only karmana-yoga. The idea is that a soul moving through the curved type of motion cannot reach a new place only with the help of the effort produced by the former body; but a new effort on its part is possible only with the help of the karmic body - that is, a subtle type of body, for at that time it is possessed of no body of a gross type. Because of the absence of a gross body there also then does not take place an activity through manas or an activity of the form of speech. 26

The Rule of Motion :

The mobile bodies are of two types - viz. soul and matter. Both these possess the capacity to undertake motion and so when suitable occasion is available they, undergoing appropriate transformation, actually undertake motion. Now on account of the prevailing extraneous circumstances they might well undertake a curved motion but the motion natural to them is invariably straight. By straight motion is meant motion in a straight line beginning from the akasa-portion earlier occupied by the concerned soul or

material particle and proceeding in an upward, downward or transverse direction. It is keeping this natural motion in view that the present aphorism lays down that motion takes place following a sreni. By sreni is meant a straight line drawn in akasa and possessing thickness just equivalent to - that is, neither more nor less than - the size of the seat earlier occupied. From this account of the natural motion it also gets indicated that when a counter-acting cause is available a soul or a material particle can also undertake motion in a curved line rather than in a straight one. The idea is that the motion undertaken by mobile bodies takes place in a straight line of the size of the seat earlier occupied when a counter-acting occasion is absent while it takes place in a curved line when such an occasion is present. 27

The Manners of Motion :

It has already been said that motion is of two types - viz. straight and curved. The straight motion is that in which while proceeding from the earlier place towards the new one the straight line is not broken - that is, in which there is not undertaken even a single turning. The curved motion is that in which while proceeding from the earlier place towards the new one the straight line is broken - that is, in which there is undertaken at least one turning. It has also been said that both soul and matter are entitled to both the types of motion in question. However, in the present context the main question relates to soul. The souls which leave an earlier place and proceed towards a new one are of two types. One type comprises such ones as proceed towards a new place after leaving for good all body, whether gross or subtle - they being called mucyamana or those in the process of being emancipated. The other type comprises such souls as assume a new gross body after giving up the old one. At the time of transmigratory motion these latter type of souls are invariably accompanied by a subtle body and it is they who are designated worldly souls. The souls in the process of being emancipated proceed towards the affixed place of moksa of straight motion - not by curved one; for they get seated in that particular place of moksa which happens to lie in the direction of the straight line drawn from their earlier worldly place - not in one which even slightly deviates from the direction of this straight line. But in the case of a worldly soul there is no rule about the place of birth. Sometimes it so happens that the new place where it has to assume birth lies in the direction of the straight line drawn from its earlier place but sometimes it lies in the direction of a curved line drawn from that place. For the decisive factor determining the new place for rebirth is the earlier accumulated karma and such karma is of various sorts. That is why the worldly souls are entitled to both the straight and curved types of motion. The idea is that the souls proceeding towards a place of moksa undertake only the straight type of motion while those proceeding towards a new place for rebirth undertake both the straight and curved types of motion. Another name for straight motion is isugati (lit.

arrow-like motion), for it is straight on account of the momentum produced by the earlier body just like the motion of an arrow impelled by the momentum imparted to it by a bow. Three names for curved motion are panimukta, langalika, gomutrika. The panimukta is motion in which the straight line is broken but once, the langalika that in which it is broken twice, gomutrika that in which it is broken thrice. In the case of a soul there is not possible such a curved motion as involves more than three turnings; for a soul's new place of rebirth - however out of sreni it might lie - that is, however curved might be the direction in which it lies - must be reached after three turnings at the most. So far as the curved motion of matter is concerned there is no rule as to the number of turnings possibly involved in it, for in that case this number is determined by the nature, of the concerned impelling force. 28, 29

The Duration of Motion :

The minimum duration of transmigratory motion is one samaya, its maximum duration is four samayas.

What has to be understood is that this duration is of one samaya when the motion concerned is straight while it is of two, three or four samayas when the motion concerned is curved. The increment in the number of samayas is determined by the increment in the number of turnings involved. Thus the curved motion involving one turning is of a duration of two samayas, that involving two turnings is of a duration of three, that involving three turnings is of a duration of four. The idea is that when the new place of birth is to be reached by a motion involving one turning then one samaya is required for reaching the place of turning from that of earlier birth while another samaya is required for reaching the place of new birth from that of turning.

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1. The names panimukta etc. are well current in the Digambara commentary texts.

This very rule implies that the motion involving two turnings requires three samayas, while that involving three turnings requires four.

In this connection it must also be noted that in a soul proceeding by straight motion to assume a new birth the new contingent of the karmas types ayus, gati and anupurvi is manifested as soon as the earlier body is given up; but in a soul proceeding by a curved motion the new contingent of the karma types ayus, gati and anupurvi is duly manifested at the place of the first turning; for the ayus etc. pertaining to the earlier birth remain manifested only upto the place of the first turning. 30

The Duration of Absence of Nourishment :

In the case of a soul that is in the process of being emancipated there is no question of nourishment being undertaken during the course of transmigratory motion; for such a soul is devoid of all body - whether subtle or gross. But in the case of a worldly soul the question of nourishment does arise; for during the course of transmigratory motion, such a soul is invariably accompanied by a subtle body. By nourishment is to be understood the process of receiving physical particles appropriate for the formation of a gross body. Nourishment thus understood is found and also not found in the case of worldly souls while in the course of transmigratory motion. Those souls which are proceeding by straight motion or by motion involving one turning and requiring two samayas are not devoid of nourishment. For in the case of the souls proceeding by straight motion the same samaya which is the samaya of leaving the earlier body is also the samaya of assuming the new one - thus there being transversed no further samaya in the process. Hence in their case the samaya of straight motion is either the samaya of undertaking nourishment through the body of the earlier birth or that of undertaking nourishment through the body of the new one. The same applies to the motion involving one turning; for out of its two samayas the first is that of undertaking nourishment through the body of the earlier birth, while the second is that of reaching the place of new birth - during which latter samaya nourishment is undertaken with a view to putting up a new body. However, in the case of motion requiring three samayas and involving two turnings as also in that of motion requiring four samayas and involving three turnings such a situation does arise as is characterized by absence of nourishment. That is so because among the samayas constituting the duration of these two motions - three samayas in the case of the first, four in that of the second - the first is that of undertaking nourishment through the body left behind, while the last that of undertaking nourishment at the place of new births but the period lying in between these two samayas is characterized by absence of nourishment. That is why in the case of a motion involving two turnings souls are considered to be devoid of nourishment for a period of one samaya, while in the case of that involving three turnings they are considered to be devoid of nourishment for a period of two samayas. It is this very idea that is expressed in the present aphorism. The sum and substance of the matter is that in the case of straight motion and of motion involving one turning the state of undertaking nourishments persists throughout, while in the case of motion involving two turnings and of that involving three the period lying in between the first and the last samaya - to be explicit, a period of one samaya in the first case, that of two samayas in the second - is characterized by absence of nourishment. Certain texts go on to speak of a period of three samayas characterized by absence of nourishment; there the possibility is conceded of motion requiring five samayas and involving four turnings.

Question : We thus learn about the absence during transmigratory

motion of a reception of gross physical particles by way of nourishment needed for building body, but what about the karmic physical particles? Are they received during that stage or are they not?

Answer : They are received.

Question : How?

Answer : At the time of transmigratory motion the worldly souls are invariably possessed of a karmic body. Hence that wavering of a soul-units produced by a body which is called karmana yoga or karmic activity is also invariably present then. And when activity is there the reception of karmic physical particles is inevitable; for it is but activity that is the cause of the attraction of the groupings of karmic particles. Thus just as at the time of rainfall a thrown forth heated arrow proceeds receiving or absorbing within its body the particles of rain-water, so also during transmigratory motion, a soul rendered unsteady by karmic activity proceeds towards a new place receiving the groupings of karmic particles and assimilating them within its body. 31

The Types of Janma or Birth and Yoni or Seat of Birth :

Agglutination, coming out of a womb, and sudden manifestation - these three are the types of birth. 32

That possessed of living entities, cold and concealed - these three, their corresponding opposites - viz. that devoid of living entities, hot and revealed -, plus three mixtures of the members of the first and second triads - viz. that partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities, partly cold, partly hot, and partly concealed and partly revealed - thus nine in all are the types of set of birth. 33

The jarayuja or beings born wrapped with the jarayu coverage, the andaja or those born out of an egg and the potaja or those born in a bare state-these three types are born coming out of a womb. 34

The hellish beings and heavenly beings are born by way of sudden manifestation. 35

The remaining types of beings are born by way of agglutination. 36

The Types of Birth :

When their earlier worldly career is over the worldly beings assume a new one; for that they have to take birth. But not in the case of all the beings in birth of one and the same type - it is this point that has been

brought forth in the present aphorism. When after having given up the gross body pertaining to the earlier worldly career and after having undertaken transmigratory motion as accompanied by the karmic body alone a soul first receives physical particles appropriate for the gross body suited to the new worldly career - that is called birth. Birth thus understood is of three types - viz. agglutination, coming out of a womb, and sudden manifestation. Birth of the form of agglutination is that where without requiring parental intercourse the physical particles of the audarika type existing at the place of birth are first transformed into a body. Birth of the form of coming out of a womb is that where the physical particles comprising the semen and blood (=pertaining to ovum) existing at the place of birth are first received for the sake of building a body. Birth of the form of sudden manifestation is that where the physical particles of the vaikriya type existing at the place of birth are first transformed into a body. 32

The Types of Seat of Birth :

Birth requires a place. And the place where the physical particles first received for the sake of building a gross body get mixed with a karmic body - as water gets mixed with hot iron - that is designated 'seat of birth'. The seat of birth is of nine types - viz. that possessed of living entities, cold, concealed, that devoid of living entities, hot, revealed, that partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities, partly cold and partly hot, partly concealed and partly revealed.

(1) That possessed of living entities : the seat where soul units are in position.

(2) That devoid of living entities : the seat where no soul-units are in position.

(3) That partly possessed of and partly devoid of living entities : the seat where in one part soul-units are in position, while in another part they are not.

(4) Cold : the seat characterized by cold touch.

(5) Hot : the seat characterized by hot touch.

(6) Partly cold and partly hot : the seat where one part is characterized by cold touch, another by hot.

(7) Concealed : the seat which is under a lid or covered.

(8) Revealed : the seat which is not under a lid but is open.

(9) Partly concealed and partly revealed : the seat where one part is covered, another open.

The following are the details as to which species of living beings are born at one type of seat of birth, which species at another type :

The Species The Type of the Birth

The hellish beings and That devoid of living heavenly beings. entities.

The human beings born of a That partly possessed of and womb and animals born of a partly devoid of living womb. entities.

The Rest - that is, the five All the three - viz. that species of static beings, the possessed of living entities, three species with deficient that devoid of living sense-organs (i.e. the two entities, that partly sensed, three sensed, four possessed of and partly devoid sensed beings), the five of living entities.sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb.

The human beings born of a Partly cold and partly hot.womb and animals born of a womb, the heavenly beings.

The fire beings.Hot.

The Rest - that is, the four All the three - viz. cold, hot species of static beings, the and partly cold and partly three species with deficient hot.sense-organs, the five-sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb, the hellish beings.

The hellish beings, the Concealed.heavenly beings, the one-sensed beings.

The five sensed human beings Partly concealed and partly and animals born of a womb. revealed.

The Rest - that is, the three Revealed.species with deficient sense organs, the human beings and the animals not born of a womb.

Question : What is the difference between birth and seat of birth?

Answer : The seat of birth is support, birth is that which is supported. That is to say, the first reception of physical particles appropriate for a gross body is birth, the place where this reception takes place is the seat of birth. -------------------------

1. In the Digambara commentary texts the heavenly beings and the hellish

beings are alone said to be entitled to a partly cold and partly hot seat. So according to them, those entitled to all the three types of seat - viz. cold, hot and partly cold and partly hot - should not include the hellish beings and they should include the human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb.

Question : But they say the types of seat of birth are 84 lac in number. Why then is the number nine give here?

Answer : The mention of number 84 lac relates to a detailed statement. Thus all the seats of birth belongning to the species earth-bodied etc. and differing from one another as to the degree of colour, smell, taste, touch would amount to 84 lac as so many types of seat of birth belonging to the species of beings taken in their entirety. It is these 84 lac types that are here briefly presented as nine types - viz. that possessed of living entities, etc. 33

Those Entitled to a Particular Type of Birth :

Of the above mentioned three types of birth which one takes place in the case of which species of beings - this specification stands as follows :

The species jarayuja, andaja and potaja are born coming out of a womb, the heavenly beings and the hellish beings are born by way of sudden manifestation, the rest - that is, the five species of static beings, the three species with deficient sense-organs, and the five-sensed human beings and animals not born of a womb - are born by way of agglutination. The jarayuja are those species which are born from jarayu - e.g. men, cows, buffaloes, goats etc. Jarayu is a form of net-like coverage which is filled with blood and flesh and which enwraps the newly born young. The andaja are those species which are born out of an egg - e.g. serpents, peacocks, birds, pigeons etc. The potaja are those species which are born without being wrapped in a coverage - e.g. elephants, rabbits, mongooses, rats etc. These last species are born neither as covered by jarayu, nor are they born out of an egg, but they are born in the form of an uncovered body. In the case of the heavenly beings and hellish beings there is a particular fixed place where birth takes place and which is called upapata. (i.e. the region of sudden manifestation). A place situated on the surface of a divine couch covered by divine clothing is the upapata-region for the heavenly beings; a ventilator situated in a hard mortar wall is the upapata-region for the hellish beings. For these two species of beings receive for the sake of building a body the physical particles of the vaikriya type existing in those two upapata-regions. 34-36

An Account Pertaining to the Types of Body ;

Audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa and karmana - **these five are types of body. 37**

Among these five types one mentioned later is subtler than one mentioned earlier. 38

Among the three types mentioned before taijasa one mentioned later is made up of asankhyata times bigger atomic-aggregates than one mentioned immediately earlier. 39

The last two types - viz. taijasa and karmana - possess ananta times bigger atomic aggregates than the earlier mentioned ones. 40

Both the body types taijasa and karmana are without resistance. 41

They happen to be in association with a soul since a beginningless time. 42

And they are possessed by all the worldly souls without exception. 43

A soul can simultaneously possess either the taijasa and karmana types of body, or these two plus one more, or these two plus two more. 44

Only the last type of body - viz. karmana - is devoid of an experience of pleasure, pain etc. 45

The first type of body - viz. audarika - is exclusively produced either in the case of birth out of a womb or in that of birth by way of agglutination. 46

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1. Here in the vrtti to the Bhasya the word 'pradesa' has been explained as 'aggregate made up of ananta atoms.' But in the Sarvarth-siddhi etc. it is explained as 'atom'.

The vaikriya type of body is produced in the case of birth by way of sudden manifestation. 47

And it is also produced through labdhi or super-ordinary power. 48

The aharaka type of body - that is, made up of auspicious physical particles -, pure - that is, effective in a blameless fashion-, and one without resistance; and it is possessed only by a monk versed in the fourteen texts belonging to the class called Purva. 49

Birth constitutes the beginning of a body; so an account of body is offered after that of birth. In this connection numerous questions are

taken up for consideration one by one as follows.

The Types of Body and How to Understand Them ;

The embodied souls one ananta in number, and their bodies too, being separate from one another, are, individually taken, ananta in number. However, from the viewpoint of the similarly of their function, cause etc. they are briefly subdivided and said to be of five types - viz. audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa and karmana.

Body is a soul's instrument of functioning. (1) That type of body which can be burnt, pierced, cut into pieces is audarika. (2) That type of body which is now small, now big, now thin, now thick, now one, now many - in short, the type of body that can assume various forms - is vaikriya. (3) The type of body which can be produced only by a monk versed in the fourteen Purva-texts is aharaka. (4) The type of

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1. After this aphorism another one - viz. taijasam api - is found in the Digambara tradition but not in the Svetambara. In the Sarvartha-siddhi etc. the new aphorism is explained as follows : the taijasa type of body too is capable of being produced through labdhi or super-ordinary power - that is to say, just as the vaikriya type of body can be produced through super-ordinary power so too can be the taijasa type; of course, this does not mean that the taijasa type of body can be produced through super-ordinary power alone.

body which, being made up of fire, causes on the one hand digestion of the consumed food and on the other a glow is taijasa. (5) The total aggregate of karmas constitutes the karmana type of body. 37

The Character of Being Gross and Subtle :

Among the above mentioned five types of body audarika is the grossest while vaikriya is subtler than it; on the other hand, aharaka is still subtler than vaikriya; similarly, taijasa is subtler than aharaka, karmana is subtler than taijasa.

Question : Here what is meant by gross and subtle?

Answer : By grossness and subtlety are respectively meant the looseness and tightness of construction, not the bigness and smallness of size.

Now vaikriya is subtler than audarika but it is grosser than aharaka; similarly, aharaka etc. too are subtler than a type mentioned earlier and grosser than one mentioned later. That is to say, the character of being gross and subtle is but relative. This means that a body-type is subtler than another - and the latter grosser than the former - in case the

construction of the latter than that of the former.

On their part, thee looseness and tightness of construction depend on physical transformation. For the physical particles are possessed of a multifarious power of transformation; so when, even if small in quantity, they are transformed into a loose body they are called gross, and when, even if large in quantity, they are transformed into an increasingly tight body they are called increasingly subtle. For example, if we take a bean of lady's finger and a piece of ivory, both equal in size, then it will be found that the former's construction is relatively loose, the latter's relatively tight. Thus it is that even in the case of size being equal the physical stuff constituting ivory is greater in amount than that constituting lady's finger. 38

The Quantity of the Originating - that is, Constituting - Stuff :

On the above understanding of gross and subtle it follows that the originating stuff of a later mentioned body-type is greater in quantity than that of an earlier mentioned one. But what that quantity actually is, is told in the two present aphorisms.

Those aggregates made up of atoms out of which a body is built are called the originating stuff of this body. So long as atoms lie separate from one another they cannot go to build a body. It is only the aggregates - which are of the form of an accumulated lot of atoms - that can do that. Moreover, even these aggregates ought to be made up of ananta atoms. Thus the originating aggregates of a vaikriya body are asankhyata times greater than those of an audarika body; that is to say, the originating aggregates of an audarika body are made up of ananta atoms and the originating aggregates of a vaikriya body too are made up of ananta atoms; but the latter number ananta is asankhyata times larger than the former. A similar relative numerical superiority is to be understood in the case of the number ananta that characterizes the atoms making up the aggregates of a vaikriya body and the number ananta that characterizes those making up the aggregates of an aharaka body.

The number ananta that characterizes the atoms making up the aggregates of a taijasa body is ananta times larger than that characterizing the atoms making up the aggregates of an aharaka body; similarly, the atoms making up the aggregates of a karmana body are ananta times larger in number than those making up the aggregates of a taijasa body. Thus it is obvious that the originating stuff of a later mentioned body-type is larger quantity than that of an earlier mentioned one; even so, owing to the peculiarity of the transformation concerned a later mentioned body-type is tighter in construction than an earlier mentioned one and so is called subtler than it.

Question : The aggregates of an audarika body are made up of atoms

and so also are the aggregates of a vaikriya body and the rest made up of ananta atoms. How is then it possible that a member of the former set of aggregates is smaller than a member of the latter set?

Answer : The number ananta is of ananta types - so that even while both are made up of ananta atoms it is not impossible that the aggregate of a vaikriya body and the rest is asankhyata times larger than that of an audarika body . 39-40

The Last Two Types of Body - Their Nature, Temporal Duration and Those Entitled to Them :

Among the above mentioned five types of body the last two, as compared to the first three, possess a certain speciality - in connection with which three points are respectively laid down in the present aphorism.

The Nature :

The taijasa and karmana - these two types of body suffer no resistance anywhere in the world; that is to say, even an entity as hard as diamond cannot prevent them from gaining entrance - for they are subtle in the extreme. Even though it is normally found that a tangible entity suffers resistance at the hands of another such entity, this rule of resistance is applicable to gross entities alone - not also to the subtle ones. For a subtle entity gains entrance everywhere and suffers no resistance whatsoever - thus behaving as fire does in relation to an iron-ball.

Question : But then being subtle the vaikriya and aharaka types of body too should be declared to be such as suffer no resistance?

Answer : Certainly, they too gain entrance without suffering resistance, but in the present context by motion devoid of resistance is to be understood motion that suffers no resistance right upto the end of the loka-region. So far as the vaikriya and aharaka types of body are concerned they are doubtless such as suffer no resistance; however, unlike the taijasa and karmana types of body they exhibit this feature not throughout the loka-region but only in the sub-region of it called trasa-nadi (lit. the tunnel containing the mobile beings).

Their Termporal Duration :

The connection of the taijasa and karmana types of body with a soul is beginningless in the form of a stream, something which is not the case with the first three types of body. For these three types of body cease to remain connected with a soul after a particular period of time is past.

That is why the three types of body audarika etc. are declared to be such as are connected with a soul occasionally or temporarily, while the taijasa and karmana types such as are connected with a soul since a beginningless time.

Question : When they are connected with a soul since a beginningless-time they should cease to be never at all. For that which beginningless never suffers destruction?

Answer : The two types of body in question are beginningless not qua individual entities but qua streams of entities. Hence they too undergo increment as well as deminution. Only that entity of a positive form which is beginningless qua an individual entity never suffers destruction; e.g. an atom.

Those Entitled to Them :

The taijasa and karmana types of body are possessed by all the worldly souls whatsoever but not so the audarika, vaikriya and aharaka types. Hence those entitled to the taijasa and karmana types of body include all the worldly souls, while those entitled to the types audarika etc. include only some among them.

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1. The same idea is expressed also in the Gita : nasato vidyate bhavo nabhavo vidyate satah/2.16

Question : Let something be told by way of distinguishing between a taijasa type of body and a karmana type.

Answer : The karmana type of body is the root-cause of the remaining types. For this body is of the form of karmas while karmas constitute the occasioning cause of all bodily functioning whatsoever. On the other hand, the taijasa type of body is not in this way the occasioning cause of all bodily functioning whatsoever; it rather remains connected with all souls whatsoever and as such renders assistance in acts like digesting the consumed food. 41-43

The Number of Bodies Simultaneously Available to a Soul :

The taijasa and karmana - these two types of body are in possession of the worldly souls throughout the period of their worldly existence; but the types audarika etc. are exchanged for one another and hence they are sometimes available to a soul, sometimes they are not. So the question arises as to what is the maximum and what is the minimum number of bodies that can be simultaneously in possession of a soul. The question is answered in the present aphorism. Thus a worldly soul can possess two bodies at the least and four at the most; it cannot possess all the five of them. When two bodies are possessed they are taijasa and karmana - for

they stay with a soul so long as its worldly existence lasts. Such a situation arises only at the time of transmigratory motion, for at that time no other body is possessed by the soul concerned. When three bodies are possessed they are either taijasa, karmana and audarika or taijasa, karmana and vaikriya. The former combination is available to the human beings and animals from birth till death, the latter combination is similarly available to the heavenly beings and hellish beings. When four bodies are possessed they are taijasa, karmana, audarika, vaikriya, or taijasa, karmana, audarika, aharaka. The former combination is available only to some of the human beings and animals at the time when they happen to exercise their super-ordinary power of vaikriya-formation, the latter combination is available to a monk versed in the fourteen Purva-texts at the time when he happens to exercise his super-ordinary power of aharaka-formation. Nor soul can simultaneously possess all the five bodies; for it is not possible to simultaneously exercise the super-ordinary power of vaikriya-formation as also that of aharaka-formation.

Question : At the time when in the above stated fashion two, three or four bodies are possessed how is it possible for one and the same soul to be simultaneously connected with so many of these bodies?

Answer : Just as the light of one and the same lamp can fall on a number of things, similarly, the constituent-units of one and the same soul can be indivisibly connected with a number of bodies.

Question : Is it the case that no soul ever possesses just one body?

Answer : Yes. For the general rule is that the taijasa and karmana bodies are never found separate from one another; hence it is never possible that a soul should possess just one body. However, certain authorities are of the view that the taijasa body, unlike the karmana, does not last so long as the worldly existence lasts, but that, like the aharaka body, it is acquired only through a super-ordinary power. On this view, at the time of transmigratory motion there remains with a soul just the karmana body. Thus in that case there arises the possibility of a soul possessing just one body.

Question : It has been said that the super-ordinary power of vaikriya-formation and that of aharaka-formation these two are never exercised simultaneously. Why is that so?

Answer : At the time when the super-ordinary power of vaikriya-formation is exercised and when a vaikriya body is

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1. This view is referred to in the Bhasya. See chapter 2, aphorism 44.

thus formed the soul concerned is necessarily in a state of negligence. But such is not the case with the aharaka body; for even if the exercise of the super-ordinary power of aharaka-formation takes place in a state of negligence when the aharaka body is thus formed a state of lack of negligence ensues on account of the possibility of spiritual purification. Hence it is that the simultaneous exercise of the two super-ordinary powers in question is impossible. The idea is that when it is said that five bodies do not exist simultaneously the reference is to these bodies appearing in a manifested form. On the other hand, so far as the capacity to form these bodies is concerned all the five of them can well appear simultaneously; for a monk possessing the super-ordinary power of aharaka-formation can well possess that of vaikriya-formation as well. 44

Purpose :

Every thing serves some purpose or other, so the bodies too must serve some purpose. But the question is as to what is their chief purpose and as to whether this purpose is common to all the bodies or it exhibits some peculiarity in one case or another. It is the question that is answered here. The chief purpose of a body is upabhoga which is possible only on the part of the first four bodies. Contrariwise, the last body - viz. the karmana - does not serve this purpose and so is called nirupabhoga or 'devoid of upabhoga'.

Question : What is meant by 'upabhoga'?

Answer : To receive objects like good or bad sound etc. through the cognitive organs like ear etc. and then to experience pleasure or pain, to perform good or bad actions like donation, violence etc. through hands, feet etc., to suffer the good or bad consequence of earlier accumulated karmas, to cleanse off - i.e. to destroy - the earlier accumulated karmas through holy performance - all this is called upabhoga.

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1. The idea occurs in the Bhasyavrtti on chapter 2, aphorism 44.

Question : The audarika, vaikriya and aharaka bodies are possessed of cognitive organs and of bodily parts, and so upabhoga thus understood is well possible on their part. But the taijasa body is possessed neither of cognitive organs nor of bodily parts; how then is upabhoga possible on its part?

Answer : Even though the taijasa body is not possessed of cognitive organs or bodily parts like hands, feet etc. it can well be of use in tasks like digestion etc.; and hence upabhoga understood as an experience of pleasure, pain and the like becomes possible on its part. Moreover, this body has another function in the form of inflicting curse and bestowing benefit. That is to say, all without exception make use of the taijasa body for tasks like digesting food etc. but the specially

competent ascetics who through their penance happen to acquire a super-ordinary power are in a position to burn down the person with whom they are angry and to shower calm on the person with whom they are pleased. Thus insofar as the taijasa body is of use in tasks like inflicting curse and bestowing benefit it is treated as possessed of upabhoga in the form of experiencing pleasure and pain, accumulating good and bad karmas, and so on and so forth.

Question : If things are viewed so minutely then the karmana body too which, like the taijasa, is without cognitive organs and without bodily parts can be shown to be possessed of upabhoga. For it is this body that is the root cause of all the remaining ones. Hence upabhoga exhibited by the remaining bodies should in fact be treated as upabhoga appropriate to the karmana body. Why then is this body said to be devoid of upabhoga?

Answer : That is right. As thus understood even the karmana body is cerrtainly possessed of upabhoga. However, when in the present context it is declared to be devoid of upabhoga the idea simply is that without receiving assistance from the remaining bodies the karmana alone is not in a position to make possible upabhoga as described above. That is to say, for realizing upabhoga as thus understood it is four bodies audarika etc. that are directly instrumental; that is why they are said to be possessed of upabhoga while the karmana body is said to be devoid of upabhoga because it is thus instrumental only indirectly. 45

Bodies Available Since Birth and Those Created Artificially :

Lastly there arises the question as to which bodies are available since birth and which are created artificially - also the question as to which body is available since birth in the case of which type of birth and as to what causes the artificial creation of a body.

An answer to all this comes in the present four aphorisms.

The taijasa and karmana - these two bodies are neither available since birth nor are they created artificially. That is to say, these bodies are there immediately after birth and yet they are connected with a soul since a beginningless time. The audarika body is exclusively available since birth and emerges in the case of birth out of a womb as also in that of birth by way of agglutination; and those entitled to this body are none but the human beings and animals. The vaikriya body is of two types - one that is available since birth and the other that is created artificially. Of these, that available since birth emerges in the case of birth by way of sudden manifestation and those entitled to it are none but the heavenly beings and hellish beings. As for the vaikriya body created artificially its cause is a super-ordinary power. The super-ordinary power in question is a sort of capacity born of penance and is possible only in certain human beings born out of a womb and animals

born out of a womb. Thus those entitled to the vaikriya body created through the super-ordinary power in question are none but the human beings born out of a womb and animals born out of a womb. Another sort of super-ordinary power too is considered to be the cause of an artificially created vaikriya body, a power which however is not born of penance but is available since birth. This sort of super-ordinary power is said to be possessed only by certain gross-formed air-bodied beings; hence they too turn out to be ones entitled to the type of vaikriya body created artificially. The aharaka body is exclusively an artificial creation. Its cause is but a special super-ordinary power which is found in no species other than human beings, and among human beings too it is found only in certain specially competent monks.

Question : Which specially competent monks?

Answer : Those versed in the fourteen Purva-texts.

Question : When do they exercise the super-ordinary power in question and for what purpose?

Answer : When a doubt arises as to some subtle question then in order to get this doubt removed they do so. That is to say, when a monk versed in the fourteen Purva-texts happens to harbour a doubt as to some difficult subject-matter and no omniscient personage is available to him in the neighborhood then in case he finds it impossible to reach another world-region through his audarika body he exercises his special super-ordinary power and creates a small body of the size of a cubit which on account of being made up of auspicious physical particles is handsome, on account of being created for a praiseworthy purpose is blameless, on account of being extremely subtle is devoid of resistance - that is, such as obstructs nothing and is obstructed by nothing. Through such a body the monk in question approaches an omniscient personage available in some other world-region, gets his doubt removed at the hands of the latter, and returns back to his original seat. All this takes place well within the space of a muhurta.

Question : Is no other body acquired through a super-ordinary power?

Answer : No.

Question : From upabhoga in the form of inflicting curse and bestowing benefit that has been described in the case of the taijasa body it obviously seems to be a type of body acquired through super-ordinary power. Why then is it said that no other type of body is acquired through super-ordinary power?

Answer : When we speak of a body acquired through super-ordinary power we mean a body produced through such power not a body made use of through such power. The taijasa body, unlike the vaikriya and aharaka, is not produced through such power. That is why in the present context the taijasa body is not said to be a type of body acquired through super-ordinary power - that is, a type of artificially created body. 46-49

The Apportionment of Veda or Linga -
That is, Sexual Characteristic :

The hellish beings and beings born by way of agglutination are necessarily neuter. 50

The heavenly beings are in no case neuter. 51

After an account of bodies has been offered there arises the question of linga or sexual characteristic. It is this that has been clarifies here. Linga literally means characteristic sign. It is found in three forms - as has already been earlier laid down in connection with enumerating the audaayika bhavas. The three lingas or sexual characteristics are the masculine, the feminine, the neuter. Another name for linga is veda. Each of these three vedas is of two types - viz. the dravya type and the bhava type. By the dravya type of veda is understood the external sign, by the bhava type of veda the concerned specific desire. (1) That bodily sign through which

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1. See chapter 2, aphorism 6.

2. For mutual relationship between the dravya and bhava types of veda as also for certain other allied matters of importance see the Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha, p. 53, Note.

a man is recognized as such in masculine veda of the dravya type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a woman is masculine veda of the bhava type. (2) That bodily sign through which a woman is recognized as such is feminine veda of the dravya type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a man is feminine veda of the bhava type. (3) The collective of bodily signs in which some constituents are characteristic of a man some characteristic of a woman is neuter veda of the dravya type, the desire for the pleasure born of intercourse with a man as well as a woman in neuter veda of the bhava type. Veda of the dravya type is of the form of physical configuration such as results from the manifestation of a particular nama-karma; veda of the bhava type is of the form of a mental unease such as results from the manifestation of a particular mohaniya-karma. The relation between the dravya and bhava types of veda is that of the means and end or that of the sustainer and sustained.

The Apportionment of Veda :

The hellish beings and beings born by way of agglutination are possessed of neuter veda. The heavenly beings are not possessed of neuter veda but are possessed of the remaining two. The rest - that is, the human beings born of a womb and animals born of a womb - ar possibly possessed of all the three vedas.

The Relative Intensity and Mildness of the Concerned Mental Unease :

The mental unease born of masculine veda is least durable, that born of feminine veda is more durable than that, that born of neuter veda is still more durable. The idea is thus explained with the help of an illustration.

The mental unease born of masculine veda is like hay fire which calms down soon but also manifests itself soon. The mental unease born of feminine veda is like cow-dung fire which does not calm down soon but also does not manifest itself soon. The mental unease born of neuter veda is like a heated brick which takes extremely long time to calm down.

In a woman the soft disposition is predominant and it stands in need of a tough element, in a man the tough disposition is predominant and it stands in need of a soft element. In a neuter person, on the other hand, both these dispositions are found mixed and they stand in need of both those types of elements. 50-51

The Types of Life Quantum and Those Entitled to Them :

The beings born by way of sudden manifestation. (i.e. the hellish beings and the heavenly beings), those possessing a body for the last time, the highly noble personages and the beings destined to live for asankhyata years - these are necessarily possessed of an anaparvartaniya life-quantum, that is, one whose temporal duration is irreducible. 52

When one finds that in the course of calamities like wars etc. thousands of bright young men meet death simultaneously while on the other hand even old persons and persons with a shattered body clean escape a terrible disaster one feels doubtful whether there is or is not a thing like untimely death-so that in one case a number of persons die simultaneously while in the other none dies. The question is here answered in the affirmative as also in the negative.

The life-quantum is of two types - viz. apavartaniya or one whose temporal duration is reducible and anapavartaniya or one whose temporal duration is irreduciable. Thus apavartaniya ayus is the life-quantum that can possibly be enjoyed away even before that period is past which was its

due period at the time when it was earned by way of karmic bondage, while anapavartaniya ayus is the life-quantum that cannot be thus enjoyed away. That is to say, apavartaniya ayus is that life-quantum whose period of enjoyment is less than the period that was due at the time of the concerned karmic bondage, while anapavartaniya ayus is the life-quantum whose period of enjoyment is equivalent to this latter period.

Whether the life-quantum earned by way of karmic bondage will be earned in an apavartaniya or an anapavartaniya form is not something that happens automatically but it depends on the intensity or mildness of the mental perturbation of the time concerned. Thus life-quantum for the immediately next birth is earned by way of a karmic bondage some time during this birth. And if at the time the prevailing mental perturbation happens to be mild the resulting bondage of life-quantum is loose - so that when an occasion is available the period that was its due at the time of bondage can well be reduced. On the contrary, if at the time the prevailing mental perturbation happens to be intense the resulting bondage of life-quantum is tight - so that even when an occasion is available the period that was its due at the time of bondage is never reduced, nor is it possible to enjoy it away at one go. Just as the row of persons standing in an extremely tight formation is unbreakable while that of persons standing in a loose formation is breakable or just as the plants born of the denser sown seeds prove hard of entry for the animals while those born of the seeds sown with a wide spacing prove easy of entry for them - similarly, the life-quantum that was subject to tight bondage on account of the intensity of the then prevailing mental perturbation is not exhausted before its due period is over however much one might employ weapon, poison etc. against the person concerned, while on the other hand the life-quantum that was subject to loose bondage on account of the mildness of the then prevailing mental perturbation can well be enjoyed away - may be within the space of one muhurta - even before its due period is over but as soon as one happens to employ weapon etc. against the person concerned. It is this sudden enjoying away of life-quantum which is called apavartana - that is, time-reduction - or akala-mrtyu - that is, untimely death; on the other hand, the enjoyment of life-quantum for a period that was its fixed due is called anapavartana - that is, impossibility of time reduction - or kala mrtyu - that is, timely death. The life-quantum open to time reduction is necessarily characterized by upakarma - that is, availability of a hastening agent. The availability of the things like a sharp weapon, a deadly poison, a violent fire which cause untimely death is called upakarma. And the life-quantum open to time reduction is necessarily characterized by upakarma thus understood; for this life quantum is necessarily capable of being enjoyed away before its due period is over. On the other hand, the life-quantum not open to time-reduction is of two types-viz. that characterized by upakarma and that not so characterized; that is to say, in the case of this life-quantum the agents of untimely death are sometimes available and

sometimes not. However, even when those agents are available this life-quantum is never exhausted before its due period is over. The idea is that the beings possessed of the life-quantum open to time-reduction do happen to encounter some means or other to time-reduction do happen to encounter some means or other like a weapon etc. that hastens death-with the result that they meet an untimely death. On the other hand, the beings possessed of the life-quantum not open to time-reduction never meet untimely death however powerful might be the means of hastening death that they might possibly encounter.

Those Entitled to the Different Types of Life :

The beings born by way of sudden manifestation are necessarily hellish beings or heavenly beings. The beings possessing a body for the last time and the highly noble personages are necessarily human beings. The beings who, without assuming another birth, attain moksa through this very body are called beings possessing body for the last time, the tirthankaras, cakravartins, vasudevas etc. are called highly noble personages. The beings destined to live for asankhyata years are some of the human beings and animals.

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1. The human beings destined to live for asankhyata years are doubtless born in the 30 akarmabhumis, the 56 antardvipas and the karmabhumis. On the other hand, the animals destined to live for asankhyata years are to be found not only in the just mentioned world-regions but also in the continents and oceans lying outside the innermost circle of two world-continents and a half.

Among these the beings born by way of sudden manifestation and the beings destined to live for asankhyata years are possessed of a life-quantum not open to time-reduction and not characterized by upakarma; on the other hand, the beings possessing a body for the last time and the highly noble personages are possessed of a life-quantum not open to time-reduction but either characterized or not characterized by upakarma. Leaving aside these, all the remaining human beings and animals are possessed of a life-quantum open to time-reduction.

Question : If life-quantum is enjoyed away before its due period is over then there would arise the contingencies of a loss of the done, an attainment of the undone, futility, contingencies which the the scriptural texts treat as undesirable. How are these contingencies to be evaded?

Answer : The above difficulty does not arise in the case of a sudden enjoying away of life-quantum. For the same karma which was to be enjoyed taking a long time is now enjoyed all at once; but no part of it is left without its consequence being experienced. Hence here there is involved neither a loss of the karma that was earned nor its futility. Similarly,

what occurs here is death arising owing to a karma that was earned; hence here there is involved no attainment of the consequence of a karma that was not earned. All this is just as a spark of fire dropped on one side of a tightly bound mass of hay manages to burn down this entire mass blade by blade and taking a long time while a number of such sparks dropped on all sides of a loose and scattered mass of hay burn down the entire mass all at once.

In order to elucidate this very idea the theoretical texts offer two more illustrations, one pertaining to an arithmetical operation, the other pertaining to the act of drying a piece of cloth. Thus if we are to find out the least common multiple of a particular set of numbers there are a number of ways for doing so suggested by the science of arithmetic. Now one highly expert in arithmetic employs such a method in this connection as yields the desired result within a very short time while an ordinary student of arithmetic gets the same result after a long time and through a prolonged operation involving division etc. Here the result yielded in the two cases is the same but the expert arithmetician gets it soon while the ordinary one gets it after a long time. Similarly, of two pieces of cloth equally wet if one is dried in a bundled form the othe in a spread out form, the former will take a long time to get dried, the latter will get dried soon. Here even if the quantity of water is equal and the process of drying up the same in the two cases the process takes a long or short time depending on whether the concerned piece of cloth is in a bundled or a spread out state. Similarly, two equivalent massess of life-quantum - one open to time-reduction, the other not so open - differ from one another only as to the longness or shortness of the time required for their respective enjoyments. And so the above urged contingencies like a loss of the done etc. do not really arise in this case. 52

CHAPTER THREE

In the second chapter the worldly souls, so far as it concerns their life-species, have been divided into four types - viz. the hellish beings, human beings, animals and heavenly beings. In the third and fourth chapters their special nature is to be delineated through an account of their place of residence, life-duration, body-size etc. The third chapter is devoted to an account of the hellish beings, animals and human beings, the fourth to that of the heavenly beings.

An Account of the Hellish-Beings :

Ratnaprabha, sarkraprabha, valukaprabha, pankaprabha, dhumaprabha, tamahprabha, mahatamahprabha - **these seven are grounds. These grounds are situated on dense water, air and akasa and they lie one below another while the further down a ground is the more extensive it is. 1**

The hells are situated in those grounds. 2

These hells are ever characterized by an increasingly more inauspicous lesya or soul-colouring, parinama or physical transformation, body, vedana or tactile feeling, and vaikriya or self-wrought bodily transformation. 3

Moreover, they suffer from the pain caused to each other by each other. 4

And in the grounds earlier than the fourth - that is, in the uppermost three grounds - they also suffer from the pain caused by the evil-hearted Asuras. 5

The maximum life-duration of the beings residing in those hells is 1, 3, 7, 10, 17, 22 and 33 Sagaropamas respectively. 6

The loka is divided into three portions - viz. the lower, middle and upper. The lower portion is understood to start from a distance of 900 yojanas down below the level of the mountain Meru; it stands in akasa like a down turned earthen bowl - that is to say, it is found to be increasingly more extensive as one moves downwards. The volume covering 900 yojanas above the level of the mountain Meru and 900 yojanas below it - that is a volume 1800 yojanas thick - constitutes the middle loka-portion whose length is equal to its breadth and which is like a jhalara (a musical instrument) in shape. The entire loka lying above its middle-portion constitutes its upper-portion which in shape is like a

mrdange (also a musical instrument).

The grounds constituting the residing place of the hellish beings are called hellish-grounds and are situated in the lower loka-portion. Such grounds are seven in number and they rather than standing side by side with one another lie one below another. They are not equal to one another in length and breadth but the further down a ground is situated the greater are its length and breadth. Thus the length and breadth of the second ground are greater than those of the first, those of the third greater than those of the second, and so on till we find that the length and breadth of the seventh ground are greater than those of the sixth.

These seven grounds are situated one below another but they do not stand tightly close to one another. For a very huge gap divides one of those grounds from another. And this gap is occupied by dense ocean, dense air, rarefied air and akasa arranged in this very order one below another. That is to say, down below the first hellish ground there lies dense ocean, down below the dense ocean dense air, down below the dense air the rarefied air, and down below the rarefied air akasa. After akasa comes the second hellish ground. In between the second and third hellish grounds too dense ocean etc. lie in exactly the above order. And similarly uptil the seventh hellish ground it is found that down below a hellish ground dense ocean etc. lie arranged in the order in question. The further down a hellish ground is situated the less thick it is - that is, the lesser distance separates its top level from its bottom level. Thus the thickness of the first hellish ground is 180,000 yojanas, that of the second 132,000 yojanas, that of the third 128,000 yojanas, that of the fourth 120,000 yojanas, that of the fifth 118,000 yojanas, that of the sixth 116,000 yojanas, that of the seventh 108,000 yojanas. The seven rings of ocean that are situated below the seven hellish grounds are all equal in thickness - that is, they are all 20,000 yojanas thick. On the other hand, the seven rings of dense air and the seven of rarefied air that are thus situated are each asankhyata yojanas thick but they are not mutually equivalent; for the number asankhyata measuring the thickness of the rings of dense air and rarefied air situated below the second ground is bigger than that measuring the thickness of similar rings situated below the first ground, and so on till we find that the thickness of the rings of dense

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1. In the Bhagvatisutra the nature of the elemental arrangement pertaining to loka has been very clearly described as follows :

"The support of all the living beings - whether mobile or static - is earth, the support of the earth is ocean, the support of the ocean is air, the support of the air is akasa. But how can the ocean stand supported by air and the earth supported by ocean? The question is to be answered thus. Let a lether-bag be filled with air and thus expanded in size. Let the

mouth of this bag be tightly tied with a leather ribbon; let the middle part of this bag be similarly tied. As a result of this the air filling the bag will be divided into two parts and the bag will look like a dugdugi. (a small musical instrument). Next, let the mouth of the bag be opened and air expelled from its upper part; then let this upper part be filled with water and the mouth of the bag be tied once more. Lastly, let the tie occuring at the middle part of the bag be lossened aside. Now it will be found that the water filled in the upper part of the bag remains fixed in that very part - that is, it stays in the part situated above that carrying air, in other words, it stays above air without ever reaching a point situated below it. This will happen because the water situated in the upper part of the bag stands supported by the air situated in its lower part. That is to say, just as in the leather bag the water stays in the upper part it being supported by air similarly earth etc. stand supported by air. " Sataka 1, Uddesaka 6.

air and rarefied air situated below the seventh hellish ground is greater than that of the similar rings situated below the sixth hellish ground. The same consideration applies to the rings of akasa situated below the different hellish grounds.

The first ground, owing to a predominance of ratnas or jewels, is called ratnaprabha. Similarly, the second, owing to a predominance of sarkara or gravel, is called sarkraprabha. The third owing to a predominance of valuka or sands, is called valukaprabha. The fourth, owing to an excess of panka or mud, is called pankaprabha. The fifth, owing to an excess of dhuma or smoke, is called dhumaprabha. The sixth, owing to a marked possession of tamas or darkness, is called tamahprabha, while the seventh, owing to a high concentration of mahatamas or dense-darkness, is called mahatamahprabha. These seven are respectively designated gharma, vamsa, saila, anjana, rista, maghavya and maghavi.

The ground ratnaprabha has got three kandas or parts. The upper most part - called kharakanda - has a predominance of jewels and is 16000 yojanas thick. The part down below it has a predominance of mud and is 84000 yojanas thick. The lower most part has a predominance of water and is 80000 yojanas thick. Thus the three parts taken together turn out to be 180,000 yojanas thick. However, the grounds beginning from the second and lasting upto the seventh are not thus divided into parts, for in their case the substance concerned - viz. gravel, sands etc. - is equally found at each place. In the case of ratnaprabha the first part stands supported by the second, the second by the third. The third part on its part, stands supported by the ring of dense ocean, the dense ocean by the ring of dense air, the dense air by the ring of rarefied air, the rarefied air by akasa. However, the akasa stands supported by nothing else; it is rather self-supported, for such is the nature of akasa that it stands in need of no other support. Similarly, the second ground stands supported by its own

ring of dense ocean, this ring stands supported by the related ring of dense air, the dense air stands supported by the below lying ring of rarefied air, the rarefied air stands supported by the below lying akasa; this akasa is self-supported. The same order obtains in the case of each ground upto the seventh and of the ring of dense organ etc., pertaining to it.

Even if the further down a ground is situated the less thick it is, the length and breadth of a below lying ground are greater than those of an above lying one. That is why their collective shape has been likened to that of a chatratichatra (i.e. an umbrella-over-umbrella series) - that is, a shape where extension is found to be greater as one looks further downwards. 1

In each of the seven grounds barring an uppermost strip and a lowermost strip of 1000 yojanas each the entire remaining thickness has hellish residing places (i.e. hells) situated within it; thus for example in the case of ratnaprabha the total thickness of 180,000 yojanas minus an upper strip and a lower strip of 1000 yojanas each amounts to a thickness of 178,000 yojanas and it is within this that hells are situated. The same consideration applies to the remaining grounds upto the seventh. The hells bear names like raurava (lit. terrifying), raudra (lit. frightening), ghatana (lit. killing), socana (lit. worrying) etc. which are fearsome even to hear. Beginning from the hellish residing place named simantaka situated in ratnaprabha and lasting upto that named apratisthana situated in mahatamahprabha all the hellish residing places are with a floor akin to diamond-knife. They are not all similar in shape; for some of them are circular, some triangular, some looking like a cooking vessel, some looking like an iron jar-they thus being of mutually different shapes. The prastaras or strata which are like storeys of a mutlistoreyed building-are to be counted as follows : thirteen in ratnaparbha, eleven in sarkraprabha and similarly decreasing by two in each ground - so that there is only one prastara in the seventh ground mahatamahprabha. It is in these prastaras that hells are situated.

The Number of the Hellish Residing Places in Different Grounds :

There are 30 lacs hellish residing places in the first ground, 25 lacs in the second, 15 lacs in the third, 10 lacs in the fourth, 3 lacs in the fifth, one lac minus five in the sixth, just five in the seventh.

Question : What is meant by saying that hells are situated in the prastaras?

Answer : In the space intervening in between two prastaras there are situated no hells; but within each prastara the entire thickness measuring 3000 yojanas has situated in it the hells of various shapes.

Question : What relation obtains between a hell and a hellish being?

Answer : The hellish beings are a type of souls while hells are the place where these souls reside. It is precisely on account of their association with the residing place called hell that these souls are called hellish beings. 2

The second ground is of a more inauspicious construction than the first, the third of a more inauspicious construction than the second, and so on till we find that the seventh ground is of the most inauspicious construction. Similarly, in the case of the hellish beings residing in these hells the lesya or soul-colouring, the parinama or physical transformation, the body, the vedana or tactile feeling, the vaikriya or self-wrought bodily transformation are increasingly more inauspicious.

Lesya or Soul-colouring :

The kapota or grey lesya obtains in ratnaprabha, the same obtains in sarakaraprabha but it is comparatively more impure there, the grey and blue lesyas obtain in valukaprabha, the blue lesya obtains in pankaprabha, the blue and black lesyas obtain in dhumaprabha, the black lesya obtains in tamahprabha and the same does in mahatamahprabha but it is comparatively more impure in the latter.

Parmana or Physical Transformation :

The physical transformations like colour, smell, taste, touch, sound, shape etc. are found to be increasingly more inauspicious in the grounds as one moves further downwards.

Body :

The bodies of the hellish beings residing in the different grounds, on account of a manifestation of the karma designated asubhanama, are found to be increasingly more inauspicious in colour, smell, taste, touch, sound, shape and increasingly more impure and terrifying as one moves further downwards.

Vedana or Tactile Feeling :

In the seven grounds the hellish beings experience a tactile feeling increasingly more sharp. Thus in the first three grounds there obtains a hot tactile feeling, in the fourth a hot tactile feeling supplemented by cold, in the fifth a cold tactile feeling supplemented by hot, in the sixth a cold tactile feeling, in the seventh a still colder tactile feeling. These hot and cold tactile feelings are so intense that if the hellish beings suffering from them happen to reach the region of human

beings during an extremely hot or an extremely cold season they can enjoy a sound sleep with utmot ease.

Vaikriya or Self-wrought Transformation :

Their vikriya too is increasingly more inauspicious. Fed up with suffering they endeavour to get rid of it but what results is just the opposite. While seeking to work out a means of pleasure what they actually achieve is a means of pain. Thus with the help of their super-ordinary power of vikriya-formation they seek to build up something auspicious but what is actually built up is something inauspicious.

Question : What is meant by saying that in the cases under consideration the increasingly more inauspicious phenomena like lesya etc. are ever there?

Answer : By saying that they are ever there what is meant is that they are there without cessation. Thus as a result of a manifestaion of the karmas designated gati-, jati-, sarira-, and angopanga-nama the phenomena like lesya etc. obtaining in a hellish birth remain inauspicious throughout life - that is to say, not even for a moment do they undergo a change nor do they ever turn auspicious. 3

From the very nature of its location a hell is characterized by a terrible pain of heat and cold, but still more terrible pain of heat and cold, but still more terrible is the pain of hunger and thirst. Thus so acute is the pain of hunger that it does not subside even when the person concerned, behaving like fire, consumes everything whatsoever; on the contrary the act only results in a further intensification of the fire of hunger. Similarly, the pain of thirst is so acute that no satisfaction is reached however much be the quantity of water gulped down. Besides the pain of this nature a greate one results to the hellish beings from their mutual animosity and beating up. For just as a crow and an owl, a snake and a mongoose are born-enemies, so also are the hellish beings born-enemies to one another. That is why as soon as they see one another they quarrel like dogs, bite one another and burn with anger. Hence it is said about them that they suffer from the pain caused to each other by each other. 4

The hellish beings are understood to suffer from three types of painful tactile feeling. Of these, that owing to the very nature of their residing place and that caused to each other by each other have already been described. The third type is that owing to an extremely acute demerit. The first two types are common to all the seven hellish grounds, but the third is found only in the first three of them. For it is only in them that the paramadharmikas (lit. the extremely demeritorious ones) are found. The parmadharmikas are such a species of asura-gods as are extremely cruel by nature and ever engaged in sinful activities. There are

fifteen sub-species of them like amba, ambarisa etc. By their very nature they are so cruel and frivolous, that they find pleasure in inflicting pain on others. Hence it is that they make the hellish beings miserable through striking them in various ways. They make the latter fight against each other like dogs, buffaloes and wrestlers; and when they see the latter fighting against and beating each other they derive immense pleasure out of the spectacle. Though these paramadharmikas are a kind of gods and though so many other means of pleasure are already available to them, it is owing to the terrific demerit earned by them in a past life that they derive pleasure out of the oppression caused by them to others. As for the poor hellish beings they are helpless owning to their own past karmas and as such they lead the entire life suffering terrific tactile feelings. But however acute might be the painful tactile feeling suffered by the hellish beings there is no shelter for them against it, nor does their life come to an early close, it being the case that the life-quantum enjoyed by them belongs to the anapavartaniya type - that is, to a type not open to time-reduction. 5

Life - duration of the Hellish Beings :

In the case of each species of living beings life-duration is mentioned in two ways - viz. as maximum and as minimum. The life-duration less than which it is not possible for the species concerned to have its minimum, the one more than which it is not possible for it to have is maximum. In the present context there is a mention of the maximum life-duration of the hellish beings, their minimum life-duration will be mentioned subsequently. This maximum life-duration is one sagaropama in the first hellish ground, 3 in the second, 7 in the third, 10 in the fourth, 17 in the fifth, 22 in the sixth, 33 in the seventh.

Here closes a general account of the lower portion of the loka. In this connection two things have to be specially

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1. See chapter 4, aphorisms 43-44.

learnt - viz. the situation as to agati-gati - that is, coming and going - and the possibility of their being continents, oceans etc.

Agati-gati or Coming and Going :

The beings devoid of samjna can, after their death, be born uptil the first hellish ground, the beings which crawl on arms uptil the second, the birds uptil the third, the lions uptil the fourth, the serpents uptil the fifth, the women uptil the sixth, the fishes and human beings uptil the seventh. The idea is that only the animals and human beings - not the heavenly beings and hellish beings - can be born in a hellish ground, the reason for it is that the heavenly beings and hellish beings are devoid of such (spiritual) states as are responsible for birth in a hellish ground.

As a matter of fact, the hellish beings can, after their death, be born neither among the hellish beings nor among the heavenly beings; they can be born only among the animals or among the human beings.

The hellish beings belonging to the first three grounds can, when they are born among the human beings, even attain the status of a tirthankara; those belonging to the first four grounds can then even attain moksa; those belonging to the first five grounds can then attain total discipline; those belonging to the first six grounds can then attain partial discipline; those belonging to any of the seven grounds can then attain right-inclination.

The Possibility of Continents, Oceans etc. :

In none of the hellish grounds, except ratnaprabha, are there to be found either continents, oceans, mountains, ponds, or villages, towns etc.; or the gross plant-bodied beings like trees, creepers etc., or the beings from two-sensed upto the five-sensed ones, or the human beings, or any of the types of heavenly beings. Here an exception is made in the case of ratnaprabha because a small part of it is situated in the middle loka-portion - the loka portion that is transverse - and in that part there can well be found the just mentioned phenomena like continents, oceans, villages, towns, plants, animals, human beings, heavenly beings. In the six grounds that remain there after excluding ratnaprabha there are to be found only the hellish beings and certain one-sensed beings. To this general rule there are however several exceptions; for in the case of these six hellish grounds sometimes and at some places it can possibly happen that they are occupied also by certain human beings, heavenly beings and five-sensed animals. The possibility of a human being occupying them arises because a person engaged in kevali-samudghata, being spread out throughout the loka, stretches his soul-units also in those six hellish grounds. Besides, also the human beings possessed of the super-ordinary power of vaikriya-formation can reach these grounds. As for the animals they can certainly reach these grounds but exclusively as possessed of the super-ordinary power of vaikriya formation. In the case heavenly beings as are their friends of a former life and that with a view to removing the suffering of the latter. However, even such heavenly beings can proceed only upto the third hellish ground - not beyond. The paramadharmikas who are a type of heavenly beings and wardens of the hell are found in the first three hellish grounds ever since their birth, but the other types of heavenly beings can be found ever since their birth only in the first hellish ground. 6

An Account of the Middle Loka-portion :

The continents are Jambudvipa etc., are bearing an auspicious name. Similarly, the oceans are Lavana etc., each bearing an ausipicious name. 7

All these continents and oceans are like a bracelet in shape; of them, an inner lying one is surrounded by the immediately outer lying one and the breadth or diameter of the latter is double that of the former. 8

In the middle of them all is situated the continent Jambhudvipa which is of the shape of a full circular disc, is 1 lac yojanas in diameter, and has the mountain Meru situated in its middle. 9

In the Jambudvipa there are seven regions - viz. Bharatavarsa, Haimavatavarsa, Harivarsa, Videhavarsa, Ramyakavarsa, Hairanyavatavarsa, and Airavatavarsa. 10

Separating these regions from one another and running from east to west there are here six mountains designated varsadhara (lit. holder of the region), their names being Himavat, Mahahimavat, Nisadha, Nila, Rukmin, and Sikharin. 11

In the continent Dhatakikhanda the number of mountains and regions is double that of those in the Jambudvipa. 12

The same is true of the inner half of the continent Puskaradvipa. 13

The human beings are to be found only upto the mountain Manusottara. 14

These are either arya or mleccha. 15

The entire regions Bharata, Airavata and Videha barring the sub regions Devakuru and Uttarakuru are Karmabhumis (lit. fields of action). 16

In the case of the human beings the maximum life-duration is 3 palyopamas, the minimum a period measuring less than a muhurta. 17

The same is true of the animals. 18

Continents and Oceans :

It has already been said that the shape of the middle loka-portion is like that of a jhalara (a cymbal like musical instrument); the same is here elucidated through an account of the continents and oceans.

In the middle loka-portion there are situated asankhyata continents and oceans. They are so arranged that there first lies a continent, surrounding this continent an ocean, surrounding this ocean a continent, surrounding this continent an ocean, and so on and so forth. All of them bear but auspicious names. In the present context information is conveyed

about three things related to them - viz. their diameter, their relative arrangements, their shape. Knowing this one comes to know the shape of the middle loka-portion.

Diameter :

The extent of the continent Jambudvipa is 1 lac yojanas in the east-west direction, 1 lac yojanas in the north-south, the extent of the ocean Lavana is double that of Jambudvipa, that of the continent Dhatakikhanda double that of Lavana, that of the ocean Kalodadhi double that of Dhatakikhanda, that of the continent Puskaravara double that of Kalodadhi, that of the ocean Puskarodadhi double that of Puskaravara. The same relation as to extent obtains uptil the end; that is to say, the extent of the ocean Svayambhuramana is double that of the last continent Svayambhuramana,

Relative Arrangement :

The relative arrangement of the oceans and continents is akin to that of the mill-stone and the surrounding mill-railing (in the domestic grinding apparatus). That is to say, the continent Jambudvipa is surrounded by the ocean Lavana, the ocean Lavana by the continent Dhatakikhanda, the continent Dhatakikhanda by the ocean Kalodadhi, the ocean Kalodadhi by the continent Puskaravara, the continent Puskaravara by the ocean Puskarodadhi. The same relative arrangement obtains upto the ocean Svayambhuramana.

Shape :

The continent Jambudvipa is circular like a plate, the remaining continents and oceans are shaped like a bracelet. 7-8

Jambudvipa and an Account of Its Regions and Chief Mountains :

Jambudvipa is a continent that comes first of all and lies in the middle of all the continents and oceans; that is to say, it surrounds no other continent or ocean. Jambudvipa is 1 lac yojanas in breadth. It is circular in shape like a potter's wheel and is not shaped like a bracelet as Lavana etc. are. In the middle of it is situated the mountain Meru; the following is an account of Meru :

The height of Meru is 1 lac yojanas, of which 10000 yojanas are invisible - that is to say, they lie below the surface of the earth. As for its remaining height measuring 99,000 yojanas it lies above the surface of the earth. The 1000 yojanas thick volume lying below the surface of the earth has everywhere a length and a breadth of 10,000 yojanas. But the volume lying above the surface of the earth has in the

uppermost portion, where a Culika or pinnacle just forth, a length and a breadth of 1000 yojanas. Meru has got three sub-divisions. It stands occupying all the three Loka-portions and is surrounded by four groves. The first sub-division is 1000 yojanas thick and lies below the surface of the earth, the second is 63,000 yojanas thick, the third 36,000 yojanas thick. In the first sub-division there is a predominance of pure earth, gravel etc., in the second that of silver, rock-crystal etc., in the third that of gold. The four groves are respectively named Bhadrasala, Nanadana, Saumanasa and Panduka. After the height of 1 lac yojanas is past there is situated in the uppermost portion a Culika or pinnacle which is 40 yojanas high and has a length and a breadth of 12 yojanas at the bottom, 8 yojanas in the middle and 4 yojanas at the top.

Jambudvipa has got seven chief regions which are designated Vamsa, Varsa or Vasya. Of these, the first is Bharata which lies in the extreme south, north of Bharata is Haimavata, north of Haimavata Hari, north of Hari Videha, north of Videha Ramyaka, north of Ramyaka Hairanyavata, north of Hairanyvata Airavata. As per the practical rule for determining direction the mountain Meru is situated in a northerly direction in relation to all these seven regions.

Situated in the midst of the seven regions and dividing them from one another are six mountains which are designated Varsadhara. They all run from east to west. The mountain Haimavata divides the region Bharata from Haimavata, the mountain Mahahimavat divides Haimavata from Harivarsa, the mountain Nisadha divides Harivarsa from Videha, the mountain Nila divides Videha from Ramyaka, the mountain Rukmin divides Ramyaka from Hairanyavata, the mountain Sikharin divides Hairanyavata from Airavata.

In Jambudvipa shaped like a plate the above mentioned seven regions are situated one close to another and spread out like a sheet of cloth running from the eastern end upto the western. The region Videha lies in the middle of them all; and hence it is that the mountain Meru lies just in the middle of this region. It has just been stated that the mountain Nila divides the region Videha from Ramyaka while the mountain Nisadha divides it from Harivarsa. Now that crescent-shaped portion of the region Videha which lies in between the mountains Meru and Nila - a portion whose eastern and western limits are defined by two local mountains - is designated Uttarakuru; and the similar crescent-shaped portion lying in between the mountains Meru and Nisadha is designated Devakuru. The two tracts Uttarakuru and Devakuru are a part and parcel of the region Videha (also called Mahavideha), but being a residing place of the human beings born as a doublet they are distinguished from

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1. The practical rule for determining direction depends on the sun-rise and sun-set. Thus when one stands facing the direction of sun-rise one finds that Meru lies to the left hand side and in the North. Now what is

the direction of sunset in Bharata that precisely is the direction of sunrise in Airavata. Hence in the latter region too one who stands facing the direction of sunrise will find that the mountain Meru lies in the North. Similarly is to be understood how Meru lies in a northerly direction in relation to all the remaining regions.

the rest. The whole of Mahavideha that is left after Uttarkuru and Devakuru are excluded is divided into sixteen parts in its eastern flank and into sixteen in the western. Each of these parts is designated Vijaya. Thus there are 32 Vijayas in all - sixteen standing on the eastern side of the mountain Meru, sixteen standing on its western side.

In Jambudvipa the mountain Haimavata situated on the border of the region Bharata has its two ends extended in the eastern and western Lavana-ocean. The same is the case with the mountain Sikharin situated on the border of the region Airavata. Since each of these mountain-ends is divided into two parts we have in the case of the two mountains eight parts in all that are situated in the Lavana-ocean. And since they are shaped like a canine-tooth they are called damstra (Sanskrit for 'canine tooth'). On each damstra there are located seven regions populated by human beings. Inasmuch as these regions lie within the confines of the Lavana-ocean they are known as antardvipa or intermediate continents. Such antardvipas are 56 in all and in them too there reside the human beings born as a doublet. 9-11

The Continent Dhatakikhanda and Inner Half of the Continent Puskara :

As compared to Jambudvipa the number of Merus, Varsas and Varsadharas found in Dhatakikhanda is double; that is to say, the latter contains 2 Merus, 14 Varsas and 12 Varsadharas. But they bear the same name; that is to say, the same names that are borne by the Meru, Varsadharas and Varsas situated in Jambudvipa are also borne by those situated in Dhatakikhanda. The bracelet-shaped Dhatakikhanda is divided into two parts - viz. an eastern half and a western half. The division into an eastern half and a western half is executed through two mountains which run from North to South and are isvakara or arrow-like - that is to say, which run straight like an arrow. In each half there is one Meru, seven Varsas and six Varsadharas. That is to say, whatever rivers, regions, mountains etc. there are in Jambudvipa are also in Dhatakikhanda but double in number. There are two mountains - running from north to south and arrow like - which divide Dhatakikhanda into an eastern half and a western half, while in each half there are six Varsadhara mountains that run from east to west. All these mountains touch the Lavana-ocean on one side and the Kalodadhi ocean on the other. If the six Varsadharas situated in the eastern half and six situated in the western half are likened to the spokes inserted in the nave of a wheel then the regions Bharata etc. resulting from the separation caused by these Varsadharas should be

likened to the blank space lying in between those spokes.

Whatever is the number of Merus, Varsas and Varsadharas situated in Dhatakikhanda is also that of those situated in the inner half of the continent Puskara. That is to say, in the latter too there are found 2 Merus, 14 Varsas and 12 Varsadharas - which are situated in an eastern half and a western half, the two divided from each other by 'arrow-like' mountains. Thus in two continents and a half there are in all 5 Merus, 30 Varsadharas and 35 Varsas. Among these 35 Varsas there are 5 (Maha) Videhas with 5 Devakurus, 5 Uttarakurus and 160 Vijayas. As for the 'intermediate continets' they are found only in the Lavana-ocean and hence are only 56 in number. In the continent Puskara there is a mountain Manusottara which, circular in shape, is situated just in the middle of it - like fortification running around a town - and which surrounds the Manusyaloka or 'region where human beings are found.' Jambudvipa, Dhatakikhanda and the inner half of Puskara, these two continents and a half on the one hand and the ocean Lavana and Kalodadhi on the other - only this much loka-part is called manusyaloka. This loka-part is called manusyaloka and that mountain surrounding it manusottara because outside this loka-part no man is ever born and no man ever dies. Only a super-ordinarily skilled monk or a person possessed of the super-ordinary power of Vaikriya formation can proceed beyond these two continents and a half; but even they are born and die only in the region lying this side of the mountain Manusottara. 12-13

The Seat of Human Race and Its Types :

The two continents and a half and two oceans lying within the limits set by the mountain Manusottara are no doubt a seat of man but not on every point of this loka-part is man to be found. For a seat by birth of the human race are only those 35 regions and 56 'intermediate continents' situated within the two continents and a half in question, but carried away by a super-ordinary personage or himself exercising a super-ordinary skill or capacity a man might well be found in any part of the two continents and a half and two oceans in questions. Nay, in that capacity a man can even be found on the top of the mountain Meru. Even so, it is on account of his association with a particular region that a man is called Bharatiya (i.e. one belonging to Bharata), Haimavatiya (i.e. one belonging to Haimavata) etc. while on account of his association with a particular continent that he is called Jambudvipin (i.e. one belonging to Jambudvipa), Dhatakikahandin (i.e. on belonging to Dhatakaikhanda). 14

The human race is chiefly divided into two classes - viz. Aryas and Mlecchas. Depending on the distinguishing circumstances the Aryas are of six types. Thus some are Aryas owing to location, some Aryas owing to race, some Aryas owing to family, some Aryas owing to activity, some Aryas owing to industrial skill, some Aryas owing to language. Aryas owing to

location are those who are born in one of the fifteen Karmabhumis and there too in what are called Arya-lands. Aryas owing to race are those who are born

-------------------------- 1. In each of the five Bharatas and five Airavatas there are enumerated twenty-five and a half Arya-lands. Thus these amount to 255 Arya-lands in all and, besides, the 160 Cakravarti-Vijayas situated in the five Videhas are also Arya-lands. It is only in these lands that the tirthankaras are born

among the races like Iksvaku, Videha, Hari, Jnata, Kuru, Ugra etc. Aryas owing to family are the Kulakaras, Cakravartins, Baladevas, Vasudevas as also those others who are born in highly dignified families. Aryas owing to activity are those who earn their livelihood through performing Yajna and making others perform it, through undertaking studies and making others undertake them, through agriculture, penmanship, trade etc. Aryas owing to industrial skill are the weavers, barbers, potters, etc. who earn their livelihood through a profession that involves meagre violence and is blameless. Aryas owing to languages are those who conveniently speak and otherwise make use of a language given recognition to by cultured personages. All those who lack features characteristic of these Aryas of six types are Mlecchas.

The Karmabhumis Mentioned :

A Karmabhumi is a place where there are born tirthankaras conversant with the path leading to moksa and actively engaged in preaching it to others. Within the limits of those two continents are the places where human beings are born; but among these there are only fifteen to fulfill the description of a Karmabhumi just given : These are 5 Bharatas, 5 Airavatas, 5 Videhas. The remaining 20 regions and all the intermediate continents are but akarmabhumis (=bhogabhumis). And though the two sub-regions Devakuru and Uttarakuru lie within the limits of Videha they are not Karmabhumis; for persons born there are born as a doublet and so are not in a

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and preach religion. The entire area of the fifteen Karmabhumis that remains there after excluding these Arya-lands is denied the status of an Arya-land.

1. By cultured personages are to be understood tirthankaras, ganadharas etc. who are possessed of superior capacities and languages that are theirs are Sanskrit, Ardhamagadhi etc.

2. According to this definition those residing in one of the 30 bhogabhumis (lit. fields of enjoyment) or akarmabhumis (lit. fields of non-action) like Haimavata etc. are all veritably Mlecchas. 15

position to practise Caritra or an ideal conduct - just as those born in the akarmabhumis like Haimavata etc. are not. 16

Life duration of the Human-beings and Animals :

In the case of the human beings the maximum life-duration is 3 palyopamas, the minimum life-duration a period measuring less than a muhurta. The same is true of animals; that is to say, in their case too the maximum life-duration is 3 palyopamas, the minimum life-duration a period measuring less than a muhurta.

Life duration is of two types - viz. bhavasthiti and kaayasthiti. The maximum or minimum life-duration that a being can enjoy after being born in a particular species is bhavasthiti appropriate to that species; the period for which a being continues to be born in a particular species rather than any other is kayasthiti appropriate to that species. The just mentioned life-duration appropriate to the species human beings and animals is in fact Bhavasthiti appropriate to them. As for kayasthiti appropriate to them the situation is as follows : In the case of human beings as well as animals the minimum kayasthiti, like the minimum bhavasthiti, is a period measuring less than a muhurta. The maximum kayasthiti appropriate to human beings measures a period of seven or eight births; that is to say, a being who is continuously born in the human species must take leave of it after seven or eight births.

Not all the animals have the same kayasthiti or the same bhavasthiti; and so in their case the two require to be mentioned in details. Thus bhavasthiti appropriate to the earth-bodied beings in 22000 years, that appropriate to the water-bodied beings 7000 years, that appropriate to the air-bodied 3000 years, that appropriate to the fire-bodied beings 3 days and nights. In the case of all these four kayasthiti measures a period of asankhyata utsarpini-cum-avasarpini. Bhavasthiti appropriate to the plant-bodied beings is 1000 years, kayasthiti appropriate to them a period of anantautsarpini-cum-avasarpini. Bhavasthiti appropriate to the two-sensed beings is 12 years, that appropriate to the three-sensed beings 49 days and nights, that appropriate to the four-sensed beings 6 months. In the case of all these three kayasthiti measures a period of asankhyata thousand years. In the case of the five-sensed animals bhavasthiti is different for those born out of a womb and those born by way of agglutination. Thus among those born out of a womb bhavasthiti appropriate to the water-born beings, the uragas (a species of serpent), the bhujagas (a species of serpent) is 1 crore purvas, that appropriate to birds one by asankhyata palyopama, that appropriate to the land-born quadrupeds 3 palyopamas. Similarly, among those born by way of agglutination bhavasthiti appropriate to the water-born beings is one crore purvas, that appropriate to uragas 53000 years, that appropriate to bhujagas 42000 years, that appropriate to birds 72000 years, that appropriate to the

land-born beings 84000 years. In the case of five-sensed animals kayasthiti appropriate to those born out of a womb measures a period of seven or eight births, that appropriate to those born by way of agglutination measures a period of seven births. 17-18

CHAPTER FOUR

The third chapter chiefly offered an account of the hellish beings, human beings and animals; the present one chiefly offers an account of the gods or heavenly beings.

The Types of gods :

The gods are divided into four nikayas. 1

Nikaya means a particular group or species. The four nikayas or species of gods are as follows :

Bhavanapati, Vyantara, Jyotiska and Vaimanika. 1

The lesya or soul-colouring appropriate to the third nikaya.

The third species of gods is possessed of yellow lesya. 2

Of the above four nikayas of gods the third are Jyotiskas. They are possessed of just yellow lesya. Here lesya means lesya of the dravya type - that is, lesya of the form of bodily colour not lesya of the bhava type which is of the form of a particular spiritual endeavour; for so far as the latter type of lesyas are concerned all the six of them are found in all the four species of gods. 2

The Sub-types of the Four Nikayas :

The four Nikayas of gods - upto those residing within the zone of Kalpas - have got 10, 8, 5, and 12 sub-types respectively. 3

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1. The Digambara tradition attributes four Lesyas - from black upto yellow - to the three species of gods - viz. Bhavanapati, Vyantara and Jyotiska; but the Svetambara tradition attributes these four lesyas only to the two species Bhavanapati and Vyantara while to the species Jyotiska it attributes a single lesya yellow. Owing to this difference of opinion the present aphorism as also the seventh read difference of opinion the present aphorism as also the seventh read differently in the Svetambara tradition; for the Digambara tradition has in the place of these two aphorism just one - viz. aditas trisu pitantalesyah.

2. For a special account of lesya see the Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha - Appendix pertaining to the term lesya p. 33.

The Bhavanapati-nikaya has got ten sub-types, the Vyantara-nikaya eight, the Jyotiska-nikaya five and the Vaimanika-nikaya twelve - as will be

detailed later. The twelve sub-types in question of the Vaimanika-nikaya relate to those Vaimanika gods who reside within the zone of Kalpas; for there are Vaimanika gods who reside beyond the zone of Kalpas and who therefore are not included among these twelve sub-types. The twelve heavens-lands of gods-from Saudharma upto Acyuta are called Kalpa. 3

An Inner Classification of the Four Nikayas of gods :

Each of those sub-types numbering ten etc. belonging to the four nikayas of gods are of the form of indras, samanikas, trayastrimsas, parisadyas, atmaraksas, lokapalas, anikas, prakirnakas, abhiyogyas and kilvisikas. 4

The Vyantaras and Jyotiskas do not include the classes trayastrimsa and lokapala. 5

The gods of the Bhavanapati-nikaya are of ten sub-types asurakumara etc. Each of these sub-types is divided into the classes indra, samanika etc. (1) Indras are those who act as lord in relation to the classes samanika etc. (2) Samanikas are those who are akin to indras as regards life-duration etc. - that is to say, who are venrable like a chief minister, father, preceptor etc. but who are only devoid of the status of an indra. (3) Trayastrimsas are those who act as a minister or a chaplain. (4) Parisadyas are those who act as companion. (5) Atmaraksakas are those who, weapons in hand, stand at the back like a border-lines. (6) Lokapalas are those who guard the border lines. (7) Anikas are those who act as soldiers and army-chiefs. (8) Prakirnakas are those who are akin to the rank and file townsmen and countrymen. (9) Abhiyogyas (=sevakas) are those who are akin to slaves. (10) Kilvisikas are those who are akin to the antyajas or the lowermost stratum of the human society. Also the so many types of Vaimanika gods residing in 12 heavens are divided into these ten classes indra, samanika etc.

The eight sub-types of the Vyantara-nikaya and the five of the Jyotiska-nikaya are divided into just eight classes, for in these nikayas there are not found the classes trayastrimsa and lokapala. 4-5

The Rule Regarding the Number of Indras :

The first two nikayas have got two indras each. 6

In each of the 10 sub-types asurakumara etc. belonging to the Bhavanapati-nikaya and in each of the 8 sub-types kinnara etc. belonging to the Vyantara-nikaya there are two indras. Thus among asurakumaras they are Camara and Bali, among nagakumaras Dharana and Bhutananda, among vidyutkumaras Hari and Harisaha, among suparnakumaras Venudeva and Venudarin, among agnikumaras Agnisikha and Agnimanava, among vatakumaras

Velamba and Prabhanjana, among stanitakumaras Sughosa and Mahaghosa, among udadhikumaras Jalakanta and Jalaprabha, among dvipakumaras Purna and Vasistha, among dikkumaras Amita-gati and Amitavahana : This as regards the Bhavanapati-nikaya; as regards the Vyantara-nikaya the situation is as follow : Among kinnaras the indras are Kinnara and Kumpurusa, among kimpurusas they are Satpurusa and Mahapurusa, among mahoragas Atikaya and Mahakaya, among gandharvas Gittarati and Gitayasas, among yaksas Purnabhadra and Manibhadra, among raksasas Bhima and Mahabhima, among bhutas Pratirupa and Apratirupa, among pisacas Kala and Mahakala.

When it is said that the two nikayas Bhavanapati and Vyantara have got two indras each, then it is implied that the remaining two nikayas have not got two indras each. In the case of Jyotiskas, Candra (i.e. the moon) and Surya (i.e. the sun) act as indra. And since Candras and Suryas are asankhyata in number the same is the number of indras pertaining to the Jyotiska-nikaya. In the case of the Vaimanika-nikaya each Kalpa has got one indra. Thus in the Saudharma-kalpa Sakra is indra, in Aisana Isana, in Sanatkumara Sanatkumara; similarly, in the heavens further upwards there is an indra bearing a name corresponding to that of the heaven itself. The only noteworthy point in this connection is that the two Kalpas Anata and Pranata have got a common indra whose name is Pranata while the two Kalpas Arana and Acyuta have got a common indra whose name is Acyuta. 6

The Situation as to Lesya in the First Two Nikayas :

The gods of the first two nikayas possess Lesyas upto the yellow. 7

The Bhavanapatis and Vyantaras - these two species of gods are said to possess just four dravyalesyas, lesyas which are of the form of bodily colour. These are black, blue, grey and yellow. 7

An Account of Sexual Enjoyment on the Part of Gods :

The Gods residing upto Aisana are Kayapravicara - that is, such as experience sexual enjoyment through body. 8

As for the remaining Kalpas the gods residing in the first two experience sexual enjoyment through touch, those residing in the next two do so through form, those residing in the next two do so through sound, those residing in the next two do so through thought. 9

The rest of the gods are all immune from sexual enjoyment. 10

The Bhavanpatis, Vyantaras, Jyotiskas and the Vaimanikas residing in the first two heavens - these gods derive pleasure from a sexual enjoyment

experienced through body just as do men.

The Vaimanika gods residing in the heavens third upward do not experience sexual enjoyment through a wholesale touch of body - as do men; they rather experience such enjoyment in a different manner. E.g. the gods residing in the third and fourth heavens satisfy their sexual hunger - and thus derive pleasure - through a mere touch of the goddesses.

The gods residing in the fifth and the sixth heavens derive satisfaction born of sexual enjoyment through a mere look at the decorated form of the goddesses. The gods residing in the seventh and eigth heavens have their sexual passion calmed down through a mere listening to the various sounds produced by the goddesses, and it is thus that they derive pleasure born of an experience of sexual enjoyment. The gods residing in the two pairs of heavens ninth-tenth and eleventh-twelfth have sexual satisfaction through a mere thought of the goddesses; for this satisfaction they require neither to touch the goddesses, nor to have a look at their form, nor to listen to their songs etc. The idea is that the goddesses are to be found only upto the second heaven, not further upwards. Hence it so happens that when the goddesses find that gods residing in the third heaven and further upwards are eager for sexual enjoyment and hence regardful towards them they straightaway approach those gods; and as soon as they approach them the gods residing in the third and fourth heavens have sexual satisfaction through a mere touch of the hands etc. of these goddesses, those residing in the fifth and sixth heavens do so through a mere look at the finely decorated handsome body of these goddesses, those residing in the seventh and eighth do so through a mere listening to the beautiful musical sound of these goddesses. The access of the goddesses is possible only upto the eighth heaven, not furthe upwards. The gods residing in the heavens ninth upto the twelfth have sexual satisfaction through a mere thought of the goddesses. The gods residing in the heavens beyond the twelfth are calm and immune from sexual desire; that is why they do not require to experience enjoyment through touching the goddesses, through looking at their form, through listening to the sounds produced by them or through thinking of them - and yet they feel more satisfied and more joyous than the remaining gods. The reason is obvious and is as follow. The greater the intensity of sexual passion the greater is mental perturbation, and the greater the mental perturbation the greater is the amount of sexual enjoyment required to get rid of it. The gods residing in the third and fourth heavens have milder sexual passion than those residing upto the second, those residing in the fifth and sixth heavens have milder sexual passion than those residing in the third and fourth, and so on we find that the further upwards a god resides the milder is his sexual passion. Hence it is that the gods residing further upwards suffer from lesser mental perturbation; and hence it is that they require fewer means of sexual enjoyment. The gods residing in the heavens beyond the twelfth have their sexual passion calmed down and so they require no sexual enjoyment whatsoever, whether born of touching,

or of looking, or of listening, or of thinking. These gods ever remain submerged in the great joy born of satisfaction. This explains why the joy experienced by a god residing further upwards is said to be greater than that experienced by one residing further downwards. 8-10

An Account of the above Mentioned
Types of the Four nikayas of Gods ;

The Bhavanvasi-nikaya consists of the types Asurakumara, Nagakumara, Vidyutkumara, Suparnakumara, Agnikumara, Vatakumara, Stanitakumara, Udadhikumara, Dvipakumara and Dikkumara. 11

The Vyantara-nikaya consists of the types Kinnara, Kimpurusa, Mahoraga, Gandharva, Yaksa, Raksasa, Bhuta and Pisaca. 12

The Jyotiska-nikaya consists of the types Surya (i.e. the sun), Candra (i.e. the moon), Graha (i.e. planet), Naksatra (i.e. constellation), Prakirnatara (i.e. stray star). 13

In the Manusyaloka (i.e. the loka-part where alone the human beings are born) the Jyotiska-gods make round about the mountain Meru and are ever on the move. 14

The division of time is worked out by these Jyotiska-gods on the move. 15

Outside the Manusyaloka the jyotiska gods remain static. 16
The fourth Nikaya of gods consists of those called Vaimanika. 17

They are such as reside within the zone of Kalpas as also such as reside outside this zone. 18

They reside one above another. 19

Their residing places are Saudharma, Aisana, Sanatkumara, Mahendra, Brahmaloka, Lantaka, Mahasukra Sahasrara, Anata, Pranata, Arana and Acyuta, the nine Graiveyakas, as also Vijaya, Vijayanta, Jayanta, Aparajita and Sarvarthasiddha. 20

The Ten Types of Bhavanapatis :

All the ten types of Bhavanapatis reside down below the the mountain Meru situated in Jambudvipa, this residence being in a southerly as well as a northerly direction related to this mountain; as for the transverse direction this residence is extended upto crore multiplied by crore lacs

yojanas. The Asurakumaras reside mostly in avasas and sometimes in bhavanas, but all the remaining types Nagakumara etc. usually reside in bhavanas. The avasas are everywhere found in the 178,000 yojanas thick volume of the land-mass Ratnaprabha that remains there after excluding its uppermost and lowermost strata each 1000 yojanas thick; on the other hand, the bhavanas are found only in the lower most 90,000 yojanas thick volume pertaining to Ratnaprabha. The avasa look like huge canopies, the bhavanas look like towns. The bhavanas are shaped like a circle on the exterior side, like a square on the interior, while their bottom is shaped like a Puskarakarnika (=the finger on the tip of an elephant's trunk).

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1. According to the Svetambara tradition there are twelve Kalpas, but according to the Digambara tradition they are sixteen. For the latter tradition adds to the above list four more members - viz. Brahmottara, Kapistha, Sukra and Satara, members which respectively occupy in the newly emergent list the 6th, 8th, 9th and 11th serial position. For the Digambara reading of the present aphorism see the Appendix pertaining to the comparative reading of aphorisms.

All the Bhavanapatis are called Kumaras because like a Kumara (i.e. a youngster) they are handsome to look at and delicate; moreover, their movement is light and lovely and they are of a playful disposition. All the types of Bhavanapatis have got since their very birth a natural property comprising symbol etc., a property that is different in the case of a different type. For example, in the crown of the Asurakumaras there is affixed the symbol of head-jewel. With the Nagakumaras the symbol is that of serpent, with the Vidyutkumaras that of thunderbolt, with the Suparnakumaras that of garuda, with the Agnikumaras that of jar, with the Vatakumaras that of horse, with the Stanitakumaras that of vardhamana or a pair of earthen bowls, with the Udadhikumaras that of crocodile, with the Dvipakumaras that of lion, with the Dikkumaras that of elephant. In the case of Nagakumaras etc. the symbol concerned is affixed in their ornament. All the types have got a different clothing, weapon, ornament etc. 11

The Types and Sub-types of the Vyantaras :

All the Vyantaras reside in the bhavans and avasas situated in the upper, middle as well as lower Loka-portions. On their own or as impelled by others they visit different places. Some of them even go to the extent of attending upon the human beings. They are called Vyantara because they reside in the various antaras or intervening spaces that come to be formed within the mountains and caves as also within the forests. Of these the type Kinnara is divided into ten sub-types - viz. Kinnara, Kimpurusa, Kimpurusottam, Kinnarottam, Hrdayangama, Rupasalin, Anindita, Manorama, Ratipriya, Ratisrestha. The type Kimpurusa is divided into ten sub-types - viz. Purusa, Satpurusa, Mahapurusa, Purusavrsabha, Purusottama, Atipurusa,

Marudeva, Maruta, Meruprabha and Yasasvat. The type Mahoraga is divided into ten sub-types - viz.

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1. The text Sangraha attributes the symbol of horse to the Udadhikumaras and that of crocodile to the Vatakumaras. Gatha 26.

Bhujaga, Bhogasalin, Mahakaya, Atikaya, Skandhasalin, Manorama, Mahavega, Mahesvaksa, Merukanta and Bhasvat. The Gandharvas have got twelve sub-types - viz. Haha, Huhu, Tumburava, Narada, Rsivadika, Bhutavadika, Kadamba, Mahakadamba, Raivata, Visvavasu, Gitarati, Gitayasas. The Yaksas have got thirteen sub-types - viz. Purnabhadra, Manibhadra, Svetabhadra, Haribhadra, Sumanobhadra, Vyatipatikabhadra, Subhadra, Sarvatobhadra, Manusyayaksa, Vanadhipati, Vanadhara, Rupayaksa and Yaksottama. The Raksasas have got seven sub-types - viz. Bhima, Mahabhima, Vighna, Vinayaka, Jalaraksasa, Raksasa, Brahmaraksasa. The Bhutas have got nine sub-types - viz. Surupa, Pratirupa, Atirupa, Bhutottama, Skandika, Mahaskandika, Mahavega, Praticchanna, Akasaga. The Pisacas have got fifteen sub-types - viz. Kusmanda, Pataka, Josa, Ahnaka, Kala, Mahakala, Cauksa, Acauksa, Talapisaca, Mukharapisaca, Adhastaraka, Deha, Mahavideha, Tusnika, Vanapisaca.

The eight types of Vyantaras haves respectively got for their symbol Asoka, Campaka, Naga, Tumbaru, Vata, Khatvanga, Sulasa, Kadambaka. All these symbols, barring Khatvanga, are of the form of a species of tree and all are affixed in the ornament etc. of the type of Vyantara concerned. 12

The Five Types of Jyotiska :

The region of the circle of Jyotiskas begins at a height of 790 yojanas above the even ground-level of the mountain Meru; beginning from there the region is 110 yojanas thick, while in the transverse direction its extent equals that of asankhyata continents and oceans. At a height of ten yojanas within this region - that is, at a height of 800 yojanas above the even ground-level of the mountain Meru - there are situated the Vimanas or celestial quarters of the Suryas. At a height 80 yojanas above the Vimanas of the Suryas - that is, at a height of 880 yojanas above the ground-level of Meru - there are situated the Vimanas of the Candras. Upto a height

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1. Khatvanga is a particular instrument employed by an ascetic.

of 20 yojanas above the Vimanas of the Candras - that is, upto a height of 900 yojanas above the level of Meru - there are situated the Grahas, Naksatras and Prakirnataras. By Prakirnataras are understood such stars as are possessed of no fixed path of motion and so are found to move sometimes above the Suryas and Candras, sometimes below them. Within the 20 yojanas thick space rising above the Candras Naksatras are situated at

the end of the first 4 yojanas, the planets Sanaiscara at the end of the next 3. When a star with no fixed path of motion moves below a Surya it moves within that 10 yojanas thick space which lies within the region of Jyotiska-gods. The Suryas etc. are called Jyotiska because they reside in Jyotiska or luminous celestical quarters. In the crown of them all is affixed a symbol luminous like a circle-of-rays and shaped like solar disc etc; to be precise, in the case of Surya the symbol is shaped like solar disc, in the case of Candra it is shaped like lunar disc, in the case of tara it is shaped like astral disc. 13

The Mobile Jyotiskas :

That the Manusyaloka extends upto the mountain Manusottara has already been stated. Now the Jyotiskas to be found in this Manusyaloka are always on the move. And movement on their part takes place around the mountain Meru. In all there are in the Manusyaloka 132 Suryas and 132 Candras. Thus in Jambudvipa there are two of them each, in the Lavana-ocean four each, in Dhatakikhanda twelve each, in the Kalodadhi-ocean forty-two each, in Puskaradha seventy-two each. The companionship of one Candra consists of 28 Naksatras, 88 Grahas and 66975 crores multiplied by crore taras. Although it follows from the precisely fixed nature of the loka itself that the Vimanas of Jyotiskas are

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1. See chapter 3, aphorism 14

always automatically on the move, yet with a view to making manifest their specific prosperity as also owing to the manifestation of the nama-karma designated abhiyogya or sevaka certain gods of a playful disposition raise those Vimanas as if to support them and thus move about. Thus in the front the lion-shaped gods, on the right side the elephant-shaped ones, at the back the bull-shaped ones, on the left side the horse-shaped ones keep touching those Viamanas from below and thus move about. 14

The Division of Time :

The various types of usage as to time - e.g. muhurta, day and night, fortnight, month etc., past, present etc., as also numerable, non-numerable etc. take place only within the confines of the Manusyaloka and not outside it. Even if there be someone outside the Manusyaloka to resort to the usage in question as to time and even if he actually resorts to such usage all this happens in accordance with the corresponding usage current in the Manusyaloka; for the chief basis of a practical division of time is but determinate activity and this activity is nothing but the motion of the Jyotiskas like Suryas, Candras etc. However, motion does not characterize the Jyotiskas seated at whatever place but only those seated within the confines of the Manusyaloka. Hence it is upheld that the division of time depends on but a specific motion of the Jyotiskas. The

gross divisions of time like day, night, fortnight etc., since they depend on a determinate motion of the Jyotiskas, can be known through this motion; but the subtle divisions of time like samaya, avalika etc. cannot be known through it. At a particular place the usage as to day takes place on the basis of an activity of the form of motion on the part of the sun beginning from the time it first comes in sight and continuing upto the time it goes out of sight - that is, during the interval of time that stretches from sunrise upto sunset. Similarly, the usage as to night takes place on the basis of an activity of the form of motion on the part of the sun during the interval of time that stretches from sunset upto sunrise. A muhurta is the thirtieth part of one day-and-night. A fortnight consists of fifteen days-and-nights. Two fortnights make a month, two months make rtu, three rtus make an ayana, twwo ayanas make a varsa. All this and similar everyday division of time takes place on the basis of an activity of the form of motion on the part of the sun. An activity that still goes on makes the present phase of time, an activity that is yet to take place makes its future phase, an activity that has already taken place makes its past phase. The duration of time that can be subjected to enumeration is sankhyeya or numerable, the duration that cannot be subjected to enumeration but can only be known with the help of similes is asankhyeya or non-numerable - e.g. palyopama, sagaropama etc. The duration of time that has no end is ananta or endless. 15

The Static Jyotiskas :

Outside the Manusyaloka the Vimanas of the Jyotiskas like Surya etc. are static; for by their very nature these Vimanas stay at one place rather than move about from place to place. This precisely is why their Lesya and their light too are of an uniform, static type. That is to say, since Rahu etc. do not cast their shadow on the Jyotiskas seated there the natural yellow colour of the latter ever remains the same and since there is no rising and no setting on the part of these Jyotiskas their light ever retains its extent of one lac yojanas. 16

The Vaimanika-gods :

The gods belonging to the fourth nikaya are called Vaimanikas. However, this name Vaimanika is a mere technicality, for as a matter of fact even gods belonging to the other nikayas move by Vimanas. 17

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1. This only gives a literal meaning of the term ananta. For the full idea at the back of it see Chautha karmagrantha.

The Vaimanikas are of two types - viz. Kalpopapanna or those lying within the zone of Kalpas and Kalpatita or those lying beyond the zone of Kalpas. The Kalpopapanna are those who reside inside the Kalpas, the Kalpatita are those who reside above the Kalpas. These Vaimanikas reside

neither at one and the same place nor by the side of one another. 18-19

There are twelve classes of Kalpas - viz. Saudharma, Aisana, etc. Of these, Saudharma-kalpa is situated at a height of an asankhyata yojanas above the circle of Jyotiskas and in the akasa-part indicated by the southerly side of Meru. Much above it but in a northerly direction is situated the Aisana-kalpa. Situated much above the Saudharma-kalpa and in a single straight line is the Sanatkumara-kalpa while situated above the Aisana-kalpa and in a single straight line is the Mahendra-kalpa. Situated in between them but above them is the Brahmaloka-kalpa. Above it are situated one above another and in a single straight line the three Kalpas, Lantaka, Mahasukra and Sahasrara. Above them are situated in the fashion of Saudharma and Aisana the two Kalpas Anata and Pranata. Above them are situated in the fashion of Sanatkumara and Mahendra and in a single straight line the two Kalpas Arana and Acyuta. Above the Kalpas are situated one above another the nine Vimanas which, because they act like neck (Sanskrit, 'griva') in relation to loka conceived after the figure of a man, are called graiveyaka. Above them are situated one above another the five Vimanas Vijaya, Vijayanta, Jayanta, Aparajita and Sarvarthasiddha which, because they are best (Sanskrit, uttara) or chief among all, are called anuttara.

The gods residing from Saudharma upto Acyuta are Kalpopapanna while those residing above them are Kalpatita. The relation of servant and lord obtains among the Kalpopapanna gods but not among the Kalpatita ones; the latter, since they are all akin to indra, are called ahamindra (lit. 'I am Indra'). If an occasion arises for visiting the Manusyaloka it is the Kalpopapanna gods who undertake the venture; as for the Kalpatita ones, they never leave their place with a view to visiting another quarter. 20

The Relative Superiority and Inferiority of Gods in Respect of Certain Matters :

As for sthiti or life-duration, prabhava or efficacy, sukha or pleasure, dyutti or glow lesyavisuddhi or purity of soul-colouring, indriyavisaya or object of sensous cognition, avadhi visaya or object of avadhi-cognition - a god has more of it the higher he is seated. 21

As for gati or movement, sarira or body, parigraha or appropriation, abhimana or arrogance - a god has less of it the higher he is seated. 22

So far as seven things are concerned a higher seated god has more of them than a lower seated one.

This as follows :

1. Sthiti or Life-duration :

The special details as to this question are offered in the aphorisms 30 to 53.

2. Prabhava or Efficacy :

The power to punish and to benefit, the power to super-ordinary realization like anima or turning small, mahima or turning huge, etc., the power to attack others and thus make them act in one's own interest-these are the components of efficacy. And though a higher seated god has got more of efficacy thus understood he makes a lesser use of it because he suffers less from arrogance and mental perturbation.

3. 4. Sukha or Pleasure and Dyutti or Glow :

To experience through sense-organs the objects graspable through them is sukha or pleasure. The brightness radiating from body, clothes, weapons etc. is glow. The reason why a higher situated god has more of pleasure and glow thus understood is that owing to the very nature of its location a higher situated loka-region is characterized by a more auspicious type of physical transformations.

5. Lesyavisuddhi or the Purity of Soul-colouring :

The rule as to lesya will be elucidated in the next aphorism 23. Here only this much has to be understood that even among those gods who stand on the same footing so far as lesya is concerned one seated higher has got a purer lesya than one seated lower because the former suffers less from mental perturbation.

6. Indriya-visaya or Object of Sensuous Cognition :

The power of a sense-organ to grasp a desirable object from afar is greater in a higher seated god because he is more copiously equipped with meritorious qualifications and suffers less from mental perturbation.

7. Avadhijnana-visaya or Object of avadhi-cognition :

The power of avadhi-cognition too is greater in a higher seated god. Thus the gods of the first and second heavens are in a position to grasp through avadhi-cognition in the downward direction a region down to ratnaprabha, in the transverse direction a region one asankhyata lace yojanas wide, in the upward direction a region upto their own bhavana; those of the third and fourth heavens are in a position to similarly grasp in the downward direction a region down to Sarkaraprabha, in the transverse direction a region one asankhyata lacs yojanas wide, in the upward direction a region upto their own Vimana. Thus gradually increasing it is ultimately found that the gods of the Anuttaravimanas are in a

position to grasp through avadhi-cognition the entire loka of the form of a tunnel. Even among those gods whose area of avadhi-jnana is equally extensive one seated higher has a purer cognition than one seated lower. 21

So far as four things are concerned a higher seated gods has less of them than a lower seated one. This as follows :

1. Gati or Movement :

The capacity to undertake activity of the form of movement and actual indulgence in such activity are both found less in a god who is seated higher; for a higher seated god, being more high-souled and disinterested, is less enamored of the pleasure-seeking available in a foreign land. Thus the gods belonging to the heavens Sanatkumara etc. whose minimum life-duration is 2 sagaropamas possess the capacity to move down to the seventh hell in the lower loka-portion and to move upto one asankhyata thousand crores multiplied by crore in the transverse direction. But in the case of the gods with a higher minimum life-duration the capacity to move is so much reduced that those belonging to the upper-most heavens are in a position to move down to the third hell at the most. Of course, even if possessed of a great capacity no god has ever gone nor will he ever go beyond the third hell in the lower loka-portion.

2. Sarira or Body :

The size of body is seven cubits in the first and second heavens, six cubits in the third and fourth, five cubits in the fifth and sixth, four cubits in the eighth, three cubits in ninth upto twelfth, two cubits in the nine graiveyakas, one cubit in the anuttravimanas.

3. Parigraha or Appropriation :

32 lacs vimanas constitute parigraha or appropriation in the first heaven, 28 lacs in the second, 12 lacs in the third, 8 lacs in the fourth, 4 lacs in the fifth, 50,000 in the sixth, 40,000 in the seventh, 6000 in the eight, 700 in the ninth upto twelfth, 111 in the lower three graiveykas, 107 in the middle three, 100 in the upper three, just 5 in the anuttaras.

4. Abhimana or Arrogance :

Abhimana or arrogance means ahankara or self-conceit. Arrogance originates in respect of location, retinue, power, object-of-cognition, super-ordinary possession, life-duration etc. A higher seated god possesses less of arrogance thus understood because he suffers less from passion.

There are five further things related to gods which are not mentioned in the aphorism but are worth knowing. They are (1) ucchvasa or breath. (2) ahara or nourishment. (3) vedana or feeling. (4) upapata or ability for birth. (5) anubhava or inherent loka-nature.

1. Ucchvasa or Breath :

As the life-duration of a god increases so also increases the duration of his breath. Thus the gods with a life-duration 10,000 years have breath with a duration 7 stokas while those with a life-duration one palyopama have one breath a day. As for the gods with life-duration measured in sagaropamas the rule in their case is that as many sagaropamas be one's life-duration so many fortnights is the duration of one's breath.

2. Ahara or Nourishment :

As for nourishment the rule is that gods with a life-duration 10,000 years take it on alternate day, while those with a life-duration one palayopama take it at an interval of days numbering prthaktva. As for the gods with life-duration measured in sagaropamas the rule in their case is that as many sagaropamas be one's life-duration so many thousand years constitute the interval at which one takes nourishment.

3. Vedana or Feeling :

Generally speaking, the gods experience only a pleasant feeling. And if per chance a painful feeling does attack them it does not last longer than a period of antarmuhurta (i.e. a period measuring less than one muhurta). As for a pleasant feeling it persists in an identical form for a period of six months and then undergoes a change.

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1. Prthaktva is a technical term standing for the numbers two to mine.

4. Upapata or Ability for Birth :

Upapata means ability for birth in a particular place. One bearing the outward signs of a non-Jaina and suffering from mithyatva (i.e. wrong inclination) can be born only upto the twelfth heaven; one bearing the outward signs of a Jaina and suffering from mithyatva can be born upto the graiveyakas. One possessed of samyaktva (i.e. right inclination) can be born anywhere from the first heaven upto the sarvarthasiddha. However, a disciplined personage well-versed in the 14 Purva-texts is in no case born below the fifth heaven.

5. Anubhava or Inherent loka-nature :

Anubhava means inherent loka-nature. It is on account of it that all the vimanas and siddhasila (i.e. the rock acting as seat of location for

the emancipated souls) etc. remain fixed in akasa even in the absence of a support.

At the time of the birth-ceremony of a Lord Arhat there is a quivering of the seat of gods - this too is a manifestation of loka-anubhava. Soon after the quivering of their seat some gods, employing their avadhi-cognition, come to realize the greatness of the Tirthankara concerned, approach him and benefit themselves through offering him hyms of praise, obeisance, worship etc. On the other hand, some gods, while staying back at their own place, worship the Tirthankaras through acts like getting up, raising folded hands, lying prostrate, making obeisance, offering gifts. All this too is a manifestation of lokanubhava. 22

The Rule as to Lesya Among the Vaimanikas :

In two, three and the remaining heavens there reside gods respectively having yellow, red and white lesyas. 23

The gods residing in the first two heavens are possessed of yellow lesya, those residing from the third upto the fifth are possessed of red-lesya, while those residing from the sixth upto the sarvarthasiddha are possessed of white lesya. This rule applies to a lesya of the dravya type - which is of the form of a bodily colouring; for so far as lesyas of the bhava type - which are of the form of a spiritual state - are concerned all the six of them are found in all the gods. 23

The Enumeration of Kalpas :

The Kalpas are situated before the graiveyakas. 24

Those heavens in which there is posited (posit= klp) a division of gods in the form of indra, samanika, trayastrimsa etc. are designated kalpas. Such kalpas - from Saudharma upto Acyuta - all situated before the graiveyakas, are twelve in number.

The heavens beyond the graiveyakas are kalpatta (i.e. those lying beyond the zone of kalpas), for in them there is posited no division of gods in the form of indra, samanika, trayastrimsa etc., that is to say, in them the gods, since they all enjoy an equal status, are called ahamindra. 24

An Account of the the Gods Designated Lokantika :

Brahmaloka is the residing place of the gods designated Lokantika. 25

Sarasvata, Aditya, Vahni, Aruna, Gardatoya, Tusita, Avyabadha, Maruta

and Arista - these classes of gods are Lokantika. 26

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1. In the edition published by the Royal Asiatic Society the wording 'aristas ca' is not definitely given as a part of the aphorism but is inserted within brackets. However, in the edition published by Manasukh Bhagubhai the corresponding wording is 'ristas ca' and is definitely given as a part of the aphorism. And though in the Svetambara tradition the original text of this aphorism contains the wording 'aristas ca' the Tika on the bhasya to it says "surinopattah ristavimanaprastaravartibhih" on the basis of which it might be argued that the wording in question is 'ristas ca' rather than 'aristas ca'. On the other hand, in the Digambara tradition the last part of the aphorism reads 'vyabadharistas ca'. This clearly gives out the name 'arista' and not 'rista'; besides, here there is no mention of 'Maruta.

The Lokantika gods, who on account being immune from sexual passion are called devarsi (i.e. divine ascetics), who since they suffer from no inequlity among themselves are all independent, who at the time when a Tirthankara renounces his home observe the custom of appearing before him and enlightening him through calling out 'bujjhaha bujjhaha' (i.e. please understand, please understand), reside at no other place but around the fifth heaven Brahmaloka in the cardinal directions and mid-directions. Released from there they are born as human beings and attain moksa.

Since of these gods one species each resides in the four directions, the four mid-directions and the middle-region there are nine species of them in all. Thus in north-east there resides the Lokantika species designated srasvata, in east that designated aditya, in south-east that designated vahni, in south that designated aruna, in south-west that designated gardatoya, in west that designated tusita, in north-west that designated avyabadha, in north that designated maruta and in the middle region that designated arista. These names sarasvata etc. have gained currency on the basis of those of the corresponding Vimanas. In this connection one particularity has to be further noted. Thus the original bhasya on these two aphorisms enumerates just eight-not nine-classes of Lokantika-gods. Likewise, the reading of aphorism current in the Digambara tradition yields the number eight, for it makes no mention of 'Maruta. Of course, the sutra-texts Sthananga etc. do speak of nine classes of the gods in question; for that matter, the text uttamacarita speaks of even ten classes in this connection. But from all that is said above it appears that the word 'maruta' is a later interpolation in the present aphorism. 25-26

The Specific Peculiarity of the Gods
Residing in Anuttara Vimanas :

In the heavens Vijaya etc. the gods concerned are dvicaramas - that

is, such as attain moksa after being twice born as a human being. 27

Of the anuttaravimanas there are five types. And the gods residing in four of them - viz. Vijaya, Vaijayanta, Jayanta and Aparajita - are dvicaramas - that is, such as attain moksa after being born as a human being twice at the most. The order of the process is as follows : released from one of the four anuttaravimanas one is born as a human being, at the end of this life one is again born as a god in an anuttaravimana, released from there one is again born as a human being and attains moksa in this very life. However, the gods residing in the vimana Sarvarthasiddha are born as a human being but once; that is to say, released from that vimana they are born as a human being and attain moksa in this very life. In the case of gods other than those residing in an anuttaravimana there is no hard and fast rule in this connection; for among them some attain moksa after being born as a human being but once, some after being thus born twice, some thrice, some four times, some more than four times. 27

The Nature of Animals :

All the beings which are not men and are not born by way of sudden manifestation belong to the species animal. 28

'What beings are to be designated animal? ' - this question has been answered in the present aphorism. Leaving aside those born by way of sudden manifestation - that is, the heavenly beings and hellish beings - as also the human beings all the worldly souls are to be designated animal. The heavenly beings, hellish beings and human beings are necessarily five-sensed; but the animals might be from one-sensed upto five-sensed ones. The animals are unlike the heavenly beings, hellish beings and human beings who are necessarily confined to certain particular loka-regions, for they might be found in any and every loka-region. 28

An Adhikara-sutra-that is, an Aphorism with Its
Jurisdiction Running Over the Several Next :

Now begins an account of life-duration. 29

The maximum and minimum life-duration in the case of the human beings and animals has been stated, the same in the case of the heavenly beings and hellish beings remains to be stated. This latter enunciation, beginning from the next aphorism, continues upto the end of the chapter. 29

The Maximum Life-duration in the
Case of the Bhavanapati-nikaya :

In the bhavanas the indras belonging to the southern half have a life-duration of 1 1/2 palyopama. 30

The remaining indras have a life-duration of 1 3/4 palyopama. 31
The two asurendras respectively have a life-duration of one sagaropama and somewhat more than one sagaropama. 32

Here life-duration mentioned in the case of the Bhavanapati-nikaya must be treated as maximum such duration; for the corresponding minimum duration is going to be mentioned in the coming aphorism. 45

The ten types of the Bhavanapati-nikaya - viz. Asurakumaras, Nagakumaras etc. - have already been described; each of those types has got two indras in the form of a chief of the southern half and a chief of the northern half - that too has been described. Of these the two asurendras - one belonging to south, the other to north - have a maximum life-duration as follows : The asurendra who is a chief of the southern half and is named Camara has a maximum life-duration of one sagaropama, while the asurendra who is a chief of the northern half and is named Bali has a maximum life-duration of somewhat more than one sagaropama. And leaving aside the Bhavanapati-type asurakumara there are nine others - viz. Nagakumara etc.; among them the nine indras Dharana etc. who belong to the southern half have a maximum life-duration of 1 1/2 palyopama while the nine indras Bhutananda etc. who belong to the northern half have a maximum life-duration of 1 3/4 palyopama. 30-32

The Maximum Life-duration in the Case of the Vaimanikas :

In the case of the heavens Saudharma etc. the situation as regards life-duration is as follows : 33
In the case of Saudharma the life-duration is that of sagaropamas. 34
In the case of Aisana the life-duration is that of some-what more than 2 sagaropamas. 35
In the case of Sanatkumara the life-duration is that of 7 sagaropamas. 36
From Mahendra upto Aranacyuta the life-duration is respectively that of somewhat more than 7 sagaropamas, 3 plus 7 sagaropamas, 7 plus 7 sagaropamas, 11 plus 7 sagaropamas, 13 plus 7 sagaropamas, 15 plus 7 sagaropamas. 37

In the case of the heaven situated above Aranacyuta - that is, in the case of the nine Graiveyakas, the four heavens Vijaya etc., the heaven Sarvarthasiddha - life duration gradually increases by one sagaropama. 38

Life-duration here mentioned in the case of the Vaimanika-gods is the maximum such duration; the corresponding minimum duration will be mentioned later on. This life-duration measures 2 sagaropamas in the first heaven, somewhat more than 2 in the second, 7 in the third, somewhat more

than 7 in the fourth, 10 in the fifth, 14 in the sixth, 17 in the seventh, 18 in the eighth, 20 in the ninth and tenth, 22 in the eleventh and twelfth; the same measures 23 sagaropama in the first graiveyaka, 24 in the second and so on uptil it measures 31 in the ninth; in the first four annuttaravimanas it measures 32, in the Sarvarthasiddha 33. 33-38

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1. In the Digambara commentaries and at places even in Svetambara texts the maximum life-duration in the case of the four heavens Vijaya etc. is said to be 33 sagaropamas. See bhasya on the aphorism 42 of the present chapter. In the text Sangrahani also the life-duration in question is said to be 33 sagaropamas.

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the Vaimanikas :

The minimum life-duration measures one palyopama and somewhat more than one palyopama. 39

It measures 2 sagaropamas. 40

It measures somewhat more than 2 sagarapamas. 41

Hence onwards the maximum life-duration of an immediately preceding heaven is the minimum life-duration of an immediately succeeding one. 42

The minimum life-duration in the case of Saudharma etc., is respectively as follows : In the case of the first heaven it is one palyopama, in that of the second it is somewhat more than one palyopama, in that of the third it is 2 sagaropamas, in that of the fourth it is somewhat more than 2 sagaropamas. From the fifth heaven onwards the minimum life-duration in the case of a heaven is the same as the maximum life-duration in the case of the immediately preceeding one. According to this rule the maximum life-duration in the fourth heaven and the minimum in the fifth both measure somewhat more than 7 sagaropamas; the maximum in the fifth and the minimum in the sixth both measure 10, the maximum in the sixth and the minimum in the seventh both measure 14; the maximum in the seventh and the minimum in the eighth both measure 17; the maximum in the eighth and the minimum in the ninth and tenth both measure 18; the maximum in the ninth and tenth and the minimum in the eleventh and twelfth both measure 20; the maximum in the eleventh and twelfth and the minimum in the first graiveyaka both measure 22. Similarly, the maximum life-duration in an immediately preceding graiveyaka is the minimum life-duration in an immediately succeeding one; this way the minimum life duration in the case of the ninth graiveyaka turns out to be 30 sagaropamas. In the case of the first four anuttaravimanas the minimum life-duration is 31 sagaropamas. In the case of the sarvarthsiddha is no difference between the maximum and the minimum life-duration; that is to say, in its case both measure 33 sagaropamas. 39-42

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the Hellish-Beings :

In the hellish grounds second onwards the maximum life-duration of an immediately preceding one is the maximum life-duration of an immediately succeeding one. 43

In the case of the first hellish ground the minimum life-duration is 10,000 years. 44

The same order of succession which in the aphorism 42 has been described for the minimum life-duration of the heavenly beings obtains for the minimum life-duration of the hellish beings residing in the grounds second onwards. According to this rule the maximum life-duration in the first ground and the minimum in the second both measure one sagaropama, the maximum in the second and the minimum in the third both measure 3, the maximum in the third and the minimum in the fourth both measure 7, the maximum in the fourth and the minimum in the fifth both measure 10, the maximum in the fifth and the minimum in the sixth both measure 17, the maximum in the sixth the minimum in the seventh both measure 22. As for the minimum life-duration in the first hellish ground, it measures 10,000 years. 43-44

The Minimum Life-duration in the Case of the Bhavanapatis :

In the Bhavanas also the minimum life-duration measures 10,000 years. 45

The Life-duration in the Case of the Vyantaras :

The minimum life-duration in the case of the Vyantaras is 10,000 years. 46

And the maximum life-duration in their case is one palyopama. 47

The Life-duration in the Case of the Jyotiskas :

In the case of the Jyotiskas- that is, Suryas and Candras the maximum life-duration is somewhat more than one palyopama. 48

In the case of grahas it is one palyopama. 49

In the case of naksatras it is 1/2 palyopama. 50

In the case of taras it is 1/4 palyopama. 51

The minimum life-duration in the remaining cases - that is, in the

case of the remaining Jyotiskas like grahas and naksatras - is 1/4 palyopama. 53

CHAPTER FIVE

The chapters second to fourth have offered an account of the fundamental verity jiva or soul; the present chapter offers an account of the fundamental verity ajiva or not-soul.

The Types of ajiva :

The astikaya dharma, the astikaya adharma, the astikaya akasa and the astikaya pudgala - these four are ajiva-kayas or bodies of the form of not-soul. 1

The methodology of treatment requires that a thing should be defined first and then there should follow an enumeration of its types. But when in the present context the author without offering a definition of the fundamental verity ajiva enumerates its types his ideas is that the definition of ajiva becomes understood on the basis of a definition of jiva itself: hence there is no particular need to offer a separate definition of ajiva. Certainly, the construction of jiva demonstrates that that which is not jiva is ajiva. Now upayoga or cognition constitutes a definition of jiva - so that the vertiy devoid of upayoga is ajiva; and from this it automatically follows that absence of upayoga constitutes a definition of ajiva.

Ajiva is a positive verity standing opposed to jiva; it is not merely of the form of negation.

When dharma etc. - the four verities of an ajiva type - are called astikaya the idea is that they are not of the form of a single unit or a single component but of a combination or collection. Dharma, adharma and akasa, these three are of the form of a collection of units, while pudgala is either of the form of a component or of the form of a collection of components.

Kala or time has not been counted among the types of the fundamental verity ajiva. That is because there obtains a difference of opinion as to whether kala is or is not a fundamental verity. Even those authorities who treat kala as a fundamental verity consider it to be of the form of loose units not of the form of a collection of units; hence according to them too it is not proper to enumerate kala along with the astikayas. As for those authorities who do not at all treat kala as a fundamental verity, there is according to them no question of enumerating kala among the types of a fundamental verity.

Question : Are these four fundamental verities of an ajiva type

admitted also by the other philosophical systems?

Answer : No. The two verities akasa and pudgalas are admitted by the systems like Vaisesika, Nyaya, Sankhya etc.; but the remaining two verities dharmastikaya and adharmastikaya are admitted by no system other than the Jaina. The same verity which is called akasastikaya by the Jaina system is called akasa by the non-Jaina ones. The designation pudgalastikaya is current only in the Jaina theoretical treatizes; as for the non-Jaina theoretical treatizes, in them the verity standing in place of pudgala is known by the names like pradhana, prakrti, paramanu etc. 1

Enunciation of the Fundamental Substances :

The above mentioned four fundamental verities of an ajiva type - viz. dharmastikaya etc. - and jiva or soul - these five are substances. 2

According to the Jaina viewpoint this universe is not exclusively of the form of modification or change but in spite of being subject to change it is beginningless and endless. According to the Jaina viewpoint there are in this universe just five fundamental substances of the form of astikaya; it is they are mentioned in the present aphorism.

In the present aphorism and certain coming ones the generic and specific properties of the substances are described and thus are laid down the sadharnya and the vaidharmya obtaining between them. Sadharmya means agreement as to a property - that is, similarity -, vaidharmya means dis-agreement as to a property - that is, dis-similarity. Dravyatva or the character of being a substance that is predicated in the present aphorism is the similarity in respect of being a substance, a similarity that characterizes the five entities dharmastikaya etc. Such a similarity can only be constituted by qualities and modes, for qualities and modes are not themselves substances. 2

The Similarity and Dissimilarity Obtaining
Between the Fundamental Substances :

The above mentioned substances are nitya or eternal, avasthita or immutable and arupin or devoid of form. 3

The pudgalas are possessed of rupa - that is, are murta or tangible. 4

Of these five substances those upto akasa are one each. 5

And they are devoid of kriya or activity. 6

All the five substances dharmastikaya etc. are eternal - that is, they never give up the general and the specific nature that is theirs.

They are also immutable, for there is never a reduction or increment in their number. However, so far as being devoid of rupa is concerned, that characterizes just four substances - viz. dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya, akasastikaya and jivastikaya. The idea is that being eternal and being immutable - these two similarities characterize all the five substances, but being devoid of rupa - this one similarity characterizes just four substances that remain there after excluding pudgala.

Question : What is the difference between being eternal and being immutable?

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1. The bhasya has the reading 'a akasat' - that is, a reading without the word-conjunction in question. In the Digambara tradition even the aphorism has this reading without word-conjunction.

Answer : Not to give up the general and the specific nature that is one's - that means eternal; while retaining one's own nature not to assume a nature that belongs to some other verity - that means being immutable. For example, the verity jiva never gives up its general nature of the form of being a substance and its specific nature of the form of being conscious - this constitutes its being eternal. And while not giving up its above nature it never assumes the nature of the verity ajiva - this constitutes its being immutable. The idea is that not to give up one's own nature and not to assume the nature of something else - these two aspects are common to all substances whatsoever. Of these, the first aspect is called 'being eternal', the second 'being immutable'. When the substances are declared to be eternal what is indicated is that the universe is ever-lasting, when they are declared to be immutable what is indicated is that they are mutually un-mingled. That is to say, these substances even while subject to change ever retain their own characteristic nature and even while standing by the side of one another they are untouched by the characteristic nature of one another. That is why the universe is beginnigless and endless while at the same time the number of the fundamental verities belonging to it ever remains constant.

Question : When the ajiva entities dharmastikaya etc. are substances and are also fundamental verities, then they must be having some svarupa or other. Why then are they declared to be arupa or devoid of rupa?

Answer : Being devoid of rupa does not here mean being devoid of svarupa; for even the verities dharmastikaya etc. must possess some svarupa - that is, nature - or other. For had they been devoid of a svarupa they would have turned out to be nonentities like the horn of a horse. When mention is here made of arupitva or the character of being devoid of rupa what is denied is murti. So rupa here means murti. And murti means either 'the emergent configuration of colour etc.' or 'the collective of the properties colour, taste, smell and touch.' Murti thus

understood is absent in the four verities dharmastikaya etc. - this very information is conveyed by calling these verities arupin. 3

The words rupa, murtatva and murti are all mutually synonymous :

The properties colour, taste etc. that are capable of being grasped through sense-organs they verily are called murti. The properties of pudgalas are capable of being grasped through sense-organs, hence pudgalas are alone murta or rupin. No other substance except pudgala is murta because none of them can be grasped through sense-organs. Hence possession of rupa constitutes the dissimilarity that obtains between pudgala on the one hand and the four verities dharmastikaya etc. on the other.

Although a number of subtle substances like atoms etc. and so also their properties are, on account of being supra-sensuous, incapable of being grasped through sense-organs, yet under some specific condition which is of the form of some specific transformation they do develop the capacity to be grasped through sense-organs. That is why even if suprasensuous they are doubtless rupin or murta. As for the four substances dharmastikaya etc. that are called arupin they are utterly devoid of the capacity to be grasped through sense-organs. This is what distinguishes the suprasensuous pudgala from the suprasensuous substances like dharmastikaya etc. 4

Of the above mentioned five substances those upto akasa - that is, the three substances dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya, and akasastikaya - are of the form of one instance each. In their case there are not to be found two or more instances.

Similarly, these very three substances are all devoid of kriya. Thus being of the form of one instance and being devoid of kriya these two features constitute the similarity that obtains between the three substances in question; they also consitute the dissimilarity that obtains between these three substances on the one hand pudgalastikaya as well as jivastikaya on the other. In the case of the substances pudgala and jiva numerous instances are to be found and they are also possessed of kriya. For unlike Vedanta the Jaina system of philosophy does not consider the substance soul to be of the form of one instance and unlike the entire lot of the Vedic systems like Sankhya, Vaisesika etc. it does not consider it to be devoid of kriya.

Question : According to the Jaina viewpoint all substances are characterized by a transformation of the form of modification - that is, by origination and destruction. Now such a transformation is possible only in the case of substances that are possessed of kriya. So if the three substances dharmastikaya etc. are treated as devoid of kriya, then how will it be possible to posit in their case a transformation of the form of

modification?

Answer : By declaring something to be devoid of kriya what is here denied to it is kriya of the form of motion - not kriya as such. So according to the Jaina viewpoint the phrase 'substance devoid of kriya' simply means substances devoid of motion. Certainly, even in the case of the substances dharmastikaya etc. that are devoid of motion the Jaina system does posit kriya of the form of transformation into something similar to oneself. 5-6

A Consideration of the Number of
Pradesas or Constituent-units :

In the case of dharma and adharma the pradesas are asankhyata in number. 7

In the case of one particular jiva the pradesas are asankhyata in number. 8

In the case of akasa the pradesas are ananta in number. 9

In the case of the substance pudgala the pradesas are sankhyata, asankhyata or ananta in number 10.

In the case of anu or atom there are no pradesas. 11

When earlier the four ajivas dharma, adharma etc., on the one hand and jiva on the other - these five substances were called kaya or body then it was indicated that these five substances are of the form of astikaya or a collection of pradesas. However, it was not mentioned there as to what is the particular number of pradesas to be found in each case; it is this number that is mentioned here.

In the case of the two substances dharmastikaya and adharmastikaya the number of pradesas is asankhyata each. By pradesa is understood a subtle constituent-part in whose case it is not possible even to posit through intellect a further constituent-part. Such an indivisible subtle part is also called partless part. Dharma and adharma - these two substances are of the form of one instance each, and in their case the number of pradesas or partless parts is asankhyata each. This amounts to saying that these two substances are of the form of such an impartite aggregate in whose case an asankhyata number of indivisible subtle parts can only be posited through intellect but cannot be taken out of the objectively existing aggregate concerned.

The substance jiva is of the form of ananta instances. And each particular jiva is an impartite entity which, like dharmastikaya, is made

up of asankhyata pardesas.

Of all the substances akasa constitute the biggest aggregate, for in its case the number of pradesas is ananta.

The aggregates pertaining to the substances pudgala - unlike the other four substances dharma, adharma etc. - are not of a definite form; for one pudgala-aggregate might be made up of sankhyata pradesas, another made up of asankhyata, a third made up of ananta, a fourth made up of anatananta.

There is one difference between pudgala and the other substances - viz. that the pradesas of pudgala can be separated from the aggregate concerned while the pradesas of the other four substances cannot be so separated. For the four substances other than pudgala are non-murta and it is the nature of a non-murta entity that it is not broken into pieces. As for the substance pudgala it is murta and a murta entity can well be broken into pieces; for the murta substances are found to possess the capacity to join together as a result of association and the capacity to separate from one another as a result of dissociation. It is on account of this difference that all parts - whether big or small - of a pudgala aggregate are called avayava or component. By avayava is meant a part that can be separated off.

Though being pudgala an atom too is murta, yet it cannot be further divided into parts; for like a pradesa of akasa it is the smallest part of pudgala. The magnitude of an atom is the smallest possible magnitude and hence it too belongs to the category indivisible part.

When it is here said that an atom is not divisible into parts, then what is spoken of is an atom in the form of an instance of a substance not that in the form of modes. For so far as an atom in the form of modes is concerned parts are posited in its case too. Certainly, in one and the same atom there exist numerous modes like colour, smell, taste, etc., and in relation to this substance they all behave like parts of the form of bhavas or modal states. Hence it is maintained that to a single atom there belong numerous bhava atoms or atoms of the form of modal states.

Question : What is the difference between a pradesa of dharma etc. and an atom of pudgala?

Answer : So far as magnitude is concerned there is no difference. For that much area which is occupied by an atom is called pradesa. And since an atom is an indivisible part the area occupied by it too will be but indivisible. Hence so far as their magnitude is concerned an atom on the one hand and the area called pradesa occupied by it on the other are mutually similar. Even so, they differ from one another insofar as an atom can be separated from the aggregate of which it is a part while the

pradesa of the substances dharma etc. cannot be separated from their respective aggregates.

Question : In the aphorism 9 there occurs the word 'ananta' - on the basis of which it can be made out that the substance pudgala can possibly be made up of ananta pradesas. But what word yields the meaning - derived above - that it can possibly be made up of anantananta pradesas?

Answer : The word 'ananta' is of a general significance and can stand for all the types of numbers ananta. Hence it can also yield the meaning anantananta. 7-11

A Consideration of the Seat of Occupation
in the Case of Substances :

Whatever substances act as occupant they do so in relation to the lokakasa or akasa-portion confined to loka. 12

The substances dharma and adharma occupy the entire lokakasa. 13

The pudgala-substances occupy indefinitely - that is, as might be the case - one pradesa or more of the lokakasa. 14

The jivas occupy one by asankhyata part or more of the lokakasa. 15

For like a lamp their pradesas undergo contraction and expansion. 16

The universe is of the form of five astikayas. So the question arises : what acts as support or seat of occupation in relation to the five astikayas? Does some substance other than these act as support for them all or does one of these do so for the rest of them? The question is here answered by maintaining that akasa acts as occupant. This answer should be understood as given from a practical standpoint, for viewed from a definitive standpoint all substances are verily self-supporting. Fundamentally speaking, it is not possible for one substance to act as support for another. But the question might be asked : Viewed from a practical standpoint akasa acts as support for the remaining substances, but what similarly acts as support for akasa itself? The answer would be that akasa has got no further support, there being no other verity greater than it or equivalent to it in magnitude. Thus viewed from both a practical standpoint and a definitive standpoint akasa is but self-supporting.

And when akasa is declared to be support in relation to the remaining substances the reason is that it is greater in magnitude than them all.

Even the four substances dharma etc. acting as occupant do not reside in the entire akasa; they in fact are seated in but a particular limited portion of akasa. And that portion of akasa in which they are seated is called loka-akasa. Loka means the five astikayas. Round about the portion in question there exists akasa ananta units in extension. And since in this surrounding portion of akasa there exist no other substances it is called aloka-akasa. Here when the relation of support and occupant is considered in connection with the astikayas that should be understood as pertaining to but loka-akasa.

The two astikayas dharma and adharma are each of the form of an impartite aggregate such that they occupy the entire loka-akasa. The same idea can also be expressed as follows : When in the really impartite akasa two parts loka and aloka are posited through intellect that is done only on the basis of its association with the substances dharma and adharma. Thus the region where association with these substances obtains is called loka, that where it does not is called aloka.

As for the substances pudgala its appropriate seat of occupation, viewed generally, is doubtless loka-akasa; even then the magnitude of the seat of occupation is different in the case of different pudgala-substances. For unlike the substances dharma and adharma, the substance pudgala is not of the form of one instance - so that there is no question of there being just one seat of occupation in the case of this substance. The different pudgala-substances are different individual bodies and they differ rather than agree as to their magnitude. That is why the magnitude of their seat of occupation is here described in the form of alternatives. Thus one pudgala occupies one pradesa of lokakasa, another occupies two of them; similarly, some pudgala occupies a portion of loka-akasa measuring asankhyata pradesas. The idea is that the number of pradesas constituting the seat of occupation can be equal to or less than-but not more than-the number of atoms constituting the pudgala-substance acting as occupant. That is why one atom can occupy only one pradesa of akasa but a dvyanuka or diad can occupy either one pradesa or two. And then gradually increasing the number of constituent atoms by one we find that tryanuka can occupy one upto three pradesas, a caturanuka one upto four, a sankhyatanuka one upto sankhyata. A substance made up of sankhyata atoms does not require a seat of occupation made up of asankhyata pradesas. An aggregate made up of asankhyata atoms can at the least occupy a seat made up of one pradesa and at the most one made up of asankhyata pradesas. Even the aggregates made up of ananta and anatananta atoms occupy one upto asankhyata pradesas; they not require for that purpose pradesas numbering ananta. Even the biggest possible aggregate of the substance pudgala which is designated acitta maha-skandha and is made up of anantananta atoms manages to seat itself in a portion of loka-akasa made up of asankhyata pradesas.

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1. The aggregate or composite made up of two atoms is called dvyanuka, that made up of three tryanuka; similarly, the aggregate or composite made up of four atoms is called caturanuka, that made up of sankhyata atoms sankhyatanuka, that made up of asankhyata atoms asankhyatanuka, that made up of ananta atoms anantanuka, that made up of anantananta atoms anantanantanuka.

According to the Jaina system of philosophy the magnitude of a soul is neither all-pervading like that of akasa nor atomic like that of an atom but is medium. However, even though the medium magnitude is the same in the case of all the souls so far as it concerns the number of their pradesas these souls do not have the same length, breadth etc. And hence arises the question as to what is the maximum and what the minimum seat of occupation in the case of the substances jiva or soul. The question is here answered by maintaining that the seat of occupation in the case of a jiva is one by asankhyata part of loka-akasa upto the whole of it. Even though the magnitude of akasa measures asankhyata pradesas, yet since the number asankhyata is of asankhyata types one can conceive of asankhyata such loka-akasa parts whose magnitude is one by asankhyata part of a finger; even such a tiny single part is made up of asankhyata pradesas. A jiva can occupy one such single part, it can also occupy two; similarly, gradually increasing the number by one we find that a jiva can occupy even the whole of the loka-akasa. The idea is that the minimum seat of occupation in the case of a substance jiva is a loka-akasa portion measuring one by asankhyata part of a finger, a portion which is one by asankhyata part of the entire loka-akasa. The same jiva at a later time or another jiva can have a seat of occupation double of the above in magnitude; similarly, the same jiva at a later time or another jiva can have a seat of occupation three times the above in magnitude, four times the above, five times the above and in the last count asankhyata times the above - that is to say, in the last count the entire loka-akasa. A jiva can have the entire loka-akasa for its seat of occupation only in case it is experiencing the state technically designated kevali-samudghata. When it is here said that the magnitude of the seat of occupation in the case of a jiva is more or less depending on whether the magnitude of this jiva itself is more or less the statement should be taken as referring to one single soul. For so far as the entire lot of jivas is concerned its seat of occupation is doubtless the whole of the loka-akasa.

Now the question arises as to why it is that the same soul-substance assumes different magnitudes at different times or that the different soul-substances assume different magnitudes at the same time. It is here answered by maintaining that the same jiva assumes different magnitudes or so many of them do so on account of an association with the karmic body which has accompanied a jiva since beginingless time and which is of the form of a collection of anantananta atoms. The karmic body does not always remain of the same form, and the other body-types audarika etc. which are acquired on account of the karmic body are greater or lesser in magnitude

corresponding to the concerned karmic body. The substance jiva is in fact amurta or non-tangible but on account of its association with a body it behaves as if it is murta or tangible. That explains why it possesses the same magnitude as it possessed by the body which might belong to it at this occasion or that.

When the substances dharmastikaya etc. are amurta just like the substance jiva then why is it that there is a change of magnitude in the case of the latter but not in that of the former? This question is answered by pointing out that all this is due to nothing else but nature. For it is the very nature of the substance jiva that when suitable conditions are available to it, it undergoes contraction and expansion just like a lamp. Thus the light of a lamp placed in the open sky possesses a certain magnitude but when it is placed in the open sky possesses a certain magnitude but when it is placed inside a chamber its light assumes exactly the same magnitude as is that of this chamber; again, when it is place down below a trough it illumines just the region lying down below a trough it illumines just the region lying down below this trough and when it is placed down below this trough and when it is placed down below a jug its light assumes exactly the same magnitude as that of this jug. In this manner the substance jiva is liable to contraction and expansion just like a lamp. Hence it is that its magnitude becomes greater or lesser according as it assumes a greater or lesser body.

Here arises the following question : If a jiva assumes a small magnitude on account of its nature for contraction then why does it not manage to occupy a region smaller than one by asankhyata part of the loka-akasa - that is, why does it not occupy one, two four or five pradesas of loka-akasa? Similarly, if a jiva possesses a nature for expansion then why does it not cover also the aloka-akasa just as it covers the entire loka-akasa? The answer is that the extent of contraction undergone by a jiva depends on the extent of the concerned karmic body while it is impossible for a karmic body to be smaller than one by asankhyata part of a finger; hence the contraction of a jiva remains limited to this very magnitude. As for the expansion undergone by a soul its limit is defined by the loka-akasa. For this two reasons are adduced. The first is that a jiva possesses just as many pradesas as does the loka-akasa; and since even in the state of utmost expansion one pradesa of jiva can occupy one pradesa of akasa at the most - not two or more pradesas of it - a jiva even in the state of utmost expansion cannot cross the limits of the loka-akasa and occupy a region lying beyond the same. The second reason is that expansion is a result of motion while motion is impossible in the absence of dharmastikaya; hence there arises no question at all of a jiva expanding beyond the limits of the loka-akasa.

Question : How is it possible for the embodied jivas numbering ananta

to occupy the loka-akasa with pradesas numbering asankhyata?

Answer : On account of getting transformed into a subtle state the jivas numbering ananta and sharing a common body together reside in one and the same akasa-portion, a portion occupied by a body of the type designated nigoda. Moreover, inside one and the same audarika body of men etc. there are found to reside a number of jivas born by way of agglutination. Hence there is nothing contradictory about the loka-akasa being occupied by jivas numbering anantananta.

Even though the substances pudgala are anantananta in number and are murta they manage to occupy the loka-akasa because they possess the capacity to get transformed into a subtle state. When such a transformation takes place then atoms numbering anantananta occupy one and the same region without obstructing one another just as the light of thousands of lamps occupies one and the same place without obstruction of any sort. The substances pudgala, even if murta, proves obstructive only when it is transformed into a gross state; on the other hand, in a state of subtle transformation it neither obstructs anything nor is itself obstructed by anything. 12-16

The Definition of Dharma, Adharma and Akasa Enunciated on the Basis of their Respective Functions :

To act as an occasioning cause for motion and to do so for stoppage - these two respectively are the functions of the substances dharma and adharma. 17

To act as an occasioning cause for the provision of room is the function of akasa. 18

Dharma, adharma and akasa - all these three are suprasensuous, and so their existence cannot be proved on the basis of ordinary preception. It is on the basis of scriptural testimony that their existence is admitted but a reasoning is also available which lends support to the scriptures and proves the existence of the substances in question. The reasoning runs as follows : In the universe jiva and pudgala these two are the substances that are liable to undertake motion as also stoppage-subsequent-to-motion. Now even though motion

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1. The reading gati-sthityupagrahau too is found at places, but on consulting the bhasya the reading gati-sthityupagraho appears to be more proper. In the Digambara tradition the reading gati-sthityupagrahau alone is unanimously approved.

and stoppage, being the states and functions of the substances in question, are born to those substances themselves - that is, the material

cause of motion and stoppage are nothing save jiva and pudgala, yet an occasioning cause, which is invariably required for the production of an effect, must be different from the concerned material cause. Hence in the form of an occasioning cause for the motion of jiva and pudgala dharmastikaya is proved to exist, while in the form of an occasioning cause for their stoppage adharmastikaya is proved to exist. It is with these considerations in view that theoretical treatizes define dharmastikaya as 'that which is an occasioning cause for the motion of things liable to move; and adharmastikaya as 'that which is an occasioning cause for stoppage'.

All the four substances dharma, adharma, jiva and pudgala must stay at some place or other; that is to say, to act as occupant or to seek room is a function of theirs. But to provide room - a place - within itself is the function of akasa; hence it is that the provision of room is admitted to be a defining characteristic of akasa.

Question : The substance akasa is admitted in the systems of philosophy like Sankhya, Nyaya, Vaisesika etc. but the substances dharma and adharma are admitted nowhere else. Why then are they posited by the Jaina system alone?

Answer : The physical and conscious substances are a specific part of the visible-cum-invisible universe, and their mobility is a matter of plain experience. Now if no constraining verity is available there, then these substances, on account of their natural mobility, will move on to any place whatsoever in the ananta-unit extent of akasa. And if they actually move on to any place whatsoever in the ananta-unit extent of akasa then that fixed configuration of the visible-cum-invisible universe which always appears there bearing the same general form will remain utterly unaccountable; for in that case the pudgala numbering ananta and the jivas numbering ananta, as a result of moving without restrain in the akasa-region of an ananta-unit extent, will be so separated from one another that a reunion on their part and an appearance in the form of a fixed world-picture will turn out to be hardly possible if not actually impossible. That is why the Jaina system admits the existence of a verity supposed to define the limit of motion in the case of those mobile substances; it is this verity that is designated dharmastikaya. And when the verity in question is admitted in the form of a definer of the limit of motion then the same reasoning enables the Jaina system to admit the verity adharmastikaya in the form of a definer of the limit of stoppage-of-motion.

The usage as to east, west etc. which is supposed to be a function of the substance dik is well accountable on the basis of akasa, and so there is no need to posit a substance dik apart from akasa. But the function of dharma and adharma is not accountable on the basis of akasa: for if akasa

be admitted to be a definer of motion and stoppage then being of an ananta-unit extent and impartite it would not be able to prevent the physical and conscious substances from moving about anywhere and everywhere within itself, and that being the case the fixed configuration of the visible-cum-invisible universe will remain unaccountable. Hence to posit the substance dharma and adharma apart from and independent of akasa is proper. When the things physical and conscious are mobile by nature then motion on their part within a limited akasa-region should not be accountable on the basis of their own nature-that is, without positing a definer in this connection; hence the existence of the substances dharma and adharma is reasonably demonstrated. 17-18

The Definition of Pudgala on the basis of its Function :

Body, speech, manas or internal organ, in-breath and out-breath-these are benefits due to pudgala, that is, these are functions of pudgala. 19

Again, pleasure, pain, life and death - these too are benifits due to pudgala. 20

Of the numerous functions of pudgala some are enumerated here which prove beneficial or harmful to the jivas. All the bodies of the types audarika etc. are certainly paudgalika - that is, are certainly made up of pudgala. And though the karmic body is suprasensuous it yields fruits like pleasure, pain etc. when conjoined with another murta substance of the type audarika etc. - just as paddy-seed yields fruit when conjoined with water etc.; hence it too soul be considered to be paudgalika.

Of the two types of bhava or speech that of the bhava type is a specific capacity which is acquired as a result of the ksayopasama of the karmas viryantaraya, matijnanavarana and srutajnanavarana and of the manifestation of the of the nama-krama designated angopanga; this capacity, since it is dependent on pudgala, is paudgalika. And the aggregates belonging to the material-grouping of the form of speech that are converted into speech when impelled by a soul possessed of the capacity in question constitute speech of the dravya type.

Manas of the bhava type in the form of labdhi and upyoga is paudgalika because it is dependent on pudgala. On the other hand, those aggregates belonging to the material-grouping of the form of manas which, as a result of the ksayopasama of the karmas jnananvarana and viryantaraya and of the manifestation of the namakarma designated angopanga, prove beneficial to a soul in its task of considering the merits and demerits, memory etc. - that is, which stimulate the capacity of this soul - constitute manas of the dravya type. Similarly, nisvasavayu or prana - that is, out-breath-which a soul expels outwards from the abdomen and ucchvasavayu or apana - that is, in breath - which a soul conveys inwards

into the abdomen are both paudgalika; and inasmuch as they are life-giver they prove beneficial to a soul.

Bhasa, manas, prana and apana - these are all found to suffer obstruction and suppression. Hence just like body they are all doubtless paudgalika.

The transformation of a jiva of the form of easement is pleasure and it is produced through an internal cause of the form of satavedaniya karma and an external cause of the form of the concerned substance, place etc. Distress, verily is pain and it is produced through an internal cause of the form of asatavedaniya karma and an external cause of the form of the concerned substance etc.

The continuance of out-breath and in-breath in the case of an embodied soul as a result of the manifestation of ayukarma is life, the discontinuance of out-breath and in-breath is death. All these modifications pleasure, pain etc. are produced in jivas through the instrumentality of pudgala. Hence in relation to jiva they are treated as benefits due to pudgala. 19-20

The Definition of Jiva Enunciated on the
Basis of its Function :

Acting as an occasioning cause in relation to one another that is a benefit due to jivas. 21

This aphorism describes the mutual benefits that are due to jivas. One jiva benefits another through instruction as to what is gainful or what is harmful. The employer benefits the servant through paying him money, the servant benefits the employer through speaking to him what is gainful or what is harmful. The teacher benefits the disciple through instruction as to good deeds and through himself practising them, the disciple benefits the teacher through acting as instructed by him. 21

The Definition of Kala or Time Enunciated on the Basis of its Function

Perduration, transformation, activity and superiority-cum-inferiority-these are benefits due to kala. 22

Here benefits due to kala are enumerated by treating it as an independent substance. When the substances like dharma etc. are by themselves engaged in practising their respective modifications then the impelling them to do so on the part of kala acting as an occasioning cause is called perduration. When a substance without giving up its specific form and without undertaking motion udergoes a modification that is of the form of the cessation of an earlier state and the origination of a new one, then this modification is called transformation. Such transformations

in the case of a jiva are cognition etc. and anger etc., those in the case of pudgala blue-colour, yellow-colour etc., those in the case of the remaining substances like dharmastikaya etc. the increment and diminution of the quality designated agurulaghu or neither-light-nor-heavy. By activity is meant but motion. By

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1. In the Jaina tradition the term agurulaghu has been employed at three places in three different senses :

(1) Of the eight qualities jnana, darsana etc. belonging to a soul and considered liable to concealment at the hands of eight karmas one is the quality agurulaghutva which receives concealment at the hands of gotrakarma. The function of gotrakarma is to attribute to a being a high or low status in life. In practical life the jivas are treated as high or low on the basis of a consideration of birth, family, race, country, complexion and so many similar circumstances. But as a matter of fact, all the souls stand on the same footing and among them there is none high and none low. Thus in souls there resides an equality based on capacity or ability and that natural quality or capacity which keeps this equality intact is called agurulaghutva.

(2) There is a karma called agurulaghu which is counted among the sub-types of the sixth karma-type nama-karma. Its function will be described in the sequel in connection with an account of nama-karma and should be learnt from there.

(3) The agurulaghutva for which interpretation is above offered in the first para pertains exclusively to a soul, but that which is going to be described just now pertains to all the substances - jivas as well as ajivas. The question is : If a substance is by nature liable to undergo transformation then why does it not sometimes happen that a substance of one type should transform itself into a substance of another type? Similarly, there arises

superiority is meant being older, by inferiority being younger. Though the functions perduration etc. are really functions on the part of the concerned substances dharmastikaya etc. they are here described as benefits due to kala because in the case of them all kala acts as an occasioning cause. 22

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another question : If the various capacities or qualities residing in a substance go on producing transformations appropriate to themselves then why does it not happen that some one of these capacities crosses the limit of the definite stream of transformations appropriate to itself and produces transformations that are appropriate to another such capacity? So also there arises a third question : In the case of various capacities posited in a substance why does it not happen that giving up their fixed

concomitance they scatter away all round? All these three questions are answered in terms of the quality agurulaghu. In the case of all the substances this quality enjoys the status of a restrainer on account of which one type of substance does not become a substance of another type, one quality does not perform the function appropriate to another quality, the qualities characterized by a fixed mutual concomitance do not turn away from one another.

Even in the absence of a very clear support of authoritative texts I gave thought to the last of the above interpretations of the quality agurulaghu. At the same time I was in search of a corroboration for it. In case somebody made from me an enquiry in this connection I would offer the above interpretation but eagerness to get at a corroboration was nevertheless ever awake. When the time came for writing the present note. I suddenly came accross the booklet 'Sri Jainasiddhanta-Pravesika' by the late Gopaldasji Baraiya. In this Sri Baraiyaji too has expressed a similar idea. It can therefore be said that that to this extent my idea has received a corroboration. And hence I make a mention of the fact here. Let further investigation be made by the specialists. Sri Baraiyaji on his part was an extra-ordinary connoiseur of Jaina philosophy.

A reasoning similar to the one above offered in support of positing the quality agurulaghu is offered in support of the bodies dharmastikaya and adharmaitikaya admitted in the Jaina tradition. From a comparative standpoint that is worth knowing. Since the physical and conscious substances are liable to motion the bodies in questions are posited to act as restrainer with a view to preventing these substances from moving away to any place whatsoever; and it is maintained that it is on account of these bodies that motion and stoppage characterizing the mobile substances remain confined within the limits of the loka-region. Now just as these bodies

The Characteristic Modes of Pudgala :

The pudgalas are characterized by touch, taste, smell and colour. 23

They are also characterized by sound, binding, subtleness, grossness, configuration, splitting, darkness, shadow, hot radiation and not-hot radiation. 24

The Buddhists employ the word pudgala to mean jiva. And in the systems like Vaisesika etc. the tangible substances earth etc. are not supposed to be equally possessed of the four qualities touch, taste etc.; rather on their view earth is possessed of the four qualities in question, water possessed of three qualities - viz. those four minus smell, fire possessed of two qualities - viz. those four minus smell and taste, and air possessed of the single quality touch. Similarly, they altogether deny

to manas the four qualities in question. So the present aphorism is aimed at pointing out a difference of opinion with those Buddhists etc. Thus this aphorism indicates that according to the Jaina system jiva and pudgala are two mutually different verities; hence the word pudgala is

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are considered to be restrainer in the case of motion and stoppage, agurulaghu ought to be so considered in the case of qualities.

A question naturally arises. What is wrong if the two bodies in question are not posited and it is declared that the factor responsible for fixing the limit of motion and stoppage is the very nature of the things under-taking motion and stoppage or that akasa is such a a factor? But here is a subject-matter that lies outside the sphere of reasoning - so that what remains to be done in this connection is to lend support to what has been laid down. And since this subject-matter does not lie within the sphere of reasoning it will not do to accept or reject the bodies in question on the basis of reasoning alone. In the case of the quality agurulaghu too one should mainly adopt an approach characteristic of what lies beyond the sphere of reasoning.

One cannot help conceding that in the last count all reasoning is meant to lend support to what lies beyond the sphere of reasoning. Thus in the case of all the systems of philosophy it turns out that certain subject-matters lie within the sphere of reasoning, certain others lie beyond it.

here not employed to mean the verity jiva. Similarly, earth, water, fire and air - these insofar as they are pudgala are all mutually similar, that is, they are all possessed of the four qualities touch etc. Furthermore, according to the Jaina system manas too being made up of pudgala is possessed of the qualities touch etc. Touch is admitted to be of eight types - viz. hard, soft, heavy, light, cold, hot, smooth, rough; taste is of five types - viz. pungent, bitter, astringent, sour, sweet; smell is of two types - good smell and bad smell; colour is of five types - viz. black, blue, green, red, yellow and white. In this way there are twenty types in all of touch etc.; but each one of them depending on its degree is of sankhyata, asankhyata and ananta sub-types. Thus whatever thing is soft has its softness characterized by some degree or other. Hence even if generally speaking softness represents but one touch it has sankhyata, asankhyata, and ananta types depending on its degree. The same consideration applies to the other touches hard etc. and to the other modes taste etc.

Sound is not a quality as is maintained by the Vaisesikas, Naiyayikas etc. It is rather a particular transformation of the pudgalas belonging to the physical-groupings-of-the-form-of-speech. Depending on an occasioning cause it is divided into various types. The sound produced through effort

on the part of a soul is prayogaja or voluntary, that produced without such an effort is vaisrasika or non-voluntary. For example, roar of clouds is vaisrasika. The prayogaja sound is declared to be of six types, viz. (1) Bhasa - the various speeches, explicit in the case of men obscure in that of animals, birds etc. (2) Tata-sound produced by the leather-covered musical instrument like mrdanga (a drum like musical instrument) (3) Vitata - sound produced by stringed instruments like lute, Sarangi (a violin - like musical instrument) etc. (4) Ghana - sound produced by jhalara (a cymbal like musical instrument), bell etc. (5) Susira - sound produced by the musical instruments like conch-shell, flute etc. that are blown. (6) Sangharsa - sound produced by rubbing as in the case of wood etc.

Binding of the form of mutual sticking together is likewise of two types - viz. prayogika and vaisrasika. The association of jiva with body and of lac with wood, inasmuch as they both depend on an effort, are cases of prayogika binding. The sticking together of pudgalas as is found in the lightening, cloud, rainbow etc., inasmuch as it is independent of all effort, is a case of vaisrasika binding.

Subtleness and grossness are each of two types - viz. absolute and relative. The subtleness and grossness which cannot both characterize one and the same thing as viewed in relation to certain other things are absolute subtleness and absolute grossness; those which can do so are relative subtleness and relative grossness. Thus subtleness characterizing the atoms and grossness characterizing the universe-wide mahaskandha or great-aggregate are each absolute; for as viewed in relation to nothing whatsoever can an atom be characterized by grossness and as viewed in relation to nothing whatsoever can a mahaskandha be characterized by subtleness. On the other hand, both subtleness and grossness characterizing the intermediate aggregates diad etc. are relative. Take for example, the subtleness characterizing an amalaka (a fruit) and the grossness characterizing a bilva (a fruit). As compared to a bilva an amalaka is small and hence subtle, as compared to an amalaka a bilva is gross. But the same amalaka as compared to a berry is gross, the same bilva as compared to a pumpkin is subtle. Thus the two contradictory modes subtleness and grossness, insofar as they are relative, can both characterize one and the same thing; on the contrary, the absolute type of subtleness and grossness cannot both characterize one and the same thing.

Configuration is of two types - viz. itthantva-rupa and anitthantva-rupa. The shape that can be compared with something else is itthantva-rupa, one that cannot be so compared is anitthantva-rupa. The configuration or construction of cloud etc. is anitthantva-rupa, for being of an indefinite form it cannot be described in some one single manner; on the other hand, the configuration of the remaining things is itthantva-rupa - e.g. that of a ball, a singhara (a triangle shaped small fruit). etc. There are many sub-types of a configuration of the itthantva-rupa type - e.g. circular, triangular, rectangular, long, ring-like etc.

When a pudgala-body of the form of a unit or an aggregate is disjoined or dissociated that is called splitting. It is of five types - viz. (1) Auktrika - the splitting like that of a piece of wood when sawn off or of a piece of stone when sculptured. (2) Caurnika - being powered down as in the case of sattu (i.e. powdered parched grain), flour etc. (3) Khanda - being broken into pieces like that of a jar broken into pot-shreds. (4) Pratara - gradually chopping off layers as in mica, birch etc. (5) Anutata - removing the bark as in bamboo, sugar-cane etc.

Darkness is that particular transformation which stands opposed to light and obstructs vision.

Dimming makes its appearance when light undergoes a coverage. It is of two types.

The reflection of a face which is cast in some shining object like mirror etc. and in which the colour, shape etc. of this face are to be seen as they are in the original is dimming of the form of a transformation consisting of modes like colour etc.; on the other hand, the mere shadow that is cast on some non-shining object is dimming of the form of shadow.

The hot light pertaining to the sun etc. is hot-radiation, the non-hot light pertaining to the moon, jewel, glow-worm etc. is non-hot radiation.

All the above modes touch etc. as well as sound etc., inasmuch as they are of the form of effects produced by pudgala are treated as modes pertaining to pudgala.

By separating the aphorisms 23 and 24 from one another it is indicated that the modes touch etc. are to be found in both atoms and aggregates but that the modes sound binding etc. are to be found exclusively in the aggregates. Though subtleness too is a mode that pertains to both atoms and aggregates it is enumerated not along with touch etc. but along with sound etc., for it is deemed proper that mention of it be made in the company of grossness which is the mode standing opposed to it. 23-24

The Chief Types of Pudgala :

Pudgala is of the form of an atom and of the form of an aggregate. 25

Individually taken the pudgala-substances are ananta in number and their variety too is unlimited; even so, since in the next two aphorisms there are going to be formulated the various causes that lead to the

origination of transformation appropriate to pudgala and since that would be of use in this formulation mention is here being made of the two broad types of pudgala - viz. atoms and aggregates. The entire lot of pudgala-substances belongs to one or the other of these two types.

That pudgala-substances which is of the form of a cause and not of the form of an effect is called an ultimate substance. Such a substance is an atom which is permanent, subtle, and possessed of some one taste, one smell, one colour and two touches. Certainly, knowledge regarding such an atomic substance cannot be had through sense-organs; rather this knowledge is to be had through scriptural testimony or through inference. The inference proving the existence of an atom is of the type where an effect acts as probans. Thus one infers : whatever effects made up of pudgala are visible all around are possessed of a cause; similarly, the last invisible effect too must be possessed of a cause; it is this cause which is an atomic substance. Since no other substance acts as cause to it, it is called an ultimate substance. An atomic substance neither is nor can be possessed of an inner division; hence it is its own beginning, middle as well as end. An atomic substance is not of the form of something tied together - that is, not of the form of a collection.

The second type of pudgala-substance is an aggregate. All the aggregates are of the form of something tied together - that is, of the form of a collection. In relation to the substance that acts as their cause they ar a substance of the form of an effect; in relation to the substance that acts as their effect they are a substance of the form of a cause. For example, a two-atomed or a bigger aggregate is an effect in relation to the atoms concerned but it is a cause in relation to a three-atomed or a bigger aggregate. 25

The Ordered Statement of what Causes an
Aggregate and what Causes an Atom :

The aggregates are caused through combination, split and combination-cum-split. 26

An atom is caused through split alone. 27

An aggregate or a composite substance originates in three ways. Thus some aggregate is caused through combination, that is, through transformation of the form of becoming one; some is caused through split, while some is caused through a joint undertaking of the two operations combination and split. The two atomed aggregate resulting from the coming together of two atoms existing separately is an aggregate caused through combination. Similarly; a mere coming together of three, four, sankhyata, asankhyata, ananta or anantananta atoms results in a three-atomed, four-atomed, sankhyata-atomed, asankhyata-atomed, ananta-atomed or anantananta-atomed aggregate; all these are aggregates caused through

combination. The smaller aggregates that result from the mere disruption of a bigger aggregate are aggregates caused through split. These too can possibly be two-atomed upto anantananta-atomed. When an aggregate undergoes disruption while at the same time some other substance gets conjoined to a component of it then the new aggregate thus coming into existence is an aggregate caused through split-cum-combination. Such aggregates too can be two-atomed upto anantananta-atomed. In the case of aggregates made up of more than two atoms it should be noted that a three-atomed aggregate can come into existence either through a combination of three atoms or through the combination of one atom with a two atomed aggregate; similarly, a four-atomed aggregate can come into existence either through a combination of four atoms or through the combination of two atoms with a two-atomed aggregate or through the combination of one atom with a three-atomed aggregate; similar considerations apply to bigger aggregates.

An atomic substance is not an effect of some other substance; so its origination cannot possibly be due to a combination of two substances. Really speaking, an atom is admitted to be permanent; even so, its origination is here spoken of from the standpoint of modes. That is to say, an atom viewed as a substance is certainly permanent but from the standpoint of modes it is an originated entity as well. Thus when an atom sometimes acts as a component of some aggregate and there stays in a state of combination and when subsequently the same atom splits away from this aggregate and stays in a state of disruption - then what we are having before us are but two particular modes or states of one and the same atom. Now for the atom the state of disruption originates exclusively from a split. So when it is above said that an atom characterized by a state of disruption - not an atom as such - is a product of split.

The Cause for an Invisible Aggregate Becoming Visible :

The visible aggregates are caused only through split and combination occurring together. 28

This aphorism is aimed at demonstrating that depending on conditions even an invisible aggregate can become visible.

Various are the transformations of pudgala; hence it is that some pudgala-aggregates are invisible-that is, not cognizable through the visual sense-organ - while some are visible - that is, cognizable through the visual sense-organ. Thus the same aggregate which being subtle was earlier invisible becomes visible when through the availability of appropriate conditions it gives up the transformation of the form of subtleness and assumes that of the form of grossness. For this aggregate behaving in this manner just two causes are required - viz. split and combination. When in an aggregate the transformation of the form of subtleness ceases new atoms must necessarily get combined with this

aggregate. However, not only is there such a combination, but certain atoms must also necessarily split away from the aggregate in question. Thus a cessation of the transformation of the form of subtleness followed by an emergence of the transformation of the form of grossness never results either from just combination - that is, the combining of atoms - or from just split - that is, the splitting away of atoms. Now no aggregate can ever become visible unless there emerges in it the transformation of the form of grossness; hence it is here laid down as a rule that a visible aggregate is caused through split and combination occurring together.

The word 'split' (Sanskrit 'bheda') means two things : (1) The disruption of an aggregate - that is, the splitting away of atoms from it. (2) The cessation of an earlier transformation followed by the emergence of a new one. Of these the first meaning was accepted while offering the above interpretation of the aphorism; on accepting the second meaning the interpretation should be as follows : When an aggregate assumes the transformation of the form of grossness, a transformation cognizable through the visual sense-organ - that is, when an aggregate ceasing to be invisible becomes visible - then that is due to the transformation of the form of grossness, a transformation which in its turn is dependent on sanghata or the particular number ananta charracterizing the atoms concerned. Thus for an aggregate becoming visible the cause is not just a cessation of the transformation of the form of subtleness followed by an emergence of the transformation of the form of grossness, nor is it just the particular number ananta characterizing the atoms concerned; for this cause comprises both the transformation in question - this being the meaning of the word 'bheda' or 'split' - and the number in question - this being, the meaning of the word 'sanghata' or 'combination.'

Though, through the word 'caksusa' or 'visible' occuring in the aphorism just such an aggregate is directly meant as is cognizable through the visual sense-organ, yet the word 'caksus' or 'visual sense-organ' should here be taken in a broad sense to mean that for any suprasensuous aggregate becoming cognizable through sense-organs the required cause are split and combination occuring together. Now owing to the unlimited variety of the transformations appropriate to pudgala just an an aggregate that was earlier suparasensuous subsequently becomes cognizable through sense-organs when appropriate conditions in the form of split and combination are available there, similarly, a gross aggregate too can become subtle. Not only that, owing to this very variety of transformations it can so happen that an aggregate that was earlier cognizable though a larger number of sense-organs subsequently remains cognizable through a lesser number of them. For example, things like salt, hingu (a strong-smelling spice) etc. are cognizable through four sense-organs - viz. the visual, tactile, gustatory and olfactory - but when dissolved in water the same remain cognizable through just two sense-organs - viz. the gustatory and olfactory.

Question : For an aggregate becoming visible a twofold cause has been mentioned, but why has no cause been mentioned for the origination of an invisible aggregate?

Answer : In the aphorism 26 a general mention has been made of the three causes required for the origination of an aggregate as such. As for the present aphorism it only lays down causes for the origination of a particular type of aggregates - that is, for the invisible aggregates becoming visible. Hence in accordance with that earlier general statement there ought to be just three causes in the case of the origination of an invisible aggregate. The idea is that from the statement contained in the aphorism 26 it follows that the invisible aggregates originate through all the three possible causes - viz. split, combination and split-cum-combination. 28

The Term 'Real' Interpreted :

That thing alone which is associated with-that is, is characterized by - all the three features origination, destruction and permanence is called 'real'. 29

As regards the nature of the real the different systems of philosophy maintain different views. Thus according to one system the real taken as a whole (that is Brahman) is exclusively permanent. According to another one, it is momentary without a residue (that is, is exclusively characterized by origination and destruction). According to a third, the real in the form of the conscious verity is exclusively permanent while the same in the form of the verity designated prakrti is permanent-amidst-transformations (that is, permanent-cum-transitory). According to a fourth, of the so many real entities some like atoms, time, soul etc. are exclusively permanent while some like a jar, a piece of cloth etc. are exclusively characterized by origination and destruction. But the view maintained by the Jaina system as to the nature of the real is different from all these and it is this that

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1. Vedanta (Aupanisada) following Sankara.

2. The Buddhist.

3. Sankhya,

4. Nyaya-Vaisesika.

On the Jaina view, what is real or entitative that taken as a whole cannot be exclusively permanent or exclusively transitory-without-a-residue nor is it possible that a certain part of it is exclusively permanent while a certain other part is

permanent-amidst-transformations, nor is it possible that one part of it is exclusively permanent while another one is exclusively transitory. Rather on this view all things deserving to be designated 'real' - be they conscious or physical, tangible or intangible, gross or subtle - are possessed of a triple form - that is, are possessed of three features origination, destruction and permanence.

Each and every real entity is possessed of two aspects - one such as proves lasting throughout the three phases of time, the other such as proves ever transitory. It is on account of its lasting aspect that an entity is called permanent while it is on account of its transitory aspect that it is called something characterized by origination and destruction. When of these aspects one alone is kept in view while the other is kept out of view the entity appears to be exclusively permanent or exclusively transitory. But when both these aspects are kept in view then alone can the complete and real nature of the entity be known. Hence according to both the stand points in question is the nature of the real propounded in the present aphorism. 29

The Rebuttal of the Charge of Contradiction and the Nature of Permanence-Amidst-Transformations :

That certainly is permanent which does not deviate from its essence - that is, from its specific nature. 30

In the last aphorism it has been said that one and the same entity is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence - that is, that it is characterized by the two features permanance and transience. But then it might be asked how is that possible. That which is permanent how can the same be transient? And that which is transient how can the same be permanent? It is not tenable that the two features permanence and transience - mutually contradictory like hot and cold - should simultaneously belong to one and the same thing. Is it not therefore self-contradictory to interpret the real as that which is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence? To delineate the nature of permanence as acceptable to the Jaina system and thus to rebut the charge of contradiction here levelled is the aim of the present aphorism.

If the Jaina system, like certain others, had described the nature of a real entity by maintaining that without undergoing any change whatsoever it ever retains one and the same form, then since transience would have been impossible in an entity thus alleged to be absolutely permanent it would have been self-contradictory to attribute to this entity permanence as well as transience. Similarly, if the Jaina system maintained that a real entity is exclusively transitory - that is, if on the ground that a real entity originates and perishes every moment the system denied that this entity is possessed of a permanent basis - then too since permanence would have been impossible in an exclusively transitory entity

experiencing origination and destruction the same self-contradiction as above would have had been faced. But as a matter of fact, the Jaina system, refusing to attribute either absolute permanence or absolute transience to anything treats everything as permanent-cum-transitory. Hence according to it all verities, while remaining fixed within the bounds of their respective specific natures, experience change - that is, origination and destruction - depending on conditions. Hence there is nothing self-contradictory about a real entity being found characterized by permenance when viewed from the standpoint of specific nature - that is, substance - and the same being found characterized by origination and destruction when viewed from the standpoint of transformation. The Jaina doctrine of permanence-cum-transience, unlike its Sankhya counterpart, is not limited to the physical sphere - the sphere of prakrti - but is applicable to the conscious verity as well.

For the admission that the doctrine of permanence-cum-transience is universally applicable to all verities whatsoever the chief means of support is experience. When matter are viewed minutely it turn out that no such verity is ever experienced as is exclusively permanent or exclusively transient. Certainly, all things whatsoever - whether external or internal - are found to be but permanent-cum-transitory. If all things are exclusively momentary then since this thing has got no permanent basis there should never have been experience of likeness in relation to the concerned series of momentary transformations - that is, on seeing again a thing that was seen earlier there should in no way take place recognition in the form 'this is the same thing', for recognition requires on the one hand permanence in the thing that acts as its object and on the other hand permanence in the soul that acts as seer. Similarly, if either the physical or conscious verity is exclusively changeless then in the universe that is of the form of a commixture of these two verities there should never crop up that variety which is there to be seen every moment. Hence it is that the doctrine of permanence-cum-transience is treated as tenable by the Jaina system of philosophy.

A Description of the Constancy of the Just Mentioned Real Based on an Alternative Interpretation :

The real since it never gives up its being is constant. 30

To be characterized by origination, destruction and permanence - this verily is the nature of a thing as such. It is this nature that is called real. And this real nature is constant - that is, it persists in the same form throughout the three phases of time. It never so happens that a particular thing or a thing as such is characterized by origination, destruction and permanence at one time and not characterized by them at another time. The three aspects origination, destruction and permanence are necessarily there all the time - and it is just this that is meant by the constancy of the real. Not to give up one's specific nature is the dhrauvya or permanence that characterizes all substances

whatsoever, to originate and perish in the form of a different transformation every moment is the utpada-vyaya or origination-cum-destruction that characterizes them. Thus cycle of dhrauvya and utpada-vyaya always operates in a substance as such.

And that in this cycle no aspect ever vanishes is stated in the present aphorism. Thus dhrauvya spoken of in the earlier aphorism refers to just the aspect of permanence belonging to a substance while nityatva spoken of in the present aphorism refers to the non-cessation of all the three aspects origination, destruction and permanence. Herein lies the difference between dharauvya spoken of in the earlier aphorism and nityatva spoken of in the present. 30

Defending the Tenet of Anekanta or Non-extremism :

Each thing is possessed of a number of properties; for as viewed from the standpoint adopted and as viewed from another standpoint it proves to be something self-contradictory. 31

How the mutually contradictory but validly cognized properties can be co-present in one and the same thing and why from among the many properties that are present there in it one is taken account of at one time another at another time - these two questions are answered in the present aphorism.

The character 'being existent' that makes itself felt in connection with the cognition or statement 'the soul is existent' cannot maintain itself irrespective of everything else. For could it do so a soul should prove to be existent as possessed of an alien nature like that of a jar etc. as it proves to be existent as possessed of its own nature like consciousness etc.; that is to say, in that case jarness too should be apparent in a soul just as consciousness is actually apparent in it - which in its turn would mean that a soul possess no characteristic nature of its own. Certainly, it is the very essence of a characteristic nature that it is existent in the form of the own nature of the thing concerned and non-existent in the form of an alien nature. Thus depending on the standpoint adopted both the properties existence and non-existence are proved to characterize a soul. And just like the properties existence and non-existence and non-existence the properties permanence and transience too are proved to characterize it; for permanence is proved from the standpoint of substance or the general transience from the standpoint of mode or the specific. Similarly, the properties like oneness, manyness etc. which appear to be mutually contradictory but which are proved to be actually present there when the standpoints adopted are taken into consideration coexist in all the things like a soul etc. and there is no difficulty about the matter. Hence it is that all entities are to be treated as possessed of many properties.

An Alternative Interpretation :

Each thing is liable to be a subject-matter of usage in various ways; for usage is accounted for on the basis of arpana and anarpana - that is, on the basis of a consideration of chief or subordinate status depending on the desire of the speaker concerned. 31

Of the many properties proved to occur in a thing depending on different relationships sometime some one at another time its direct opposite is made the basis of making usage as regards this thing - this is not an unproved or a self-refuted proposition; for even those properties which do actually occur in a thing are not all simultaneously desired to be spoken of. Thus depending on the purpose aimed at sometimes some one property sometimes some other is desired to be spoken of. When a particular property is desired to be spoken of that becomes chief while its counterpart becomes subordinate. Thus he alone who performs an act enjoys its fruit - when this sameness of substratum for an act and its fruit is sought to be demonstrated then the permanence of a soul is desired to be spoken of, permanence proved to occur from the standpoint of substance. At that time its transicence which is proved to occur from the standpoint of mode is not desired to be spoken of and is therefore subordinate. However, the state of soul at the time of enjoying the fruit of an act is different from its state at the time of performing this act - when with a view to demonstrating this difference between a soul's state at the time of performing an act and its state at the time of enjoying its fruit the transicence of this soul - proved to occur from the standpoint of mode - is spoken of, at the time the permanence of this soul proved to occur from the standpoint of substance is no more chief. Thus depending on the desire to speak or not to speak a soul is sometimes called permanent sometimes transicent. However, when these properties are simultaneously desired to be spoken of then since there exists no single word connotative of them both the soul is said to be indescribable. And apart from the sentential constructions based on a desire to speak, a desire not to speak and a desire to speak simultaneously there are four more that result from the various combinations of those three. Thus a soul can be characterized as permanent-cum-transient, permanent-cum-indescribable, transient-cum-indescribable, permanent-cum-transient-cum-indescribable. These seven sentetial constructions are designated saptabhangi or 'sevenfold predication.' Of these seven sentences the first three - and of these three the first two - are basic. And just as on the basis of the properties permanence and transience proved to occur from different standpoints and depending on the desire of the speaker concerned sevenfold predication is applied to a thing, similarly sevenfold predication should be applied to it on the basis of the pairs of properties existence and non-existence, oneness and manyness, describable and indescribable which too appear to be mutually contradictory but are proved to occur from different standpoints. Hence it is that one and the same thing is treated

as characterized by various properties and as a subject-matter of the usages of various types. 31

Stating the Cause for Combination among Pudglas :

Combination takes place on the ground of smoothness and roughness. 32

A pudgala-aggregate does not originate merely from a mutual conjunction of its components like atoms etc. For that something else is required apart from conjunction - to point out this is the aim of the present aphorism. Besides a conjunction of the components concerned what is further required is that these components should possess the qualities smoothness and roughness. When smooth and rough components join together then there takes place combination - that is, transformation of the form of becoming one; it is on account of this combination that there emerge into being aggregates like two-atomed etc.

A conjunction of smooth and rough components can be of two types - viz. similar or dissimilar. A conjunction of the smooth with the smooth or that of the rough with the rough is a similar conjunction; a conjunction of the smooth with the rough is a dissimilar conjunction. 32

Exception to the General Rule as to Combination :

Combination does not take place between smooth and rough components of a minimum degree (that is, between components whose smoothness or roughness - as the case might be - is of a minimum degree). 33

When the degrees concerned are equal combination does not take place between similar components-that is, between one smooth component and another, as also between one rough component and another. 34

Combination well takes place between components whose degrees differ by two units or more. 35

Of the present aphorisms the first prohibits combination. According to it mutual combination does not take place between atoms whose smoothness or roughness is of a minimum degree - such atoms being called atoms of a minimum degree. This prohibition implies that mutual combination takes place between all such smooth and rough components whose degree is medium or maximum; but this rule too has an exception which is pointed out in the next aphorism. According to it, mutual combination does not take place between similar components whose degrees are equal to one another; that is why smooth atoms of the same degree do not form an aggregate, nor do rough atoms of the same degree. This prohibition, in its turn, implies that combination can well take place between similar components of unequal degrees. This implication is further restricted in the third aphorism where tn the case of similar atoms a limit is laid down within which unequal degrees are conductive to combination. According to it, even in the case of similar components of unequal degrees combination takes place only when the degree of smoothness or roughness

characterizing one component differs from that characterizing the other by two, three, four or more units. Hence it is that case the degree of smoothness or roughness characterizing one component differs from that characterizing the other by just one unit, then combination cannot take place between those two similar components.

The Svetambara and Digambara traditions do not differ as to the reading of these three aphorisms but they do differ as to their meaning. In connection with this difference of meaning three thins are noteworthy :

(1) To concede or not the possibility of combination in the case where just one atom is of a minimum degree.

(2) To take or not the word 'etc.' occuring in the aphorism 35 to mean the numbers three etc.

(3) To maintain or not that the rule of combination laid down in the aphorism 35 applies only to the cases of similar components.

(1) According to both the Bhasya and Vrtti combination is denied only in case both the atoms are of a minimum degree; that is to say, according to both these texts combination is well possible in case just one atom is of a minimum degree while the other is not. But according to all the Digambara commentaries like Sarvarthasiddhi etc. just as combination is denied in the case of two atoms of a minimum degree it is also denied in the case where just one atom is of a minimum degree though the other is not.

(2) According to the Bhasya and the Vrtti the word 'etc.' occuring in the aphorism 35 is taken to mean the numbers three etc. Hence according to them combination is deemed possible in case the degree of smoothness or roughness characterizing one component differs from that characterizing the other by two, three, four .....sankhyata, asankhyata, ananta units; it is deemed impossible only in case the difference in question is just one unit. But according to all the Digambara commentaries combination is deemed possible only in case the difference in question is two units; that is to say, according to them it is deemed impossible not only when the difference in question is one unit but also when it is three, four, ...sankhyata, asankhyata, ananta units.

(3) According to the Bhasya and the Vrtti the rule of combination laid down in the aphorism 35 according to which combination is possible when the difference concerned is two, three or more units applies only to the cases of similar components. But according to the Digambara commentaries it applies not only to the cases of similar components but also to those of dissimilar ones.

The following charts give out the net regulations as to the possibility or otherwise of combination which emerge out because of the difference of meaning attributed by the two traditions to the present set

of aphorisms :

The Chart Following the Bhasya and the Vrtti :

	Degree	Similar	Dissimilar
1	Minimum + minimum	No	No
2	Minimum + one unit more	No	Yes
3	Minimum + two units more	Yes	No
4	Minimum + three or a larger number of units more	Yes	Yes
5	Non-minimum + Non-minimum of equal degree	No	Yes
6	Non-minimum + non-minimum with one unit more	No	Yes
7	Non-minimum + Non-minimum with two units more	Yes	Yes
8	Non-minimum + Non-minimum with three or a larger number of units more	Yes	Yes

The Chart Following Sarvarthasiddhi etc :

	Degree	**Similar**	**Dissimilar**
1	Minimum + minimum	No	No
2	Minimum + one unit more	No	No
3	Minimum + two units more	No	No
4	Minimum + three or a larger number of units more	No	No
5	Non-minimum + Non-minimum of an equal degree	No	No
6	Non-minimum + non-minimum with one unit more	No	No
7	Non-minimum + Non-minimum with two units more	Yes	Yes
8	Non-minimum + Non-minimum with three or a larger number of units more	No	No

Smoothness and roughness are both a particular type of touch. Though each is of one form so far as its specific nature is concerned it is of numerous types depending on the larger or smaller degree of the transformation concerned. This difference of degree is so much emphatic that in between the minimum smoothness and the maximum - so also in between the minimum roughness and the maximum - there are inserted anantananta units of degree. Take, for example, the difference of degree obtaining between the milk of she-goat and that of a she-camel. Both of them do possess smoothness, but there is so little of it in one case so

much of it in the other. Of the transformations of the form of smoothness and roughness characterized by a difference of degree that which is smallest of all - that is, that which is indivisible - is called a minimum degree.

And leaving aside the minimum all the rest are called non-minimum. Thus non-minimum includes the medium as well as the maximum. That transformation of the form of smoothness which is largest of all is maximum; all the transformation lying in between the minimum and the maximum are medium. Since maximum smoothness is anantananta times greater than the minimum, if the minimum smoothness is called one unit the maximum ought to be called anantananta units. And the units two, three, sankhyata, asankhyata, ananta, the maximum minus one - all these ought to be called medium.

Hence 'similar' signifies the fact the smooth is combined with the smooth or the rough with the rough, 'dissimilar' the fact that the smooth is combined with the rough. 'Minimum' signifies one unit, 'one unit more (than the minimum)' 'two units : similarly, we can have 'two units more', 'three units more', 'four units more' ...... 'anantananta units more.' 'Of an equal degree 'means 'of an equal number'; when the number of units is the same on both sides we have a case of 'of an equal degree'. 'Non-minimum of the form of two units' is of an equal degree in relation to 'non-minimum of the form of two units', 'non-minimum of the form of three units' is one unit more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of four units' is two units more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of five units' is three units more in relation to the same, 'non-minimum of the form of six units' is four units more in relation to the same. Similarly, in relation to the 'non-minimum of the form of three units' upto 'non-minimum of form of ananta units' we can work out what is 'non-minimum of an equal degree', what is 'non-minimum one unit more', what is 'non-minimum two units more', what is non-minimum three units more' and so on. 33-35

The Nature of Transformation :

At the time of combination an equal or a larger degree transforms an equal or a smaller degree. 36

After rules and prohibitions have been laid down for combination the question arises : Of the similar or the dissimilar atoms that enter into combination which transforms which? It is answered here.

When the parties to combine are of an equal degree a 'similar' combination does not take place at all, what then takes place is a 'dissimilar' combination : For example, two units of smoothness might combine with two units of roughness, or three units of smoothness with

three of roughness. In such cases either of the parties might lend its own form to the other; that is to say, in accordance with the nature of the concerned substance, place, time, mode it so happens in such cases that sometimes smoothness converts roughness into smoothness sometimes roughness converts smoothness into roughness. But when the parties to combine are of an unequal degree it is one with a larger degree that lends its own form to one with a smaller degree. For example, the five-unit smoothness lends its own form to the three-unit

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1. In the Digambara tradition the aphorism reads bandhe'dhikau parinamikau ca. So here it is not desired that a quality of a particular degree should assimilate into itself another of the same degree; what is desired is that a quality of a larger degree should assimilate into itself another a smaller degree.

smoothness; that is to say, as a result of combing with the five-unit smoothness the three-unit smoothness too becomes five-unit smoothness. Similarly, the five-unit smoothness lends its own form to the three-unit roughness; that is to say, roughness is here converted into smoothness. And when roughness is of a larger degree it too lends its own form - viz. the form of roughness - to the smoothness of a smaller degree. 36

The Definition of Dravya or Substance :

A dravya or substance is possessed of gunas or qualities and paryayas or modes. 37

Substance has been earlier mentioned a number of times; so a definition of it is being offered here.

That which is possessed of qualities and modes is called substance. Since to undergo transformations is the very nature of a substance it goes on being variously transformed - that is, goes on undergoing various transformations - from samaya to samaya. The capacity of a substance to produce transformations is called its quality while the transformations produced by a quality are called modes. Thus the quality is a cause, the modes its effect. Now qualities of the form of a capacity residing in a substance are ananta in number and they are in fact inseperable from the substance acting as their support as also from one another. Similarly, in the case of each quality of the form of a capacity the modes that emerge from samaya to samaya throughout the three phases of time are ananta in number. A substance as well as the capacities in question that act as its aspects, since they never originate or perish, are eternal - that is, beginningless and endless. On the other hand, all the modes, since they originate and perish every moment, are individually transitory - that is, such as are possessed of a beginning and and an end; however, viewed as a stream of successive states even modes are beginningless and endless. Certainly, all those modes which are produced in a substance by one and

the same capacity acting as a cause and which flow in the form of a stream running throughout the three phases of time belong to one and the same class. The ananta capacities residing in a substance give rise to ananta streams of modes and all these streams run their course simultaneously. Naturally, different modes belonging to different classes because produced by different capacities can be found to exist in a substance simultaneously, but different modes belonging to the same class because produced by the same capacity cannot be found to exist in a substance simultaneously.

A soul and a pudgala are substances because they are respectively possessed of ananta qualities like consciousness etc. and colour etc., and they are respectively possessed of ananta modes like upayoga in the form of jnana and darsana and blue, yellow etc. A soul on account of its capacity for consciousness undergoes transformation of the form of various upayogas, a pudgala on account of its capacity for colouration undergoes transformation of the form of blue, yellow etc. The capacity for consciousness cannot be separated from the substance soul or from the other capacities residing in a soul; similarly, the capacity for colouration cannot be separated from the substance pudgala or from the other capacities residing in a pudgala. The stream of various upayogas like jnana, darsana etc. occurring at different samayas-a stream running throughout the three phases of time - has for its single cause the capacity for consciousness, and the stream of modes that acts as an effect of this capacity is of the form of upyoga. Similarly, in a pudgala the capacity for colouration resides in the form of a cause while the stream of modes of the form of various colours like blue, yellow etc. is an effect of this single capacity. In a soul just like the stream of modes of the form of upayoga there simultaneously flow ananta such streams of modes - e.g. the stream of modes of the form of feelings like pleasure and pain, the stream modes of the form of effort. And when just like the capacity for consciousness one capacity each - e.g. the capacity for ananda or joy, the capacity for virya or endeavour - is posited for the various streams of modes-belonging to the same class ananta capacities are proved to reside in a soul. Similarly, in a pudgala just like the stream of modes of the form of colour there always flow ananta streams of modes - e.g. the stream of modes of the form of smell, that of modes of the form of taste, that of modes of the form of touch. Hence when one capacity each is posited for these various streams of modes then just like the capacity for colouration ananta capacities are proved to reside in a pudgala too - e.g. the capacity for smell, that for taste, that for smell. In a soul there can be simultaneously found the different modes belonging to the different capacities like consciousness, joy, endeavour etc.; but there cannot be simultaneously found the different modes of the form of upayoga belonging to the capacity for consciousness or the different modes of the form of feeling belonging to the capacity for joy; for in the case of each capacity just one mode at a time can make itself manifest. Similarly, in a

pudgala there can be simultaneously found the different modes belonging to the different capacity like colouration, smell, etc., but there cannot be simultaneously found the different modes blue, yellow etc. belonging to the capacity for colouration. Just as the substances soul and pudgala are permanent so also are their capacities like consciousness etc. and colouration etc. However, a mode of the form of upayoga produced by the capacity for consciousness, and the mode blue or yellow produced by the capacity for colouration are not permanent; since they originate and perish all the time they are individually transient but the stream of modes of the form of upayoga and the stream of modes of the form of colour, since they persist throughout the three phases of time, are permanent.

A substance verily is an indissoluble collection of ananta qualities. However, in the case of a soul not all its qualities but just a few of them like consciousness, joy, moral conduct, endeavour are open to the comprehension of a worldly being with ordinary intelligence; similarly, in the case of a pudgala not all its qualities but just few of them like colour, taste, smell, touch etc. are open to comprehension. The reason for it is that the totality of streams-of-modes belonging to a soul or such totality belonging to a pudgala substance cannot be comprehended in the absence of a supra-ordinary cognition. Only those qualities are made a subject-matter of usage which act as a cause to the stream of modes comprehensible. Thus the qualities consciousness, joy, moral conduct, endeavour etc. belonging to a soul are comprehensible - that is, are amenable to thought and verbal communication; similarly, the qualities colour etc. belonging to a pudgala are comprehensible. All the remaining qualities are incomprehensible and open to the cognition of an ommniscient alone.

When it is said that each of the streams of ananta modes has for its cause one capacity or quality and that a substance is but a collection of ananta such capacities - then the statement is taking cognizance of difference. For viewed from the standpoint of non-difference a mode is of the form of the quality that acts as its cause while a quality is of the form of the substance concerned - which in its turn means that a substance is to be considered to be itself of the form of qualities and modes.

Not all the qualities belonging to a substance are of the same type. For some of them ar common - that is, such are found in all the substances - e.g. existence, being made up of units, being cognizable etc.; on the other hand, some of them are unique - that is, such as are found in just some one particular substance - e.g. consciousness, colour etc. It is only on account of their unique qualities and modes produced by them that substances differ from one another.

Similar considerations should be applied to the qualities and modes

belonging to the substances dharmastikaya, adharmastikaya and akasastikaya. In this connection the following thing should be understood. Since the pudgala-substance is murta or tangible the qualities as well as modes belonging to it are called gurulaghu or heavy and light but since the remaining substances are amurta or non-tangible the qualities as well modes belonging to them are called agurulaghu or neither heavy nor light. 37

Consideration Relating to kala or Time :

Certain authorities maintain that kala too is a substance. 38

It possesses ananta samayas (as modes). 39

So many modes like perduration etc. have been earlier attributed to kala but unlike in the case of dharmastikaya etc. substance-hood has not been predicated of it. So the question arises : Since substance-hood has not been attributed to kala is it the case that it is not a substance? Or since the modes like perduration etc. have been attributed to kala, is it the case that it is a substance? The answer is forthcoming here.

The aphorist conveys the information that certain authorities treat kala as a substance. So he seems to maintain that there is no unanimity about viewing kala as an independent substance.

The aphorist does not refute the position of the authorities who view kala as an independent substance, he simply

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1. In the Digambara tradition the aphorism reads 'kalas ca.' Accordingly, those following it treat kala as an independent substance. Then they maintain not that the present aphorism puts forth the view of a limited section of authors but that the aphorist himself intends to view kala as an independent substance. Those who treat kala as an independent substance and those who do not, how they lend support to their respective views, how they view kala, what further difference of opinion has arisen in this connection - for a detailed information on all these and allied matters see Hindi Chautha Karmagrantha, appendix pertaining to the term kala. p. 157.

2. See chapter 5, aphorism 22.

describes it. In connection with this description he says that it possesses ananta modes. Now the modes perduration etc. have already been mentioned earlier. But modes of the form of samayas too belong to kala itself. The mode of the form of a present samaya is necessarily single, but modes of the form of a past or a future samaya are ananta. Hence it is said that kala possesses ananta samayas. 38-39

The Nature of Guna or Quality :

Those which always reside in a substance and are themselves devoid of qualities are qualities. 40

Quality has been mentioned in connection with defining substance; so its nature is being delineated here.

Though modes too reside in a substance and are devoid of qualities they, being subject to origination and destruciton, do not reside in a substance always. The qualities, on the other hand, being permanent do always reside in a substance. Herein lies the difference between a quality and a mode.

Those very capacities which, ever residing in a substance, produce modes in it are qualities.

If further qualities or capacities are attributed to those qualities there will arise an infinite regress; hence it is that the qualities which are of the form of a capacity residing in a substance are treated as devoid of qualities. In the case of soul the qualities are consciousness, right inclination, moral-conduct, joy, endeavour etc.; in the case of pudgala they are colour, taste, smell, touch etc. 40

The Nature of Parinama or Transformation :

One's being - that is, one's retaining one's specific nature and yet undergoing origination and destruction - is transformation. 41

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1. See chapter 5, aphorism 37.

Parinama or transformation too has been mentioned earlier at so many places. Hence its nature is being delineated here.

The Buddhists maintain that every thing whatsoever is momentary and such as perishes without leaving a residue. So on their view parinama or transformation turns out to mean utter destruction following origination - that is, non-persistence of any element whatsoever subsequent to destruction. On the other hand, the system like Nyaya etc. which uphold the doctrine of difference and according to which a substance is utterly different from its qualities would give out that parinama or transformation means the origination and destruction of qualities in a substance which itself remains utterly unchanged. As against both these views as to the nature of parinama or transformation the maintenance of the corresponding Jaina view - this is the aim of the present aphorism.

There is no such substance or quality as remains utterly unchanged. However, even while undergoing change - that is, even while assuming ever new states- no substance or quality gives up its original specific nature. The idea is that all substances as well as qualities, without giving up their respective specific natures, assume ever new states every moment depending on the conditions available. It is this that is called the parinama or transformation undergone by the substances and qualities.

A soul, whether it assumes the form of a man or that of an animal or that of a bird, ever retains its soulness in the midst of all these various states. Similarly, whether it be determinate upayoga of the form of jnana or indeterminate upayoga of the form of darsana, whether it be cognition grasping a jar or that grasping a piece of cloth - in the midst of all these modes of the form of upayoga the quality consciousness retains its identity. Again, a pudgala, whether it be in a two-atomed state or in a three - atomed state, never

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1. See chapter 5, aphorisms 22,36.

gives up its pudgala-ness in the midst of these various states. Lastly, the white colour might change into the black, the black colour might change into the yellow - but in the midst of all these various modes of the form of colour the specific nature colourness retains its identity. The same considerations should apply in the case of each and every substance and each and every quality. 41

The Types of Parinama and the Mention of Their Respective Seats :

It is of two types - viz. that without a beginning and that having a beginning. 42

In the case of substances possessed of colour - that is, pudgala - substances - it is possessed of a beginning. 43

In the case of jivas it is yoga and upayoga that are possessed of a beginning. 44

The period of time whose early end is unknown is that without a beginning, that whose early end is known is that having a beginning. When this well-known and universally accepted meaning of the phrases 'time without a beginning' and 'time having a beginning' is accepted, then in connection with considering the seat of the two types of parinama the conclusion is established that all substances whatsoever, whether coloured or otherwise, are characterized by both the types of parinama - that is, by parinama without a beginning as well as by those having a beginning. Thus in the case of each of the substances it can be said that its

parinamas viewed as a continuous stream are without a beginning while the same taken individually are possessed of a beginning. Even so, not only in the present aphorisms but even in the Bhasya on the same why has all this not received a clear and complete formulation? - this question has been raised by the author of the Vrtti and he has ultimately conceded that as a matter of fact all substances whatsoever possess both the types of parinama - that is, parinamas without a beginning as well as those having a beginning.

In the Digambara commentary-texts like Sarvarthasiddhi it has clearly been maintained that all the substances are possessed of both the types of parinama; and in support of this contention it has been argued that from the standpoint of substance or the general a transformation is without a beginning while from the standpoint of mode or the specific it is possessed of a beginning.

The Digambara commentaries do not include in their text-reading the three aphorisms 42-44; they instead offer a complete and clear formulation as to the types of parinama and as to their respective seats in the course of their commentary on the aphorism 'tadbhavah parinamah' hence it was that instead of completing the aphorisms that were incomplete in their meaning they thought it better to state their own views in an independent manner. 42-44

CHAPTER SIX

An account of jiva and ajiva has already been offered, that of asrava or inflow is now due.

The Nature of Asrava Defined through a
Description of Yoga or Activity :

The activity of body, speech and manas is yoga. 1

That - on account of being the factor responsible for an association with karma - is designated asrava or inflow. 2

That activity of the form of the wavering of the constituent-units of a soul which results from a ksayopasama or ksaya of the viryantaraya-karma and which proceeds on the basis of pudgalas is called yoga. There are three types of it, differing according to the difference of basis - viz. yoga pertaining to body, yoga pertaining to speech, yoga pertaining to manas. That yoga which proceeds on the basis of the pudgalas belonging to the physical groupings that go to constitute a body of the audarika type or that like is yoga pertaining to body. The wavering of the constituent-units of a soul that is on the point of undergoing a transformation of the form of speech - is yoga pertaining to speech. The wavering of the constituent units of a soul that is on the point of undergoing a transformation of the form of manas - a wavering which occurs when there has been an acquisition of internal manas of the form of a ksayopasama of the no-indriya matijnanavarana karma and which proceeds on the basis of the physical groupings that go to constitute a manas - is yoga pertaining to manas.

It is this very threefold yoga that is called asrava or inflow. The reason why yoga is called asrava or inflow is that it is through yoga that the physical groupings which go to constitute karma flow into a soul - that is, get associated with it in the form of karma. Just as the mouth of a tunnel etc. through which water enters a pond is called asrava or inflow because it is the cause of asrava or inflow (of water), similarly, yoga is called asrava or inflow because it is the cause of an asrava or inflow of karma. 1-2

The auspicious yoga is asrava or cause-of-bondage in the case of punya or good karmas. 3

And the inauspicious yoga is asrava in the case of papa or evil karmas. 4

All the three yogas - viz. body-yoga etc. are auspicious as well as inauspicious.

The auspicious or inauspicious character of yoga depends on the auspicious or inauspicious character of the accompanying mental feeling. The yoga directed towards an auspicious purpose is auspicious, that directed towards an inauspicious purpose is auspicious. The auspicious or inauspicious character of yoga does not depend on the auspicious or inauspicious character of the effect concerned - that is, the concerned karmic bondage; for had that been so all the yoga would have turned out to be inauspicious and none auspicious. For in the gunasthanas eighth etc. even the auspicious yoga

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1. In the place of the aphorisms 3 and 4 the Digambara texts have a single aphorism in the form 'subhah punyasyasubhah papasya.' But in connection with a discussion of these aphorisms the Rajavartika says, 'tatah sutradvayam anarthakam', (see p. 248, commentary on the Vartika 7). From this statement it appears that the commentators wrote these aphorisms together and then commented on them while they saw that the aphorisms in question and so also the comments on them went together, thought that these are not two aphorisms but a single one and so gave a single serial number to them both.

causes the bondage of the inauspicious karmas like jnanavaraniya etc.

The bodily operations like violence, theft, incontinence etc. are cases of inauspicious body-yoga; those like mercy, donation, continence etc. cases of auspicious body-yoga. True but blameworthy speech, false speech, harsh speech and the like are cases of inauspicious speech-yoga; blameless true speech, soft speech, civilized speech and the like are cases of auspicious speech-yoga. Thinking ill of others, thinking of injuring others and the like are cases of inauspicious manas yoga; thinking well of others, feeling happy on seeing others flourish and the like are cases of auspicious manas-yoga.

The auspicious yoga brings about a bondage of good karmas, the inauspicious yoga that of evil karmas - this statement made by the present aphorisms is of a relative import. For yoga occurring at the time when there is mildness of mental perturbation or passion is called auspicious yoga while that occurring at the time when there is acuteness of mental perturbation is called inauspicious yoga. Now just as at the time of inauspicious yoga - that is, while the gunasthanas first etc. - all the karmas like jnanavaraniya etc., whether good or evil, are bound down depending on the occasion, similarly at the time of auspicious yoga - that is, while in the gunasthanas sixth etc. - all the karmas, whether good or evil, are bound down depending on the occasion. How then is it justified to make a separate mention of the auspicious yoga as cause-of-bondage in the case of good karmas and of the inauspicious yoga as cause-of-bondage

in the case of evil karmas? By way of answering this question it should be understood that the present statement chiefly relates to karmic bondage in respect of anubhaga or flavour. Thus at the time of the intensity of the auspicious yoga it so happens that the quantity of anubhaga characterizing the good karmas

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1. For this see Hindi Chautha-Karmagrantha : A consideration of bondage in the case of different gunasthanas; also Hindi Dusara Karmagrantha.

is relatively larger while the quality of anubhaga characterizing the evil karmas is relatively smaller. On the contrary, at the time of the intensity of the inauspicious yoga the quantity of anubhaga characterizing the evil karmas is relatively larger while the quantity of anubhaga characterizing the good karmas is relatively smaller. So keeping in view the relatively larger quantity of the anubhaga characterizing the good karmas caused by the auspicious yoga and the relatively larger quantity of the anubhaga characterizing the evil karmas caused by the inauspicious yoga - that is to say, keeping in view what is predominent in the two cases - it has been maintained that the auspicious yoga is cause-of-bondage in the case of good karmas and inauspicious yoga cause-of-bondage in the case of evil karmas. The relatively smaller quantity of the anubhaga characterizing the evil karmas caused by the auspicious yoga and the relatively smaller quantity of the anubhaga characterizing the good karmas caused by the inauspicious yoga are here not taken into account; for just as in everyday intercourse so also in theoretical treatizes it is a rule that usage takes place on the basis of what is predominent. 3-4

Statement as to a Difference in the Result of Yoga
Depending on a Difference in the Agent Concerned :

Yoga on the part of a soul possessed of kasaya or passion and yoga on the part of a soul devoid of kasaya are respectively asrava or cause-of-bondage in the case of samparayika karma and iryapatha karma. 5

The beings in whom there takes place a manifestation of the kasaya or passion like anger, greed etc. are those possessed of kasaya, the beings in whom it does not take place are those devoid of kasaya. All the souls situated in

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1. pradhanyena vyapadesa bhavanti (that is, designations take place on the basis of predominance) - this is how the rule runs. For example, the village where there is a predominance or numerical superiority of Brahmins is called a Brahmins' village even if other castes reside in it as well.

the gunasthanas first to tenth are more or less possessed of kasaya while those situated in the gunasthanas eleventh onwards are devoid of kasaya.

The karma that brings about the samparaya or downfall of a soul is called samparayika karma. Just as the airborne dust falling on a wet piece of leather gets stuck to it similarly that karma attracted towards a soul through yoga which on account of a manifestation of passions gets associated with this soul and acquires some duration is samprayika karma; on the other hand, just like a wooden sphere striking against a dry wall the karma which is attracted towards a soul through yoga but which on account of the absence of a manifestation of passions touches this soul and is immediately released away from it is iryapatha karma. An iryapatha karma is understood to be possessed of a duration of just one samaya.

The karmas which the souls possessed of a manifestation of kasaya bind down to themselves through the three types of yoga - viz. body yoga etc. - of an auspicious or an inauspicious type in samprayika karma; that is to say, depending on the acuteness or mildness of kasaya this karma is possessed of a greater or smaller duration and it yields a good or bad consequence as might be made possible. But the karma which the souls devoid of passion bind down to themselves through the three types of yoga, since it makes appearance in the absence of all passion, neither yields a consequence nor is possessed of a duration of more than one samaya. The reason why this karma of a duration of one samaya is called iryapathika is that in the absence of all passion it is bound down merely through the patha or instrumentality of irya or acts like coming and going. The idea is that even if the three types of yoga are equally present there the karma acquired will lack bondage in respect of duration and bondage in respect of flavour in case a passion is not present there at the same time. Certainly, passion is the cause of bondage in respect of both duration and flavour; hence passion it is that is true cause of worldly existence. 5

The Type of Asrava Pertaining to Samparayika karmas :

The first of these - that is, of the two asravas that pertaining to samprayika karma - has got, for its types avrata, kasaya, indriya and kriya which are respectively 5, 4, 5 and 25 in number 6.

The causes that lead to the bondage of samparayika karma are called asravas pertaining to samprayika karma. Such asravas can possibly be found only in the souls possessed of kasayas. The types of asrava enumerated in the present aphorism are certainly cases of asrava pertaining to samprayika karma, for they are all rooted in passions.

Violence, untruth, theft, incontinence and acquisitiveness - these are five avratas which are described in the chapter seven, aphorisms 8-12. Anger pride, deceit and greed - these are four kasayas whose specific nature is delineated in the chapter eight, aphorism 10. The five indriyas like tactile etc. have already been described in the chapter two, aphorism

20. In the present context indriya means the operation of an indriya actuated by attachment and aversion - for the mere presence of an indriya is no cause of karmic bondage, nor such an operation of indriyas as is free from attachment and aversion.

The 25 kriyas are named and defined as follows :

I (1) Samyaktvakriya - kriya which being of the form of homage paid to a deity, a preceptor or a scriptural text nourishes samyaktva.

(2) Mithyatvakriya - kriya which is of the form of homage paid to a passion-ridden deity and which results through the instrumentality of mithyatvamohaniya-karma.

(3) Prayogakriya - kriya of the form of a bodily operation like coming, going etc. vitiated by passion.

(4) Samadanakriya - kriya of the form of an inclination towards worldly enjoyment on the part of one who has renounced the world.

(5) Iryapathakriya - kriya which causes either the bondage or the experiencing of iryapathakarma - that is, karma of a duration of one samaya.

II (1) Kayikikriya - undertaking some endeavour - that is, getting ready to perform some job-with an evil mental feeling.

(2) Adhikaranikikriya - getting hold of the instruments of violence.

(3) Pradosikikriya - action undertaken under the impulse of anger.

(4) Partipanikikriya - action of the form of inflicting pain on the living beings.

(5) Pranatipatikikriya - action of the form of depriving the living beings of their pranas or vital elements.

III (1) Darsanakriya - under the influence of attachment the tendency to view lovely forms.

(2) Sparsanakriya - under the influence of carelessness the tendency to touch things that are open to touch.

(3) Pratyayikiriya - The forging of new weapons.

(4) Samantanupatanakriya - to evacuate, urinate etc. at a place frequented by women, men, animals etc.

(5) Anabhogakriya - to seat one's own body etc. at a place not properly inspected and not properly cleansed of dust.

IV (1) Svahastakriya - to do oneself what is to be done by someone else.

(2) Nisargakriya - to give consent to an evil performance.

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1. The five sense-organs, the three energies - viz. manas, speech and body -, out-breath and in-breath, life-quantum - these are ten pranas.

(3) Vidarakriya - to make public an evil act performed by someone else.

(4) Ajnavyapadikikriya or Anayanakriya - because of one's own incapacity to follow a scriptural injunction to preach something contrary to this injunction.

(5) Anavakanksakriya - out of roguishness or lethargy to evince disregard for an injunction laid down in scriptures.

V (1) Arambhakriya - to indulge in acts like wounding, beating, killing and to take joy in the same when performed by others.

(2) Parigrahikikriya - action undertaken with a view to preventing the destruction of one's acquisitions.

(3) Mayakriya - to deceive others in respect of qualifications like jnana, darsana etc.

(4) Mithyadarsanakriya - if there be a person who indulges in himself performing and making others perform acts befitting a mithyadrsti, then to praise him by saying to him 'yes, you are right' and thus to further confirm him in his mithyatva.

(5) Apratyakhyanakriya - under the influence of the karmas destructive of samyama or discipline not to refrain from performing evil acts.

Of the kriyas included in the above five pentads - each containing five members - there is only one - viz. iryapathakriya - that is not asrava for a samparayika karma; as for the remaining ones since they are all impelled by kasaya they are all cause-of-bondage for samparayika karma. And when all these kriyas are here called asrava for a samparayika-karma that is done simply because most of them (really, all of them except the iryapathiki) are in fact so. Again, even though in the case of the avratas, the operation of indriyas, and the above enumerated kriyas the capacity to cause bondage really belongs to the accompanying attachment and aversion - and so really speaking, attachment and aversion are the only cause-of-bondage for a samparayika karma - yet they are mentioned as a cause-of-bondage apart from kasayas simply in order to make it clear as to what operations born of kasayas are chiefly met with in practical life and as to what operations should be sought to be prevented by one desirous of samvara - that is protection against the karmic inflow. 6

Even When the Cause-of-bondage is the Same there Being a Peculiarity in Karmic Bondage Depending on a Difference in the Accompanying Mental State :

There is a peculiarity in it - that is, in karmic bondage - depending on a difference as to acuteness, mildness, knowingliness, unknowingliness, exertion, adhikarana. 7

The present aphorism is aimed at demonstrating as to what brings it about that even in case the above mentioned asravas or causes-of-bondage like violence, operations of indriyas, samyaktvakriya etc. are equally present there the resulting karmic bondage displays a peculiarity.

Thus even when the external cause-of-bondage is the same the resulting karmic bondage is different depending on whether the accompanying mental state is acute or mild. For example, when two persons view the same spectacle, one with a sense of mild attachment, the other with a sense of acute attachment, then there is a relatively more acute karmic bondage in the case of the latter. Knowingliness means undertaking an operation intentionally, unknowingliness means undertaking it unintentionally. Here again even when the external operation is the same there is a difference in the resulting karmic bondage depending on whether this operation is undertaken knowingly or unknowingly. For example, one person taking a deer to be a deer shoots it down with an arrow and another person, while aiming at a lifeless target, shoots down by mistake a deer that comes in between; here karmic bondage in the case of the conscious killer is more acute than that in the case of the mistaking one. A difference as to exertion or energy too is a cause of difference in the karmic bondage concerned. For example, whether it be a good performance like donation, service etc. or an evil performance like violence, theft etc. an energetic person undertakes it more conveniently and enthusiastically than a weakling. Hence karmic bondage - whether good or evil - in the case of a weakling is relatively milder than that in the case of an energetic person.

So many adhikaranas of the form of jiva and ajiva are going to be described just below; depending on a difference as to them there is a difference as to karmic bondage. For example, in connection with performing evil acts like violence, theft etc. and good acts like protecting others etc. suppose one person is in possession of highly effective instruments another in possession of ordinary ones; then it is likely that karmic bondage in the case of the former is relatively more acute, for being in possession of highly effective instruments he is more imbued with a certain type of impulsiveness.

Though the present aphorism lays down that when inspite of the sameness of an external asrava there is a difference as to the resulting karmic bondage the cause lies in the difference obtaining as to exertion, adhikarana etc., yet in point of fact the chief cause for a difference as to karmic bondage is the acuteness or mildness of the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. But even when the fact of acting knowingly or unknowlingly or a difference as to energy acts as a cause of the difference as to karmic bondage that too happens owing to a difference as to the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. Similarly, when it is said that a difference as to karmic bondage is due to a

difference as to the instrument employed, then too the statement should be understood to mean that the difference in question is due to a difference as to the accompanying mental state of the form of passion. 7

The Two Types of Adhikarana :

Adhikarana is of the form of jiva and ajiva. 8

The first-that is, adhikarana of the form of jiva - is of three types depending on whether it is of the form of samrambha, samarambaha or arambha, of three types depending on a difference of the yoga concerned, of three types depending on whether it is krta, karita or anumata, of four types depending on a difference of the kasaya concerned. 9

The second - that is, adhikarana of the form of ajiva is of the form of nirvartana, niksepa, samyoga and nisarga, they being respectively of two, four, two and three types. 10

All acts, whether good or evil, are accomplished through the instrumentality of jiva as well as ajiva. Nothing can be done by a jiva alone or an ajiva alone. Hence both jiva and ajiva are called adhikarana - that is to say, a means, implement or weapon of karmic bondage. Both these adhikaranas are of two types - viz. a dravya type and a bhava type. A jiva in the form of an individual person and an ajiva in the form of an inanimate thing are adhikarana of a dravya type. The mental states like kasaya etc. belonging to a jiva and the potency-in-the-form-of-sharpness etc. belonging to an inanimate thing are adhikarana of a bhava type. 8

A worldly jiva at the time of performing a good or evil act must experience some one of certain 108 states. Hence these states are adhikarana of a bhava type. These states are as follows : Krodhakrta kaya samrambh or 'samrambha ppertaining to body undertaken through anger' 'mohakrta kaya samrmbha' or 'samrambha pertaining to body undertaken through pride','mayakrta kayasamrambha' or 'samrambha pertaining to body undertaken through deceit' , 'lobhakrta kayasamrambha' or 'samrambha pertaining to body undertaken through greed' - these make four states. Here replacing the word krta by karita (so that the meaning is not 'undertaken through anger etc.' but 'cause-to-be-undertaken through anger etc.,) and replacing it by anumata (so that the meaning is 'consented to be undertaken through anger etc.,) we have eight more states. So in all we have twelve states by now. Then in all replacing the word kaya by vacana (so that the meaning is not 'samrambha pertaining' to body but 'samrambha pertaining to speech') and replacing it by manas (so that the meaning is 'samrambha pertaining to manas') wee have twenty-four more states. So in all we have thirty-six states by now. Lastly, in all these replacing the word samrambha by samarambha (so that the meaning is not 'samrambha pertaining to body' but 'samarambha pertaining to body') and replacing it by arambha (so that the meaning is 'arambha pertaining to body) we have

seventy-two more states. So in all we have one hundred and eight states finally.

An implusion to undertake acts like violence etc. on the part of a careless jiva is called samrambha, to collect means for the performance of those acts is called samarambha, while ultimately to actually undertake these acts is called arambha. That is to say, an act has got three stages beginning from the subtle state of the form of an intention to perform it and culminating in its actual performance, stages that are respectively called samrambha, samarambha and arambha. The three types of yoga have already been described earlier. Krta means undertaking to perform an act oneself, karita means causing someone else to perform an act, anumata means giving consent to an act performed by someone else. The four kasayas anger, pride etc. are well known.

When a worldly soul peforms a good act like donation etc. or an evil act like violence etc. he does so impelled by either anger or pride or some other kasaya. And even when impelled by a kasaya he either performs it himself or causes someone else to perform it or gives consent to someone else performing it. Similarly, in connection with the performance of this act he is engaged in either samrambha or samarambha or arambha - each pertaining to either body or speech or manas. 9

The murta or tangible things like atoms etc. are ajivadhikarana or a dravya type. And all the states in which is to be found a murta substance useful in connection with a good or evil act on the part of a jiva are ajivadhikarana of a bhava type. Here four chief types are enumerated of the ajivadhikarana of a bhava type - viz. nirvartana or constructing, niksepa or placing, samyoga or combining and nisarga or operating. Nirvartana has got two sub-types - viz. mulagunanivartana and uttaragunanirvartana. When pudgala-substance is constructed in the form of a body of the audarika type or the like, construction which acting as an internal means proves useful to a jiva in its good or evil acts - then we have before us what is called mulagunanirvartana; on the other hand, when pudgala-substances undergoes transformation of the form of wood, stone etc., transformation which acting as an external means proves useful to a jiva in its good or evil act - then we have before us what is called uttaragunanirvartana.

Niksepa has got four sub-types - viz. apratyaveksita-niksepa, duspramarjita-niksepa, sahasa-niksepa and anabhoga-niksepa. To place a thing at some spot without properly inspecting this thing is called apratyaveksita-niksepa (pratyaveksana=inspection). To place a thing at some spot after properly inspecting it but without cleansing it of dust is called duspramarjita-niksepa (pramarjana=to cleanse of dust). To place a thing at some spot without properly inspecting it or cleansing it of dust is called sahasa-niksepa (sahasa=suddenly). To inattentively place a thing

at some spot is called anabhoga-niksepa (anabhoga=inattention).

Samyoga has got two sub-types - viz. bhaktapana-samyogadhikarana and upakarana-samyogadhikarna. The former consists in combining or producing foodstuffs like cereal, water etc., the latter in combining or producing inplements like clothes, utensils etc.

Nisarga has got three sub-types - viz. kayanisarga, vacananisarga and manonisarga. They respectively consist in operating body, operating speech, and operating manas. 10

Enumeration of the Respective Cause of bondage in the Case of the Eight Types of Samparayika-karma :

Jealousy in respect of it (i.e. Jnana or darsana), concealment, ungenerosity, obstruction, denial, false accusation - these are asrava or cause of bondage in the case of jnanavaranakarma and darsanavarana-karma. 11

Pain, sorrow, heart-burning, crying, killing, bewailing, each caused to oneself, to someone else or to both - these are cause of bondage in the case of asatavedaniya karma. 12

Compassion for beings as such, compassion for those leading a disciplined life, donation, proper attentiveness towards disciplined-life-yet accompanied by attachment etc., forbearance, purity - these are cause of bondage in the case of satavedaniya karma. 13

Speaking ill of the omniscient, the scripture, the religious order, the religion, the deity is cause of bondage in the case of darsanamohaniya karma. 14

The acute mental state resulting from the manifestation of kasaya is cause of bondage in the case of caritramohaniya karma.15

Too much infliction of injury and too much accumulation of possession - these are cause of bondage in the case of narakayus. 16

Deceit is cause-of-bondage in the case of tiryagayus. 17

Meagre infliction of injury, meagre accumulation of possession, softness and simplicity of nature - these are cause of bondage in the case of manusyayus. 18

To be devoid of sila (i.e. the subisidiary vows of discipline), to be

devoid of vrata (i.e. the chief vows of discipline), as also the just mentioned features 'meagre infliction of injury' etc. - these are cause of bondage in the case of all ayus whatsoever. 19

Disciplined - life - yet accompanied by attachment, life of discipline cum indiscipline, refraining from evil acts out of compulsion, childish penance - these are cause of bondage in the case of devayus. 20

The crookedness of acts and causing false behaviour (alternatively, creating dissensions) - these are cause of bondage in the case of asubhanama karma. 21

The opposite of the just mentioned features - that is, the straightforwardness of acts and causing genuine behaviour (alternatively, healing a dissension) - these are cause of bondage in the case of subhanama karma. 22

Purity of inclination, respectful attitude towards things highly spiritual, non-violation of sila and vrata, ever-wakefulness as to the acquisition of knowledge regarding verities, ever present fear of worldly joys, renunciation as per one's capacity, penance as per one's capacity, providing means of

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1. According to the Digambara tradition this aphorism means that lack of sila and lack of vrata - these two features ordinarily cause the bondage of the three types of ayus, naraka etc. while the same features as belonging to the human beings born in a bhogabhumi cause the bondage of devayus as well. It is in this sense that mention is here made of the cause of bondage appropriate to devayus, a subject matter not touched upon in the Bhasya. However, in the Vrtti to this Bhasya the author has thoughtfully taken note of this shortcoming of the Bhasya and has requested the learned readers to make it good on the basis of the scriptural texts.

2. In the Digambara tradition apart from the cause of bondage appropriate to devayus enumerated in the present aphorism another one is mentioned and for that the present aphorism is followed by another one - viz. samyaktavam ca. According to this tradition this new aphorism means that samyaktva is the cause of bondage in the case of ayus that pertains to the deities residing in the kalpas saudharma etc. The Bhasya makes no mention of it. Even so, the author of the Vrtti to the Bhasya has included samyaktava too in the list of additional causes of bondage enumerated by him in this connection.

easement to the fourfold religious order - particularly the order of monks, offering services to the competent personages, feeling of devotedness towards a tirthankara, preceptor, a highly learned personage,

a scriptual text, not missing a performance of the daily religious service designated avasyaka, to cultivate the path of moksa and to make others traverse it, feeling of disinterested love towards the co-religionists - these are cause of bondage in the case of tirthankaranamakarma. 23

To condemn other, to praise oneself, to turn a blind eye condemn oneself, to praise others, to make a display of one's own shortcomings, to turn a blind eye towards one's own merits-as also humility and non-arrogance - these are cause of bondage in the case of uccagotra karma. 25

To cause obstruction to others engaged in the task of donation etc. is cause of bondage in the case of antaraya karma. 26

From here upto the end of the present chapter three runs an account of the respective causes of bondage obtaining in the case of the different basic types of karma. Even though in the case of all karma-types the common cause of bondage are yoga and kasaya, yet the present section is aimed at seperately laying down as to which of the many tendencies born of kasaya is likely to cause the bondage of which karma.

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Jnanavaraniya karma :

(1) To harbour a feeling of jealousy towards jnana, towards a possessor of it, towards a means of it is called jealousy in respect of jnana. That is to say, when a learned personage communicates to others his jnana relating to the fundamental verities then there are certain people who feel jealous of this jnana, of one who communicates this jnana, of the means of this jnana; it is this feeling of jealousy on the part of these people that is called jealousy in respect of jnana.

(2) When someone makes from a person an enquiry or asks this person for a means of jnana then in case this person even if possessed of the jnana or of the means of jnana asked for, replies - and does so from a defiled motive - 'I do not know' or 'I do not have that means of jnana' then we have a case of concealment in respect of jnana.

(3) When a piece of jnana is such as has been repeatedly practised and is ripe, also such as is fit to be communicated to others, then the defiled tendency not to communicate it to others even though a competent receiver be at hand is ungenerosity in respect of jnana.

(4) Impelled by a defiled motive to obstruct one in one's endeavour to receive jnana is obstruction in respect of jnana.

(5) When someone is communicating jnana to others then to deny this fact through one's speech or through one's body (i.e. bodily gesture) is denial in respect of jnana.

(6) When someone has made a proper statement then if owing to one's

own perverse intellect it sounds improper to one who then levels false accusation against the speaker we have a case of accusation in respect of jnana.

When the above enumerated features jealousy, concealment etc. pertain to jnana (=determinate cognition), to a possessor of jnana, to a means of jnana they are called jealousy in respect of jnana, concealment in respect of jnana etc. When they pertain to darsana (=indeterminate cognition), to a possessor of darsana, to a means of darsana they are called jealousy in respect of darsana, concealment in respect of darsana etc.

Question : What is the difference between denial and false accusation?

Answer : Even when jnana is present there not to pay respect to it, not to disclose it before others, not to demonstrate its merits - that is denial; on the other hand, when jnana itself is perversely mistaken to be lack of jnana and is sought to be destroyed then we have a case of false accusation. This is how the two features differ from one another. 11

The Nature of the Cause of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Asatavedaniya karma :

(1) To experience suffering owing to an external or an internal cause is pain. (2) To feel troubled and worried on having been deprived of the company of a well-wisher is sorrow. (3) When on being insulted one's mind is defiled and one experiences an acute distress that is heart burning. (4) To weep and wail shedding tears and with a choked voice is crying. (5) To deprive some being of its life is killing. (6) The pitiful weeping that ensues on recalling the merits of a departed one is bewailing.

When the above six features - as also certain others similar to them, e.g. beating, threatening - are caused to oneself, to someone else or to both then in relation to the person who does the causing they act as cause of bondage for the asatavedaniya karma.

Question : If the above stated features pain etc. as caused to oneself or to someone else act as cause of bondage for the asatavedaniya karma, then acts like plucking of hair, fasting, observing the vows and the similar regulations too, since they prove to be a cause of pain, ought to act as cause of bondage for the asatavedaniya karma. And if that be so then why not a renunciation of those regulations like vows etc. - rather than a performance of them - be deemed proper?

Answer : The above features pain etc. act as cause of bondage only when they are produced under the impact of an impulse like anger etc. not they as such - that is, not they merely as a cause of pain. For a true world-renouncer or ascetic a performance of even the harshest vows and

regulations does not cause a bondage of the asatavedaniya karma. That is due to two reasons. Firstly, however harsh be the vows whose observance causes suffering to a true world-renouncer he suffers this pain not as impelled by anger or any such evil motive but as impelled by a noble tendency of conduct and noble understanding. He observes harsh vows but however painful contingencies might arise in this connection since they are not accompanied by passions like anger, distress etc. they do not prove to be a cause of bondage for him. The second reason is that it frequently happens that those world-renouncers rather experience real joy at the time of observing the harshest vows and regulations; so in such cases there arises no question of the personages concerned suffering pain, sorrow etc. It is well known that there is no hard and fast rule that a contingency which causes pain to one must necessarily cause pain to others as well. Hence since in the case of the personages in question the observation of those vows and regulations imparts a feeling in mental joy this observation in their case is of the form of pleasure rather than pain. Just as a kind physician, even when through his act of surgery he causes pain to someone else, does not prove guilty of sin because he is impelled by a feeling of compassion, similarly the world-renouncer too, since with a view to removing the worldly pain he gladly resorts to means appropriate for this removal, does not bind down evil karmas because of his noble tendencies of conduct. 12

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Satavedaniya karma :

(1) To harbour a feeling of compassion towards all the living beings is compassion for beings as such; and to treat the pains caused to others as pains caused to oneself is compassion.

(2) A householder who observes the vows partially and a world-renouncer who observes them completely - when a feeling of compassion is harbourd towards both these we have a case of compassion for those leading a disciplined life.

(3) To offer to others with a feeling of humility the things belonging to oneself is donation.

(4) Proper attentiveness towards disciplined life yet accompanied by attachment etc., means proper attentiveness towards disciplined life yet accompanied by attachment, life of discipline cum indiscipline, refraining from evil acts out of compulsion, childish penance. When with a view to renouncing obsessive desire that is the cause of the worldly entanglement one adopts a disciplined life and yet the impressions left in one's mind by one's past experience of attachment are not attenuated then the disciplined life in question is disciplined life yet accompanied by attachment. The life of a partial adoption of discipline is life of discipline cum indiscipline. When worldly enjoyments are renounced not voluntarily but under external pressure then we have a case of refraining from evil acts out of compulsion. An act of penance like entry into fire,

diving into water, eating cowdung etc., on the part of a child - that is, a mithyadrsti devoid of genuine knowledge - is called childish penance.

(5) To supress defilements like anger etc., out of a religious motive is forbearance.

(6) To supress the tendency towards greed and the like defilements is purity. 13

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining of the Case of the Darsanamohaniya karma :

(1) Speaking ill of the omniscient means a pervert intellect levelling false charges against the omniscient; e.g. not admitting the possibility of omniscience and asking : 'If he was really omniscient then why did he not preach easy pathways to moksa rather than such difficult ones as are impossible of pursuance?'

(2) Speaking ill of the scripture means a jealous intellect levelling false charges against the scripture - e.g. saying that this scripture is useless because it is composed in Prakrit which is a language of the illiterate - alternatively, because it is composed in a complication ridden language of the pedant - or that it contains a futile and bothersome description of the various vows, regulations, expiations etc.

(3) Speaking ill of the religious order means levelling false charges against the religious order composed of four divisions - viz. monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen - e.g. saying that these monks unnecessarily take the trouble of observing vows, regulations etc., since monkhood is in fact an impossibility nor is it conducive to a wholesome result, or saying about the laymen that they undertake no cultured performances like bath, donation etc. nor do they lead a life of purity.

(4) Speaking ill of the religion means levelling false charges against the great religious acts like non-violence etc. or saying that a religious act is not a open to perception while what is not open to perception cannot possibly exist, or saying that non-violence has led to the downfall of the entire human race or that of a particular nation.

(6) Speaking ill of the deities means denigrating them - e.g. saying that the deities do not exist at all or that even if they exist they are of no use - for when they are allegedly so powerful there is no reason why they should not help us or why they should not remove the misery of their earthly relatives. 14

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Cases of the Caritramohaniya karma :

(1) To produce a kasaya in oneself or in others and to undertake unworthwhile acts under the influence of a kasaya - these are cause of bondage for the kasaya mohaniya karma.

(2) To ridicule the true religion, to make fun of a poor or helpless person, to develop the habit of frivolous joking - these and similar acts

involving laughter are cause of bondage for the hasya mohaniya karma.

(3) Indulging in various recreations evincing disinclination towards the proper moral restrains like vows and regulations - this and similar acts are cause of bondage for the rati mohaniya karma.

(4) To cause worry to others, to disturb someone in one's rest, to keep the company of petty persons - these and similar acts are cause of bondage for the arati mohaniya karma.

(5) To maintain a sorrowful demeanour, to arouse a feeling of sorrow in others - these and similar acts are cause of bondage for the soka mohaniya karma.

(6) To feel afraid and to frighten others are cause of bondage for the bhaya mohaniya karma.

(7) To despise a beneficial act and a beneficial general conduct is cause of bondage for the jugupsa mohaniya karma.

(8-10) A habit for cheating, finding fault with others, and the like are cause of bondage for the striveda karma. Moreover, to nourish mental impressions that are appropriate to male sexual feeling, to nourish those that are appropriate to female sexual feeling, and to nourish those that are appropriate to neuter sexual feeling are respectively causes of bondage for the striveda karma, the purusaveda karma and the napumsakaveda karma. 15

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Narakayus karma :

(1) To undertake such an act accompanied by kasaya as causes pain to others is infliction of injury.

(2) An emphatic assertion to the effect that this thing is mine while I am its owner is accumulation of possession. When the tendency to inflict injury and that to accumulate possession are extremely acute, when there is constant indulging in violent and cruel acts, when the property of another person is snatched away, when there is an excessive attachment for worldly enjoyments - then there operates a cause of bondage for the narakayus karma. 16

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Tiryagayus-karma :

A ramified act of deception or harbouring a crooked feeling is deceit. For example, in the name of preaching things religious to introduce sheer falsity and propagate them with a selfish motive, to keep one's life devoid of disciplined conduct - these and similar acts are called deceit which constitutes cause of bondage for the tiryagayus karma. 17

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Manusyayus-karma :

To reduce the tendency to inflict injury and that to accumulate possession, to exhibit softness and simplicity out of one's very nature - that is, without an external motivation - these constitute cause of bondage for manusyayus karma. 18

The Common Cause of bondage Obtaining in the
Case of the Above Three Types of Ayus-karma :

Apart from the various separate causes of bondage just enumerated for the three types of ayus karma - viz. naraka, manusya and tiryak - there are certain causes of bondage that commonly obtain in the case of all the three. It is these latter that are enumerated in the present aphorism; they are to be devoid of sila and to be devoid of vrata.

(1) The five chief regulations non-violence, truth etc., are called vrata. (2) The subsidiary vratas that are observed with a view to buttressing those chief vratas are called sila - e.g. the three gunavratas and four siksavratas. Similarly, the renunciation of anger, greed etc., which one resorts to for the sake of the observation of those very vratas is also called sila.

For vrata to be absent is called to be devoid of vrata, for sila to be absent is called to be devoid of sila. 19

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the
Case of the Devayus-karma :

(1) When even after there has been a resort to discipline in the form refrainment from the great defilements like violence, untruthfulness, theft etc., there yet persist certain remnants of kasayas then we have disciplined life yet accompanied by attachment. (2) When vratas like non-violence etc., are observed only partially then we have a life of discipline cum indiscipline. (3) When either under external pressure or simply for the sake of imitating others one refraining from evil acts out of compulsion. (4) When bodily torture like entry into fire, diving into water, falling from the mountain-top, taking poison, fasting etc., are resorted to in a childish fashion - that is, without a proper understanding of the issues - then we have childish penance. 20

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the
Case of the Asubha and Subha Nama-karmas :

(1) Crookedness of acts means fraudulence as to manas, speech and body. When one thinks in one way, speaks in another way and acts in third way - then we have fraudulence. (2) Causing false behaviour means making someone act in a fraudulent manner; (on alternative interpretation,

creating dissension means causing misunderstanding between two friends). Both these are cause of bondage for the asubha-namakarma.

Question : How do the two differ from one another?

Answer : The difference lies in that the former refers to oneself while the latter refers to someone other than oneself. Thus when there is fraudulence as to manas, speech and body in one's own case we have crookedness of acts, when there is a similar fraudulence in the case of someone else we have causing false behaviour. For example, one who is going the right way is pervertly advised 'Go not this way but that' and is thus misled to a wrong path.

The features opposite of the just mentioned ones - viz. straightforwardness as to manas, speech and body (i.e. uniformity of acts) and healing a dissension (that is, removing the rift from between the two and thus uniting them), (on alternative interpretation, to lead on to the right path one who is going the wrong way) - are causes of bondage for the subhanama-karma. 21-22

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Tirthankaranama-karma :

(1) Purity of inclination means a blameless and firm inclination towards the verities propounded by a personage devoid of attachment. (2) Respectful attitude towards things highly spiritual means an appropriate feeling of a right regard towards jnana etc. that constitute the pathway to moksa and towards the means thereof. (3) Non-violation of sila and vrata means exhibiting no negligence as to the observation of vratas like non-violence, truth etc., that constitute basic meritorious qualifications and as to the observation of the other regulations like abhigraha (=self imposed restriction) etc., that are called sila and are useful for the observation of the just mentioned vratas. (4) Ever-wakefulness as to the acquisition of knowledge regarding verities. (5) Ever present fear of the worldly joys means always fearing - that is, never being allured by - the worldly joys which are in fact conducive to pain rather than pleasure. (6) Renunciation as per one's capacity means offering gift of food, safety, knowledge etc., discriminately and without concealing an iota of one's capacity. (7) Penance as per one's capacity means practising tolerance of all sorts discriminately and without concealing an iota of one's capacity. (8) Providing means of easement to the fourfold religious order - particularly the order of monks-so as to keep them fit. (9) Offering services to the competent personages - that is, seeking to ably remove whatever difficulties such a personage might happen to face. (10-13) Feeling of devotedness towards a tirthankara, a preceptor, a highly learned personage, a scriptural text - that is, a feeling of devoted affection towards all these. (14) Not missing a performance of the daily

religious service designated avasyaka - that is, not missing a devoted performance of the six avasyakas, samayika etc. (15) To cultivate path of moksa and to make others traverse it - that is, to practise in one's daily life and without a feeling of arrogance jnana etc. that constitute the path of moksa, as also to preach the same to others so as to augment their efficacy. (16) Feeling of disinterested love towards the co-religionists - as of a cow towards its calf. 23

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Nicagotra-karma :

(1) To condemn others : To condemn others means a pervert intellect publicly pointing out as belonging to another person defects that might or might not exist in him. (2) To praise oneself : To praise oneself means to publicly point out as belonging to oneself merits that might or might not exist in oneself. (3) To turn a blind eye towards even the existing merits of others - that is to say, to conceal even such merits as exist in another person and not to publicly mention them even when occassion arises for that. (4) To make a display of even the non-existing merits in oneself. 24

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Uccagotra-karma :

(1) To condemn oneself means to take cognizance of one's own defects. (2) To praise others means to admire the merits belonging to others. (3) To make a display of one's own shortcomings. (4) To turn a blind eye towards one's own merits. (5) Humility means developing an humble attitude towards the venerable personages. (6) Non-arrogance means not feeling arrogant even when one is superior to others in respect of knowledge, property etc. 25

The Nature of the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Antaraya-karma :

To cause obstruction to others means intending to place or placing obstacles before others in their act of donation, their act of reception, their act of immediate consumption of something, their act of long-term consumption of something. 26

Some Special Considerations as to the Causes of bondage Obtaining in the Case of the Samparayika-karma :

The causes of bondage enumerated in the aphorisms 11-26 in connection with each of the various types of karma are to serve as a mere indicator; that is to say, the cause of bondage similar to those actually enumerated in connection with a particular type of karma are to be understood as

mentioned even when they are not actually mentioned. For example, lethargy, negligence, false-preaching have not been enumerated as cause of bondage for the jnanavaraniya and darsanavaraniya karmas and yet they have to be enumerated in that connection. Similarly, evil performances like killing, binding, beating etc. have not been enumerated as cause of bondage for the asatavedaniya karma and yet they have to be enumerated as such.

Question : In the case of each type of karma a different set of causes of bondage has been mentioned. Hence the question arises : Causes of bondage like jealousy in respect of jnana have been enumerated in connection with the karma types like jnanavaraniya; now does such a cause of bondage bind down just one karma-type like jnanavaraniya or is it able to bind down other karma-types as well? If a cause f bondage enumerated in connection with one karma-type can bind down other karma-types as well then it is futile to mention different causes of bondage for the different karma-types; for now it turns out that a cause of bondage already appropriate to one karma-type is operative in connection with another karma-type as well. And if a cause of bondage enumerated in connection with one karma type binds down just this karma-type and no other there ensues conflict with a particular scriptural rule. For there is a scriptural rule to the effect that generally speaking all the karma-types minus the ayus-karma - that is, seven karma-types in all - are bound down simultaneously. Following this rule one must admit that at the time when there is a bondage of the jnanavaraniya karma there is also a simultaneous bondage of the six karma-types vedaniya etc. Thus so far as cause of bondage is concerned there is available at one time just that which is appropriate to one particular karma-type; but on the other hand, there is bondage at this particular time also of the other karma-types not standing in conflict with this particular one. That is to say, the alternative that a particular cause of bondage causes the bondage of just one particular karma-type stands cancelled by the scriptural rule in question. What then is the purpose behind enumerating separate causes of bondage for the separate karma types?

Answer : The separate mention of causes of bondage that we find here must be understood as referring to bondage in respect of flavour. The idea is that the scriptural rule to the effect that at the time of experiencing the cause of bondage appropriate to one karma-types should be understood as referring to bondage in respect of karmic particles not to that in respect of flavour. So the net conclusion is that the separate mention of causes of bondage refers not to bondage in respect of karmic particles but to that in respect of flavour. So on conceding that experiencing bondage in respect of karmic particles is simultaneously possible for a number of karma types there remains no difficulty about the just quoted scriptural rule. On the other hand, the different karma-types are responsible only for the bondage in respect of flavour pertaining to those karma-types; so

the separate mention of causes of bondage that we find here remains equally free from difficulty.

When things are thus specified the just quoted scriptural rule and the separate mention of causes of bondage that we find here both remain equally free from difficulty. Even so, it has been further understood that when the separate mention of causes of bondage is defended by suggesting that the mention refers to bondage in respect of flavour then this defence too has in view just the equality of bondage. That is to say, at the time of experiencing a cause of bondage like jealousy in respect of jnana there is chiefly bondage in respect of flavour of a karma type like jnanavaraniya : as for the other karma types that are simultaneously bound down there is bondage in respect of flavour in their case too but it obtains in a subordinate measure. For it is impossible to maintain that bondage in respect of flavour obtains for just one karma type and not for the others that are simultaneously bound down. The reason is that whatever karma types experience on account of yoga bondage in respect of karmic particles the same simultaneously experience on account of kasaya bondage in respect of flavour. Hence the separate mention of causes of bondage we find here can be defended in no other way except by suggesting that it refers to bondage in respect of flavour and that obtaining chiefly. 26

CHAPTER SEVEN

As causes of bondage for the satavedaniya karma compassion for those leading a disciplined life (Sanskrit-Vratins) and donation - these two features have been enumerated. Now with a view to offering a particular elucidation of the same a detailed account is being presented in this chapter relating to vratas or disciplinary vows and donation, both occupying an important place in the Jaina tradition.

The Nature of Vrata :

To refrain - through manas, speech and body - from violence, untruth, theft, sexual intercourse, and attachment for possession - that is called vrata. 1

The nature of the moral defilements like violence, untruth etc., will be described in the sequel. To understand the nature of the defilements, to take a vow to renounce them, and then not to resort to them-that precisely is vrata.

Since non-violence is chief of all the vratas it comes first of all. Just as fence is meant for the protection of a field, so also are the remaining vratas meant for the protection of non-violence; hence it is that the greatest importance is attached to non-violence.

Refrainment and a positive activity - these are two aspects of a vrata; when both these aspects are present there then alone is a vrata complete. To be engaged in a virtuous activity means a prior refrainment from the evil activities that are its opposite; formulation to this effect follows as a matter of course. Similarly, refrainment from an evil activity means engagement - through manas, speech and body - in virtuous activities that are its opposite; formulation to this effect too follows as a matter of course. Though refrainment from a defilement is here explicitly described as vrata, yet it does include within itself the aspect of positive virtuous activity. Hence it has to be understood that vrata is not simply of the form of inactivity.

Question : There is a well-known vrata that goes by the name of ratribhojanaviramana or refrainment from eating during night-time. Why has that not been mentioned in the aphorism?

Answer : Since long a separate vrata has gained currency under the name ratribhojanaviramana but as a matter of fact that is not a fundamental vrata; it rather is a sort of necessary vrata that is implied by a fundamental vrata. So many others are such vratas and still more can be conceived of. But what is sought to be offered in the present context

is an account of just the fundamental vratas. Derivative vratas implied by the fundamental vratas. Derivative vratas implied by the fundamental ones are certainly covered by a broader account of the fundamental ones. And ratribhojanaviramana is merely one of the numerous vratas that are implied by the vrata of the form of non-violence.

Question : Keeping in view the destruction of living beings that is occasioned on account of the non visibility obtaining during darkness as also keeping in view the numerous types of injury that are occasioned when an earthen lamp is lighted ratribhojanaviramana turns out to be a part and parcel of the vrata of the form of non-violence. But what is the difference between the night-time eating and day-time eating in the case of a cold country where there is no darkness nor occassion for an injury due to the lighting of an earthen lamp or in the case of a place where electric light is available?

Answer : Keeping in view the countries that are predominantly hot and keeping in view the obviously visible violence that obtains in an arrangement involving the old type earthen lamps etc. the night-time eating is said to occasion more violence than the daytime eating. When this is admitted and at the same time proper consideration is given to the possibility that under certain conditions the night-time eating might not occasion more violence than the daytime eating, then too from the point of view of the masses in general - particularly, from the point of view of an ascetic life - the daytime eating is particularly praiseworthy. Briefly speaking, the following are the reasons in support of a view like this :

(1) From the point of view of health electric light, moonlight or the like might well be advantageous but it is not universal, indivisible and health-giving like sunlight. Hence where both are available then from the point of view of health it is sunlight that is more useful for the masses in general.

(2) The religion of renunciation lies rooted in contentment - from this point of view too it is proper to finish during daytime eating just like other activities appropriate to daytime and to contendly give rest to the digestive system during night time. This facilitates proper sleep and the obeservance of continence - all this resulting in an augmentation of healthiness.

(3) If with a view to contentenent either the daytime eating or the night-time eating has to be chosen then a wakeful, skilled intellect will definitely choose the former. This is the testimony of the life-history of the great saints that have lived upto this day. 1

The Types of Vrata :

Partial renunciation is anu-vrata or minor-scale vow, total renunciation is maha-vrata or major-scale vow. 2

Every person desirous of renunciation refrains from defilements; but not in the case of all such persons in renunciation of one and the same form, and from the point of view of the evolutionary order of stages that is only natural. Hence treating as vrata all refrainment - large or small - from defilements like violence etc. the author briefly divides vratas into two types, viz. (1) Through manas, speech and body to get rid of all forms of a defilement like violence etc.,- that is maha-vrata of the form of non-violence etc. (2) To get rid of the above defilements on a partial scale, howsoever small - that is anu-vrata of the form of non-violence etc. 2

The Bhavanas or Practical Accessories
Pertaining to the Different Vratas :

In the case of each of these vratas there are five bhavanas that are meant to render them steady. 3

Unless certain special types of suitable activities are undertaken most attentively the vratas would not gain a standing in one's soul simply on the ground that one has formally accepted a vrata (that is, has formally committed oneself to the implementation of a vrata). Hence certain activities that prove suitable to the different vratas - so that an accepted vrata penetrates deep into the life of the person concerned - are broadly enumerated; it is they that go by the name of bhavana. If behaviour is properly maintained in conformity to these bhavanas then an accepted vrata will bring about salutary consequences in the life of a preserving person - just in the manner of a highly effective medicine; taken in proper order of these bhavanas are as follows :

(1) Attentiveness as to movement, keeping one's manas under guard, attentiveness as to procuring things, attentiveness as to receiving and placing things, proper inspection of things eaten and drunk - these five are the bhavanas appropriate to the vrata of non-violence.

(2) Speaking after proper consideration, renunciation of anger, renunciation of greed, renunciation of fear, renunciation of laughter - these five are bhavanas appropriate to the vrata of truthfulness.

(3) Begging for shelter after proper consideration, frequently begging for shelter, fixing a limit of shelter, begging

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1. The bhavanas referred to in this aphorism are, according to the Svetambara tradition, described only in the bhasya; hence here there are no separate aphorisms mentioning them. But in the Digambara tradition there are five additional aphorisms - viz. 4-8 mentioning these bhavanas. See the relevant appendix.

shelter from a co-religionist, eating and drinking as per permission - these five are the bhavanas appropriate to the vrata of non-theft.

(4) To refrain from the use of bedding etc. used by a woman, an animal, an impotent person, to refrain from passionate talks about women, to refrain from looking at the beautiful bodily organs of a woman, to refrain from recalling the sensuous enjoyments earlier experienced, to refrain from taking delicious food - these five are the bhavanas appropriate to the vrata of continence.

(5) To accord similar treatment to an agreeable and a disagreeable touch, an agreeable and a disagreeable taste, an agreeable and a disagreeable smell, an agreeable and a disagreeable form, an agreeable and a disagreeable sound - these five are the bhavanas appropriate to the vrata of non-attachment for possessions.

Details Concerning the Bhavanas :

(1) To cautiously move about so as not to cause inconvenience either to oneself or to others - that is attentiveness as to movement; to withdraw one's manas from evil preoccupations and to engage it in good ones - that is keeping one's manas under guard; to look for a thing, to receive it and to utilize it - these three constitute 'procuring' and so to act that none of these three types or procuring is vitiated by a defect - that is attentiveness as to procuring things; to inspect a thing while receiving it or placing it somewhere and to take care of it through cleansing it of dust etc. - that is attentiveness as to receiving and placing things; to receive an eatable or a drinkable after proper inspection and likewise to consume it after proper inspection - that is proper inspection of things eaten and drunk.

(2) Speaking after proper consideration - that is one bhavana, renunciation of anger, greed, fear, laughter - these are the remaining four.

(3) Only after proper consideration to beg for a place needed for shelter - that is begging after proper consideration. In the case of a place of shelter many sorts of owners are possible - e.g. a king, a chief householder, a sayyatara (i.e. any person in possession of a place that has been begged for), a co-religionist; now it is particularly proper that this place be begged from whoever be its proper owner; however, it is possible that an owner has taken back the place he had earlier offered but that it is again required owing to illness etc; in that case to frequently beg this place from its owner - so that he might not be put to inconvenience is called 'frequently begging for shelter'; at the very time when a place for shelter is begged from its owner if a limit is fixed to it then it is called 'fixing a limit to shelter'; if a place for shelter has already been begged by a co-religionist but an occasion arises for it

to be used by oneself then to beg it from this co-religionist is called 'begging shelter from a co-religionist'; when eatables, drinkables etc. have been properly procured and shown to the preceptor then to partake of them only after receiving the preceptor's permission is called 'eating and drinking as per permission.'

(4) For a man or woman practising continence not to use a bedding or a seat used by a being of a different sex - that is refraining from the use of bedding etc. used by a woman, an animal, an impotent person; for a person practising continence not to indulge in talks rousing sexual passion - that is refraining from passionate talks about women; for a person practising continence not to look at such bodily parts of a person belonging to a different sex as rouse sexual passion - that is refraining from looking at the beautiful bodily organs of a woman; not to recall the sensuous enjoyments that one experienced before adopting the life of continence - that is refraining from recalling the sexual enjoyments earlier experienced; not to consume eatables and drinkables that rouse sexual passion - that is refraining from taking delicious food.

(5) Not to feel attraction towards such touch, taste, smell, colour and sound as rouse an agreeable feeling and not to feel aversion against such touch, taste etc. as rouse a disagreeable feeling - that is, according similar treatment to an agreeable and a disagreeable touch, taste etc.

Jainism being a religion directed towards renunciation a monk practising mahavratas occupies the most important place in the Jaina religious order. Hence the bhavanas have been described here as pertaining to mahavratas and so that they are in conformity to a monk's duties. Even so, their nature is such that any and every practiser of vratas can increase or reduce their number as might suit his own level of spiritual development. Hence keeping in view the specific conditions of place and time as also the inner capacity of the practiser concerned the bhavanas can be increased, reduced or ramified - as to their number and as to their meaning -, all this being done from the pure motive of rendering steady a vrata that has been accepted. 3

A Number of other Bhavanas :

To view in relation to the five defilements violence etc. the this-worldly troubles as also the other-worldly undesirable contingencies. 4

Or to develop in relation to these violence etc. a feeling that they are of the nature of but misery. 5

To develop a feeling of friendliness in relation to beings in general, a feeling of gladness in relation to those superior to oneself in merits, a feeling of compassion for those in misery, a feeling of neutrality in relation to those who in an idiot-like fashion are unworthy of instruction. 6

To reflect over the nature of the world in general and of body so as to develop a feeling of fear and of dispassion in relation to things worldly. 7

When defects are correctly viewed as belonging to the things that are to be renounced, then alone can a renunciation of these things be of a lasting character. Hence with a view to the steadiness of the vratas like non-violence etc., it is deemed necessary that defects be viewed as belonging to violence etc. This viewing of defects is here described in two ways - viz. a this-worldly viewing of defects and an other worldly viewing of defects. A this-worldly viewing of defects is an ever present realization of this worldly troubles that are experienced by oneself or by others as a result of resorting to violence, untruthfulness etc. Similarly, an other worldly viewing of defects consists in a realization of the other worldly undesirable contingencies that might be envisaged as possibly resulting from violence etc. To nourish the mental impressions pertaining to both these types of 'viewing' - that makes up the bhavana appropriate of the vratas like non-violence etc.

In an exactly like manner, when constant practice has been made of viewing the character 'being of the form of misery' as belonging to the tendencies that are to be renounced, then alone can a renunciation of these tendencies be particularly lasting. Hence instruction is here offered to the effect that constant practice should be made of the tendency to regard violence etc. as things of the form of misery (the practice being called duhkha-bhavana). The person accepting the vratas of non-violence etc. thinks of the misery caused to others by violence etc. - just as he thinks of the misery caused to oneself by them - that practice is duhkha-bhavana. And this bhavana is useful too for rendering these vratas steady.

As for the four bhavanas friendliness, gladness etc., they being of utmost use in the practice of any virtuous merit whatsoever are doubtless of particular use in the task of rendering steady vratas like non-violence etc.; hence it is that instruction relating to these four bhavanas has been offered here. The respective referential objects of these four bhavanas are to some extent different from one another; for in case each of these bhavanas is practised in relation to its specific referential object then alone is it able to bring about the mental state aimed at. Hence it is that these bhavanas have been described through mentioning

their respective referential objects.

(1) When the feeling of friendliness is practised in regard to all living beings whatsoever then alone is it possible for one to act in relation to each living being as non-violent, truthful, etc. Friendliness means to view others as one views oneself and hence the tendency or desire not to cause pain to others just as one does not cause pain to oneself.

(2) Often it so happens that one develops a feeling of jealousy on seeing someone superior to oneself. Now so long as this tendency is not exterminated it is not possible for non-violence, truthfulness etc. to find a firm standing. Hence as against jealousy one is instructed to practise the bhavana of the virtuous merit gladness. Gladness means to evince respect for one superior to oneself in merit and to feel pleased on seeing him flourishing. The referential object of this bhavana is a person superior to oneself in merit, for evil tendencies like jealousy, envy etc. are possible only in relation to such a person.

(3) If on seeing someone suffering pain a feeling of compassion is not roused in one, then it is impossible for one to observe to vratas like non-violence etc. Hence it is that the bhavana of compassion has been deemed necessary. Its referential object is a miserable person suffering pain; for it is a miserable, poor, helpless person who stands in need of considerate regard and assistance.

(4) It is not on every occasion and at every place that bhavanas of the form of a positive activity prove effective; for only too often the maintenance of an attitude of mere neutrality is of use in rendering steady the vratas like non-violence etc. Hence it is that one is instructed to practise the bhavana of neutrality. Neutrality means indifference or standing aloof. Thus when one comes across a person with an utterly idiotic mental background and one who is incapable of receiving into his head even a single salutary subject matter - moreover, when all attempt at reforming him ultimately comes to utter nought - then it is only worthwhile that an attitude of neutrality is a person unworthy of instruction - that is, an incapable person.

In the absence of fear for things worldly and of dispassion in relation to the same vratas like non-violence etc. are not possible at all; hence one practising these vratas first of all requires such fear and such dispassion. As for the seed of these fear and dispassion, that is sown through a reflection over the nature of the world in general and of body. Hence it is that one is instructed to practise a bhavana in the form of a reflection over the nature of these two.

All the living beings whatsoever do suffer pain - much or little. Life is utterly perishable, nor is any other thing of perdurable nature.

Such a reflection over the nature of the world in general puts an end to one's infatuation with this world and generates in one fear in relation to it. Similarly, through a reflection over the transitory, impure and worthless nature of body there is generated in one a feeling of non-attachment or dispassion towards objects internal as well as external. 4-7

The Nature of Violence :

The destruction of life due to an act involving negligence is violence. 8

The five vratas, non-violence etc. that have been described earlier - if they are to be properly understood and implemented during the course of one's life-activity then it is necessary that the nature of the defilements standing opposed to them be correctly comprehended. Hence begins this section dealing with the five defilements in question; of these the first - viz. violence - is defined in the present aphorism.

The present definition of non-violence has been rendered complete through two constituents; of these the first is pramattayoga (translated as 'an act involving negligence') meaning an act that involves attachment-cum-aversion and is careless, the second pranavadha (translated as 'the destruction of life'). Here the first constituent is of the form of a cause, the second of the form of its effect. Hence the net meaning of the aphorism is that whatever pranavadha is due to pramattayoga that is himsa or violence.

Question : To deprive a living being of its life or to inflict injury on it - that is violence. This meaning of violence is comprehensible to every one and is also much well knwon. Why then is the element yielded by the phrase pramattayoga superadded to this meaning?

Answer : So long as thought and action characterized by high refinement do not gain entry within the human society there is no particular difference between such a society and the other species of living beings so far as their practice is concerned. Just like animals and birds, a man belonging to such a society impelled by a prepossession deprives a living being of its life - knowingly or unknowingly, feeling a need or feeling no need whatsoever. When in this primitive stage of human society - so replete with violence - the thought of some individual is roused to reflect over the nature of violence, then he pronounces as a defilement the violence that is current - that is, violence of the form of depriving a living being of its life - and preaches that no living being should be deprived of its life. Thus on the one side there is a well-established tendency born of a custom like violence and on the other side the rise of the new attitude of non-violence, and when there ensues a conflict between the two certain questions - raised from the side of the

tendency to violence-automatically pose themselves before the opponent of violence; and these questions are also posed before him by others. In brief the questions are there :

(1) Even the advocates of non-violence have to maintain life after all, and it is impossible for one to maintain life without resorting to violence in one form or another. So the violence resorted to in connection with maintaining life-is that or is that not covered under the defilement designated violence?

(2) So long as it is not proved that it is possible for mistake and ignorance to be utterly absent from man's actions it is quite possible to envisage that some being is deprived of life at the hands of an advocate of non-violence through mistake or ignorance. So violence of this description - is it or is it not covered under the defilement designated violence?

(3) Often it so happen that one committed to non-violence seeks to save some one from a danger or to provide him with a pleasure or convenience but that the result is just the opposite - that is to say, the person sought to be helped happens to lose his very life. Now such violence taking place under conditions like these - is it or is it not covered under the defilements violence?

When such questions are posed then an endeavour to answer them results in a deeper consideration bestowed on the nature of violence and non-violence and in a further extension of the meaning of the terms concerned. To deprive a being of its life - at the most, to cause pain to a being - that was the meaning of violence uptil now; similarly, not to deprive a being of its life - at the most, not to cause pain to a being - that was the meaning of non-violence uptil now. But the theoreticians of non-violence now entered into subtleties and instead declared that a mere deprivation of life or a mere causing of pain must not necessarily be treated as a cause of defilement designated violence; thus besides the act of deprivation of life or of causing of pain what has to be further investigated is as to what was the mental feeling that actuated the agent concerned - whence alone it being possible to decide whether the act of violence in question was or was not a case of defilement. The mental feeling to be looked for in this connection is made up of the various impulses of attachment and aversion as also carelessness - a totality for which the technical designation is pramada or negligence. When deprivation of life or causing of pain results from an evil or petty mental feeling of this sort then alone is it a case of violence and such violence alone is of the form of defilement. On the other hand, deprivation of life or causing of pain taking place in the absence of the mental feeling in question might well be called violence on account of its outward appearance but is not a case of defilement. Thus when the refined attitude of non-violence gained currency in the midst of a society acustomed to violence and consequently when the thought pertaining to the matter

underwent development, then it was not deemed sufficient that violence be defined as mere deprivation of life but an important element in the form of pramattayoga or 'act involving negligence' was superadded to the proposed definition.

Question : In connection with the above definition of violence the question arises whether deprivation of life taking place in the absence of an act of negligence is or is not a case of violence. Similarly, the question is whether when deprivation of life does not take place but an act of negligence is present there we have or do not have a case of violence. And if both these are actual cases of violence then a further question is whether they are cases of violence born of an act of negligence or of violence of some other sort.

Answer : A mere deprivation of life, being a gross state of affairs, is certainly violence of a visible sort while a mere act of negligence, being a subtle state of affairs, is something invisible. But besides this difference as to being visible or otherwise there is another important difference between the two, and it is on this latter difference that it depends whether a case of violence is or is not a case of defilements. Thus a viewed outwardly deprivation of life is certainly a case of violence but it is not necessary that it must be a case of defilement; for its character of being a defilement is non dependent on itself. In the case of violence its being a defilement depends on the mental feeling of the person indulging in violence; hence this its character is dependent on something other than itself. If the mental feeling is question is itself evil then the deprivation of life resulting from it is a case of defilement; but if this mental feeling is not of that kind then this deprivation of life is not a case of defilement. Hence it is that in the technical terminology such violence not of the form of a defilement is called dravya himsa - that is, formal violence - or vyavaharika himsa - that is, violence practically speaking. Dravya himsa or vyavaharika himsa only means violence whose character of being a defilement is not open to cancellation. On the contrary, the subtle mental feeling of the form of an act of negligence itself being of the form of defilement its character of being a defilement is dependent on itself - that is to say, this its character is not dependent on a gross deprivation of life or on any other external happening. Thus even if deprivation of life did not take place and even if pain to it one actually lengthened the life-duration of this being or caused pleasure to it - but if the mental feeling obtaining on the occassion was evil then it is to be treated as an absolute case of defilement. Hence it is that in the technical terminology such a mental feeling is called bhava himsa - that is, material violence - or niscaya himsa - that is violence definitively speaking. Bhava himsa or niscaya himsa only means violence whose character of being a defilement, being dependent on itself, is not-open to cancellation during all the three phases of time. Thus when once it is understood that a mere act of

negligence and a mere deprivation of life - though each of them is called of violence their character of being a greater or lesser defilement is as just stated then an answer is automatically given to the question whether these two are cases of violence born of an act of negligence or of violence of some other sort. And the answer is to the effect that even if not visible to gross eyes it is a mere act of negligence that is a case of violence born of an act of negligence while a mere deprivation of life is not a case of violence of this sort.

Question : If as stated just above the root-cause of violence being a case of defilement is merely an act of negligence, then by way of defining violence one must simply say that it is of the form of an act of negligence. And if this reasoning be valid then the question naturally arises as to why the definition of violence contains a mention of deprivation of life.

Answer : Certainly, it is an act of negligence that is in truth a case of violence, but its renunciation on the part of people at large is not possible suddenly and for the most part. On the contrary, a mere deprivation of life - even if it is a gross act its renunciation is desirable for the sake of a balanced maintenance of popular life; besides, such renunciation is possible for the most part. Thus even if there has been no renunciation of all act of negligence but if the tendency towards a gross deprivation of life has been reduced - then too there often prevail happiness and calm in popular life. Certainly, in virtue of the stagewise evolution of the tendency to non-violence it becomes possible that among the people at large there takes place first the renunciation of a gross deprivation of life and gradually the renunciation of all act of negligence. Hence even though the renunciation of violence of the form of an act of negligence is recommended to be adopted as an instrument of high spiritual evolution, yet from the point of view of popular life the gross deprivation of life too is treated as a case of violence and its renunciation as a case of non-violence.

Question : Understood that non-violence means refrainment from what the theoretician has called violence. But let it be further told as to what duties aimed at building up life are incumbent on one who has accepted the vrata of non-violence as thus understood.

Answer : (1) To keep on rendering life simpler and simpler and to keep on reducing its requirements more and more.

(2) Whatever might be the scope of ignorance within the sphere of human activity there is yet place in it for knowledge as per one's endeavour. Hence to be ever vigilant and to be careful that no mistakes are committed, and if a mistake has been actually committed then to develop such a view that it is not thrust away out of sight.

(3) Even while reducing one's requirements and even while aiming at vigilance to constantly endeavour to reduce the craving for a gross life -

craving that is one real defilement of mind - as also the other defilements like attachment and aversion that are born of this one defilement.

Question : The character of being a defilement is above attributed to violence. What is meant by that?

Answer : Whatever reduces the softness of mind and augments like harshness, whatever prolongs the craving for a gross life - therein lies the character of being a defilement as attributed to violence. On the other hand, whatever does not augment the harshness in question and does not in the least disturb a natural loving disposition of mind and a life oriented inwards - all that, even if outworldly appearing like violence, is of the form of not a defilement. 8

The Nature of Untruthfulness :

To speak what is a-sat (that is, false or improper) that is untruthfulness. 9

Though in this aphorism speaking the a-sat has alone been called untruthfulness the phrase should be understood in a broad sense so that its meaning equally includes both thinking the a-sat and practising the a-sat; hence it is that the defilement designated untruthfulness covers speaking the a-sat, thinking the a-sat as well as practising the a-sat. Just as in the definition of violence so also in that of untruthfulness and of the remaining defilements like taking what is not given (i.e. theft) etc. the qualification 'due to an act involving negligence' has to be understood as superadded. Thus the net meaning of the aphorism is 'speaking the a-sat, thinking the a-sat of practising the a-sat which is due to an act involving negligence-that is untruthfulness.'

Here it will do to attribute two chief meanings to the word a-sat:

(1) To utterly deny the existence of a thing that does actually exist or while not denying its existence to describe it as it does not in fact exist-that is speaking the a-sat.

(2) To speak what is true but what causes distress to another person, it being accompanied by a mental ill-feeling directed against the latter-that is speaking the a-sat (that is, speaking what is reprehensible).

According to the first meaning there is a case of speaking the a-sat when a person who, while having money, says to his creditor that he has got no money or who, while not denying that he has got money, offers such an account of it that the creditor in unable to realize his dues. According to the second meaning there is a case of speaking the a-sat when

referring to a person who is illiterate or simpleton one says that he is illiterate or simpleton, a statement which, though true, has been made with a view to slighting this person and so as to cause him distress.

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1. The qualifications is not to be superadded in the case of the defilement of incontinence; for it is quite impossible for this defilement to occur in a state of non-negligence. That exactly is why the vrata of continence is said to be such as brooks no exception whatsoever. For details of the matter see the Gujarati essay "Jainadrstie Brahmacarya."

As a result of this understanding of untruthfulness the following duties turn out to be incumbent on one who accepts the vrata of truthfulness :

(1) To renounce all acts of negligence.
(2) To maintain uniformity in the activity of manas, speech and body.
(3) Not to speak, think or practise - out of ill-feeling- what is true but what proves disagreeable to another person. 9

The Nature of Theft :

To take what has not been given - that is theft. 10

A thing which is under the ownership of someone else - be it as lowly in worth as a blade of hay-to take it away stealthily without the permission of its owner - that is theft.

As a result of this definition of theft the following duties turn out to be incumbent on one who accepts the vrata of non-theft.

(1) To renounce the tendency to greediness towards any and every thing.
(2) So long as one is not rid of a greedy habit, to earn legitimately and through one's own edeavour the thing that is the object of one's greed - at the same time not to even think of taking without permission a thing of this description belonging to another person. 10

The Nature of A-brahma or Incontinence :

The act of maithuna-that is copulation-constitutes a-brahma or incontinence. 11

Maithuna or copulation means an act on the part of a mithuna or couple. The word 'mithuna' or 'couple' ordinarily stands for a pair of a woman and a man, but here it is to be understood in a somewhat broader sense. The pair in question can be made up of a woman and a man, a man and a man, or a woman and a woman; moreover, it can be homogeneous (that is, made up of two beings belonging to same one species, e.g. two men) or heterogenous (that is, made up of two beings belonging to two different

species, e.g. a man and an animal). An act of manas, speech or body impelled by sexual passion on the part of such a couple is called maithuna or copulation - that is, a-brahma or incontinence.

Question : When there exists no couple but a single man or a single woman impelled by sexual passion indulges in sexual misconduct making use of some inanimate object or his/her own bodily parts like hands etc. would that be a case of copulation according to the definition just proposed?

Answer : Of course, for copulation only means any act whatsoever impelled by sexual passion. And this description certainly applies to the said misbehaviour on the part of a single person; hence it too is a case of defilement designated copulation.

Question : Why has copulation been called a-brahma?

Answer : What is not brahma is a-brahma. And brahma means that whose observance is conducive to an augmentation of virtuous merits; on the other hand, a course of action which, when followed, results not in an augmentation of virtous merits but in a nourishment of defilements is a-brahma. Now copulation is an act involvement in which immediately initiates the process of an augmentation of all defilements and a diminution of all merits; hence it is that it is given the designation a-brahma. 11

The Nature of Parigraha or Attachment for possessions :

Murccha constitutes parigraha. 12

Murccha means attachment. Thus whether a thing be small or large, inanimatic or animate, external or internal - nay, even in case the thing in question does not exist at all - getting entangled with it - that is to say, losing all sense of discrimination out of a pinning for it - that is called parigraha.

Question : True it is that the five defilements from violence upto attachment for possessions, when viewed outwardly, seem to differ as to their nature, but on minute consideration it appears that they exhibit among themselves no difference whatsoever. For in the case of all these five defilements the character of being a defilement depends on nothing except attachment, aversion and infatuation. Certainly, attachment, aversion and infatuation constitute the poison that vitiates the activities like violence etc. - and it is on account of them that these activities are called defilement. Now if all this is correct then it should be sufficient to make declaration to the effect that attachment, aversion etc. are the cases of defilement. Why then undertake a description of the five - or more or less - defilements like violence etc.?

Answer : Granted that all worldly activity proceeds from attachment,

aversion etc. Hence attachment, aversion etc. are alone chiefly a defilement and to refrain from this defilement is the sole chief vrata. Even so, when one is to be instructed as to refrainment from attachment, aversion etc. then it is only through an elucidation of the activities proceeding from them that one can be asked to refrain from those activities as also from attachment, aversion etc. that impel them. Certainly, while dealing with the gross-witted people no other order of procedure can possibly be adopted. Now of the innumerable activities proceeding from attachment and aversion violence, untruthfulness etc. are the chief ones. And it is these activities that cheifly eat up into the vitals of life - spiritual or worldly; hence it is that these activities like violence etc. have been divided into five types and thus an account offered to the five defilements in question. Of course, from time to time and depending in question. Of course, from time to time and depending on the difference of country there has been in past and there is to be in future a difference as to the number of defilements brought under consideration. However, without bothering our heads as to the number of these defilements or their gross names this much is to be chiefly understood that through a delineation of them what is indicated is but a refrainment from the defilements of the form of attachment, aversion and infatuation. And hence it is that there remains no question as to which among the five defilements violence etc. is chief, which subordinate, which of them is to be renounced first, which later on. As a matter of fact, the defilement of violence, as broadly understood, includes within itself all the remaining ones. Hence it is that one who views non-violence as the chief of virtues includes within the defilement of violence all the remaining defilements untruthfulness etc., and thus feels that a refrainment from mere violence means a refrainment from all the defilements. Similarly, one who views truthfulness as the chief of virtues includes within the defilements of untruthfulness all the remaining defilements and feels that a refrainment from mere untruthfulness means a refrainment from all the defilements. The same reasoning is adopted also by those who view contentment, continence or the like as the chief of virtues. 12

The First Requirement of a True Vratin -
that is, of One Truly Committed to Vratas :

Only he who is devoid of a thorn can be a true vratin. 13

Through a mere formal acceptance of the vratas like non-violence, truth etc. one does not become a true vratin; rather in order to become a true vratin one has to observe a minimum or first condition - which is mentioned here. The condition is the renunciation of a thorn. In brief, the thorns are three in number.

(1) False pretension, deception, or a tendency to cheat; (2) Greed for worldly enjoyments; (3) Not to have faith in what is true or to insist on what is false. All the three are of the form of a mental defilement. So

long as they are there they eat up into the vitals of the mind and the body and they do prevent the soul from retaining its balance. Hence a person possessed of a thorn, even if he formally accepts a vrata, cannot concentrate on its observance. When a thorn or some such sharp thing is kept thrust within a bodily part then the body and the mind of the person concerned are deprived of their balance by this irritant and as a result this person is prevented from concentrating on any task; in a like manner do the mental defilements in question act as a cause of unease - which is why a renunciation of them is the first condition of becoming a vratin. 13

The Types of Vratin :

There are two possible types of Vratin - viz. agarin (lit. one with a house) or householder and anagarin (lit. one without a house) or world renouncer. 14

Not all those accepting vratas are possessed of similar capacities. Hence corresponding to the greater or lesser effectiveness of their capacities the vratins are divided into two types - viz. (1) agarin and (2) anagara. Agara means house. And he who stands associated with a house in agarin. So agarin means householder. Similarly, he who does not stand associated with a householder. Similarly, he who does not stand associated with a house in anagara - that is, a world-renouncer, a monk. Though the direct meaning of the words agarin and anagara refers to residing in a house and not residing in a house yet what has to be adopted here is the corresponding intended meaning, and viewed from that end an agarin is one afflicted with worldly desires while an anagarin one free from worldly desires. When this intended meaning is adopted the net purport of the aphorism turns out to be as follows : If a person, even while residing in a house, is free from all worldly desires then he is in fact an anagara; on the other hand, if a person, who has renounced his house and resides in a forest, is not yet free from worldly desires then he is in fact an agarin. Thus the true and chief criterion of being an agarin and being an anagara is just one, and it is on the basis of it that the vratins are here classified into two types.

Question : If an agarin is so called because he is afflicted with worldly desires then how can such a one be called a vratin?

Answer : Broadly speaking, just as a man in fact resides in his own house or in some such fixed place and yet under certain definite conditions it is said about him that he resides in that particular city, similarly a person who while yet afflicted with worldly desires is associated with vratas in a small measure can on that account be called a vratin even. 14

An Account of the Vratin of the Type Agarin :

He who is anuvratadharin - that is, one committed to a minor-scale observance of the vratas - is a vratin of the type agarin. 15

He is also committed to an observance of the vratas designated digvirati, desavirati, anarthadandavirati, samayika, pausadhopavasa, upabhoga-paribhoga-parimana, atithisamvibhaga. 16

And he also undertakes a performance of samlekhana unto death. 17

The householder who is not in a position to undertake a full-scale observance of the vratas like non-violence etc. but who is possessed of a tendency to refrainment from worldly enjoyment, such a person, while yet comforming to the limitations imposed on a householder is called a layman committed to a minor-scale observance of the vratas.

The vratas accepted with a view to full-scale observance are called mahavratas and since the vow taken in connection with them refers to a total commitement there obtains no difference of degree in the case of such a vrata; but when these vratas are accepted on a small-scale then since smallness can be of various degrees the vow taken in connection with one of them is possibly of many different types. However, the aphorist, without entering into the variety that thus pertains to each single minor-scale vrata, describes as one minor-scale vrata each of the vratas non-violence etc. accepted by a householder. Such minor-scale vratas are five which, inasmuch as they serve as root or foundation stone for world-renunciation, are called mulaguna - that is fundamental virtue - or mulavrata - that is, fundamental vrata. And with a view to protecting, nourishing and purifying these fundamental vratas a householder also accepts certain other vratas known as uttaraguna - that is, subsidiary virtue - or uttaravrata - that is, subsidiary vrata.

Such subsidiary vratas are here briefly enumerated to be seven. And there is also reference here to a vrata that a householder vratin is impelled to adopt right at the end of his life; that vrata is designated samlekhana. The following is a summary delineation of the nature of all these vratas.

The Five Minor-scale Vows :

(1) Not being in a position to refrain from all violence - whether undertaken through manas or through speech or

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1. Generally speaking, the entire tradition of Lord Mahavira is without a difference of opinion as to the number five of the minor-scale vows, or as to their name or their order of enumeration. Only in the Digambara tradition certain authorities have enumerated 'refrainment from nightly eating' as a sixth minor-scale vow. But as regards the householder's

vratas treated as secondary virtues there are current a number of traditions, old and new. In the Svetambara sect two such traditions are observable, one that pertaining to the Tattvarthasutra, the other that pertaining to the texts like Agamas etc. The first enumerates not upabhogaparibhagaparimanavrata but desaviramanavrata after digviramanavrata, while the second enumerates upabhogaparibhogaparimanavrata after digviramanavrata and desaviramanavrata after samayikavrata. But inspite of this difference as to the order of enumeration there is here no difference at all as to designating a particular set of three of these vratas as gunavrata and the set of the remaining four as siksavrata. On the other hand, in the Digambara sects as many as six traditions are current as to subsidiary virtues; thus different views are held on the question by the authorities like Kundakunda, Umasvati, Samantabhadra, Svami-Kartikeya, Jinasena, Vasunandin. In connection with this difference of views the divergence pertains sometimes to name, sometimes to the order of enumeration, sometimes to number, sometimes to the development of meaning. Those desirous to familiarize themselves with the details of the matter must go through Babu Jugalkishoraji Mukhtar's Hindi book 'Jainacaryom ka Sasanabheda' from p.29 onwards. Publisher Jainagrantharatnakar Karyalaya, Hirabag, Bombay.

through body-directed against anything, big or small, to refrain from all violence that goes beyond the limit set for oneself by oneself keeping in view the needs of one's life as a householder - that is the minor-scale vow of non-violence.

(2-5) Likewise, to refrain from all untruthfulness, all theft, all incontinence, all attachment for possessions that goes beyond the limit set for oneself by oneself keeping in view one's specific conditions of life-these are respectively the minor-scale vows of truthfulness, non-theft, continence, non-attachment.

The Three Gunavratas :

(6) In conformity to one's capacity to refrain from the worldly enjoyment, to fix a limit in all the directions east, west, etc. and not to undertake any un-virtuous act whatsoever beyond this limit - that is called digvirati vrata.

(7) Even when a limit has been fixed in a particular direction to impose from time to time a further limit within this limit and not to undertake any un-virtuous act whatsoever beyond the inner limit thus imposed - that is called desavirati-vrata.

(8) Making an exception of all un-virtuous act that might be necessary for the fulfilment of some worldly need of one's own to refrain from all un-virtuous act whatsoever - that is to say, to refrain from all unvirtuous act that serves no purpose - that is anarthadandavirati-vrata.

The Four Siksavratas :

(9) Making a mental fixation of time - that is, for a fixed period of time - to refrain from all un-virtuous act whatsoever and to remain engaged in a virtuous act - that is samayika-vrata.

(10) On the 8th, 14th or full-moon date of the lunar month - or on any other date - to keep fast, to refrain from bodily decoration, to keep awake during night time engaged in virtuous acts - that is called pausadhopavasa-vrata.

(11) To refrain from such a use of food and drink, ornaments, clothing, utensils etc. as involves much un-virtue and to fix a limit even for such a use of these things as involves little un-virtue - that is upabhogaparibhogaparimana-vrata.

(12) To donate with a feeling of pure devotion to a worthy recipient things of daily need like food and drink etc. such as have been earned legitimately and are in a usable condition, a donation so made as to prove advantageous to both the parties concerned - that is, atithisamvibhaga-vrata.

With a view to putting a complete end to the kasayas, to weaken them through reducing the causes that make them come into play and nourish them - that is samlekhana. Since the vrata of samlekhana is accepted for a period lasting upto the end of the present body it is called samlekhana unto death. The samlekhana vrata of this description can be accepted in full faith and fully implemented even by a householder; hence it is that a householder has been said to be a performer of this vrata.

Question : One accepting the vrata of samlekhana puts an end to one's body through fasting etc., but that amounts to suicide while suicide is a case of violence against oneself. How far then is it proper to accord it the status of a vrata within the fold of a religion of renunciation?

Answer : Simply on the ground that the vrata in question is apparently of the form of suffering or apparently of the form of destruction of life it does not become a case of violence.

The nature of violence proper is essentially constituted by a tendency to attachment, aversion and infatuation; now in the vrata of samlekhana there certainly takes place a destruction of life but since this destruction does not come about through attachment, aversion or infatuation the vrata does not become a case of violence. Nay, this vrata is born out of a constant practice of the feeling of lack of infatuation and of lack of passion and it attains completion only when this feeling is sought to be fully mastered; hence it is a case not of violence but of subha-dhyana - that is, auspicious meditation - or suddha dhyana - that is, ultra pure meditation and it is as such that is accorded a place

within the fold of a religion of renunciation.

Question : Even in certain non-Jaina sects there was and is current the custom of putting an end to one's life and treating it as a religious act - e.g. the custom called Kamalapuja, Bhairavajapa, Jalasamadhi etc. - ; how does the custom differ from that of samlekhana?

Answer : So far as the gross appearance of destruction of life is concerned all these acts are doubtless similar, hence if at all they can differ from one another that can be only as to the mental feeling actuating them. Thus if at the back of Kamalapuja etc. there is present no material aspiration or some other such greed but a mere impulse of devotion or a mere tendency to surrender, then a situation like this differs from that of samlekhana - where neither an impulse nor a greed is present - only as to the feeling of devotion built up on the basis of a metaphysics. Thus in conformity to the metaphysics lying at its back the Jaina devotion is aimed not at surrendering oneself before someone else or pleasing someone else but at a mere self-purification. Thus a refined version of the various old established religious customs involving a destruction of one's own life - a version devised for the sake of fulfilling the aim in question - is present with the Jaina sect in the form of the vrata of samlekhana. Hence it is that the vrata of samlekhana has been recommended as suitable for particular occasions.

When the end of life appears to be drawing near for certain, when the religion and such other necessary duties are in the danger of perishing through non-observance, when no sort of vicious meditation is present there at all - these are conditions under which this vrata is deemed worthy of observance. 15-17

The Aticaras or Failures of Conduct Connected
with Samyak-darsana or Right inclination :

Doubt, longing, inconstancy of understanding, praising those holding an alien view, developing intimacy with those holding an alien view - these five are failures of conduct connected with samyak darsana. 18

The type of moral deviations on account of which a vrata that has been accepted gets bedimmed and gradually diminishing ultimately perishes are called 'failures of conduct'.

Now samyaktva is the fundamental basis of all code of right conduct, and it is on its purity that the purity of conduct is dependent. Hence the failures of conduct that are likely to disturb the purity of samyaktva are here described by being divided into five classes.

(1) After having adopted the viewpoint of the Jaina scriptures to

raise as regards certain subtle or suprasensuous entities - which in fact are cognizable only by an omniscient or on the basis of scriptural testimony - doubt as to whether they exist or do not - that is failure of conduct of the form of doubt. In Jaina metaphysics there is full scope for doubt as also for investigation based on it; if nevertheless doubt is here described as a failure of conduct then the intention is to discourage all attempt at applying the criteria of rational viewpoint to matters that lie outside the field of reasoning. Such an attempt results in a situation that the spiritual realizer, having failed to rationally comprehend a field amenable to faith alone, ultimately loses interest even in the field actually amenable to rational comprehension. Hence only that doubt which obstructs the progress of spiritual realization is to be given up as a failure of conduct.

(2) A wish for this worldly and other worldly objects - that is called 'longing'. When such a longing begins to take place the spiritual realizer can any time give up his adopted doctrine without having reflected over its merits and defects. Hence it is called a failure of conduct.

(3) Even when there obtains occasions for a difference of opinion or a difference of view then too not to take a decided stand oneself but to say out of sheer dull-wittedness 'this position is correct and that too is correct' - this sort of unsteadiness of intellect is called 'inconstancy of understanding.' Such unsteadiness of intellect does not allow the spiritual realizer to remain firm on some one principle and is therefore of the nature of a failure of conduct. (4-5) To praise and to develop intimacy with those holding a perverted view are respectively called 'praising those holding a false view' and 'developing intimacy with those holding a false view'. Even in persons suffering from the defect of holding a deluded view virtues like thoughtfulness, renunciation etc. are quite often present. When on the basis of an attraction towards those virtues of his and without discriminating between merits and defects such a person is praised or intimacy is developed with him then the danger is that the spiritual realizer not yet ripe in discrimination might deviate from his adopted doctrine. Hence it is that praising those holding an alien view and developing intimacy with those holding an alien view are called failures of conduct. The spiritual realizer who with a feeling of impartiality and discrimination views merits as merits and defects as defects, in his case it is not necessary that the praise in question or the intimacy in question must prove harmful. These five failures of conduct are common to all vratins - whether laymen or monks -; for samyaktva is a characteristic common to them both. 18

The Failures of Conduct Connected with the Vratas and Silas Enumerated and Described :

Connected with the different vratas and silas and there are five failures of conduct each. Taken in order they are as follows : 19

Binding, injuring, piercing the body, loading excessive burden, denying food and drink - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale vrata of non-violence. 20

False instruction, false accusation in private, forgery, misappropriating a pledged property, divulging someone's secret - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale vrata of truthfulness. 21

To encourage someone to commit theft, to receive what has been brought by a thief, to violate the taxation regulations of an opposite kingdom, to measure out more or less than the proper quantity, to deal in counterfeit commodities - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale vrata of non-theft. 22

To arrange someone else's marraige, to enjoy a woman kept by someone else, to enjoy a woman looked after by none, unnatural sexual act, intensive desire for sexual act - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale vrata of continence. 23

To exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of fields and residential quarters, similarly to exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of manufactured and raw gold and silver, for that of cattle wealth and corn, for that of servants and maid servants, for that of clothes and utensils - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the minor scale vrata of non attachment for possessions. 24

To violate the regulation prescribed for the upward direction, to violate that prescribed for the downward direction, to violate that prescribed for the transverse direction, to make addition to the sphere of regulation, not to keep in memory a regulation that has been prescribed - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the digvirati vrata. 25

To get a thing brought by someone from outside the prescribed sphere, to send a servant to bring something from outside the prescribed sphere, to make a sound with a view to calling someone form outside th prescribed sphere, to make a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere, to make a bodily gesture for the same purpose, to throw outwards some physical stuff for the same purpose - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the desavirati vrata. 26

Uncultured talks, jokes etc., unbecoming bodily gestures, talkativeness, lending things to others without a proper thought,

possessing in excess the things of daily requirement - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the anarthadandaviramana vrata. 27

Improper bodily movement, improper speech, improper mental act, feeling of disregard, lack of requisite memory - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the samayika vrata. 28

To evacuate, urinate etc. at a place not properly inspected and not properly cleansed of dust, to receive and place things at such a place, to arrange bedding at such a place, feeling of disregard, lack of requisite memory - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the pausadhopavasa vrata. 29

To eat what possesses life, to eat a thing containing what possesses life, to eat a thing mixed with what possesses life, to eat what causes intoxication, to eat what is not properly cooked - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the upabhogaparibhoga-parimana-vrata. 30

To place the thing to be donated inside what possesses life, to cover it by what possesses life, to say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else, malice, violating the fixed time - these five are the failures of conduct connected with the atithisamvibhaga vrata. 31

To wish for life, to wish for death, affection for friends, refreshing the memory of past pleasures, to wish for some sort of enjoyment as a result of penance and renunciation - these five are the failures of conduct connected with samlekhana unto death. 32

The rule of conduct that is accepted in full faith and with a full understanding - that is called vrata. In accordance with this meaning of the word vrata all those twelve vratas of a householder are properly called vrata. However, in the present context by employment of the two words vrata and sila it has been indicated that the fundamental rules pertaining to a code of right conduct are just five - viz. non-violence, truthfulness etc. - while the remaining rules - viz. digviramana etc. - are only meant to buttress those fundamental ones. And when in connection with each vrata and each sila five failures of conduct have been enumerated that has to be understood from a moderate standpoint; for from the standpoint of brevity this number can be further reduced while from that of expansion it can be further increased.

Carita or right conduct means the constant development of the feeling of equanimity resulting from an absence of the mental perturbances like attachment, aversion etc. And in order to realize this fundamental nature of caritra whatever rules of conduct like non-violence, truthfulness etc. are adopted in practical life - they too are called caritra. However,

since practical life is built up in accordance with the conditions of place and time and with the level of refinement of human intellect when there is a difference in these conditions and in this level of refinement there comes about a difference in the practical arrangement of life; the result is that even while the fundamental nature of caritra is one and the same the number and nature of the rules supposed to buttress it are bound to be different under different conditions. This exactly is why the vratas and regulations prescribed for the laymen are variously described in the scriptural texts, and in future too they are bound to undergo changes. However, in the present context the author has divided the duties of a householder into thirteen types and has described the failures of conduct connected with each. Taken in order they are as follows.

Failures of conduct Connected with the Vrata of Non-violence :

(1) To check a living being from proceeding to its desired place or to bind it - that is binding.

(2) To thrash with a stick, a whip or the like - that is injuring.

(3) To tear or to prick the bodily parts like ear, nose, skin etc. - that is piercing the body.

(4) To load on a man or a beast burden which it is beyond his or its capacity to bear - that is loading excessive burden. (5) To check someone from receiving his food or drink - that is denying food and drink.

When no particular purpose is to be served thereby these five evil acts are in no case to be undertaken by a house holder - that is the general rule; but in case as a part of the householder's duty they are to be undertaken for some purpose or other then the need is to proceed in a soft natured manner. 19-20

Failure of conduct Connected with the Vrata of Truthfulness :

(1) By telling one things true and false to mislead one into a wrong path - that is false instruction.

(2) Impelled by passion and out of fear to separate from one another a husband and a wife or two friends, alternatively, to level accusation against someone in the presence of someone else - that is false accusation in private.

(3) To produce a false document through seal, signature etc. or to circulate a counterfeit coin - that is forgery.

(4) If the person who has pledged a security forgets something connected with the fact then taking advantage of his forgetfulness to misappropriate a small or large part of the property concerned - that is misappropriating a pledged property.

(5) With a view to terminating friendship between two persons to speak ill of one to the other, alternatively, to divulge someone's secret - that is divulging someone's secret. 21

Failures of conduct Connected with the Vrata of Non-theft :

(1) To rouse someone to commit theft or to get him roused to do so through someone else, or to give consent to someone's act of theft - that is encouraging someone to commit theft.

(2) To receive from someone what he has brought through stealing though without oneself rousing him to commit theft or approving his act of theft - that is receiving what has been brought by a thief.

(3) The different kingdoms impose restrictions on the export and import of commodities or they levy some tax on them; now to violate regulations connected with all this - that is violating taxation regulations of the opposite kingdom.

(4) To give or take things employing faulty means, weights balances - that is measuring out more or less than the proper quantity.

(5) To deal in counterfeit commodities. 22

Failures of conduct Connected with the Vrata of Continence :

(1) Not being content with arranging the marriage of one's own children to do the same in the case of someone else's children either out of affection or with a view to reaping the beneficial fruit of kanyadana or a girl's marriage (lit. making gift of a virgin) - that is arranging someone else's marriage.

(2) When someone else has reserved for oneself a prostitute or some such common woman for a certain period then to enjoy her during that very period - that is enjoying a woman kept by someone else.

(3) To enjoy a woman who is a prostitute, or whose husband has gone out, or who is helpless, or who is possession of no man - that is called enjoying a woman looked after by none.

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1. For details of the matter see the Gujarati essay Jainadrstie Brahmacarya.

(4) Unnatural sexual act.

(5) To indulge in multifarious sexual act by frequently rousing passion - that is intensive desire for sexual act. 23

Failure of conduct Connected with the Vrata of Non-attachment for possessions :

(1) To exceed the quantity that has been fixed for the possession of fields and residental quarters - thus the quantity fixed at the time of accepting the vrata being subsequently exceeded out of greed.

(2) The same relating to the possession of manufactured and raw gold and silver.
(3) The same relating to the possession of cattle wealth like cow, buffaloes etc. and corns like wheat, bajari etc.
(4) The same relating to the possession of servants and maid-servants.
(5) The same relating to the possession of the various sorts of clothes and utensils. 24

Failures of conduct Connected with the Digviramana-vrata :

(1) After having fixed the limit of height for climbing a tree, mountain etc. to violate this limit out of greed or some such mental perturbance - that is called violating the regulation prescribed for the upward direction.
(2-3) Likewise, violating the regulation prescribed for the downward direction or that prescribed for the transverse direction.
(4) When spheres with different limits have been fixed for different directions then at some occasion as per need to make reduction from the sphere pertaining to one direction and to make an equivalent addition to that pertaining to another direction - that is called making addition to the sphere of regulation.
(5) Not to keep in memory a regulation that has been prescribed - memory being the basis of all observance of a regulation. 25

Failures of conduct Connected with the Desaviramana-vrata :

(1) When a thing lying outside the prescribed sphere is got in case of need out by oneself going outside this sphere but through someone else present outside this sphere to whom a message etc. has been sent - that is called getting a thing brought by someone from outside the prescribed sphere.
(2) Likewise, when such a thing is got not by oneself going outside the prescribed sphere or by inviting someone from outside this sphere but by ordering a servant etc. to bring it - that is called sending a servant to bring something from outside the prescribed sphere.
(3) When in case of need a person present outside the prescribed sphere is cautioned to come near oneself through making a sound like that of coughing etc. - that is called making a sound with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere.
(4) Likewise, when such a person is cautioned to come near oneself through making a bodily gesture - that is called making a bodily gesture with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere.
(5) Likewise, when hint is given to a person to come near oneself through throwing towards him a gravel, stone, a lump of dry mud or the like - that is called throwing outwards some physical stuff with a view to calling someone from outside the prescribed sphere. 26

Failures of conduct Connected with the Anarthadandaviramana-vrata :

(1) Uncultured talks, jokes etc. - undertaken out of passion.

(2) The same when there are added to them unbecoming bodily gestures - like those of a buffoon.

(3) To talk much shamelessly and without coherence - that is talkativeness.

(4) When sinful instruments of act are lent out to someone else without taking into consideration one's own requirements connected with them - that is called lending things to others without proper thought.

(5) Possessing in excess the things of daily requirement - like clothes, ornaments, oil, sandalwood etc. 27

Failures of conduct Connected with the Samayika-vrata :

(1) To move in an useless and improper manner the bodily parts like hands, feet etc. - that is called improper bodily movement.

(2) To utter a speech that is devoid of word-refinement and is meaningless as well as harmful - that is called improper speech.

(3) To undertake mental acts like thinking etc. under the influence of the mental perturbances like anger, enmity etc. - that is called improper mental act.

(4) Not to feel enthused about performing the samayika - that is to say, not to take it up even when the time for it arrives or to take it up in a slovenly manner - that is called feeling of disregard.

(5) On account of an absence of concentration - that is, on account of the unsteadiness of mind - loss of the memory related to the samayika - that is called lack of requisite memory. 28

Failures of conduct Connected with the Pausadhopavasa-vrata :

(1) To evacuate, urinate, cleanse the running nose etc. at a place not properly inspected - with a view to detecting living bodies - and not properly cleansed of dust through some soft implement.

(2) Likewise, to receive and place things - like stick, wooden-seat etc. - at such a place.

(3) Likewise, to arrange bedding or seating at such a place.

(4) Not to feel enthused about the pausadha and to take it up in a slovenly manner - that is called feeling of disregard.

(5) Not to remember as to when and how the pausadha has to be or not to be performed - or as to whether it has already been performed or not - that is called lack of requisite memory. 29

Failures of conduct Connected with the Bhogopabhogaparimana-vrata :

(1) To eat any type of vegetable etc. that possesses life - that is called eating what possesses life.

(2) To eat ripe fruits like mango, berry etc. that contain seed, stone etc. which possess life - that is called eating a thing containing what possesses life.

(3) To eat things like laddu (a sweetmeat) etc. that are mixed with sesamum etc. which possess life, or to eat things mixed with ants, worms etc. - that is called eating a thing mixed with what possesses life.

(4) To consume any type of intoxicating substance or a drink like wine etc. prepared through a mixture of various substances - that is called eating what causes intoxication.

(5) To eat what is not properly cooked - or whats is half-cooked. 30

Failures of conduct Connected with the Atithi-samvibhaga-vrata :

(1) A food or drink meant for donation when placed inside something possessing life - and so placed so that it becomes unfit for use - that is called placing the thing to be donated inside what possesses life.

(2) Likewise, such a thing when covered by something possessing life - that is called covering the thing to be donated by what possesses life.

(3) To say about one's own possession that it belongs to someone else. - so as to absolve oneself honourably from the duty to donate it.

(4) Even while making a donation not to have a feeling of respect for the donee, or to undertake donation out of a feeling of envy towards someone else's virtue as a donor - that is called malice.

(5) To finish eating while it is no time for alms so as to avoid the chance of offering a donation - that is called violating the fixed time. 31

Failures of conduct Connected with the Samlekhana-vrata :

(1) On viewing the fortunes like worship, honour etc. done to oneself to get tempted by them and to long for life - that is called wishing for life.

(2) On viewing that nobody comes to offer worship, honour etc. to oneself, to get bored and hence to long for death - that is called wishing for death.

(3) Affection for friends - or for sons etc. as for friends.

(4) Refreshing the memory of past pleasures.

(5) To wish for some sort of enjoyment as a result of penance and renunciation.

All the failures of conduct enumerated above, when they are practised intentionally and out of crookedness, are of the form of an utter violation of the vrata concerned and hence are in fact the cases of misconduct; on the other hand, when they are practised out of carelessness which in its turn is born of forgetfulness they are the cases of failure of conduct proper. 32

An Account of Dana or Donation :

For the sake of rendering benefit to renounce a thing belonging to oneself - that is called donation. 33

The special merit of a donation depends on the special merit of the procedure adopted, the thing donated, the donor and the donee. 34

The duty of donation is the very root of all the five virtues of life. Hence a development of it is, from the ultimate point of view, the basis for an enhancement of the remaining virtues while from the practical point of view it is the basis for the balance obtaining in human arrangements.

Donation means offering to someone else a thing come in one's possession through legitimate means. The offering must prove beneficial both to the person making th offer and to the person receiving it. The benefit accruing to the donor consists in that he is rid of the attachment felt for the thing concerned - as a result of which he comes to develop a feeling of contentment and equanimity. The benefit accruring to the donee consists in that the thing concerned proves helpful to him in his life journey as a result of which his virtues receive proper unfolding.

Though all donations qua donation are akin to one another the result yielded by them is characterized by degrees; these degrees are accounted for by the special merit of the duty of the form of donation. This special merit, in its turn is due to the special merit of the four elements of the duty of donation. The following is an account of the special merit of these elements :

(1) The special merit of the procedure adopted : Here are included considerations like offering such a thing as suits the concerned place and time and such as proves no obstruction to the principle of the donee.

(2) The special merit of the substance : Here is included the merit of the thing donated.

The thing offered by way of donation must be such as proves beneficial in the life journey of the donee and hence such a proves cause for development of his meritorious qualities.

(3) The special merit of the donor - e.g. a feeling of respect towards the donee, absence of a feeling of contempt or malice towards him, not to feel regret for the act of donation - either at the time of performing it or afterwards.

(4) The special merit of the donee : The donee must always remain wide awake to undertake endeavour of a right sort - this is the sole merit requisite in a donee. 33-34

CHAPTER EIGHT

An account of the vratas and donation having been offered in connection with the account of the fundamental verity asrava or inflow there now begins an account of the fundamental verity bandha or bondage.

First of all the causes of bondage are mentioned :

Mithyatva or absence of right faith, avirati or absence of discipline, pramada or negligence, kasaya or passion, yoga or activity - these five are the causes of bondage. 1

The nature of bondage is going to be described in the next aphorism; only its causes are being mentioned here. As regards the number of the causes of bondage three traditions are observable. According to one tradition kasaya and yoga - only these two are the causes of bondage; according to another mithyatva, avirati, kasaya and yoga - these four are the causes of bondage; as for the third tradition it adds pramada to these latter four causes and thus makes their number five. Thus even if these traditions differ from one another as to the number and hence as to the names concerned they do not at all differ as to the essentials of the matter. E.g. pramada is but a type of asamyama or un-restrain and so is included either in avirati or in kasaya; and it is from this viewpoint that in the texts like Karmaprakrti etc. there have been enumerated just four causes of bondage. Viewed minutely both mithyatva and avirati are not essentially different from kasaya; so in the last count kasaya and yoga these two are the only causes of bondage.

Question : If this is how things stand then the question is as to what is the basis for these different traditions as to the number of causes of bondage having been current.

Answer : When any karma whatsoever is bound down then four elements at the most are built up into it; and it is as the separate causes of these four that the two causes of bondage - viz. kasaya and yoga - make their appearance. To be precise, its belonging to a certain basic type and its being made up of certain number of physical particles is due to yoga, while its possessing certain duration and certain intensity is due to kasaya. Thus it is with a view to analysing the causes of the above four elements produced in one and the same karma that the theoretical treatizes make mention of the two causes of bondage - viz. kasaya and yoga; and it is with a view to accounting for the greater or lesser number of karma-types bound down in the different gunasthanas-which are of the form of the graduated stages of spiritual progress-that there have been mentioned the four causes of bondage - viz. mithyatva, avirati, kasaya and yoga. Thus the greater is the number of the causes of bondage from among

these four present in a gunasthana the greater the bondage of karma types taking place in it; on the other hand, when the causes of bondage are fewer in number then the bondage of karma-types too is lesser. Thus the tradition of mentioning the four causes of bondage mithyatva etc. is meant to account for the greater or lesser karmic bondage taking place in the different gunasthanas; on the other hand, the tradition of mentioning the two causes of bondage - viz. kasaya and yoga - is meant to separately lay down the cause of the four elements possibly present in one and the same karma. As for the tradition of mentioning the five causes of bondage its purport is not different from that of mentioning the four; at the most it might be said that the former tradition is meant to impart to the inquisitive students a more detailed information as regards the causes of bondage.

An Interpretation of the Causes of bondage :

Mithyatva :

Mithyatva means mithyadarsana - that is, that which stands opposed to samyak-darsana. Now samyak-darsana being of the form of a right faith as regards the nature of things the darsana (that is, the faith) that stands opposed to it turns out to be of two types - viz. (i) the absence of a right faith as regards the nature of things, and (ii) a wrong faith as regards the same. The two types differ in that the former is possible even in a state of utter absence of thought while the latter is possible only in a state of positive thought. Even when there has been a development of the capacity for thought, in case a person impelled by a prejudice sticks to some one single standpoint then since there there is a partisanship of untruth inspite of the presence of a state of positive thought the standpoint in question is a case of mithyadarsana or wrong faith. And since this state of affairs is something born of instruction it is called abhigrhita or 'something taken up'. In the period when the state of positive thought is not yet stirred up there is present only an absence of thought resulting from the beginingless concealment pertaining to thought. At that time there is not present faith in what is wrong, just as there is not present faith in what is right; rather since there is then a mere absence of thought what is then present is a mere absence of faith in what is right. And since this state of affairs is something natural - that is, something not a result of instruction - it is called anabhigrhita or 'something not taken up'. All the one-sided prejudiced attachments for a standpoint or a sect are cases of abhigrhita-mithyadarsana - that is, absence of right faith that has been taken up; they are possible only in a developed species like man. As for the anabhigrhita-mithyadarsana - that is, absence of right faith that has not been taken up, it is possible even in species like worm, moth etc. with consciousness lying dorment.

Avirati :

Avirati means not to desist from vicious acts.

Pramada :

Pramada means self forgetfulness - that is, having no feeling of regard for virtuous acts. Not to remain cautious as to the memory of what has to be done and what has not to be done.

Kasaya :

Kasaya means violating the limit of equanimity.

Yoga :

Yoga means an act of manas, speech or body.

The causes of bondage tatpradosa etc. enumerated in the chapter six and the causes of bondage mithyatva etc. enumerated here differ from one another in that the former are a special cause of a special karma - type while the latter are a common cause of bondage obtaining in the case of all the karma types. From among the five causes of bondage mithyatva etc. when an earlier mentioned one obtains a later mentioned one must obtain; for example, when mithyatva obtains the four causes avirati etc. must obtain, when avirati obtains the three causes pramada etc. must obtain. On the contrary, when a later mentioned member of the series in question obtains an earlier mentioned one might or might not obtain; for example, when avirati obtains then in the first gunasthana mithyatva too obtains, but in the second, third and fourth gunasthana there obtains no mithyatva inspite of avirati obtaining. The same conditions should be applied to the remaining cases as well. 1

The Nature of bondage :

On account of its association with a kasaya a jiva receives into itself physical particles liable to become karma. 2

That is called bondage. 3

There are numerous varganas or groupings of pudgala. From among them the grouping that possesses the capacity to undergo transformation of the form of karma is received into itself by a jiva and is attached by it to its constituent units in a particular fashion. That is to say, even while amurta or non-tangible by nature a jiva since it has been associated with karmas since a beginningless time has become akin to something murta; and it is as such that it receives into itself the karmic particles that are murta.

Just as a lamp draws up oil through its wick and through the instrumentality of its own heat makes this oil undergo transformation of the form of flame, so also does a jiva through the instrumentality of its mental perturbances of the form of kasaya receive into itself the appropriate physical particles and make them undergo transformation of the

form of karma. The association with the constituent units of a soul of the physical particles that have undergone transformation of the form of karma - that is called 'bondage'. For this bondage so many factors like mithyatva etc. act as a cause; even so, when it is here said that a jiva receives physical particles on account of its association with a kasaya then the intention is to emphasize the prominence of kasayas as compared to the remaining factors in question. 2-3

The Types of Bondage :

Prakrti or nature, sthiti or duration, anubhava or intensity, pradesa or constituent units - these four are the types of it (that is, of bondage). 4

That certain physical particles received by a jiva undergo transformation of the form of karma means that at that time four elements are produced in them; it is these elements that constitute the types of bondage. For example, when the grass etc. eaten by a she-goat, cow, buffalo etc. undergo transformation of the form of milk then there is a binding of the nature of sweetness in this milk; then there is also worked up in relation to this sweetness the time-limit up to which it is to remain there in the milk; again, this sweetness is possessed of the specialities like intensity, mildness etc.; lastly the physical quantity of the milk is built up alongside of all this. Similarly, in the karmic particles received into itself by a jiva and got combined with its constituent units there are produced four elements - viz. nature, duration, intensity, constituent units.

(1) The binding of the nature - e.g. the nature to conceal jnana, the nature to obstruct darsana, the nature to cause the experience of pleasure, pain etc. - that takes place in the karmic particles is called prakrtibandha or bondage in respect of nature.

(2) Along with a nature there is produced in the karmic particles a limitation as to time-period up to which the nature in question is not to disappear from them; this production of time-limit is called sthiti-bandha or 'bondage in respect of duration.'

(3) Along with a nature there is produced in the karmic particles certain specialities on account of which the experience of the fruit concerned is characterized by intensity, mildness etc.; the production of these specialities is called anubhavabandha or 'bondage in respect of intensity.'

(4) The physical particles that have been received and have been transformed into various types of karma naturally undergo a corresponding quantitative distribution; it is this quantitative distribution that is called pradesa-bandha or 'bondage in respect of constituent units.'

Of these four types of bondage the first and the last are due to yoga; for the degrees of prakrti-bandha and pradesa-bandha depend on the degrees of the yoga concerned. On the other hand, the second and the third type of bondage are due to kasaya; for the largeness or smallness of sthiti-bandha and anubhava-bandha depends on the intensity or mildness of the kasaya concerned. 4

The Various Mula-prakrtis or Basic
Karma-types Mentioned by Name :

Of these types of bondage the first - i.e. prakrti-bandha or 'bondage in respect of nature' - is of eight types - viz. jnanavarana, darsanavarana, vedaniya, mohaniya, ayuska, nama, gotra and antaraya. 5

In the mass of karmic particles received into itself by a jiva through its specific endeavour various natures are simultaneously created depending on the variety of the concerned capacity to endeavour. These natures are in themselves invisible but they can be enumerated simply on the basis of the effects produced by them. In one worldly jiva or in many of them innumerable effects are observed to have been produced by the karmas. The natures that produce these effects are in point of fact innumerable, yet on the basis of a summary classification they have been divided into eight types. This state of affairs is called 'bondage in respect of basic types'. It is the eight basic karma-types in question that have been mentioned here; they are jnanavarana, darsanavarana, vedaniya, mohaniya, ayuska, nama, gotra and antaraya.

(1) On account of which jnana or determinate cognition gets concealed - that is called jnanavarana.
(2) On account of which darsana or indeterminate cognition gets concealed - that is called darsanavarana.
(3) On account of which pleasure and pain are experienced - that is called vedaniya.
(4) On account of which a soul suffers from delusion - that is called mohaniya.
(5) On account of which birth into a worldly career takes place - that is called ayus.
(6) On account of which gati (i.e. membership of a species of livings), jati (i.e. possession of a definite number of sense-organs) etc. are attained - that is called nama.
(7) On account of which a higher or a lower status is attained - that is called gotra.
(8) On account of which obstacles are placed in the way of giving, taking etc. - that is called antaraya.

Though from the standpoint of brevity the various natures of karma

have been divided into the above eight types, these eight types themselve have been further divided into subtypes by adopting a middle course and for the benefit of the reader eager for details. These sub-types are known by the name of uttaraprakrti or derivative karma-type, and they are 97 in number. Just below they are being enumerated as belonging to the mulaprakrti to which they do. 5

The Various Uttaraprakrtis or Derivative Karma-types Enumerated and Mentioned by Name :

The eight basic karma-types have sub-types respectively numbering five, nine, two, twenty-eight, four, fourty-two, two and five. 6

Those acting as concealment for the five jnana types mati etc. - They are the five sub-types of Jnanavarana. 7

Those acting as concealment for the four darsana-types caksur, acaksur, avadhi and kevala-darsana, as also the five to be experienced in the form of nidra, nidranidra, pracala, pracalapracala, and styanagrddhi - these are the nine sub-types of darsanamohaniya. 8

That to be experienced in the form of pleasure and that to be experienced in the form of pain - these are the two sub-types of vedaniya. 9

Darsana-mohaniya, caritramohaniya, kasayavedaniya, and nokasayavedaniya - these sub types (and still lower divisions) of mohaniya are respectively of 3, 2, 16 and 9 kinds. Samyaktva, mithyatva and a combination of two (i.e. Samyakmithyatva) - these are the three kinds of darsanamohaniya, kasaya and nokasaya - these are the two kinds of caritramohaniya. Of these, kasayacaritramohaniya is further divided into sixteen kinds - viz. anger, pride, deceit and greed, each of these four divided into four kinds - viz. anantanubandhin, apratyakhyanavarana, pratyakhyanavarana and sanjvalana. Similarly, nokasayacaritramohaniya is further divided into nine kinds - viz. hasya, rati, arati, soka, bhaya, jugupsa, striveda, purusaveda and napumsakaveda. 10

Naraka, tiryak, manusya and deva - these are the four sub-types of ayus. 11

Gati, jati, sarira, angopanga, nirmana, bandhana, sanghata, samsthana, samhanana, sparsa, rasa, gandha, varna, anupurvi, agurulaghu, upaghata, paraghata, atapa, uddyota, ucchvasa, vihayogati, the ten couples of opposite - viz. sadharana and pratyeka, sthavara and trasa, durbhaga and subhaga, duhsvara and susvara, asubha and subha, badara and suksma, aparyapta and paryapta, asthira and sthira, anadeya and adeya, ayasas and yasas -, tirthankaratva - these are the fourtytwo sub-types of namakarma.

12

Higher and lower - these are the two sub-types of gotra. 13

Those pertaining to donation etc. - these are the five sub-types of antaraya. 14

The Five Sub-types of the Jnanavarana-karma and the Nine Sub-types of the Darsanavarana-karma :

The five jnana types like mati, sruta etc. and the four darsana types like caksurdarsana etc. have already been described. Now the karmas possessing the nature of concealing one of them are respectively called matijnanavarana, srutajnanavarana, avadhijnanavarana, manahparyayajnanavarana, kevala-jnanavarana these being the five sub-types of jnanavarana - and caksurdarsanavarana, acaksurdarsanavarana, avadhidarsanavarana, kevaladarsanavarana these being the four subtypes of darsanavarana. Besides these four there are five more subtypes of darsanavarana and as follows : 1. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep from which one can be easily awakened is called nidravedaniya. 2. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep from which one can be wakened with difficulty is called nidranidravedaniya. 3. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep which overtakes one while sitting or standing is called pracalavedaniya. 4. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep which overtakes one while walking is called pracalapracalavedaniya. 5. The karma whose manifestation brings about the type of sleep when one

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1. See chapter one, aphorisms. 9 to 33 and chapter two, aphorism 9.

comes to possess the energy enabling one to accomplish a task thought of during the waking state is called styanagrddhi; (during such a sleep one comes to possess many times more efficient energy than one does during the waking state). 7-8

The Two Sub-types of the Vedaniyakarma :

(1) The karma whose manifestation makes a being experience pleasure is called satavedaniya.

(2) The karma whose manifestation makes a being experience pain is called asatavedaniya. 9

The Three Kinds of the Sub-types Darsanamohaniya :

1. The karma whose manifestation obstructs an inclination towards the

real nature of the fundamental verities is called mithyatvamohaniya. 2. The karma whose manifestation brings about neither inclination nor a disinclination towards the real nature of the fundamental verities but a state of wavering between the two is called misramohaniya. 3. The karma whose manifestation while bringing about an inclination towards the real nature of the fundamental verities obstructs an appearance of the anupasamika or kasayika type of such inclination is called samyaktvamohaniya.

The Twentyfive Kinds of the Sub-types Caritramohaniya :

The sixteen kasayas : Anger, pride, deceit and greed - these are the four chief types of kasaya. Each of these has been said to be of four types depending on the degree of its intensity. The karmas which bring about the appearance of the above four kasayas anger etc. in such an intensive degree that the jiva concerned has to wander about from one worldly state to another for an infinite period of time are respectively called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the anantanubandhi type. The karmas whose manifestation brings about the appearance of kasayas in such a degree of intensity as is just sufficient to obstruct moral discipline are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the apratyakhyanavarana type. The karmas whose fructification obstructs not a partial moral discipline but a complete moral discipline are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the pratyakhyanavarana type. The karmas whose fructification is of such a degree of intensity as does not obstruct complete moral discipline but simply produces a minor deviation or blemish in it are called anger, pride, deceit and greed of the samjvalana type.

The Nine Nokasayas :

(1) The karma whose nature it is to bring about the appearance of laughter is hasyamohaniya. (2-3) The karma which brings about liking towards someone is 'ratimohaniya', that which brings about dislike towards someone is 'aratimohaniya'. (4-6) The karma which brings about a fearing disposition is 'bhayamohaniya', that which brings about a sorrowing disposition is 'sokamohaniya', that which brings about a despising disposition is 'jugupsamohaniya'. (7-9) The karma which brings about sexual perturbance appropriate to a man is purusaveda, that which brings about sexual perturbance appropriate to a woman is striveda, that which brings about sexual perturbance appropriate to a neuter is napumsakaveda. All these nine, since they accompany the chief kasayas and stimulate them, are called 'nokasaya'. 10

The Four Sub-types of the Ayus-karma :

The karmas whose manifestation compels a being to lead the life of a heavenly being, a man, an animal, a hellish being are respectively called

deva-ayuskarma, manusya-ayus-karma, tiryak-ayuskarma, naraka-ayuskarma. 11

The Fourtytwo Sub-types of the Nama-karma :

The Fourteen subtypes designated pindaprakrti :

(1) The karma which causes birth in the four gatis or species deva etc. - species that are of the form of a state of transformation making possible the experience of pleasure and pain - that is called gati-nama.

(2) The karma which causes the experiencing of the five generic states of transformation from possession of one indriya upto possession of five indriyas - that is called jati-nama.

(3) The karma which causes the assumption of the body types audarika etc. - that is called sarira-nama.

(4) The karma which causes the having of the bodily parts and sub-parts - that is called angopanga-nama.

(5-6) The karma which causes the newly received physical particles to be associated with the earlier received similar particles audarika etc. - that is called bandhana-nama, while the karma which bestows on these newly received physical particles the form of the body type concerned - that is called sanghata-nama.

(7-8) The karma which causes the having of a particular type of bone-structure in a body - that is called samhanana-nama, while the karma which causes the having of a particular bodily shape-that is called samsthana-nama.

(9-12) The karmas which cause the presence in a body of five colours white etc., the two smells good-smell etc., the five tastes bitter etc. and the eight touches cold etc. - these are respectively called varna-nama, gandha-nama, rasa-nama, and sparsa-nama,

(13) The karma which in the case of a jiva, proceeding to take on a new birth causes its motion to follow the serial line made up of the constituent units of akasa- that is called anupurvi-nama.

(14) The karma which causes a living body to move in a well-conducted or an ill-conducted manner-that is called vihayogati.

These fourteen are designated pinda-prakrti-the reason being that each of them is further subdivided into classes.

The ten sub-types designated sthavara-dasaka :

(1-2) The karma whose manifestation causes the possession of a capacity to move about independently - that is called trasa-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation makes impossible the possession of such a capacity - that is called sthavara-nama.

(3-4) The karma whose manifestation causes the possession of such a gross body as is observable to ordinary eyes-that is called badara-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes the possession of such a subtle body as is not observable to ordinary eyes-that is called suksmanama.

(5-6) The karma whose manifestation makes it possible for a being to attain all the paryaptis (paryapti-the technical name for certain bodily capacities) appropriate to it - that is called paryapta-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation makes it impossible for a living being to attain all the paryaptis appropriate to it - that is called aparyapta-nama.

(7-8) The karma whose manifestation causes the different jivas to possess different bodies - that is called partyeka-nama; On the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes ananta jivas to share one common body. - that is called sadharana-nama.

(9-10) The karma whose manifestation causes the having of the steady bodily parts like bones, teeth etc.- that is called sthira-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes the having of the unsteady bodily parts like tongue etc. - that is called asthira-nama.

(11-12) The karma whose manifestation is responsible for the fact that the bodily parts situated above the navel are deemed auspicious - that is called subha-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation is responsible for the fact that the bodily parts situated below the navel are deemed inauspicious - that is called asubha-nama.

(13-14) The karma whose manifestation causes a jiva's voice to appear agreable to the audience - that is called susvaranama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes a jiva's voice to appear disagreable to the audience - that is called duhsvara-nama.

(15-16) The karma whose manifestation brings it about that a being, even when he does no good to others is loved by all - that is called subhaga-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation brings it about that a being, even when he does good to others, is loved by no body - that is called durbhaga-nama.

(17-18) The karma whose manifestation causes one's speech to be highly respected - that is called adeya-nama; on the contrary, the karma

whose manifestation causes one's speech not to be highly respected - that is called anadeya-nama,

(19-20) The karma whose manifestation causes fame in the world - that is called yasah-kirti-nama; on the contrary, the karma whose manifestation causes a lack of fame - that is called ayasahkirti-nama.

The eight sub-types designated pratyeka-prakrti :

(1) The karma whose manifestation causes a body to be characterized not by a transformation of the form of heavy or light but by that of the form of neither heavy nor light - that is called agurulaghu-nama.

(2) The karma responsible for the growth of obstructing bodily parts like an additioned tongue, a tooth hidden behind another, a neck-tumour etc. - that is called upaghata-nama.

(3) The karma on account of which one beats down others through one's appearance or through one's speech - that is called paraghata-nama.

(4) The karma which causes the appearance of the capacity for in-breathing - that is called svasocchvasa-nama.

(5-6) The karma which causes in a non-hot body the appearance of a hot light - that is called atapa-nama, while the karma which causes the appearance of a cold light - that is called uddyota-nama.

(7) The karma which causes the placement of the different bodily parts and sub-parts at their respective proper places - that is called nirmana-nama.

(8) The karma which causes the appearance of a capacity to establish a ford-in-the-form-of-religion - that is called tirthankara-nama. 12

The Two Sub-types of the Gotra-karma :

The karma which causes birth in a family that brings about prestige - that is called uccagotra, while the karma which causes birth in a family that fails to bring about fame even inspite of competence - that is called nicagotra. 13

The Five Sub-types of the Antaraya-karma :

The karmas which place obstacle in the way of offering something, receiving something, a once-for-all consumption of something, a repeated consumption of something, making display of one's power - these are respectively called danantaraya labhantaraya, bhogantaraya, upabhogantraya, viryantaraya. 14

An Account of Sthitibandha or
'Bondage-in-respect-of-duration :

For the first three karma-types - that is, jnanavarana, darsanavarana and vedaniya as also for antaraya the maximum duration is 30 crore-multiplied by crore sagaropamas. 15

For mohaniya the maximum duration is 70 crore-multiplied by crore sagaropamas. 16

For nama and gotra the maximum duration is 20 crore multiplied by crore sagaropamas. 17

For ayus the maximum duration is 33 crore multiplied by crore sagaropamas. 18

As for the minimum duration, it is 12 muhurtas for vedaniya. 19

For nama and gotra the minimum duration is 8 muhurtas. 20

For the rest - that is, for the jnanavarana, darsanavarana, antaraya, mohaniya, ayus - the minimum duration is a period less than one muhurta. 21

For each karma-type the maximum duration that has been mentioned obtains in the case of a being who possesses five indriyas and is mithyadrsti, paryapta, as well as samjnin; as for the minimum duration, it obtains differently for different karma-types. Thus the minimum duration of jnanavarana, darsanavarana, vedaniya obtains in the tenth gunasthana designated suksma-samparaya, that of mohaniya obtains in the ninth designated anivrtti-badara-samparaya, while that of ayus obtains in the case of animals and men destined to live for sankhyata years. Lastly, the medium duration in question is of asankhyata types and it obtains in the case of asankhyata types of beings depending on the degree of kasayas over powering their mind. 15-21

An Account of anubhava-bandha or
'Bondage in Respect of Intensity :

Vipaka-that is, the capacity to yield fruits of different types-that is called anubhava. 22

Such anubhava is experienced in conformity to the nature of the karma concerned. 23

And such an experiencing of anubhava brings about nirjara or cleansing-off. 24

An Analysis of Anubhava and of Bondage in Respect of it :

At the time of bondage there is produced in each karma a capacity to yield a more or less intense fruit depending on the more or less intense

mental-endeavour-afflicted-by-kasaya that causes this bondage. This capacity to yield fruit is called anubhava and its production anubhava-bandha.

The Mode of an Anubhava Yielding Fruit :

Anubhava yields fruit when the proper time arrives. But in this connection one thing has to be understood - viz. that an anubhava yields fruit in conformity to the nature of that very karma in which it itself resides - not in conformity to the nature of any other karma. For example, the anubhava residing in the jnanavarana-karma yields a more or less intense fruit in conformity to the nature of this karma-type - that is, it performs the task of concealing jnana; on the other hand, it does not yield fruit in conformity to the nature of the other karma-types like darsanavarana, vedaniya etc. - that is, it does not conceal the capacity for darsana, nor does it produce effects like an experience of pleasure or pain, etc. Similarly, the anubhava residing in darsanavarana conceals in a more or less intense form the capacity for darsana but it does not perform tasks like concealing jnana, etc.

However, the rule of anubhava-bandha according to which fruit is yielded in conformity to the nature of the karma concerned applies only to the basic karma-types, not also to the derivative ones. For when a derivative karma-type belonging to some basic karma-type is, as a result of a mental exertion, converted into another derivative karma-type, then the original anubhava yields fruit in conformity to the nature of the new derivative karma-type. For example, when matijnanavarana gets converted into a collateral derivative karma-prakrti srutajnavarana or the like then the original anubhava appropriate to matijnanavarana, now functioning in conformity to the nature of srutajnanavarana etc., performs the task of concealing the jnana-type sruta, avadhi etc. However, even among the derivative karma-types there are such as do not get converted into caritramoha or vice versa; similarly, naraka-ayus does not get converted into tiryak-ayus or any other type of ayus. Like conversion of nature a subsequent mental exertion also brings about a change in the flavour (=intensity) or the duration that obtained at the time of bondage. Thus a strong flavour becomes mild or vice versa; similarly, a maximum duration becomes minimum and vice versa.

The State of Karma Subsequent to the Appearance of Fruit :

After a more or less intense fruit of a karma has been experienced in accordance with the anubhava concerned this karma gets released from the soul-units and no more remains attached to them. This very process is called cessation of karma or nirjara (i.e. cleansing off). Just as the nirjara of a karma comes about through an experiencing of its fruit, so also does it quite often come about through penance as well. Thus by the force of penance a karma gets released from the soul-units even before it

has yielded fruit in accordance with the anubhava concerned. This very thing is indicated in the present aphorism through an employment of the world ca (i.e. 'and'). 22-24

An Account of pradesa-bandha or 'Bondage in Respect of Constituent-units' :

The pudgalas which are a cause of the nature of karma, are subtle, are situated at the same place, and are made up of anantananta constituent units are, as a result of a specific activity, bound down with all the constituent units of a soul and from all the sides. 25

Since pradesa-bandha is a kind of relation and since this relation has got two bases - viz. the karmic physical aggregates on the one hand and the soul on the other - eight questions arise in connection with it and it is they that are answered in the present aphorism. The questions are as follows :

(1) When the karmic physical aggregates are bound down what appears in them - that is, what is built up into them?

(2) These physical aggregates are received into themselves by what soul-units - by those situated in the upward direction or by those situated in the downward direction or by those situated in the transverse direction?

(3) Is karmic bondage similar in the case of all the souls - or is it dissimilar?

(4) Those karmic physical aggregates - are they gross or subtle?

(5) The karmic physical aggregates that are bound down with the soul-units - are they situated at the same place as these soul-units or at a different place?

(6) At the time of bondage - are those physical aggregates static or mobile?

(7) Those karmic physical aggregates - are they bound down with all the soul-units or only with some of them?

(8) Those karmic physical aggregates are made up of how many constituent units - sankhyata, asankhyata, ananta or anantananta?

The following is how these eight questions have been respectively answered in the present aphorism.

(1) In the physical aggregates that are bound down with the

soul-units there appears the nature of karma - that is, natures like jnanavarana-ness etc. That is to say, these natures are built up into these physical aggregates. Hence it is that these aggregates are said to be a cause of all these natures.

(2) Those physical aggregates are received into themselves by the soul-units situated in the upward, downward as well as transverse direction - not by those situated in some one direction alone.

(3) The karmic bondage is dissimilar in the case of all the different souls because they are dissimilar as regards their activity of manas, speech and body. Hence corresponding to the degree of activity there is degree in pradesa-bandha.

(4) The physical aggregates liable to become karma are not gross but subtle. Such physical aggregates are taken in from among the physical-groupings pertaining to karma.

(5) Only such physical aggregates are bound down as are situated at the same place as the soul-units concerned, not such as are situated outside the sphere of these soul-units.

(6) Only when they are static do the physical aggregates experience bondage, for the aggregates that are mobile are unsteady and as such incapable of entering into bondage.

(7) The ananta units of each karma are bound down with each of the soul-units concerned.

(8) All the physical aggregates liable to become karma that enter into bondage are made up of anantananta atoms - none of them is made up of sankhyata, asankhyata or ananta units. 25

A Division into the Auspicious and Inauspicious Karma-types :

Satavedaniya, samyaktvamohaniya, hasya, rati, purusaveda, subha-ayus, subha-nama, subha-gotra - these karma-types alone are auspicious; the rest are inauspicious. 26

Whatever karmas are bound down the fruit of them is in no case either exclusively good or exclusively evil; for in accordance with the good or evil character of the mental exertion acting as the cause of bondage the fruit that is built up is either good or evil. Thus the fruit built up as a result of good

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1. In the Digambara tradition there are two aphorisms in place of this one. They are as follows :

Sadvedyasubhayurnamagotrani punyam. 25
Ato'anyat papam. 26

The first of these aphorisms - unlike our present one - contains no mention of samyaktva, hasya, rati and purusaveda; as for the second, the Svetambara tradition has it not in the form of an aphorism but in the form of a Bhasya-sentence.

The 42 auspicious karma-types-enumerated in our comments are well known from the texts like Karma-prakrti, Navatattva etc. In the Digambara texts too it is they alone that are considered to be auspicious. The four karma types - viz. samyaktva, hasya, rati, purusaveda - enumerated as auspicious in the present aphorism of the Svetambara tradition are described as such in no other text.

It appears that the view which treats as auspicious the four karma types in questions is very old. For apart from its occurrence in the present aphorism the author of the Bhasya-vrtti too has quoted verses which indicate a difference of opinion and has confessed that the purport of the present view is incomprehensible to him-the tradition connected with it - presumably known to those who had been conversant with the fourteen Purva-texts - having been cut short at an earlier date.

mental exertion is good-that is, desirable-while that built up as a result of evil mental exertion is evil - that is, undesirable. Now the lesser the amount of perturbance afflicting a mental state the more particularly good it is, while the greater the amount of perturbance afflicting it the more particularly evil it is. Thus there is no mental state whatsoever that can be said to be exclusively good or exclusively evil. However, even while all mental states are good-cum-evil they are in practice called good or evil in accordance with what character predominates in them. Thus the same good mental state which produces good capacity-for-fruit in the good karma types produces evil capacity for fruit in the evil ones; on the contrary, the same mental state which produces evil capacity for fruit in evil karma types produces good capacity for fruit in good ones. The only difference is that the good capacity for fruit produced by an intensely good mental state is intensely so, while the evil capacity for fruit produced by it is mildly so; similarly, the evil capacity for fruit produced by an evil mental state is intensely so, while the good capacity for fruit produced by it is mildly so.

The 42 Karma-types Treated as Auspicious :

Satavedaniya,, manusya-ayus, deva-ayus, triyak-ayus, manusya-gati, deva-gati, pancendriya-jati, the five body types audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, taijasa, karmana, the three angopanaga types, audarika, vaikriya, aharaka, samacaturasra-samsthana, vajrarsabhanaraca-samhanana, the

auspicious varna, rasa, gandha, sparsa, manusya-anupurvi, deva-anupurvi, agurulaghu, paraghata, ucchvasa, atapa, uddyota, the auspicious vihayogati, trasa, badara, paryapta, pratyeka, sthira, subha, subhaga, susvara, adeya, yasahkirti, nirmana-nama, tirthankara-nama, uccagotra.

The 82 Karma types Treated as Inauspicious :

The five jnanavarana, the nine darsanavarana, asata vedaniya, mithyatva, the 16 kasayas, the nine nokasayas, the naraka-ayus, naraka-gati, tiryak-gati, ekendriya, dvinidriya, trindriya, caturindriya-jati, the five samhananas-that is, all minus the first - viz. ardhavajrasabha-naraca, naraca, ardhanaraca, kilika, sevarta, the five samsthanas - that is, all minus the first viz. nyagrodha-parimandala, sadi, kubja, vamana, hunda, the inauspicious varna, gandha, rasa, sparsa, naraka-anupurvi tiryak-anupurvi, upaghata-nama, the inauspicious vihayogati, sthavara, suksma, aparyapta, sadharana, asthira, asubha, durbhaga, duhsvara, nicagotra, ayasahkirti, the five antarayas. 26

CHAPTER NINE

In the chapter eight there has been offered an account of the fundamental verity bandha or bondage; in the present chapter there is being offered an account of the fundamental verity samvara or protection, an account occurring at a place demanded by the serial order.

The Nature of samvara :

The cessation of asrava or inflow - that is called samvara or protection. 1

The causes due to which a karma is bound down - that is called asrava; this definition of asrava has already been offered earlier. It is the cessation - that is, prevention of such an asrava that is called samvara. The 42 types of asrava have already been enumerated earlier; the extent to which a cessation of them takes place that exactly is the extent of the samvara attained. The graduated order of spiritual progress is due to the progress of the cessation of asrava; hence the greater is the cessation of asrava the higher is the gunasthana attained.

The Means of Samvara :

That - that is, samvara - takes place through the instrumentality of gupti, samiti, dharma, anupreksa, parisahajaya and caritra. 2

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1. In a particular gunasthana whatever causes of bondage out of the four - viz. mithyatva, avirati etc. - are operative and whatever be the karma types that are bound down as a result of them when these causes of bondage and the bondage of karma types brought about by them cease to be there in a higher gunasthana then it is this cessation that is samvara appropriate to this higher gunasthana. In other words, the absence of the asrava and of the resultant bondage appropriate to a lower gunasthana is what is samvara appropriate to a higher gunasthana. For this see the bandha - prakarana of the second Karmagrantha and the fourth Karmagrantha (verses 51-58), also Sarvarthasiddhi on the present aphorism.

Tapas brings about samvara as well as nirjara. 3

The nature of samvara is in general but one; however, its numerous types have been formulated depending on the difference of means employed for its attainment. In brief such means are enumerated to be 7, in details 69. This enumeration of types is based on the scriptural injunctions laid down in connection with religious performances.

Tapas or penance is a means of nirjara inasmuch as it is a means of samvara. Generally, penance is considered to be a means of abhyudaya or worldly enjoyment, but it has to be understood that it can as well act as a means of nihsreyas or spiritual enjoyment. For even if all penance is of one nature it is of two types - viz. sakama or that seeking a fruit, and niskama, or that seeking no fruit - depending on the mental feeling standing at the back of it. The sakama type of penance brings about abhyudaya, the niskama type nihsreyas.2-3

The Nature of Gupti :

Such a restriction of yogas or activities as is auspicious - that is called gupti. 4

Any and every type of restriction related to yoga - that is, to the activity of body, speech and manas - that is not what is called gupti; for only that such restriction which is auspicious is gupti and hence a means of samvara. An auspicious restriction means a restriction that has been accepted after proper comprehension and in right faith - that is to say, impelled by right understanding and right faith to prevent manas, speech and body from proceeding on a wrong path and to make them proceed on a right one. Since yoga is briefly of three types the gupti too which consists in a restriction related to it is of three types; that as follows :

(1) While receiving or placing anything whatsoever, while sitting, getting up, or walking, in all such acts so to restrict bodily operations that discrimination is maintained between what is to be done and what is not to be done - that is called gupti pertaining to body.

(2) Whenever there arises an occasion to speak then to restrict speech - if needs be to keep silent altogether - that is called gupti pertaining to speech.

(3) To give up volitions that are evil or are a mixture of good and evil, as also to cultivate volitions that are good - that is called gupti pertaining to manas. 4

The Types of Samiti :

Right - that is, blameless - irya or moving about, right bhasa or speech, right esana or procurement of provisions, right adana-niksepa or receiving and placing of things, right utsarga or disposal of refuse - these are five samitis. 5

All the samitis, being of the form of an activity inspired by a sense of discrimination, act as a means for samvara.

The five samitis are as follows :

(1) To move about cautiously so as to cause trouble to no living being - that is called irya-samiti.

(2) To speak what is true, beneficial, measured and free from doubt - that is called bhasa-samiti.

(3) To act cautiously while seeking to procure such means necessary for the conduct of life-journey as are free from defects - that is called esana-samiti.

(4) To receive and place any thing whatsoever after a proper inspection and a proper cleansing of dust - that is called adananiksepa-samiti.

(5) To dispose of things that are of no use at a place free from living bodies and after proper inspection - that is called utsarga-samiti.

Question : What is the difference between a gupti and a samiti?

Answer : In gupti the aspect of refraining from what is wrong is dominant, in samiti the aspect of undertaking what is right. 5

The Types of Dharma :

Ksama or forbearance, mardava or softness, arjava or sincerity, sauca or absence of greed, satya or truthfulness, samyama or restrain, tapas or penance, tyaga or renunciation akincanya or absence of a feeling of ownership, brahmacarya or studentship - these ten are the types of what is supreme dharma. 6

When the meritorious qualities forbearance etc. are practised in daily life, then alone is it possible to get rid of the defilements like anger etc.; hence it is that these qualities are said to be a means of samvara. The tenfold dharma consisting of forbearance etc., when it appears in the company of a high development of the basic meritorious qualities like non-violence, truth etc. and of the derivative meritorious qualities like purity of residence and food, etc. then alone does it assume the form of a monk's duty - otherwise not. That is to say, when the meritorious qualities forbearance etc. appear in the absence of a high development of the basic meritorious qualities non-violence etc. and of the derivative meritorious qualities associated with them, then they might well be called an ordinary man's duty but never a monk's duty. The ten items of dharma are as follows :

(1) Ksama means maintaining a forbearing disposition - that is to say, not to permit anger to take its rise and in case it does so then to render it ineffective through a power of discriminatory consideration. For cultivating forbearance five ways have been suggested - viz. (a) by way of considering whether or not the cause of anger lies in oneself, (b) by way of considering the harms that follow from an angry conduct, (c) by way of considering the childish nature of the offender concerned, (d) by way of considering the whole affair to be a result of one's own past karma, (e) by way of considering the merits of forbearance.

(a) When one succumbs to anger then one must look for its cause in oneself. If the cause of one's anger is detected to lie in oneself then

one must say to oneself : 'I am certainly in the wrong. What is wrong with what this man says? And if the cause of one's anger is not detected to lie in oneself then one must say to oneself : 'This poor fellow finds fault with me out of ignorance.' This is called considering whether or not the cause of anger lies in oneself. (b) 'He who succumbs to anger loses his memory and hence overpowered by an impulse develops a feeling of hostility towards another one, then kills him or does him some harm, thus putting an end to his own vrata of non-violence' - this pondering over a successive series of disasters is called considering the harms that follow from an angry conduct. (c) If a person speaks ill of one at one's back then one should say to oneself : 'That is the very nature of the childish-the ignorant-people. What is new about it? Nay, it is rather good of this poor wretch that he abuses me at my back, not in my presence. That certainly is something to be pleased about.' And when a person abuses one in one's presence then one should say to oneself : 'That is how the childish people are bound to behave. What they do is what follows from their nature - nothing more. Moreover, this person only abuses me in my presence but does not attack me - that certainly is something to my advantage.' Similarly, when a person attacks one then one should feel grateful to him that he has not deprived one of one's life and when a person deprives one of one's life then one should feel pity for him in return for the advantage that one could not be after all driven away from the path of religiosity. Thus the greater becomes one's difficulty the greater generosity and sense of discrimination must one exhibit and one must treat as insignificant the difficulty that is present there. All this is called considering the childish nature of the offender concerned. (d) If a person gets angry with one then one should say to oneself : 'In this connection this person is a mere occasioning cause while all that is happening is but a result of my own past karma'. That is called considering the whole affair to be a result of one's own past karma. (e) If a person gets angry with one then one should say to oneself : 'He who cultivates forbearance has his mind at ease. All the energy to be wasted in revenge or confrontation can well be utilized for leading a virtuous life.' That is called considering the merits of forbearance.

(2) The softness of heart and humility even in external conduct - that is called mardava or softness. For the cultivation of this quality what is required is that one should not feel puffed up at one's superiority as to race, family, beauty, prosperity, intellect, scriptural knowledge, achievement, exertion; on the contrary, taking into account the perishing nature of these possessions one should extract out from one's heart the thorn of pride.

(3) The purity of mental makeup - that is, uniformity as to thought, speech and act - that is called arjava or sincerity. For the cultivation of this quality what is required is that the defects of crookedness be pondered over.

(4) Not to have attachment even for the means of dharma - nay, even for one's own body - that is called sauca or absence of greed.

(5) Such a true speech as proves beneficial to the virtuous personages - that is called satya or truthfulness. A slight difference between bhasa-samiti and the presently described satya has been spoken of ; that is as follows : to maintain a sense of discrimination while speaking to any person whatsoever - that is called bhasa-samiti, to utter beneficial, measured, and true words while speaking to the virtuous personages who are one's own equal in conduct - that is called the monk's duty designated satya.

(6) To discipline manas, speech and body - that is, to cultivate caution as regards thought, speech as well as motion, stoppage etc. - that is called samyama or restrain.

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1. The seventeen types of samyama are well known but they are found described variously. Thus a control over five indriyas, a renunciation of five avratas, a victory over four kasayas, a freedom from attachment of

(7) Self-suppression that is practised with a view to developing energy adequate for the extirpation of the vicious mental tendencies - that is called tapas or penance.

(8) To bestow meritorious qualifications like jnana etc. on a worthy recipient - that is called tyaga or renunciation.

(9) Not to harbour an attitude of ownership in relation to anything whatsoever - that is called akincanya or absence of a feeling of ownership.

(10) With a view to removing shortcomings, cultivating meritorious qualifications like jnana etc., as also to practising the state of dependence in relation to the preceptor, a residence (Sanskrit carya) at the preceptor's quarters (Sanskrit brahma) - that is called brahmacarya or studentship.

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manas, speech and body - these constitute one set of seventeen items. Similarly, restrain in relation to the five types of static beings and the four types of mobile beings, as also what are designated preksyasamyama, upeksyasamyama, apahrtyasamyama, pramrjyasamyama, kayasamyama, vaksamyama, manahsamyama, upakaranasamyama - these constitute another set of seventeen items.

1. A special description of it occurs in the aphorisms 19-20 of this very chapter. Besides, various penances to be practised by various ascetics in various manners are well known in the Jaina tradition. For example, the two called yavamadhya and vajramadhya; one called candrayana; the three called kanakavali, ratnavali and muktavali; the two called ksullaka and maha; one called simhavikridita; the four pratimas designated sapta-saptamika, asta-astamika, nava-navamika, dasa-dasamika; one called sarvatobhadra - of two types - viz. ksudra and maha; one called bhadrottara; one called acamla; one called vardhamana; also the twelve bhiksupratimas etc. For a special description of these see Sritaporatnamahodadhi published by the Atmananda Sabha.

2. The guru or acarya-that is, preceptor-is said to be of five

types : pravrajaka, digacarya, srutoddesta, srutasamuddesta, amnayarthavacaka. He who offers pravraja (i.e. the title to enter the monastic order) is called pravrajaka. He who sanctions the use of any and every thing is called digacarya. He who gives first lessons in the scriptural texts is called srutoddesta. He who with a view to bringing about steady acquaintance with the scriptural texts gives special lessons in those texts is called srutasamuddesta. Lastly, he who reveals the secret of the rules and exceptions laid down in the scriptural texts is called amnayarthavacaka.

The Types of anupreksa or Deep-reflection :

The constant reflection as to anitya or the transient, asarana or the helpless, samsara or the world of transmigrations, ekatva or soleness, anyatva or separateness, asucitva or impurity, asrava or the fundamental verity designated inflow, samvara or the fundamental verity designated protection, nirjara or the fundamental verity designated cleansing off, loka or the universe, bodhidurlabha or the fact that right thought and conduct is difficult of achivement, dharma-svakhyatatva or the fact that religious message has been well delivered - that is called anupreksa or deep-reflection. 7

Anupreksa means deep - reflection. In case a piece of reflection happens to be veracious and deep it prevents the onset of the tendencies like attachment and aversion. Hence it is that such reflection has been described as a means of samvara.

Of the subject-matters which when reflected over prove specially useful for a purification of life twelve have been preferred and the reflection conducted in relation to them has been given the designation twelve anupreksas. An alternative designation for anupreksa is bhavana. These anupreksas are as follows :

(1) In order that the loss of a thing received earlier causes no sorrow attachment has to be reduced in relation to all things whatsoever. And with a view to such reduction of attachment to think as regards the things like one's body, residential quarters etc. - as also as regards one's relationship with them - that none of them whatsoever is lasting or permanent - that is called anitya-anupreksa or reflection as to the transient.

(2) In order that pure religion is alone accepted as a help in life the feeling of ownership in relation to everything else has to be discarded. And with a view to such discarding of the feeling of ownership to think as regards oneself that just as a deer caught in the clutches of a lion is without a help so also is oneself caught in the clutches of mental pains, bodily pains, external disturbances, helpless for ever -

that is called asarana-anupreksa or reflection as to the helpless.

(3) In order the craving the world of transmigration is done away with a feeling of resignation or indifference has to be cultivated in relation to the things of the world. And with a view to diverting attention from such things one must reflect as follows : 'In this beginningless cycle of births and deaths there is in fact none who is own to me and none who is alien to me. For in the course of so many births all sorts of relations have been established between me and all the beings that are there. Similarly, the beings of the world burning with attachment, aversion and delusion and out of craving for things sensuous are out to devour one another and suffer unbearable hardship as a result of a behaviour of that sort. Really speaking, this world is a garden nurturing the couples of opposities like joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain, etc., and is truly full of tortures.' That is called samsara-anupreksa or reflection as to the world of transmigration.

(4) In order to attain moksa a feeling of aloofness has to be constantly evoked on the occasion of attachment and aversion. For that the attachment developed in relation to things considered to be one's own and the aversion developed in relation to those considered to be alien to oneself have to be discarded and so one must reflect : 'I am born alone, I die alone, and alone do I reap the fruits of the form of pleasure, pain etc. yielded by the karmic seeds sown by myself.' That is called ekatva-anupreksa or reflection as to soleness.

(5) Out of a onrush of delusion man commits the mistake of regarding as his own rise and fall the rise and fall of his body and of the other things belonging to him; and the result is that he fails to have a realization of his true duty. In order to forestall a contingency like this the false imposition of ownership in relation to the alien things like body etc. has to be done away with. For that the separateness from another of the properties belonging to the two has to be reflected over as follows : 'This body is gross, possessed of a beginning and an end, and is something inanimate, while I myself am subtle, possessed of no beginning or an end, and am something conscious'. That is called anyatva-anupreksa or reflection as to separateness.

(6) One's body being most eminently an object of craving one must, with a view to reducing attachment for one's body, reflect : 'This body is itself impure, it is born out of things impure, it is nourished by things impure, it is a seat of things impure, it is the ultimate cause of a series of things impure'. That is called asucitva-anupreksa or reflection as to impurity.

(7) With a view to reducing attachment for the enjoyment of indriyas one must take up these indriyas one by one and reflect over the

undesirable consequences following from an attachment for the enjoyment appropriate to each. That is called asrava-anupreksa or reflection as to the fundamental verity inflow.

(8) With a view to closing the door for evil conduct one must reflect over the merits of virtuous conduct. That is called samvara-anupreksa or reflection as to fundamental verity samvara.

(9) With a view to strengthening the tendency to annihilate all bondage of karma one must, in the following manner, reflect over the various fruits of karma : 'The occasions for pain are of two types : one those arising without a volition or conscious effort - e.g. birth like that of an animal, a bird, a deaf and dumb where pain predominates, poverty received in inheritance -, the other those made available by oneself to oneself out of a noble motive and through a conscious effort - e.g. poverty or bodily weakness resulting from penance and renunciation. In the first case there takes place no feeling of satisfaction and so is caused a sense of distaste - which brings about consequence that are inauspicious. As for the second case, it is born of a noble feeling and so its consequences are exclusively auspicious. Hence it is to one's good that one develops a feeling of satisfaction in relation to the bitter fruits of karma brought about involuntarily and that as far as possible one reaps the fruit of the accumulated karmas through penance and renunciation - so as to meet with consequences that are auspicious. That is called nirjara-anupreksa or reflection as to the fundamental verity cleansing off.

(10) With a view to purifying one's knowledge concerning the fundamental verities to reflect over the real nature of the universe - that is called loka-anupreksa or reflection as to the universe.

(11) When the pathway to moksa has been attained then with a view to cultivating an attitude of non-negligence in relation to it one must reflect : 'For a jiva caught up in the beginningless jungle of tangles, in the stream of multifarious afflictions, and suffering the mighty strokes of the karmas like moha etc. it is difficult to attain a right viewpoint, and right conduct.' That is called bodhidurlabha-anupreksa or reflection as to the fact that right thought and conduct is difficult of achievement.

(12) So as not to deviate from the path of religion and so as to bring about steadiness in one's practice of it one must reflect : 'How highly fortunate it is that a religion full of doing good to the entire mass of living beings has been preached by the virtuous personages.' That is called dharmasvakhyatatva-anupreksa or reflection as to the fact that the religious message has been well delivered. 7

An Account of Parisaha-The Class of

Discomforts Technically so Designated :

What has to be put up with so as not to deviate from the right path and so as to annihilate karma - that is called parisaha. 8

Parisahas are twenty two in all - viz, those related to ksudha or hunger, trsa or thirst, sita or things cold, usna or things hot, damsamasaka or gadflies and mosquitos, nagnatva or nakedness, arati or distaste, stri or woman, carya or moving about, nisadya or seating, sayya or bedding, akrosa or harsh words, vadha or beating and threatening, yacana or begging, alabha or non-receipt, roga or discase, trnasparsa or the touch of grass, straw etc., mala or dirt, satkara-puraskara or honour and reward, prajna or miraculous intellect, ajnana or ignorance, adarsana or non-vision. 9

In the gunasthana designated suksmasamparaya and in the person designated chadmastha-vitaraga (who occupies two particular gunasthanas) fourteen parisahas are possible. 10

In an omniscient person (who occupies two particular gunathanas) eleven parisahas are possible. 11

In the gunasthana designated badarasamparaya all the parisahas are possible. 12

Prajna and ajnana - these parisahas take place with the jnanavarana karma acting as a cause. 13

Adarsana and alabha - these parisahas take place with the darsanamoha-karma and antaraya karma respectively acting as a cause. 14

Nagnatva, arati, stri, nisadya, akrosa, yacana and satkara-puraskara - these parisahas take place with the caritramoha-karma acting as a cause. 15

The rest of the parisahas take place with the vedaniya karma acting as a cause. 16

From one upto nineteen parisahas can simultaneously occur in one and the same soul. 17

While describing parisaha as a means of samvara the aphorist has discussed five topics - which are as follows : The definition of parisaha, the number of parisahas, the classification of parisahas according to the types of persons likely to suffer them, the respective causes of the different parisahas, the number of parisahas capable of simultaneously occurring in a soul. The details of these topics are give below.

The Definition :

So as to remain steady in the path of religiosity that has been adopted and so as to annihilate the accumulated karmic bondage whatever contingencies are to be put up with, with a sense of equanimity - those are called parisaha. 8

The Number :

Though briefly considered a less number of parisahas can be thought of and considered in details a greater number of them can be similarly thought of, yet the scriptural texts have enumerated 22 of them such as are particularly necessary for developing a sense of renunciation. They are as follows :

(1-2) However intense might be the sensation of hunger and the sensation of thirst disturbing one, one should not take food and drink in a quantity greater than that fixed by one for oneself and should thus suffer these sensations with a sense of equanimity. These are respectively called the parisaha related to ksudha or hunger and that related to trsa or thirst.

(3-4) However intense might be the un-ease caused by cold and heat one must not seek to remove it by using a prohibited thing but should rather put up with the sensations concerned with a sense of equanimity. These are respectively called the parisaha related to sita or things cold and that related to usna or things hot.

(5) In face of the disturbance caused by gadflies and mosquitos one must not grief but should rather put up with it with a sense of equanimity. That is called the parisaha related to damsamasaka or gadflies and mosquitos.

(6) To put up with nakedness with a sense of equanimity - that is called the parisaha related to nagnatva or nakedness.

(7) When in the course of the path adopted there arises, owing to the difficulties that crop up, an occasion for developing a feeling of distaste then not to develop such a feeling but to patiently take interest in the path in question - that is called parisaha related to arati or distaste.

(8) For a spiritual realizer - man or woman - not to succumb to the attraction of a member of the opposite sex - that is called parisaha related to stri or woman.

(9) With a view to keeping well nurtured the life of religiosity that has been adopted to move from place to place with a feeling of non-attachment and to take up residence at one fixed quarter - that is called parisaha related to carya or moving about.

(10) When one is seated in a lonely place fit for spiritual exercises - seated for a limited period of time and with a

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1. As to this parisaha there is an important difference of opinion between the Digambara and Svetambara traditions; and it is this very difference of opinion that is is responsible for the respective names borne by these traditions. The Svetambara scriptural texts, while approving absolute nakedness in the case of certain special spiritual realizers, sanction a limited quantity of clothes and utensils in the case of the rest and in accordance with this sanction they treat as a genuine monk him too who keeps possession of clothes and utensils though with a sense of non-attachment. On the other hand, Digambara scriptural texts uniformly recommend absolute nakedness for all the spiritual realizers deserving to be called a monk. An alternative name for nagnatva-parisaha is acelaka-parisaha (acelaka-one without clothing). In the tradition current with the Svetambara sect which permits the use of clothes and utensils the modern researchers see the root of the tradition of Lord Parsvanatha characterized by a use of clothes, while in the tradition current with the Digambara sect which insists on absolute nakedness they see the root of the tradition of Lord Mahavira characterized by no use of clothes.

definite bodily posture adopted - then to conquer without wavering the fears that crop up and not to give up the posture in question - that is called parisaha related to nisadya or seating.

(11) Whatever place - soft or hand, high or low - is available with case to sleep there with a feeling of equanimity - that is called parisaha related to sayya or bedding.

(12) When a person approaches one and says to one things harsh and disagreeable then to treat the affair as an act of honour done to oneself - that is called parisaha related to akrosa or harsh words.

(13) When a person beats or threatens one then to treat the affair as an act of service done to oneself - that is called parisaha related to vadha or beating and threatening.

(14) Without exhibiting an attitude of cringing or arrogance to adopt the career of a beggar just with a view to enabling oneself to carry out tasks religious - that is called darisaha related to yacana or begging.

(15) If inspite of begging one does not receive the thing desired then to treat this non-receipt as a greater penance than that earlier expected receipt and thus to remain content with the situation - that is called parisaha related to alabha or non-receipt.

(16) Not to get agitated when attacked by any disease whatsoever but to put up with it with a feeling of equanimity - that is called parisaha related to roga or disease.

(17) When within the body of one's sleeping apparatus or somewhere else one experiences the sharpness or harshness of grass etc. then to maintain a sense of joy as if one were lying in a soft bed - that is called parisaha related to trnasparsa or the touch of grass, straw etc.,

(18) However great might be the mass of dirt accumulated to one's body not to feel disgusted by it and not to look for embellishments like bath etc. - that is called parisaha related to mala or dirt.

(19) However much might be the honour received by one not to feel puffed up on account of that and when no honour is received not to feel worried - that is called parisaha related to satkara-puraskara or honour and reward.

(20) When in possession of a miraculous intellect not to feel arrogant on account of that and when not in possession of it not to feel worried - that is called parisaha related to prajna or miraculous intellect.

(21) Not to feel arrogant at one's special knowledge of scriptural texts and not to despise oneself when not in possession of such knowledge - that is called parisaha related to jnana or knowledge (alternatively, parisaha related to ajnana or ignorance).

(22) When on account of not being able to see things subtle and suprasensuous it appears to one as if the renunciation practised by one so far was all futile then to cultivate faith characterized by a sense of discrimination and to remain joyful even in a situation like that - that is called parisaha related to adarsana or non-vision. 9

The Classification According to the Types of Persons Coming in Picture :

In the gunasthanas designated suksmasamparaya - so designated because a very small amount of samparaya or kasaya of the form of greed is possible in it - and in those designated upasantamoha and ksina moha just fourteen parisahas are possible and they are as follows : ksudha, pipasa, sita, usna, damsamasaka, carya, prajnana, alabha, sayya, vadha, roga, trnasparsa, mala; the remaining eight parisahas are not possible in them - the reason being that they are born of moha while in the eleventh and

twelfth gunasthanas there is an absence of the manifestation of moha. As for the tenth gunasthana, moha is doubtless present in it, but it is present there in such a small amount that it is as good as not present; hence even in the case of this gunasthanas there is no mention of the parisahas born of moha but only of the remaining fourteen.

In the thirteen and fourteenth gunasthanas just eleven parisahas are possible and they are as follows : ksudha, pipasa, sita, usna, damsamasaka, carya, sayya, vadha, roga, trnasparsa, mala ; the remaining eleven parisahas are born of the karmas designated ghatin and since there karmas are absent in the gunasthanas in question these parisahas too are absent there.

In the ninth gunasthana designated badarasamparaya - and so designated because samparaya or kasaya is present in it in a particularly manifest form - all the twenty two parisahas are possible, for all those karmas that cause a parisaha are present in it and when twentyto parisahas are said to be possible in the ninth gunasthana then it automatically follows that as many are possible in the preceding gunasthanas sixth etc. 10-12

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1. As regards the parisahas occurring in these two gunasthanas there is a difference of opinion between the Digambara and Svetambara traditions. This difference of opinion is due to that relating to the possibility or otherwise of the intake of gross food on the part of an omniscient. Hence it is that the Digambara commentary texts, even while accepting for the aphorism the reading 'ekadasa jine' offer an interpretation of it that seems to be distorted. And the interpretation too is not one. Thus two interpretations have been offered in this connection and both obviously seem to be a product of the period subsequent to the emergence of a sharp difference of opinion between the sects in question. According to the first interpretation the aphorisms is supposed to mean the following. The eleven parisahas (born of the vedaniya karma) are certainly present in an omniscient, but since he is devoid of moha those ksudha etc. in his case are not of the form of a disagreeable experience and are therefore parisahas only in a figurative sense - that is, are parisahas of the dravya type. According to the second interpretation the word na (=not) is understood to be present in the aphorism and the meaning of it therefore is that even if the vedaniya karma is present in an omniscient yet since he is devoid of moha the eleven parisahas born of the vedaniya karma prove no disturbance to him and so are not present in him at all.

2. The Digambara commentary texts take the word badarasamparaya not as a noun but as an adjective - so that it stands for four gunasthanas - viz. the sixth etc.

The Respective Causes of the Different Parisahas :

Four karmas in all are understood to be the cause of a parisaha. Of these, jnanavarana is the cause of the parisahas prajna and ajnana. The antarayakarma is the cause of the parisaha alabha. From among moha darsanamoha is the cause of the parisaha adarsana while caritramoha is the cause of the seven parisahas nagnatva, arati, stri, nisadya, akrosa, yacana, satkara. Lastly, the vedaniyakarma is the cause of those eleven parisahas which were above said to be possible in an omniscient. 13-16

The Number of Parisahas Capable of Simultaneously Occurring in a Soul :

Among the twentytwo parisahas there are many which are opposite of each other in case supposed to occur simultaneously. Take for example sita, usna, carya, sayya, nisadya. Of these the first two cannot occur simultaneously, nor can the last three do so. Thus when sita occurs usna cannot and vice versa; similarly, from among carya, sayya and nisadya just one can occur at a time. Hence keeping in view the circumstance that from among the five parisahas in question just two are possible at a time and three not possible it has been declared that nineteen parisahas at the most can occur in a soul at one time. 17

The Types of Caritra or Right Conduct :

Samayika, chedopasthapana, pariharavisuddhi, suksmasamparaya, yathakyata - these five are the types of caritra. 18

The endeavour to remain steady in a state of spiritual purity - that is called caritra. Keeping in view the degrees of spiritual purity obtaining in different cases caritra has been divided into the above five classes samayika etc. This as follows :

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1. A miraculous intellect, however extensive it might be, is after all of a limited extent and so is due to jnanvarana; hence it is that the parisaha prajna is to be understood to be a product of jnanavarana.

(1) With a view to persisting in the attitude of equanimity to give up all impure activity - that is called samayika caritra. The remaining four types of caritra - viz. chedospasthapana etc. - are doubtless of the form of samayika, but in view of certain speciality as to conduct and meritorious qualification characterizing them the four have been described as different from samayika. The initiation ceremony signifying entry into a monk's career, when the period of intended monkhood is brief, is called itvarika or temporary samayika, the same ceremony, when the period in question is life long, is called yavatkathita or life long samayika.

(2) When after first undergoing the intiation ceremony for a monk's career certain special scriptural texts have been studied and then the ceremony is repeated with a view to retaining the monk's career for the

whole life - that is one case of chedopasthapana caritra; similarly, when the initiation ceremony for a monk's career that was earlier undergone is vitiated by some defect and so has to be undergone denovo - that is the other case of chedopasthapana caritra. The first is called niraticara chedopasthapana or chedopasthapana characterized by no failure of conduct, the second saticara chedopasthapana or chedopasthapana characterized by a failure of conduct.

(3) That which is characterized by a course of conduct dominated by certain special types of penance is called pariharavisuddhi-caritra.

(4) That in which the kasayas like anger etc. do not manifest themselves at all but there is present an extremely small amount of greed is called suksmasamparaya-caritra.

(5) That in which no kasaya whatsoever manifests itself is called yathakhyata or vitaraga-caritra. 18

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1. See Hindi cautha karmagrantha. p. 59-61

2. Two alternatives designations found for it are athakhyata and tathakhyata.

An Account of Tapas or Penance :

Anasana or a complete giving up of food, avamaudarya or a partial giving up of food, vrttiparisankhyana or a reduction of greed, rasaparityaga or a giving up of delicacies, viviktasayyasana or a lonely residence, kayaklesa or a mortification of body - these constitute external tapas. 19

Prayascitta or atonement, vinaya or veneration, vaiyavrttya or rendering a service, svadhyaya or self study, vyutsarga or renouncing selfish feelings, dhyana or mental concentration - these constitute internal tapas. 20

With a view to developing the spiritual power adequate for reducing passions whatever means are adopted for placing under burning hardship one's body, indriyas and manas - they are called tapas or penance. Penance has been divided into two types - viz. external and internal. That in which there is a predominance of bodily activity and which, being dependent on things external, is capable of being seen by others is called external penance; on the contrary, that in which there is a predominance of mental activity and which, not being chiefly dependent on things external, is incapable of being seen by others is called internal penance. Though external penance is a gross affair and one open to the

comprehension of common people its significance is understood to lie in that it is of use for strengthening internal penance. In this classification of penance into an external and an internal type there are included all the gross and refined rules pertaining to religosity.

The External Penance :

(1) For a limited period of time or till death to give up all sorts of food - that is called anasana or a complete giving up of food. Of these, the former is to be understood to be of a temporary type the latter to be of a life long type.

(2) To eat less than what is needed to fill the belly - that is called avamaudarya or a partial giving up of food.

(3) To reduce greed in relation to the various sorts of things - that is called vrttisamksepa or a reduction of greed.

(4) To give up ghi, milk etc. as also wine, honey, butter etc. which when consumed cause evil mental tendencies - that is called rasaparityaga or a giving up of delicacies.

(5) To reside in a lonely place free from all the disturbances - that is called viviktasayyasanasamlinata or a lonely residence.

(6) To place one's body under stress through cold or heat, through adopting diverse postures and the like - that is called kayaklesa or a mortification of body.

The Internal Penance :

(1) That through which it is possible to make clean sweep of the defects born of negligence arisen in connection with a vrata that has been accepted - that is called prayascitta or atonement.

(2) To hold in great regard the virtuous qualifications like knowledge etc. - that is called vinaya or veneration.

(3) To render service to somebody either through providing him with necessary means or through personally acting for his sake - that is called vaiyavrttya or rendering a service. Vinaya and vaiyavrttya differ from one another in that the former is a mental act the latter a bodily one.

(4) To undertake various practices with a view to acquiring knowledge - that is called svadhyaya or self-study.

(5) To renounce the feeling of 'I' and 'my' - that is called

vyutsarga or renouncing selfish feelings.

(6) To renounce the distractions of mind - that is called dhyana or mental concentration. 19-20

The Number of Subtypes Falling Under the Types Prayascitta etc. Belonging to Internal Penance :

The types of internal penance mentioned before dhyana have respectively got 9, 4, 10, 5 and 2 subtypes. 21

Since discussion pertaining to dhyana is going to be lengthy it has been left out to be treated at the end, while there has been here indicated the number of sub-types that fall under the five types prayascitta etc. belonging to internal penance and mentioned before dhyana. 21

The Sub-types of Prayascitta :

Alocana, pratikramana, both alocana and pratikramana, viveka, vyutsarga, tapas, cheda, parihara, upasthapana - these are the nine sub-types of prayascitta. 22

There are various ways for remedying a failing - a mistake, and they are all called prayascitta. In brief there are nine sub-types of it and as follows :

(1) To confess one's mistake in the presence of the preceptor and with a pure heart - that is called alocana.

(2) To repent for the mistake that has been committed and to refrain from it, as also to remain alert that no new mistakes are committed - that is called pratikramana.

(3) When these alocana and pratikramana are performed together - that is called 'both (alocana and pratikramana)' or 'a combination (of alocana and pratikramana)'

(4) When prohibited food and drink happen to have been received and the fact comes to light later on, then to discard these food and drink - that is called viveka.

(5) Adopting an attitude of concentration to give up the operations of body and speech - that is called vyutsarga.

(6) To perform external penances like anasana etc. - that is called tapas.

(7) Corresponding to the gravity of the offence committed to reduce the reckoned period of monkhood by a day, a fortnight, a month or a year - that is called cheda.

(8) To keep an offender at a distance from oneself and not to have with him dealings of any sort for a fortnight, a month or the like as might suit the gravity of his offence - that is called parihara.

(9) When on account of a violation of the earlier accepted mahavratas (=major scale vratas) non-violence, truthfulness, continence etc. they are accepted de novo - that is called upasthapana. 22

The Sub-types of Vinaya :

That pertaining to jnana, that pertaining to darsana, that pertaining to caritra and that pertaining to upacara (i.e. formality) - these are four sub-types of vinaya. 23

In the form of a virtuous qualification vinaya is but one, and yet if it is here classified into sub-types that is in view of its referential objects. Thus the object of vinaya is here chiefly divided into four kinds; this as follows :

(1) To acquire knowledge, to continue a practice of it, and not to forget it - that is true vinaya pertaining to jnana.

(2) Not to deviate from samyakdarsana that is of the from of a true apprehension of the fundamental verities, to remove doubts that arise in this connection, and thus to cultivate an attitude of freedom from doubt - that is vinaya pertaining to darsana.

(3) To keep one's mind steady while practising any of the earlier described types of caritra samayika etc. - that is vinaya pertaining to caritra.

(4) If as regards any virtuous qualification whatsoever a person happens to be superior to oneself then to behave with him in various suitable ways - e.g. to present oneself before him, to get up when he comes, to offer seat to him,

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1. In many texts there occur in place of the two items parihara and upasthapana three others - viz. mula, anavasthapya and parancika and so according to them the sub-types of prayascitta are ten in all. For a special elucidation as to which of these sub-types of prayascitta are ten in all. For a special elucidation as to which of these sub-types of prayascitta is due in the case of what sort of offences one must consult

texts like Vyavahara, Jitakalpsutra etc. that mainly deal with prayascitta.

to pay obeisance to him, etc. - that is vinaya pertaining to upacara. 23

The Sub-types of Vaiyavrttya :

Those offered to an acarya, an upadhyaya, a tapasvin, a saiksa, a glana, a gana, a kula, a sangha, a sadhu, a samanojna - these are the ten sub-types of vaiyavrttya. 24

Vaiyavrttya being of the form of a service rendered it is of ten types, corresponding to the ten types of objects worthy of a service. These objects are as follows :

(1) He whose chief task is to preside over the acceptance of a vrata or of some other rule of conduct is acarya.

(2) He whose chief task is to teach the scriptural texts is upadhyaya.

(3) He who performs a great and severe penance is tapasvin.

(4) He who being a new entrant to the monastic order is a candidate for receiving instruction is saiksa.

(5) He who has grown weak owing to a disease or the like is a glana.

(6) A group of such monks who though disciples of various acaryas study together and so are sharers in a common reading of the scriptural texts is gana.

(7) The group of disciples who have received initiation into the monastic order at the hands of a common acarya is kula.

(8) The followers of a religion constitute a sangha; it has four divisions - viz. monks, nuns, laymen, laywomen.

(9) He who has been initiated into a monastic order is sadhu.

(10) He who is one's equal as regards qualifications like knowledge etc. is samanojna - that is, one enjoying the same status.24

The Sub-types of svadhyaya :

Vacana, pracchana, anupreksa, amnaya and dharmopadesa - these are the five sub-types of svadhyaya. 25

To acquire knowledge, to render it free from doubt, lucid and ripe

and to seek to propagate it - all this being comprehended under svadhyaya it has been divided into five sub-types corresponding to the order followed in a course of study, they are as follows :

(1) To take first lessons in the wording or the meaning of a text-that is vacana.

(2) To make enquiries with a view to removing doubt or with a view to being particularly certain - that is pracchana.

(3) To mentally ponder over the wording or the meaning of a text - that is anupreksa.

(4) To correctly repeat the wording of a text that has been learnt - that is amnaya (meaning repetition).

(5) To grasp the secret of a text that has been learnt - that is dharmopadesa; alternatively, to preach things religious - that is dharmopadesa. 25

The Sub-types of vyutsarga :

To renounce bahyopadhi or the alien belongings of an external type and abhyantaropadhi or the alien belongings of an internal type - these are the two sub-types of vyutsarga. 26

Really speaking, renunciation of the form of a cessation of the feelings of 'I' and 'my' is but one; yet since the things to be renounced are of two kinds - viz. external and internal - the vyutsarga or renounciation related to them too is said to be of two kinds; they are as follows,

(1) To set aside the feeling of ownership in relation to the external things like money, corn, house, field etc. - that is vyutsarga related to bahyopadhi or the alien belonging of an external type.

(2) To set aside the feeling of ownership in relation to one's own body, as also to give up absorption in the mental perturbances born of kasayas - that is vyutsarga related to abhyantaropadhi or the alien belongings of an internal type. 26

An Account of dhyana or Mental Concentration :

Fixing the attention of mind on some one object on the part of a person possessing a superior type of bone-structure - that is dhyana. 27

It lasts upto one muhurta - that is, it lasts for less than one muhurta. 28

The Persons Authorised :

Of the six types of samhanana - that is, bodily set-up - three - viz. vajrarsabhanaraca, ardhavajrarsabhanaraca, naraca are considered to be

superior. Only a person who is possessed of a superior type of samhanana is authorised to perform dhyana. For the bodily power capable of yielding mental power requisite for performing dhyana can possibly be found only in a body with the just mentioned three types of samhanana - not in a body with the remaining three types of it. After all, it is well known that the chief basis of mental power is body while bodily power depends on bodily set-up; hence it is that none except those possessing a superior type of samhanana or bodily set-up is authorized to perform dhyana. To the extent that bodily set-up is weak to the same

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1. According to Bhasya two types of Dhyana are mentioned here in this aphorism - Ekagracinta and Nirodha. But it seems that no other commentator took notice of this. So we also have followed here the old commentators. As for the fact that these two types are really intended by the author, see Curni on Dasavaikalika by Agastya, page 16, published by Prakrit Text Society and also see an article by D. Malvania in vidya (Gujarat University), Vol. XV, No. 2, August, 1972, p. 61.

2. In the Digambara texts persons possessing any of the three superior types of samhanana are considered to be competent to practise dhyana. However, the Bhasya and the vrtti on it maintain the view that only persons possessing the two superior types of samhanana are so competent.

3. For this see chapter 8, aphorism 12.

extent is mental power meagre; and to the extent that mental power is meagre to the same extent is the steadiness of mind meagre. Hence persons with a weak bodily set-up - that is, persons with an inferior type of samhanana - can bestow on any object, whether auspicious or otherwise, so little concentration that it does not deserve to be treated as a case of dhyana.

The Nature :

Generally speaking, a stream of cognition having at this moment one thing for its object, at the next moment a second thing, at the next moment after that a third thing is unsteady like the flame of a lamp left in the midst of wind blowing from different directions. To withdraw such a stream of cognitions - such a thought process - from all the remaining objects and to fix it on some one desired object - that is to say, to prevent a stream cognitions from becoming such as is out to grasp numerous objects and to make it grasp just one object - that is dhyana. This description of dhyana applies only in the case of a non omniscient person - technically designated chadmastha. Hence it is that dhyana so described is to be found only up to twelfth gunasthana.

Even in the state posterior to the attainment of omniscience - that

is, even in the thirteenth and fourteenth gunasthanas - the possibility of dhyana has been admitted; but the nature of this dhyana is different. Thus when at the end of the thirteenth gunasthana the operations of manas, speech and body begin to cease, and when in this connection after the cessation of the gross bodily opertions there remain only subtle bodily operations to pursue their course then there takes place a dhyana designated 'suksmakriyapratipatin' - which is the third sub-type of the type called sukla-dhyana. And in the fourteenth gunasthana when at the time of an absolute cessation of the operations of manas, speech and body the operation called 'sailesikarana' pursues its course then there takes place a dhyana designated 'samucchinnakriyanivrtti' - which is the fourth sub-type of the type called sukla-dhyana. Now neither of these types of dhyana, since each is characterized by an absence of an mental operation, is of the form of a mental concentration on some one object - as is the case with the dhyana performed by a non-omniscient person; hence with a view to making it applicable even to these two types the meaning of the word dhyana has been expanded in a particular manner. Thus it is maintained that an endeavour just to put a stop to the gross bodily operations - that too is dhyana, and that a state of non-wavering assumed by the constituent units of a soul - that too is dhyana. However, there still remains one question outstanding in this connection and that as follows : From the beginning of the thirteenth gunasthana right upto the time when the operations of manas, speech and body begin to cease -that is to say, throughout that period of life when the career of an omniscient is pursued - does any sort of dhyana take place? And if it does what sort of dhyana is that? The question is answered in two ways :

(1) This state of a wandering omniscient having been designated dhyanantarikai - that is, a state devoid of all dhyana - the possibility of no dhyana whatsoever is admitted in its case.

(2) The firm endeavour pertaining to the activities of manas, speech and body that is undertaken in this state has itself been admitted to be the dhyana characteristic of this state.

The Time-Limit :

Any of the above dhyana types can last for a period of antarmuhurta at the most; and since it is difficult to prolong a dhyana beyond this period an antarmuhurta is said to be the time-limit of a dhyana.

According to some, dhyana consists in an absolute cessation of all inbreathing and outbreathing; according to others, it consists in measuring duration according to matra. But neither of these views is acceptable to the Jaina tradition. Its argument is that if inbreathing and outbreathing cease altogether then the body itself will succumb in the end; hence on its view the act of breathing, however slow, does proceed

during the state of dhyana. Similarly, it argues that when a person measures duration according to matra then his mind is busy conducting so many operations connected with measurement that he would in all probability be a distracted rather then a concentrated self. Likewise, the popular notion that dhyana might well be prolonged for a day, a month or a still longer period is not acceptable to the Jaina tradition. The reason suggested is that if dhyana is prolonged for a much long period then the danger is that the indriyas might suffer damage - which is why it is difficult to prolong dhyana beyond antarmuhurta. And when it is said that dhyana was performed for a day, a day and night, or a still longer period then the meaning is that the course of dhyana was prolonged for that much period. Thus what happened was that first dhyana was performed in relation to some one object, then it was performed in relation to the same objects and the process was continued still further - all this being called prolonging the course of dhyana. Of course, this time-limit of antarmuhurta pertains to the dhyana of a non-omniscient; for so far as the dhyana appropriate to an omniscient is concerned, its time-limit can be still longer - the reason being that the firm endeavour pertaining to the activities of manas, speech and body can be sustained by an omniscient for a pretty long period. One more point to note, the object in relation

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1. The time required to pronounce a short vowel a, i, etc. is called matra. And when a consonant is pronounced without the accompaniment of a vowel the time required is half a matra. Now if somebody develops the practice of recognizing a matra long or half a matra long period of time and then measures the duration of other activities in terms of matras and half-matras that is called measuring duration according to matra.

to which dhyana proceeds is not of the form of a substance taken in its totality but only some one part - some one mode - of it; for reflection in relation to a substance is possible only through the medium of one or another of its modes.

27-28

Arta, raudra, dharma, sukla - these are the four sub-types of dhyana. 29

Of these, the last two are a cause of moksa. 30

Of the above four types of dhyana, arta and raudra these two, since they are a cause of the worldly transmigration, are evil-dhyana and so are worthy of rejection; on the other hand, dharma and sukla these two, since they are a cause of moksa, are noble-dhyana and so are worthy of acceptance.

29-30

An Account of the Arta Type of Dhyana :

If a disagreeable thing has come in one's possession then a constant

reflection as to how to get rid of it - that is the first arta-dhyana 31

If an ailment has attacked one then a constant reflection as to how to get rid of it - that is the second arta-dhyana. 32

If an agreeable thing has gone out of one's possession then a constant reflection as to how to get it back - that is the third arta-dhyana. 33

If a thing has failed to come in one's possession then a volition or a constant reflection as to how to get hold of it - that is the fourth arta-dhyana. 34

This arta type of dhyana is possible in the gunasthanas avirata, desasamyata and pramattasamyata. 35

The sub-types of arta-dhyana and the persons susceptible to it-these two topics have been described here. That which produces arti - that is, distress or pain - arta. The causes that produce pain are four in all - viz. (1) The getting of what is not desired. (2) The losing for what is desired. (3) A disagreeable sensation. (4) A hankering after enjoyment. Depending on these causes the arta-dhyana is of four sub-types :

(1) When an undesirable thing comes in one's possession then one distressed at the pain caused thereby constantly thinks of removing away this thing - of how to get rid of this thing -; that is called arta-dhyana related to anistasam yoga or the getting of what is not desired.

(2) Again, when a desirable thing goes out of one's possession then one constantly thinks of getting it back; that is called arta-dhyana related to istaviyoga or the losing of what is desired.

(3) Similarly, when one develops a bodily or a mental pain then one experience worry caused by a pathetic eagerness to get rid of it; that is called arta-dhyana related to rogacinta or the worry at an ailment.

(4) On account of an intense hankering after enjoyment one develops a strong volition to get hold of things not yet in one's possession; that is called arta-dhyana related to nidana or a hankering after enjoyment.

The dhyana in question is possible in the first four gunasthanas, the desavirata gunasthana and the pramattasamyata gunasthana - that is, in six gunasthana in all. In this connection a special point to note is that in the gunasthana pramattasamyata all the sub-types minus that related to nidana - that is, three sub-types in all - are possible. 31-35

An Account of the Raudra Type of Dhyana :

A constant reflection related to violence, untruthfulness, theft and protection of an acquisition - that is raudradhyana; It is possible in the

gunasthanas avirata and desavirata. 36

In the present aphorism there is an account of raudradhyana and of the persons susceptible to it. As in the case of arta-dhyana the four sub-types of raudra-dhyana correspond to the four possible causes of it. He whose heart is cruel or hard is rudra and dhyana performed by such a one is raudra. Cruelty or hardness of heart takes its rise from a tendency to commit violence, to speak the untruth, to commit theft and to seek security for the things acquired, and the constant reflection that proceeds in connection with them is respectively called raudra-dhyana promoting violence, that promoting untruthfulness, that promoting theft and that promoting the protection of an acquisition. And the persons occupying the first five gunasthanas are such as are susceptible to this type of dhyana. 36

An Account of the dharma-dhyana :

The concentration of the attention of mind on ajna, apaya, vipaka and samsthana - that is called dharma-dhyana; It is possible in the gunasthana apramattasamyata. 37

And this dharma-dhyana is also possible in the gunasthanas upasantamoha and ksinamoha. 38

Here there is an indication of the types of dharma-dhyana and of the persons authorized to perform it.

The Types :

(1) What is the commandment of an omniscient personage and one devoid of passion? What sort of commandment it ought to be? To apply one's mind to an investigation like this and thus to lay bare the commandment in question-that is called dharma-dhyana devoted to a consideration of ajna or commandment.

(2) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the nature of defilements and of the question as to how to get rid of them - that is called dharma-dhyana devoted to a consideration of apaya or disaster.

(3) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the question as to what consequences that are being experienced are due to what karmas and of the question as to what karmas that are being accumulated are to yield what consequences -

that is called dharma-dhyana devoted to a consideration of vipaka or the consequence of a karma.

(4) To apply one's mind to a consideration of the nature of the universe - that is called dharma-dhyana devoted to a consideration of samsthana or structure (of the universe).

The Persons Authorized :

On the question as to who is authorized to perform dharma-dhyana the Svetambara and Digambara traditions to not maintain an identical view. According to the Svetambara tradition the three gunasthanas - viz. the 7th, 11th and 12th; - explicitly mentioned in the present aphorisms and the intervening three - viz. the 8th, 9th and 10th implicitly admitted thereby - that is to say, the entire lot of gunasthanas from the 7th upto 12th -are the six gunasthanas where dharma-dhyana is possible. On the other hand, the Digambara tradition maintains that dharma-dhyana is possible only in the four gunasthanas from th 4th upto the 7th; its argument is that since a samyagdrsti can perform dharma-dhyana only before the process designated sreni takes its start and since this process takes its start in the 8th gunasthana there can be no dharma-dhyana at all in the gunasthanas 8th onwards. 37-38

An Account of Sukla-dhyana :

The first two sukla-dhyanas are possible in the gunasthanas upasantamoha and ksinamoha; and both these sukla dhyanas are to be performed only by one versed in the Purva texts. 39

The last two sukla-dhyanas are to be performed by a kevalin or omniscient. 40

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1. The wording purvavidah is a part of the present aphorism and not a separate aphorism - this is what the commentator on the Bhasya informs us. The Digambara tradition too does not read this part as a separate aphorism. Hence it is that the same practice is followed by us as well. But a reading of the Bhasya makes it clear that purvavidah is by itself a separate aphorism.

Prthaktvavitarka, ekatvavitarka, suksmakriyapratipatin, vyuparatakriyanivrtti - these are the four sukla-dhyanas. 41

These sukla-dhyanas are respectively performed by one possessed of all the three yogas, by one possessed of any of three yogas, by one possessed of the bodily yoga, by one possessed of no yoga whatsoever. 42

The first two have got a common seat and both have to do with vitarka. 43

Of these the second is avicara - devoid of vicara - that is, the first of them is possessed of vicara. 44

By vitarka is meant sruta or a scriptural text. 45

By vicara is meant a transition from one to another object, word or yoga. 46

In the present account three topics connected with sukla-dhyana have been taken up - viz. the persons authorized to perform it, its types, its nature.

The Persons Authorized :

The statement as to the persons authorized to perform the dhyana in question has been made here in two ways - viz. from the standpoint of gunasthana and from that of yoga. From the standpoint of gunasthana the persons authorized to perform the first two of the four subtypes of sukladhyana turn out to be those occupying the eleventh and twelfth gunasthanas and they too in case they happen to be versed in Purva-texts. From the qualification 'versed in the Purva-texts' it has to be generally understood that in case a person is versed not in the Purva texts but in the eleven Anga texts or the like then while occupying the gunasthanas eleventh and twelfth he performs not sukla-dhyana

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1. At this place the reading avicara too is to be met with quite frequently. However, with a view to maintaining uniformity between the word occurring in the aphorism and that used by us in our comments a short vi has been preferred here.

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but dharma-dhyana. However, to this general rule there are exceptions possible inasmuch as personages like Masatusa and Marudevi even while not versed in the Purva texts can well perform sukla dhyana. As for the last two subtypes of sukla dhyana the person authorized to perform them is only a kevalin - that is, only one occupying the thirteenth or fourteenth gunasthanas. From the standpoint of yoga only one possessed of all the yogas is authorized to perform the first of the four subtypes of sukla dhyana. Again, one possessed of any one of the three yogas - viz. those pertaining to manas, speech and body is authorized to perform the second subtypes of sukla dhyana. Lastly, only one possessed of the bodily yoga is authorized to perform the third subtypes of sukla dhyana while only one devoid of all yoga whatsoever is authorized to perform the fourth subtype of it.

The Types :

Like the other types of dhyana sukla dhyana too is divided into four

subtypes. The four are designated as follows :

(1) Prthaktvavitarka-savicara.
(2) Ekatvavitarka-nirvicara.
(3) Suksmakriya-pratipatin.
(4) Vyuparatakriyanivrtti (or Samucchinnakriyanivrtti)

The Nature :

The first two subtypes of sukla dhyana have got a common seat - that is to say, both are performed by a person versed in the Purva-texts; and that exactly is why both have to do with vitarka or scriptural knowledge. However, even if they are mutually similar inasmuch as vitarka is present in both they are dissimilar inasmuch as the first is characterized by prthaktva or difference but the second by ekatva or non-difference. Similarly, the first subtype is characterized by vicara or transition while the second is devoid of it. Hence it is that the first is given the designation prthaktva-vitarkasavicara, the second the designation Ekatvavitarka-avicara. Thus when a performer of dhyana - in case he happens to be versed in the Purva texts then on the basis of such a text, otherwise on the basis of whatever scriptural text he is conversant with - takes up for consideration an inanimate entity like atom etc. or a conscious entity like soul and undertakes in relation to its numerous modes like permanence, destruction, tangibility, non-tangibility etc. and with the help of the various nayas like dravyastika, paryayastika etc. a reflection dominated by difference - at the same time when on the basis of whatever scriptural knowledge is available to him he in the interest of reflection swithces on from one object of the form of substance to another, from a substance to a mode, or from one mode to another, or when similarly in the interest of reflection he switches on from a meaning to a word or from a word to a meaning or, lastly, when he gives up one of yogas - e.g. that pertaining to manas in order to take up another, then the dhyana concerned is called prthaktvasavitarkasavicara. For in this dhyana, on the basis of vitarka or scriptural knowledge and in relation to one substance the variety - bheda or prthaktva - of its modes is reflected over from various viewpoints, again likewise on the basis of scriptural knowledge there is in it a transition from one meaning to another, from one word to another, from the meaning to the word, from the word to the meaning, also from one type of yoga to another. On the contrary, when a performer of dhyana on the basis of whatever scriptural knowledge is available to him takes up for consideration some one object of the form of mode and undertakes in relation to it a reflection dominated by oneness or non-difference, again when sticking to some one of the three types of yoga - viz. those pertaining to manas, speech, body - he introduces no change in the form of a transition from word to meaning or vice versa or from one type of yoga to another, then the dhyana concerned is called ekatvavitarka avicara. For in this dhyana even if it is based on scriptural knowledge, there is mainly a reflection over ekatva or oneness - that is, over abheda

or non-difference and there is introduced in it no change as to meaning, word or yoga. As for these two subtypes of dhyana when one's practice of the first that is dominated by difference has become firm, only then is one enabled to perform the second that is dominated by non-difference. Thus just as the poison of a snake etc. circulating throughout the body is, by means of a magical chant or the like, concentrated on the spot stung, similarly, one's mind unsteadily wandering about amidst the multifarious objects of the world is, by means of dhyana, made steady by being concentrated on some one object. When the steadiness of mind thus becomes firm then just as a burning mass of fire becomes extinct in case all fuel minus a little one - or all fuel whatsoever - is withdrawn away from it so also does the mind, which in the above manner has been made steady be being concentrated on some one object, ultimately becomes absolutely calm. That is to say, its fickleness is done away with and it becomes free of all wavering - with the result that all concealment vitiating knowledge is dissolved and omniscience Lord, during the course of the process called cessation of yoga, ultimately takes recourse to just a subtle bodily yoga while putting an end to all the remaining yogas, then this act of his is called suksmakriyapratipati dhyana. For at this stage there proceed on only the subtle bodily activities like inbreathing and outbreathing - and there is no possibility of a downfall from it. When even the subtle bodily activities like inbreathing and outbreathing - and there is no possibility of a downfall from it. When even the subtle bodily activities like inbreathing and outbreathing cease altogether and the constituent units of the soul concerned become free of all wavering then the state is called samucchinnakriya-

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1. The course of the process is supposed to run as follows : First of all, with the help of the gross yoga of body the gross yoga of speech and manas are rendered subtle. Then with the help of the subtle yogas of speech and manas the gross yoga of body is rendered subtle. Then with the help of the subtle yoga of body is rendered subtle. Then with the help of the subtle yoga of body the subtle yoga of speech and manas are stopped altogether. Lastly, the subtle yoga of body too is stopped altogether.

nivrtti-dhyana. For in this state there takes place no activity whatsoever - whether gross or subtle and whether pertaining to manas, or to speech or to body; nor does this state ever come to an end. Through the instrumentality of this fourth subtype of dhyana all asrava and all bandha case altogether, all karma is annihilated, and moksa is attained. In the third and fourth subtypes of sukla dhyana no sort of scriptural knowledge is made a basis; hence the two are also called analambana or 'those devoid of a basis.' 39-46

The Degrees of Karma-nirjara or Cleansing off of Karma in the Case of the Various types of Samyagdrstis :

Samyak-drsti, sravaka, virata, anantanubandhiviyojaka, darsanamohaksapaka, upasamaka, upasantamoha, ksapaka, ksinamoha, jina - in this series of the ten types of persons an immediately later member has asankhyata times greater nirjara than an immediately earlier one. 47

The total annihilation of all karmic bondage is called moksa, a partial annihilation of it is called nirjara. In view of these two definitions it becomes obvious that nirjara is but an earlier occurring integral part of moksa. And since in the present treatise the chief subject matter is the fundamental verity moksa it is proper that thought be given here to nirjara which is an integral part of this verity. Hence even if in the case of all the worldly souls whatsoever the process of karmanirjara goes on for ever, what is here considered is the process o karmanirjara taking place in the case of certain special types of souls. These special types of souls are the souls directed towards moksa. The true process of being directed towards moksa starts with the attainment of samyak-drsti and it is brought to completion in the state appropriate to jina or omniscient. The character of being directed towards moksa has been broadly divided into ten types beginning from the attainment of samyak-drsti and ending with the attainment of omniscience; in this series a later member is characterized by a greater spiritual purity than an earlier one. And the greater the purity of a spiritual state the more worthwhile the karmanirjara effected in connection with it. Hence it is that on account of the greater purity of the concerned spiritual state the karmanirjara effected in the case of an immediately later member of the series in question is asankhyata times greater than that effected in the case of an immediately earlier member. Thus proceeding it ultimately turns out that the amount of nirjara is greatest in the state of omniscience. So in this arrangement of degrees the smallest nirjara is that pertaining to a samyak drsti and the greatest that pertaining to an omniscient. The nature of the ten successive states in question is as follows :

(1) The state in which mithyadrsti goes off and samyaktva makes its appearance - that is samyak drsti.

(2) The state in which on account of ksayopasama of the apratyakhyanavarana kasaya virati or renunciation makes its appearance in some measure - that is sravaka.

(3) The state in which on account of a ksayopasama of pratyakhyanavarana kasaya virati makes its appearance in full measure - that is virati.

(4) The state in which there appears purity adequate for an annihilation of the anantanubandhi kasaya - that is anantaviyojaka.

(5) The state in which there appears purity adequate for an

annihilation of the darasanamoha - that is darsanamohaksapaka.

(6) The state in which there continues an upasama of the remaining sub-types of the moha - that is upasamaka.

(7) The state in which the upasama just mentioned is brought to completion - that is upasantamoha.

(8) The state in which there continues a ksaya of the remaining sub-types of the moha - that is ksapaka.

(9) The state in which the ksaya just mentioned is brought to completion - that is ksinamoha.

(10) The state in which omniscience makes its appearance - that is jina. 47

The Types of Nirgrantha or 'One Devoid of a Knot' :

Pulaka, bakusa, kusila, nirgrantha, snataka - these are the five types of nirgrantha. 48

The real meaning of the word 'nirgrantha' - that is a meaning yielded by the definitive standpoint - is something different from its practical sectarian meaning. Combining these two meanings into one a nirgrantha in general is here spoken of and is divided into five types. The real meaning of the word 'nirgrantha' is one who is utterly devoid of the knot of attachment and aversion; and the person who is not yet a complete nirgrantha but is a candidate for the status of a real nirgrantha - that is, one who intends to attain such a status in future - he is nirgrantha in a practical sense. Of the five types of nirgrantha the first three are such in a practical sense, the last two such in a real sense. The nature of these five types of nirgrantha is as follows :

(1) He who has not yet developed full proficiency in the basic and derivative virtues of a monk but who never wavers in his faith in the scriptures composed by the personages devoid of passion - he is called pulaka.

(2) He who indulges in decorating his body and his implements, who desires miraculous powers and fame, who is ease loving, who while not leading a lonely life keeps the company of an entourage, who suffers from the moral defects designated cheda - that is, degradation of conduct - and sabala - that is failure of conduct - he is called bakusa.

(3) Of the two sub-types of kusila he who being a slave of his indriyas acts in violation of some of the derivative virtues of a monk is called pratisevanakusila whereas he who while never succumbing to an intense degree of a kasaya is sometimes attacked by a mild degree of it is

called kasayakusial.

(4) He in whom omniscience has not yet made its appearance but who is utterly devoid of attachment and aversion and who will acquire omniscience within a period of muhurta is called nirgrantha.

(5) He in whom omniscience has made its appearance is called snataka. 48

A Special Consideration of the Nirgranthas as Regards Eight Qualifying Features :

The nirgranthas have to be considered keeping in view their mutual difference as regards samyama or discipline, sruta or scriptural knowledge, pratisevana or violation of a rule of conduct, tirtha or spiritual overlordship, linga or sign, lcsya or soul-colouring, upapata or next birth, sthana or disciplinary stage. 49

The five types of nirgrantha have been described earlier. Now with a view to defining their special characteristics eight items have been taken up and it is shown as to how those types stand in relation to each of these items.

Samyama or Discipline :

Of the five types of samyama samayika etc. two - viz. samayika and chedopasthapaniya are practised by the three types of nirgrantha - viz. pulaka, bakusa and pratisevanakusila. The above two plus the types pariharavisuddhi and suksmasamparaya- that is, four types in all - are practised by kasayakusila. The only type of samyama yathakhyata is practised by nirgrantha and snataka.

Sruta or Scriptural Knowledge :

The maximum scriptural knowledge in the case of pulaka, bakusa and pratisevanakusila consists of ten Purva texts, in the case of kasayakusila and nirgrantha it consists of the fourteen Purva texts. Similarly, the minimum scriptural knowledge in the case of pulaka consists of acaravastu in the

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1. The third prakarana of the ninth Purva bears this title and it is it that is to be understood here.

case of bakusa, kusila and nirgrantha it consists of astapravacanamata (i.e. the five samitis and three guptis). As for snataka he being omniscient is altogether devoid of scriptural knowledge.

Pratisevana or Violation of a Rule of Conduct :

Of the five mahavratas and the sixth vrata of 'desisting from nightly eating ' any one is violated by pulaka under the violent pressure of someone else; on the view of certain authorities pulaka violates only the fourth vrata. As for bakusa he is of two sub-types - viz. upakaranabakusa and sarirabakusa. Thus he who having developed a deep attachment for implements, collects them and embellishes them - he is called upakarana bakusa; on the other hand, he who having developed a deep attachment for his body embellishes it with a vie to beautifying it - he is called sarirabakusa. As for pratisevanakusila he while not at all violating any of the basic virtues of a monk violates certain of his derivative virtues. Lastly, snataka violates no rule of conduct at all.

Tirtha or Spiritual Overlordship :

All the five types of nirgrantha are to be found in the period of the spiritual overlordship of any and every tirthankara. In the view of certain authorities the three types pulaka, bakusa and pratisevanakusila are necessarily found in the period of a tirthankara's spiritual overlordship while the remaining types kasayakusila etc. are to be found both in such a period and in a period that is not such.

Linga or Sign :

The linga or sign is of two types - viz. a dravya type and a bhava type. The virtuous merit of the form of right conduct is linga of the bhava type, while an external makeup of the form of a special dress etc. is linga of the dravya type. All the five types of nirgrantha are possessed of a linga

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of the bhava type but any of them might or might not be possessed of a linga of the dravya type.

Lesya or Soul-colouring :

Pulaka is possessed of the last three lesyas yellow, red and white, while bakusa and pratisevanakusila are possessed of all the six types of lesyas. As for kasayakusial if he is characterized by parihara-visuddhi caritra then he is possessed of the above three lesyas yellow etc. while if he is characterized by suksmasamparaya he is possessed of just white lesya. Nirgrantha and snataka are possessed of just white lesya; but if snataka happens to be ayogin then he is devoid of all lesya.

Upapata or Next Birth :

In the case of the four types of nirgrantha pulaka etc. the next

birth with a minimum life-duration is that in the saudharmakalpa amidst the gods destined to live for a period of palyopama-prthaktva. As for the next birth with a maximum life duration pulaka has it in the sahsrarakalpa with a life duration 20 sagaropamas, bakusa and pratisevanakusila in the arana and acyuta kalpas with a life duration 22 sagaropamas, kasayakusila and nirgrantha in the vimana sarvarthasiddhi with a life duration 33 sagaropamas. As for snataka his next birth (rather next destination) is nirvana itself.

Sthana or Disciplinary Stage :

The suppression of kasaya and suppression of yoga- these are called samyama or discipline. Now samyama belonging to all and belonging to them always cannot be of one and the same form. For corresponding to the degree characterizing the suppression of kasaya and yoga there is a degree characterizing the resultant samyama. Thus right from the minimum suppression that deserves to be included in the category of samyama upto the samyama of the form of a

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1. According to the Digambara texts, four lesyas.

2. In the Digambara texts this life duration is 2 sagaropamas.

complete suppression there are asankhyata types of samyama corresponding to the diversity characterizing the intensity or mildness of the suppression taking place; all these different types are called the different samyamasthanas or disciplinary stages. Now so long as there obtains even the slightest tinge of kasaya the samyamasthanas concerned are to be supposed to be due to kasaya, afterwards they are to be supposed to be due to yoga; thus the situation obtaining as a result of a complete cessation of yoga is to be understood to be the last of the samyamasthanas. Thus the earlier occurring is a samyamasthana the more vitiated by kasaya are the mental states characterising it. Thus the higher and higher does a samyamasthana occur the more and more pure it has to be taken to be. As to the samyamasthanas supposed to be due to yoga alone, even if they are all equally pure inasmuch as they are all devoid of kasaya, they are more or less steady precisely to the extent that the cessation of yoga characterizing them is greater or less. Thus due to the variety of the cessation of yoga the steadiness too is of various types; hence the samyamasthanas supposed to be due to yoga alone are as well of asankhyata types. Of course, the last samyamasthana characterized by the supreme purity and supreme steadiness can only be one. Of these types of samyamasthanas the lowermost pertain to pulaka and kasayakusila. For a distance of asankhyata samyamasthanas both of these proceed together, but after that pulaka comes to a stop while kasayakusila alone covers asankhyata samyamasthanas more. After that asankhyata samyamasthanas are covered by kasayakusila, pratisevanakusila and bakusa together. After that

bakusa comes to a stop; then after covering asankhyata samyamasthanas still more kasayakusila comes to a stop. Then come the samyamasthanas devoid of all kasayas - that is, those supposed to be due to yoga alone - and they are covered by nirgrantha; but he too comes to a stop after covering asnkhyata such samyamasthanas. After that comes the one last, supreme, pure and steady samyamasthana which is experienced by snataka before he attains nirvana. Though the just described smayamasthanas are asankhyata in number the purity of an immediately later samyamasthana is anantananta times greater than that of an immediately earlier one. 49

CHAPTER TEN

An account of samvara and nirjara having been offered in the chapter nine, that of the remaining verity moksa is in order for the present chapter.

The Causes for the Origination of Kaivalya or Omniscience :

As a result of an annihilation of moha, as also that of jnanavarana, darsanavarana and antaraya there appears kevala or omniscience. 1

Prior to the attainment of moksa the origination of an all comprehending cognition (all comprehending jnana, all comprehending darsana) has been deemed indispensable in the Jaina scriptural texts. That is why while offering an account of moksa it is here first described as to what are the causes responsible for the origination of an all comprehending cognition. When as a result of an annihilation of the obstructing karmas the natural consciousness becomes free of concealment then an all comprehending cognition makes its appearance. These obstructing karmas are four in all - of which moha alone is annihilated first and then within a period of muhurta the remaining three - viz. jnanavaraniya darsanavaraniya, antaraya - are annihilated as well. Moha being the most powerful of all karmas it is only after its annihilation that an annihilation of the remaining karmas becomes possible. By all comprehending cognition is to be understood the full comprehension of a generic and a specific type. This verily is the state of an all comprehending jnana and an all comprehending darsana.1

The Causes For an Utter Annihilation of
Karmas and the Nature of moksa :

On account of an absence of the causes of bondage and on account of nirjara there takes place an utter annihilation of karmas. 2

The annihilation of all karmas - that is called moksa. 3

A karma once bound down does get annihilated at some time or other; but in case it remains possible that a karma of this type will be bound down once more or in case a karma of this type yet remains intact then it cannot be said that an utter annihilation of this karma has taken place. For an utter annihilation of karma means an absence of karma being bound down anew.

As for the state of moksa it certainly cannot come about without an utter annihilation of karmas. Hence it is that the causes for such an

utter annihilation of karmas are enumerated here. These causes are two, viz- an absence of the causes of bondage nd nirjara. Through an absence of the causes of bondage new karmas are prevented from being bound down, through nirjara there comes about an absence of the karmas earlier bound down. The causes of bondage are five viz. - mithyadarsana etc. - which have already been mentioned earlier. An absence of them can be brought about through an appropriate act of samvara. And through tapas, dhyana etc. nirjara too can be accomplished.

When the above mentioned four karmas mohaniya etc. are utterly annihilated then there appears the state of absence of passion and that of omniscience; but since at that time the four karmas vedaniya etc. are yet present in an extremely diluted from moksa does not yet take place. For that it is necessary to annihilate even these remaining karmas of a diluted form. Certainly, when that annihilation takes place, then alone is there an absence of all the karmas - as a result of which the cycle of births and deaths come to a stop. This is what constitutes moksa, 2-3

The other Causes of Moksa :

Moksa takes place when there comes about an absence of the characteristic conditions of a soul aupasamika etc. as also of the condition bhavyatva- but not of the conditions ksayikasamyaktva, ksayikajnana, ksayikadarsana and siddhatva. 4

Just like an utter annihilation of the karmas of the form of physical particles it is also necessary that on the eve of moksa there should come about an absence of certain characteristic conditions of a soul that are dependent on these karmas. It is an annihilation of these conditions that is here being described as a cause of moksa. Such conditions are chiefly of four types in all, viz. - aupasamika, ksayopasamika, audayika, parinamika. Of these, each and every condition of the first three types viz. - aupasamika etc. - is annihilated absolutely. But there is no such absoluteness about the type parinamika. For from among the conditions of the parinamika type bhavyatva alone - and no other condition - is annihilated. The reason is that the other conditions of the parinamika type - e.g. jivatva or soulness, astitva or existent ness remain there even in the state of moksa. As for the conditions of the ksayika type, though they too are dependent on karmas their absence does not come about in the state of moksa. It is in order to indicate this that the aphorism mentions as the cause of moksa an annihilation of all the conditions of a soul barring the conditions ksayika samyaktva etc. And though the aphorism makes no mention of the conditions ksayika samyaktva etc. - these former conditions can be taken to be comprehended under the one condition siddhatva - so that an absence of these conditions too can be said to have been denied of moksa. 4

The Act Performed by an Emancipated Jiva
After it Attains Emancipation :

As soon as all its karmas are annihilated the Jiva goes upwards upto the end of the loka. 5

As soon as all the karmas and the conditions aupasamika etc. dependent on them are annihilated the following three things simultaneously take place within one and the same samaya. Separation from the body, motion signifying the process of being emancipated, the reaching upto the end of the loka. 5

The Causes of the Motion that Signifies the
Process of Being Emancipated :

On account of the impulse imparted earlier, on account of the absence of an associated body, on account of the breaking down of a bondage, on account of that being its natural state of motion an emancipated jiva goes upwards. 6

As soon as a jiva is released from karma it undertakes a motion and does not remain static. As for this motion it is directed upwards and it proceeds upto the very end of the loka - not upto a point below it. Such is the position maintained in scriptural texts. Now here arise several questions. Without the help of the physical substances like karmas or a body how does an amurta jiva undertake motion? And if it does undertake motion why only upwards and not downwards or sideways? These questions have been answered here.

The substance jiva - just like the substance pudgala - is mobile by nature. The two differ only in that a pudgala is such as by nature moves downwards while a jiva such as by nature moves upwards. If a jiva happens to undertake no motion at all or if it happens to move downwards or sideways then it has to be understood that it does so owing to an association or bondage with some obstructing body. Such an obstructing body is karma. So when the association with karma is done away with and the bondage with it is broken down then there inevitably arises the occasion for the emancipated jiva to undertake an upward motion in accordance with its very nature. On such an occasion purvaprayoga acts as a cause on account of which the

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1. Two aphorisms numbered 7 and 8 following this one occur in the Digambara tradition. However, the meaning of both as also the structure of their wording is already to be found in the Bhasya to the present aphorism.

emancipated jiva undertakes upward motion. By Purvaprayoga is to be understood the impulse imparted by the karma which had been bound down

earlier but was released just now. Just as the potter's wheel made to whirl by means of a stick continues to whirl even after the stick has been withdrawn - this because of the impulse earlier imparted to it and in a measure proportional to the quantity of this impulse, similarly, a jiva released from karma makes, because of the impulse received from this earlier bound karma, an upward motion in accordance with its very nature. However, its upward motion proceeds not beyond the end of the loka, the reason merely being an absence of dharmastikaya in that region.

How as a result of the sliding away of the obstructing karmic substance the upward motion of a jiva is facilitated has been elucidated by means of the illustration of the gourdjar and of the castor seed. A gourd jar smeared with various pastes lies at the bottom of water but when these pastes happen to be rubbed away this jar naturally comes up to float on the surface of water. Again, the castor seed closed within its sheath erupts out as soon as this sheath gives way. Similarly, a jiva undertakes upward motion as soon as its karmic bondage is done away with. 6

A Consideration of the Situation of an
Emancipated Soul in Terms of Twelve Items :

Ksetra or region, kala or time, gati or species, linga or sign, tirtha or spiritual overlordship, caritra or right conduct, pratyekabuddhabodhita or 'whether enlightened through one's own effort or through that of another enlightened personage', jnana or cognition, avagahana or bodily size, antara or interval, sankhya or number, alpabahutva or relative numerical strength - these are the twelve items in terms of which the emancipated souls are made an object of investigation. 7

With a view to specially considering the nature of the emancipated souls twelve items are here indicated. And it is in terms of each of them that the nature of an emancipated soul is to be considered. Though all the souls that have attained emancipation being devoid of worthy features like gati, linga etc. do not differ from one another in any particular manner, yet in view of their respective past states even they can be differentiated from one another and can be considered as such. The consideration that is to be here undertaken in terms of the twelve items ksetra etc. must concern,as far as possible, the present as well as the past state of the concerned emancipated soul. This as follows :

Ksetra or Region :

From the viewpoint of the present place of emancipation for all the souls is the siddha ksetra (i.e. the region where the emancipated souls reside) or the constituent units of akasa. From the viewpoint of the past this place is not one and the same for all the souls. For a soul might

attain emancipation while seated in any of the fifteen karmabhumis that can be its possible birth place and it might rather attain emancipation while seated at any place in the manusya ksetra to which it can possibly be taken away from its birth place.

Kala or Time :

From the viewpoint of the present there is no ordinarily fixed time cycle for the act of attaining emancipation and all emancipation takes place within a space of one single samaya. From the viewpoint of the past one born in avsarpini, utsarpini or anavasarpini anutsarpini can attain emancipation. Similarly, a soul taken away from its place of birth can attain emancipation at any of these periods of time.

Gati or Species :

From the viewpoint of the present one belonging to the species emancipated is emancipated. As for the viewpoint of the past, if the immediately past birth is taken into consideration then only one belonging to the species man attains emancipation, if the still earlier past births are taken into consideration then one belonging to any of the four species attains emancipation.

Linga or Sign :

Linga means sexual sign or sign in general. To take the first meaning, from the viewpoint of the present one devoid of all linga attains emancipation,while from the viewpoint of the past one possessing any of the three lingas -viz. masculine, feminine, neuter - does so. To take the second meaning, from the viewpoint of the present one devoid of all linga attains emancipation while from the viewpoint of the past two types of linga have to be taken into consideration. Thus if linga of the bhava type - that is, linga of the form of a spiritual capacity - is taken into consideration then only one possessing one's own linga - that is, only one devoid of all passion - attains emancipation, while if linga of the dravya type - that is, linga of the form of an external make up - is taken into consideration then one possessing the linga characteristic of a Jaina, one possessing the linga characteristic of a non-Jaina and one possessing the linga characteristic of a house holder - all these three attain emancipation.

Tirtha or Spiritual Overlordship :

Some souls attains emancipation in the form of a tirthankara, some in the form of a non-tirthankara. As for the latter, some attain emancipation when tirthankara is in existence some when no tirthankara is in existence.

Caritra or Right Conduct :

From the viewpoint of the present one attaining emancipation is devoid of all caritra. As for the viewpoint of the past, if the last samaya is taken into consideration then only one possessing yathakhyata-caritra attains emancipation while if the still earlier periods of time are taken into consideration then one possessing three, four or five caritras attains emancipation. Here samayika, suksmasamparaya, yathakhyata and chedopasthapaniya, suksmasamparaya, yathakhyata - these two are the sets of three caritras in question, samayika, pariharavisuddhi, suksmasamparaya, yathakhyata -this is the set of four caritras in question,samayika, chedopasthapaniya, pariharavisuddhi, suksmasamparaya, yathakhyata - this is the set of five caritras in question.

Pratyeka Buddhabodhita or 'Whether Emancipated through One's Own Effort or through that of another Enlightened Personage' :

Here the two types of persons are pratyekabodhita and buddhabodita and both can attain emancipation. He who without someone else's instruction and through his own power of cognition gets enlightement and then attains emancipation is svayambuddha or self-enlightened. He is of two types - viz. an arhat or tirthankara and a non-tirthankara who impelled by some external factor acuires renunciation and knowledge and then attains emancipation. Both of these are designated pratyekabodhita. On the other hand, those who receiving instruction from a spiritual expert attain emancipation are designated buddhabodhita. Of these latter too, some impart enlightenment to others as well while some only look after their own welfare.

Jnana or Cognition :

From the viewpoint of the present only one possessing kevala-jnana attains emancipation while from the viewpoint of the past one possessing two, three or four types of jnana attains emancipation. Here two types of jnana in question are mati and sruta, three types mati, sruta, avadhi or mati, sruta, manahparyaya, four types mati, sruta, avadhi and manahparyaya.

Avagaha or Bodily Size :

A person attaining emancipation possesses a minimum bodily size of seven cubits minus angulaprtahktva and a maximum bodily size of dhanusprthaktva plus five hundred dhanusas. This from the viewpoint of the past; as for the viewpoint of the present, the bodily size in question is two thirds of that on the eve of attaining emancipation.

Antara or Interval :

When one attains emancipation immediately after another one has done so the former is designated nirantara siddha or emancipated without a gap of time. Nirantarasiddhi or emancipation without a gap of time proceeds for two samayas at the least and eight samayas at the most. On the other hand, when one attains emancipation sometimes after another one has done so the former is designated santarasiddha. The gap of time intervening between the emancipation of the two is one samaya at the least and six months at the most.

Sankhya or Number :

At one time one soul at the least and one hundred and eight souls at the most can attain emancipation.

Alpabahutva or Relative Numerical Strength :

The eleven items ksetra etc. that have been considered above, in connection with them the resultant types are numerically superior or inferior to one another; taking into account this fact is called a consideration of the relative numerical strength. For example, viewed in respect of the region of emancipation those emancipated in the region of their birth are sankhyata times more than those emancipated in a region where they have been taken away from their region of birth. Similarly, those emancipated in the urdhavaloka are smallest in number, those emancipated in the adholoka sankhyata times more than them, those emancipated in the tiryagloka sankhyata times more than the latter. Lastly, those emancipated in an ocean are smallest in number, those emancipated in a continent sankhyata times more than them. In a like manner the relative numerical strength has to be considered in connection with each of the remaining items kala etc. - all which can be learnt by the inquisitive readers from the original texts. 7

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